(Prayer: Petition (disposed of on 14-2-1958) praying that in the circumstances stated therein and in the affidavit filed therewith the High Court will be pleased to excuse the delay in filing Cil.M.P. No. 1276 of 1957 for special leave to appeal (C. A. No. 767 of 1957 on the file of the High Court) against the order of acquittal made by the Second Class Bench of Magistrates, Coimbatore, dated 13-8-1957, in C.C. No. 1157 of 1957.)

The point that arises for determination is whether when there is a delay beoond 60 days in preferring under S. 417 (4), Crl. P. C. an application for granting special leave to appeal, the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act will apply.

Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act runs as fellows:

Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law

(a) the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18, and S. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and

(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.

This question has been the subject matter of a decision in this Court by Basheer Ahmed Sayeec, J. and in two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by Umamaheshwaram, J. and a Bench of that Court composed of the learned Chief Justice and Basi Reddy, J.

Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. in In re Viswanathan Chettiar (1957) M.W.N. Orl. 23=70 L.W. 207., held that S. 5 of the Limititation Act would apply to applications of this nature on the ground that only where there is difference between the period prescribed by the Limitation Act and the period prescribed by the special law, S. 29 (2) would be applicable and S. 5 would not be available, and that in the case of special leave against acquittal the schedule to the Limititation Act not prescribing any period and thereby no difference between the period prescribed by the schedule and the period prescribed by the special law, S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act would not be applicable. Therefore, he held that S. 5 can be applied.

I do not wish to express any disagreement with this view, but we are on stronger ground on the basis on which this application of S. 5 has been rested by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In Venkata v. Duvvuru A.I.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 40

6. Umamaheshwaram, J. held that the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general law relating to procedure and not a special law within the meaning of S. 29, Limitation Act. As S. 5, Limitation Act applies to appeals, it equally applies to all applications for leave to appeal whether provided under Sch. 1 of the Limitation Act or not. It is only in respect of applications other than applications for leave to appeal or for review of judgment that the terms of S. 5 should be specially made applicable. Hence the terms of S. 5 are applicable to applications for special leave under the new S. 417 (4), Criminal Procedure Code. It is permissible to adopt a beneficent construction of a rule of limitation if alternative constructions are possible. For this purpose Kandaswami v. Karuppan A. I. R. 1952 Mad. 186 [LQ/MadHC/1951/126] =65 L.W. 11 (F.B.) was relied on.

This decision of Umamaheshawaram J. has been followed by the Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court composed of Subba Rao, C.J. and Basi Reddy, J. in In re Parchuri Adeseshamma 1958 An. W. R. 7

5. The Bench also held that the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a special law but is a general law relating to procedure, and that therefore S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an application for special leave made after the period prescribed by Sub-S. 4 of S. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the High Court in an appropriate case, may extend that period.

Therefore, there are no impediments in granting leave to appeal provided there are merits in regard to the reasons put forward for excusing the delay of 31 days in filing the appeal. I heard the learned Advocates on both sides and I find the affidavit filed by the applicant-Municipality in support of the application shows suffient reasons for excusing the delay. The application for excusing the delay is allowed and this appeal is directed to be taken on file and disposed of according to law.