M.C. Agarwal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging an order dated 26.4.1979 passed by the Prescribed Authority, Meerut-respondent No. 2 ordering the eviction of the petitioner from the property in dispute under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and an order dated 3.8.1985 passed by the IInd Addl. District Judge, Meerut whereby the petitioners appeal against the aforesaid order has been dismissed.

2. I have heard Sri K.M. Dayal, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Santosh Kumar, Advocate, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri R.N. Bhalla, Advocate, learned Counsel for the landlord respondent No. 3.

3. There is property bearing Municipal No. 57 situate on Garh Mukteshwar Road in the town of Meerut, the details of which were given at the foot of the petition under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, of which the respondent No. 3 admittedly is the landlord and the petitioner is occupying the same as a tenant since Ist of September, 1956 on a monthly rent of Rs. 300. In April, 1975 the landlord respondent, a partnership firm, moved an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act for the eviction of the petitioner. Its case was that the premises in question were let out for a period of two years only after making alterations as were desired by the tenant. The tenant i.e., Chhetriya Sri Gandhi Ashram, Meerut had opened its branch in the premises in question in the name of Kumhar Udyog Vidyalaya which was almost defunct. The landlord firm is carrying on its business in a rented accommodation at Chhipi Tank where it has several types of business and Industry. That accommodation is too small and the landlord applicant has not been able to expand its business during the last several years. The landlord firm has an agency of ACC brand cement from the year 1930 and receives 5000 to 6000 bags of cement every month. It also deals in cement sheets of various types and sizes and also cement pipes and fittings. It has also a flour mill at that place. In addition, it also deals in tiles and marbles. It was alleged that the said space at Chhipi tank is insufficient for the requirement of the landlord for the said business. In addition, the owner of the said firm has instituted a suit for the eviction of the landlord firm from the place, as a result of which it requires the disputed accommodation. It was also alleged that the landlord applicant wants to establish a factory for the manufacture of cement sheets, marbles, tiles, band, T socket, water tanks, ACC tank, sanitary tank, sanitary pipes and cement jalis and for this, it will require the whole of the land in the tenancy of the opposite party (now petitioner). It was further alleged that the landlord would keep the Sales Centre in the premises at Chhipi tank and use the disputed premises for storing and manufacturing of goods.

4. It was alleged that the tenant had acquired land for the purposes of Kumhar Udhyog Vidyalaya from the Government which has a builidng as well and the said property is in the use of the tenant, and is very close to the other large building in occupation of the tenant i.e. Gandhi Ashram, Meerut. It was also alleged that the tenant has an area of about 1 sq. mile in its possession which has about a thousand rooms and other buildings. According to the landlord the Gandhi Ashram has so much of surplus accommodation that it has let out 20 big rooms to various shop-keepers and if there was any necessity for the Kumhar Udgyog Vidyalaya, the same could have been shifted thereto. It was also alleged that from the large building, rangai and sarjam were done by the Gandhi Ashram. Thus, the landlord alleged that the tenant has sufficient accommodation where it can transfer its establishment but for ulterior motives, it is sticking to the accommodation in question.

5. The tenant petitioner filed a written statement admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was alleged that the disputed property consisted of about 5000 sq. yards of land with some buildings and it was taken on rent w.e.f. 2.9.1956 for running a pottery industry as well as a pottery training centre. According to it, in the pottery industry, tiles, gamlas, irrigation pipes, decorative goods etc. are manufactured and sold. It was admitted that the landlord firm was carrying on its business in rented premises. It was, however, denied that the accommodation was not insufficient for business. The tenant petitioner has detailed the various plants and machinery installed in the disputed premises and expressed difficulty in removing the same to another place. It was admitted that another land has been acquired for the purpose which was only an open land and even the boundary wall existed only in a portion thereof. A building plan in respect of that land had been submitted to the Prescribed Authority, Regulated Area, which was yet to be sanctioned. It was also alleged that there was some dispute in regard to that land and there were restrictions on the availability of the iron etc. and therefore, the construction activity could not be started. The old building that existed in that place, was alleged to be in a dilapidated condition. It was denied that the tenant had 1 sq. mile of land in its possession. The extent of that property was not disclosed though in para 10 of its reply, the tenant detailed the various establishments which were working there. It was admitted that some shops were let out to the business-men but it was contended that they could only be sued for sale/store purposes. It was also claimed that rangai and sarjam departments were working regularly and the pottery industry could not be run thereon. It was also alleged that the petitioner has not disclosed the extent of its present activity and how it wants to improve its business. It was also alleged that several employees of the tenant were living in various accommodation in the property in suit. According to the tenant, it was carrying on its business in the disputed premises from the year 1956 and there was no justification for evicting it. Reliance was placed on Rule 16(2)(a) of the Rules. It was then contended that the disputed land is in Khasra No. 5852. A master plan has been sanctioned in the town of Meerut under which the said khasra number is reserved partly for the road and partly for residential purposes and, therefore, legally no factory can be established in the disputed accommodation.

6. The parties led their evidences by affidavits and by filing documents and the learned Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the landlord had vacated half of the accommodation that was in its possession at Chhipi tank and the accommodation that remains with it, was insufficient for its need. It held that no industry for the manufacture of various items, as was alleged by the landlord, could be established in the land that remains in its possession. It found that the petitioner had ample property in its possession and would have no difficulty if it is to vacate the same. The claim of the landlord respondent No. 3, was, therefore, allowed by the Prescribed Authority, who by the impugned judgment dated 26.4.1979 directed it to deliver possession to the landlord within a period of three months.

7. The tenant-petitioner appealed to the District Judge, Meerut. The concerned Misc. Appeal No. 273 of 1979 came to be decided by the IInd Addl. District Judge, Meerut by the impugned judgment dated 3rd August, 1985. The learned Addl. District Judge found that the need of the landlord for the disputed accommodation for using it as a place of storage of its cement stocks and for establishing of a factory for manufacturing various goods, as stated above, was bonafide and genuine and that the tenant petitioner had sufficient alternative accommodation available to it, and therefore, had upheld the order of eviction. It, however, held that the tenant should be compensated by payment of compensation amounting to two years rent.

8. The tenant then came to this Court in the present writ petition which has remained pending in this Court for almost 13 years.

9. The first contention raised by Sri Dayal, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent No. 3, who moved the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, is a partnership firm and is not a legal person and, therefore, an application under Section 21(1)(a) on its behalf was not maintainable. It was also contended that under Section 21(1)(a) the requirement has to be of a "person" and since the firm is not a legal person for this reason too, there could be no requirement of the firm that could be entertained under the aforesaid provisions of law. It is admitted that the respondent No. 3 is a partnership firm. In the affidavit of Amar Nath Mehra, a partner of the firm, a copy of which is Annexure 5 to the writ petition, it was stated that it is a registered partnership firm. It is important to note that no such plea was raised by the tenant petitioner at any stage of the proceeding before the Prescribed Authority or before the Appellate Court. It is further important to note that no such contention was raised in the present writ petition as well and it was raised for the first time during the course of arguments after the writ petition remained pending in this Court for more than a dozen years. This plea which is of a technical nature, therefore, deserves to be rejected on this short ground.

10. Even on merits, this plea cannot succeed at this stage, Partnership, partner, firm and firm name have been defined in Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, which is as under :

"4. Definition of "partnership" - "Partnership" is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all.

"Partner", "Firm" and "Firm-name" - Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually "partners" and collectively "a firm" and the name under which their business is carried on is called the "firm- name".

Therefore, when the proceedings were initiated in the name of the partnership firm, it meant that the partners were included in the firm as the petitioner was adopting the firm name. Admittedly, the petition was signed and verified by one of the partners who purported to act on behalf of the firm. Under Order 20X of the Code of Civil Procedure any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners could sue or be sued in the name of the firm. The tenant petitioner never disputed the maintainability of the petition under Section 21(1)(a) adopting the name of the firm nor it ever required the disclosure of the names of the partnership, as is contemplated by Rule 2 Order 20X of the Code.

11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Malabar Fisheries Co. v. C.I.T., 1979 Vol. 120 ITR 49. That was a case in which development rebate was sought to be withdrawn as after the dissolution of the firm, it assets were distributed between the partners. A question was raised whether the firm could be said to have transferred the assets to its partners. In this connection, a question arose whether a partnership firm was a legal person and what was the relationship between the firm and its partners. It was held that a partnership firm is not a distinct legal entity and the partnership property in law belongs to all the partners constituting the firm and all the partners have a joint or common interest in such assets and, therefore, when on the dissolution of a firm, the assets were distributed among the partners, there was no transfer in the sense of any extinguishment of the firm rights in the partnership assets.

12. Reliance is also placed on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Duli Chand Laxminarayan v. CIT, AIR 1956 Supreme Court 354, in which a question arose whether a partnership firm was a person and could enter into a partnership with another firm or Hindu undivided family or individual. It was held that a partnership firm is not a legal person and cannot enter into partnership.

13. As is evident, the aforesaid rulings do not deal with the question as to whether the partners, who are joint landlords vis-a-vis tenant petitioner, can start the judicial proceedings against the tenant through one of them and adopting the firms name as a plaintiff or applicant. Reliance was also placed on Pooran Chand v. R.C. & E.O., Kanpur, 1959 ALJ 343. In that case, the tenancy was in the name of Chandra Oil Factory and the question came up for consideration whether Chandra Oil Factory was the tenant or the partners thereof, were the tenants. The learned Single Judge held that the firm does not have the legal status of a person. It is merely a convenient name or label for the person or persons who own it. The statement that a firm became the tenant or secured a contract is a laymans way of describing the real legal relation namely that the partners of the firm became tenants or entered into a contract. The question arises in this case is whether persons who constituted a firm at the time of the contract of tenancy, became joint landlords vis-a- vis the tenant petitioner and they could, particularly in the absence of any objection, adopt the firm name for the sake of convenience and act through one of them.

14. Reliance is also placed on another Single Judge judgment of this Court in Sangam Lal Gupta v. Addl. District Judge, 1984 ACJ 457 [LQ/GujHC/1982/265] : 1984(2) ARC 558, in which it was held that partnership firm is not a legal person and cannot become a tenant. This judgment approves the view taken by the Court earlier in Pooran Chands case and observes that the statement that a firm is a tenant of building is only a laymans way of saying that the partners of the firm became tenants of the building. The same principle would, in my view, apply when it is said that the firm is the landlord.

15. The learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand placed reliance on a judgment of the Assam High Court in Salig Ram Rai v. Abdul Gani, AIR 1953 Assam 206, in which it was held that if the partners collectively, that is to say as a firm, enter into a contract of lease, then they are the landlords and the firm is the lessor, each partner acting as the agent of the other in law and therefore while issuing a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act it was not necessary that the identity of the partners should be disclosed.

16. Initiating a proceeding by or against a partnership firm is a matter of procedure as observed by the Honble Supreme Court in Malabar Fisheries case (supra), is permitted by Order 20X of the Civil Procedure Code and under the Rules of the Code. There is no illegality if the same procedure is adopted in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, by a partnership firm, making an application through a partner. In my view, therefore, the petition could not be said to have been illegally filed in the name of the firm and in any case such a technical objection cannot be raised at such a late stage and by showering surprise on the other side.

17. As regards the question that a release order under Section 21(1)(a) can be made only in favour of a legal person, the same does not have any merit in view of what has been discussed above. When the petition has been filed in the name of a firm, it has to be treated as a petition by all the partners constituting the firm and it is the need or requirement of those partners that has to be looked into and entertained while (dealing) with a petition under Section 21 (1)(a). It may again be emphasised that in this case the requirement set up for seeking eviction of the petitioner was not the requirement of any individual partner or a member of his family independently of the firm. The property in suit was not an asset of the firm and the requirement that was set up for seeking the eviction of the petitioner was for the business requirement of the firm i.e. the partners. It, therefore, cannot be said that the requirement that was set up was not of any legal person. It was the requirement of the partners, who were legal persons and who were carrying on business under a firm name and required the property in question for the purposes of the business. These contentions, therefore, have no force and are hereby rejected.

18. The next contention raised on behalf of the tenant petitioner is that a master plan under the U.P. Urban Planning & Development Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Development Act") has been prepared and has been published under which the property in question falls in the area which is reserved for widening the Meerut-Garh Mukteshwar Road and for residential purposes. On behalf of the landlord respondents, it was not disputed that the property in dispute which is contained in Khasra No. 5852 falls within the master plan according to which a part of this plot is reserved for widening of Meerut-Garh Mukteshwar Road and the remaining portion of the plot is reserved for residential purposes. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the landlord requires the property in question for commercial purpose, which cannot be permitted, in view of the enforcement of the master plan and, therefore, this property cannot be released for commercial purpose. This contention, in my view, has no force and cannot disentitle the landlord from seeking eviction of the petitioner. Reliance was placed on Section 14 of the Development Act which provides that after coming into operation of any of the plans in any development area, no development shall be undertaken or carried out or continued in that area unless said development is also in accordance with the plan. Reliance was also placed on Section 16 of the Development Act which provides that after coming into operation of any of the plans of residential zone, no person shall use or permit to be used any land or building in that zone otherwise than in conformity with such plan.

19. Section 13 of the Development Act cenfers powers on the Development Authority, as well as the State Government of amending the plan. Therefore, it is permissible to a owner of the land to seek amendment of the plan if he intends to use the same for a purpose other than the one which the plan envisages. Further the proviso to Section 15 provides that it shall be lawful to continue to use, upon such terms and conditions, as may be prescribed by the bye-laws made in that behalf, any land or building for the purposes and to the extent for and to which it is being used on the date on which such plan comes into force. It has not been disclosed on record from which date the master plan became operative but it appears that since this plea was raised in the written statement dated 20.5.1976, it was before that date that the master plan was published. It is conceded that inspite of the master plan reserving the area in question partly for widening of the road and partly for residential purposes, the petitioner has been using the same for running a pottery industry and for storage of its goods. This seems to have been done by virtue of the proviso to Section 16. The landlord also wants the property for use as storage accommodation for the various articles in which it is dealing as a merchant and also for the manufacture of articles akin to those manufactured by the tenant. Therefore, if the tenant petitioner can continue to use the premises for those purposes, there is no provision in the Development Act which debars the landlord from using the property for similar purpose. This contention too, in my view, therefore, has no force and is rejected.

20. It was then contended that the property in question is being used for residential purposes and the same cannot be released for occupation for business purpose. Reliance is placed on clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21(1)(a) which says that no application under clause (a) shall be entertained in the case of any residential building for occupation for business purpose. It was contended that the property in question was taken for the purposes of running a training centre for pottery industries and this purpose is a residential purpose. While it is admitted by the landlord that an institution for training in pottery industry was established in the property, its case was that the tenancy was for a commercial purpose i.e. of running a pottery industry.

21. The learned Additional District Judge has held that the tenancy was for a commercial purpose. This is basically a finding of fact and cannot be interfered with in the writ jurisdiction unless shown to be perverse. In paragraph 4 of its written statement before the Prescribed Authority, the tenant petitioner has stated that the disputed property was taken on rent for Kumhar Udyog Pradeshik Prashikshan Vidyalaya and Kumhar Udyog. It then states that in the pottery industry tiles, gamlas, irrigation pipes, decoration goods etc. are manufactured and sold. Then it states that the pottery industry is running regularly. Then in paragraph 8 of the written statement, it was stated that the pottery industry and ancillary activities (demonstration squad) etc. were running in the disputed property. In paragraph 12 of the written statement also the reference to the pottery industry, which it was stated, could not be shifted to the place where rangai and sarjam departments were operating. Thus, it was admitted that the property in suit was acquired by the tenant petitioner for the twin purposes of running a pottery industry and also a training school for persons desirous of taking up training of pottery as a career. It was, therefore, an industrial and a commercial purpose as opposed to a residential purpose. The mere fact that certain employees of the Gandhi Ashram were living in the disputed property, could not change the predominant purpose i.e. of running a pottey industry.

22. It was contended that running of a school is a residential purpose. This contention has no force, in view of what has been stated above. Even otherwise it has no force. The school is not a mere educational school, it is connected with an operation industry.

23. Reliance was placed on Arun Sexena v. Ist Addl. District Judge, 1989(1) ARC 574. It was contended that it was held in this ruling that the office of a society was a residential purpose. I find no such decision in this case. On the other hand it was held that purpose of establishing the office of a society cannot be deemed to be a residential purpose. Reliance was also placed on Kamal Arora v. Amar Singh, 1985(2) Rent Control Reports 466 (SC), in which a residential building situate in a residential zone was let out for running a school. It was held by the Honble Supreme Court that running a school was a non-residential purpose. This ruling too, therefore, is also against the petitioner who placed reliance on it. Lastly reliance was placed on a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Saroj Kumar De v. Smt. Radha Rani, 1983(2) Rent Control Reports 185, in which it was opined that establishing the office of a Limited Company was a residential purpose. A perusal of this judgment shows that the point was not decided by the High Court and the High Court has itself observed that it was not necessary to finally decide this point and what was expressed was its tentative views. Therefore, it was not a concluded view which could be treated as a precedent. In any case that view was taken in connection with the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Under the U.P. Act 13 of 1972, there are specific provisions for residential and non-residential buildings and, therefore, this view cannot be of any help in interpreting the provisions of the U.P. Act. It is established beyond reasonable doubt that the property in question was let out for an industrial and commercial purpose and this plea was intended to sustain an argument invoking sub-clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21(1)(a) and also to counter the contention of the landlord respondent that if inspite of the enforcement of the master plan, the tenant petitioner can use the property for certain activities, the landlord too can use the same for similar purpose. In my view this contention too has no force and the finding arrived at by the learned Addl. District Judge that the property was let out for a commercial purpose is upheld.

24. The next point urged on behalf of the tenant petitioner was that the landlord respondent No. 3 requires the disputed accommodation for establishing a factory. The findings of the authorities below on this point are not sustainable because they are not based on any evidence. It was pointed out that eviction of a tenant can be sought if the building is bonafide required by the landlord and this bonafide requirement has to be pressing need than the tenants mere desire. It was contended that the case set up by the landlord was merely of a desire to set up a factory. This contention is correct. In paragraph 14-b of the application under Section 21(1)(a), copy of which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition, it was stated by the landlord that it wants to set up a factory for manufacturing various articles from cement and for which it requires the whole of the disputed land. Neither in the said application nor in the affidavits filed in support thereof, anything further was stated to show that setting up of such a factory is bonafide requirement of the firm or its partners. The learned Addl. District Judge has upheld the need on this account by a casual observation that it is well settled that the landlord has a right to augment his income and to expand his existing business. In the general law such right is certainly there but this right does not carry with it a further right to nullify the provisions of protective legislation like the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972. If in the exercise of that right, a landlord wants to evict a tenant, he has to establish that the eviction is sought for satisfying a bonafide requirement and not for satisfying merely a desire for affluence or to be ahead of others in economic race. The setting up of a factory by the landlord could be recognised as a need only if it was shown that their existing activities were not sufficient to provide them income to live comfortably according to their social status and they need to set up a factory for augmenting their income. No such case was set up. On the other hand it was pleaded that it is a prosperous business firm having good existing business and that it pays a substantial amount of Income Tax and has the means for setting up of a factory. Thus, there was no evidence on record to establish that the landlord needs to set up a factory, which can be considered to be a bonafide requirement within the meaning of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. Therefore, so far as the findings of the authorities below on this point are concerned, they are based on no evidence and are hereby reversed. I hold that it is not established on record that the landlord bonafide requires the accommodation in question for setting up of a factory.

25. It was also contended that the manufacture of cement pipes etc. would involve the use of Asbestos which is a hazardous material under the "Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989" and, therefore, no factory of the type proposed by the landlord can be established. Whether Asbestos will be used is a question of fact and no such point having been taken except during the arguments on this writ petition, there is no material on record and such a plea based on a question of fact cannot be entertained. In any case, in view of the finding recorded just above, this contention loses relevancy.

26. As regards the finding that the landlord requires some accommodation for its existing business, there are concurrent findings by the authorities below. The learned Addl. District Judge found that half of the disputed accommodation at Chhipi tank has already been got vacated by the concerned landlord and, therefore, the present landlord respondent No. 3 requires the accommodation for carrying on its existing business. No serious effort is made to dislodge this finding, which in my view being based on cogent evidence on record, is not amenable to review in writ jurisdiction.

27. The last contention raised on behalf of the tenant petitioner was that Rule 16(1)(d) read with Section 21(1)(a) requires that the authorities should release only so much accommodation as is sufficient to satisfy the landlords needs. Rule 16(1)(d) provides that in considering the requirement of personal occupation for purpose of residence by the landlord, where the tenants needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under the tenancy and the landlords needs would be served by releasing the other part, the Prescribed Authority shall release only the latter part of the building. Though Rule 16(1)(d) on the face of it applies to residential accommodation, yet it has been held that the same principle applies to commercial accommodation also because Section 21(1)(a) contemplates partial release as well and the learned Counsel for the respondent landlord did not dispute this legal position.

28. In Smt. Raj Rani Rastogi v. Smt. Rewari Devi & another, 1994(1) ARC 225, it was held by the learned Single Judge of this Court that even in cases of commercial buildings, the principle contained in Rule 16(1)(d) has to be applied.

30. In Bhai Ram v. Tulsi Ram, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1357, while dealing with the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, the Honble Supreme Court observed that in such matters, a humanist approach of live and let live should be adopted and the Honble Supreme Court directed that half of the tenanted accommodation be released in favour of the landlord.

31. The learned Counsel for the petitioner urged this Court to adopt a similar humanist approach in this case as well, so that the requirements of the tenant, as well as, landlord are satisfied. The Prescribed Authority and the learned Addl. District Judge had no occasion to look into this point because they had held that the landlords needs the accommodation for its existing business, as well as, for the factory intended to be set up for which the whole of the land would be required. I have found above that the need for the factory is not established. Therefore, the accommodation that is sufficient to meet the existing business requirement of the landlord alone can be released. The disputed accommodation consists of land and buildings situate on land measuring 4938 sq. yards. The landlord deals in cement and various other things like sheets, A.C. pipes, cement jalis, bricks, pipe fittings, sanitary tanks, tiles etc. Its case is that it would use the disputed accommodation as store house for the aforesaid things which, as is evident, would require sufficient space for storage. On the other hand, the Courts below have found that the tenant petitioner has sufficient alternative accommodation. This finding is not open to challenge in writ jurisdiction, particularly when as stated above. It was admitted that another land has specifically been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for this very purpose. Therefore, eviction of the petitioner from the portion of the disputed accommodation would cause no legal hardship what-so-ever to it. In my view, the landlords need would be satisfied by releasing approximately rd of the disputed accommodation in its favour and leaving the rest with the petitioner tenant. The division shall be from north to south as it is on the north of the disputed property that the Garh road is situate.

32. In the result, this writ petition is partly allowed and the impugned orders are modified with the following directions.

33. Approximately rd part of the tenanted accommodation, which shall not be less than 1600 sq. yards and which shall be demarcated by dividing the property in suit from north to south, shall be released in favour of the landlord-respondent. It shall be the option of the tenant-petitioner to choose which portion it would retain with it i.e. whether it will retain the eastern portion or the western portion. This option will be filed before the learned Prescribed Authority within 20 days from today. The Prescribed Authority shall issue a Commission at the cost of the landlord to a qualified Engineer or an Architect, who shall prepare a site plan on scale of the entire property in suit and demarcate approximately rd portion thereof, which shall not be less than 1600 sq. yards. After the map is submitted, the Prescribed Authority shall, after hearing the parties, make an order specifying the portion released in favour of the landlord. Such portion shall then stand released in favour of the landlord respondent No. 3 and the tenant petitioner shall be evicted therefrom, in accordance with Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The landlord respondent No. 3 will construct a boundary wall or other appropriate fencing to separate the released portion. The direction of the Addl. District Judged regarding the payment of compensation to the extent of two years rent is modified to the effect that the compensation will be payable in a sum equal to rd of two years rent. From the date the landlord is put in possession of the released accommodation, the rent of the accommodation remaining in the tenancy of the petitioner will stand reduced to rd of the existing rent. The parties will bear their own costs, throughout.