(1) This writ petition arises from a proceeding under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, called the Act in short. The petitioners are the vendees of the disputed lands. They seek quashing of the orders of the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms (DCLR), Hilsa dated 30-3-92 passed by Collector under the Act, in Ceiling Case No. 1 of 1990-91 and the order of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue dated 5-9-94 in Revision Case No. 157 of 1993. Copies of the said two orders have been marked Annexures 3 and 7, respectively, to the writ petition. At the appellate stage earlier, they had succeeded before the Additional Collector, Nalanda in Ceiling Appeal No. 2 of 1992-93 on 22-2-93 vide Annexure 4, to the writ petition.

(2) The dispute relates to lands of plot No. 845 measuring 0.15 acre and plot No. 849 measuring 0.06 acre situate in Village Moniyampur in the district of Nalanda. The petitioners purchased the said lands from respondent No. 5 Sohawan Singh on 11-7-88. The sale deed was finally registered on 27-7-90. Respondent No. 4 Devanti Devi, hereinafter called pre-emptor, filed an application seeking reconveyance of the lands under Section 16(3) of the Act claiming to be the adjacent raiyat. The DCLR under his order dated 30-3-92 accepted her case that she holds land on the southern boundary of the disputed land and, accordingly, allowed the application. The Additional Collector, on appeal by the petitioners held that they had already become adjacent raiyat of the disputed plot No. 844 by virtue of purchase of land of plot No. 844 prior to filing of the application. As the pre-emptor purchased the land of plot No. 846 (admittedly on the eastern boundary of plot No. 845) on 4-7-89, i.e. later than the ven-dees purchase of the disputed land on 11-7-88, she had no right of pre-emption. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue held, in revision preferred by the pre-emptor, that the vendees case of purchase of plot No. 844 prior to the filing of the application cannot be accepted as it was merely an oral sale, not permissible in law. The sale deed was really executed much later on 18-1-92. He further held that as the pre-emptor holds land on the boundary she is entitled to pre-emption. Accordingly, he set aside the order of the Additional Collector and restored that of the DCLR. The vendees have come to this Court seeking quashing of the said two orders of the DCLR and the Additional Member.

(3) Mr. Amla Kant Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the application under Section 16(3) was filed beyond the period of limitation and, therefore, the proceeding was not maintainable. He submitted that the DCLR before whom the point was raised committed error in making out a third case. He pointed out that while according to the pre-emptor the application was filed on 22-10-90 and according to the vendees it was filed on 7-11-90, the DCLR held that the application was filed on 27-10-90. He referred to previous orders passed by this Court in the present proceeding regarding this controversy.

(4) Before I deal with the dispute regarding the date of filing of the application under Section 16(3), I may observe that such a dispute has to be resolved on the basis of records and not on the basis of the case pleaded by one or the other party. Where one party says that A is son of X and the other party says that he is son of Y, the Court cannot hold that A is son of Z. But the question as to when the particular case was actually filed has to be decided on the basis of records of the Court concerned and not on the basis of the stand which one or the other party may take.

(5) Pursuant to the orders passed by this Court earlier the connected records of Case No. 1 of 1991 of the Court of DCLR, Institution Register etc. were produced. The Institution Register, it transpired, was not properly maintained. During the years 1989-90 and 1990-91 institution of two cases has been noted, which apparently is not correct. In fact, pursuant to earlier orders passed by this Court in this regard, the Commisioner, Patna Division has submitted report suggesting that the Institution Register does not disclose the correct position. This is a matter which has to be dealt with by the concerned authorities on the administrative side and I do not want to waste my time over the same. The Institution Register being of no help whatsoever, the dispute has to be resolved on the basis of the records of Case No. 1 of 1990-91 itself. I have looked into the original application filed by the pre-emptor under Section 16(3). It appears that the application was put up before the Officer who made the following endorsement in the margin on the first page :-Issue notice.Sd.-(Illegible)27-10-90.I may, in this connection, mention that the above endorsement is in the same pen and ink (green ink) which has been used by the DCLR at some places in the order-sheet which suggests that it is the DCLR who had made the endorsement in his hand. The first page of the application bears a further endorsement addressed to some Pandeyji (appears to be the name of the Clerk-in-charge) requesting him to institute a case, that is, register the case and put up. This endorsement, which in different hand and ink, also bears the date 27-10-90. To me, it appears that the application was directly presented before the DCLR on 27-10-90 who passed the aforequoted order regarding issue of notice, whereafter, when the application reached the office, some Office Clerk, may be the Head Clerk, directed the Clerk-in-charge (Pandeyji) to register the case and open case record.

(6) The stand of the petitioners that the application was filed on 7-11-90 is based on the fact that in the order-sheet, it is on that date that the first order was recorded. The stand of the pre-emptor that the application was filed on 22-10-90, on the other hand, is based on the initials dated 22-10-90, allegedly of an office staff, on the first page of the application. The ink used in writing, however, appears to be rather fresh compared to the ink used in writings on the same very page, which gives the impression that after the controversy as to the date of filing arose, some one put those initials and mentioned "22-10-90" which is the date mentioned by the Typist, some "S. Kr." Obviously, whoever put these initials did so to cause benefit to the pre-emptor. I am not inclined to accept either of the two dates as the date of filing of the case. Rather I am inclined to endorse the finding of the DCLR that the case was filed on 27-10-90. The significance of the finding of the officer who was in seisin of the case and had, therefore, first hand knowledge of the proceeding cannot be ignored.

(7) Having reached the conclusion that the application was filed on 27-10-90, the question that arises for consideration is whether it was filed within the period of limitation or not. Section 16(3)(i) of the Act provides that when any transfer of land is made to any person other than a co-sharer or raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, "within three months of the date of registration of the document of the transfer", to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed. There is no dispute that the limitation for filing the application in the present case started running from 27-7-90 when the sale deed was registered.

(8) Mr. Amla Kant Choudhary submitted that even if 27-10-90 is held to be date of filing of the application, the limitation period expired on 25-10-90. Mr. Nand Kishore Prasad No. 2 (sic) sub-mitted on the other hand, on behalf of the pre-emptor that limitation is to be computed in terms of "months" and not "days" and, thus, after excluding the day of commencement of the period, i.e. 27-7-90, the limitation expired only on 27-10-90, when the application was filed.

(9) In view of the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and, if the Limitation Act is assumed to be inapplicable because of Section 29(2) of that Act, in view of the provisions of Section 11 of the Bihar General Clauses Act, 1917 corresponding to Section 9 of the (Central) General Clauses Act, 1897, the first day of the series of days is to be excluded. Stroud in his Judicial Dictionary (3rd Edition, Vol. IV at page 3320) states :-Where something is to be done within a stated time it means that it is to be done at sometime during the course of the stated time. Within three months of the date means within three months after the date. Of is the equivalent of after. Within 21 days of the execution means within 21 days after the execution.Now, as regards the interpretation of the word month the General Clauses Act defines the word to mean "a month reckoned according to the British Calendar". Calendar month, it is well-settled, is to be reckoned by looking into the calendar and not by counting days, except where the statute intends otherwise or, in the case of private instruments, the intention of the parties appears otherwise. For example, month occurring in Section 271 of the Income-tax Act has been interpreted to mean thirty days. But generally, one month in a statute is not synonymous with thirty days as, according to British Calendar, the duration of month in terms of days may be more or less. In Iyers Law Lexicon, month has been described as follows :-

"The term month whether employed in modern statutes or contract and not appearing to have been used in different sense denotes a period terminating with the day of the succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning less one. If there be no corresponding day of the succeeding month, it terminates on the last day thereof."Reference may also be made to para 143 of Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 37 page 142 which run as follows-"When the period prescribed is a calendar month, running from any arbitrary date, the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts running save that if the period starts at the end of a calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month, the period expires at the end of the latter month."

(10) In view of the law laid down in the above- noted authorities, there can hardly be any doubt that the period of three months reckoned from 28-7-90, after excluding 27-10-90, being the first day of commencement of the limitation period, would expire on 27-10-90. The application in the present case having been filed on 27-10-90, as held above, the same, it cannot be said, was filed beyond the period of limitation. The submission of Mr. Amla Kant Choudhary in this regard is accordingly rejected.

(11) On merit of the case, Mr. Choudhary contended that the DCLR as well as the Additional Member, Board of Revenue accepted the pre-emptors case of adjacency on the basis of the recitals of the impugned sale deed. But as would appear from the description of the boundary as mentioned therein, it is the name of the pre-emptors husband Ram Dahin Singh and not that of the pre-emptor which is shown on the northern boundary. He submitted that in the absence of any proof that the husband is the benamidar of the pre-emptor and it is the pre-emptor who is the real owner of the land in question, she cannot be treated as adjacent raiyat and allowed pre-emption. In support of the contention he placed reliance on Upendra Mishra v. Smt. Inchan Mishra, 1987 BLJ 48.

(12) In the abovenoted case, the purchaser Smt. Inchan Mishra sought to resist the claim of pre-emption on the ground that her husband holds the land on the boundary. The learned single Judge accepted the contention. In Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench held, following Full Bench decision in Ram Jiwan Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 Pat 253 , that the wife has separate entity of her own and the property standing in her name will be deemed to be her own property and as such the husband cannot be presumed to be real owner unless a case of benami purchase is made out and established. In the present case, the wife is the pre-emptor, unlike the abovenoted case in which the wife was the purchaser. According to me, this makes a lot of difference. The purchaser is a party to the document, recital whereof are binding on him. If the purchaser is the wife, she is supposed to be aware of the fact that the adjacent land belongs to her husband. If with full awareness, she purchases the land in her own name, in the absence of any proof that the husband is benamidar, she cannot be said to be the real owner of the adjacent land and, therefore, an adjacent raiyat. On the other hand, a third party is not supposed to know the name of the person in whose name the adjacent land stands recorded. Accordingly, if the name of the husband, i.e. the person who is in ostensible possession of the land, is mentioned in the sale deed, the wife in whose name the adjacent land stands recorded, cannot be deprived of her right of pre-emption. In Mukhlal Ram v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 Pat LJR 487 : (1996 AIHC 1469) a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a somewhat similar question, although in a different context, observed,

"Having regard to the realities of agrarian life in this State, it would not be uncommon for a bataidar to deal with a person A in connection with his bataidar for years and decades without being aware that the recorded tenant in respect of the land was not A but his son or father or any other member of the family."

(13) Counsel for the pre-emptor contended that the parties to the sale deed dated 11-7-88 (the sale deed in question) were obviously not aware of the fact that the land of plot No. 844 on the southern boundary of the transferred land stands in the name of the pre-emptor and that is how the name of her husband, namely, Ram Dahin Singh was mentioned on the boundary but that does not mean that the real owner of the adjacent land, i.e. the pre-emptor-wife would be deprived of her right to seek pre-emption. I find sufficient force in the submission. As a matter of fact, if I may say so, if the husband of the pre-emptor had filed the application, the vendee could have legitimately contended that the land is recorded in the name of his wife and he was not entitled to pre-emption. And in view of the ratio of the decision in Upendra Mishra v. Inchan Mishra (1987 BLJ 48) (supra), the claim of pre-emption would have failed in the absence of proof that the wife is benamidar and the real owner is the husband. In this view of the matter, according to me, the decision rather helps the pre-emptor than the petitioners. It is an undisputed position that the pre-emptors land (plot No. 844) is situate on the southern boundary of the transferred land.

(14) The Additional Collector while upholding the claim of the petitioners had held that they had purchased portion of land No. 844 before the case was filed. The finding was completely unwarranted and illegal, for, it is admitted position that the sale deed with respect to that land was executed in favour of the petitioners only on 18-1-93, that is, much after the application was filed. The petitioners tried to make a case of oral purchase for a sum of Rs. 95/- (in order to escape the provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act). The Additional Member rightly disbelieved the petitioners case in this regard on facts as also in view of the provisions of Section 16(3) of the Act itself. It was, indeed, strange on the part of the Addl. Collector to have applied different standards in considering the case of the pre-emptor and the vendees-petitioners. He accepted the vendees case of oral purchase of portion of plot No. 844 on the ground that the purchase was prior to the filing of the application but rejected the pre-emptors case regarding acquisition of another adjacent plot No. 846 (which too is admittedly on the boundary) on 4-7-89 on the ground that they purchased the same later than impugned purchase.

(15) Mr. Choudhary lastly contended that the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to restore the revision (case No. 157 of 1993), which was earlier dismissed for default on 21-9-93. It was submitted that power of restoration is creature of statute and in the absence of any provision, the revision should not have been restored. The entire proceeding before the Board, after restoration of the case, including the final order, was illegal.

(16) The submission has been noticed only to be rejected. Every Court or quasi-judicial authority has got inherent power to restore the case dismissed by it in default. If the Court/authority has power to dismiss the case in default, surely, it has the power to restore the case too. The submission that it is only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as are mentioned in Section 33 of the Act, which can be applied by the authorities, is self-defeating. Because if that was so, in the absence of any mention of Order IX of the Code in Section 33, the case cannot be dismissed for default. The provisions of Section 33 in my opinion, are enabling provisions, they are not exhaustive of the powers of the authorities under the Act. In any view, the petitioners participated in the proceeding before the Board after the restoration of the revision and took chance of success. Now they cannot be allowed to raise any objection to the jurisdiction. The submission of Mr. Chaud-hary, accordingly, stands rejected.

(17) The dispute is concluded by findings of fact. The impugned orders do not suffer from any error to warrant any interference by this Court. The writ petition being, thus, devoid of merit, is dismissed, but without any order as to cost.Petition dismissed.