Das, J.I am unable to agree with the view taken by the Court below. It is quite clear that Section 22 of the Limitation Act applies to suits, and not to applications. Mr. Lakshmi Narayan Sinha on behalf of the opposite party contends that the term "suit" ought not to be used in its narrow sense as being terminated by the decree made by the first Court, but should be used in a broad sense as including not only the stages of a suit down to its termination by the decree of the First Court, but as including its appellate stage and proceedings in execution of the decree made in the suit. No doubt the term suit is used in a broad sense in most procedural Codes, but here we are dealing with a special Act, the Limitation Act, which expressly states that a suit does not include either an appeal or an application. [See Section 2, Sub-section (10) of the Limitation Act.] For the purpose of the Limitation Act, therefore, a "suit" does not include "applications," and Section 22 of the Limitation Act did not apply to an application made by the petitioner under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code.

2. It was then contended on behalf of the opposite party that, quite apart from Section 22 of the Limitation Act, the application, as regards the added party, must be regarded as having been made when the added party was actually brought on the record of the application. I do not at all agree with this view, if it were not for Section 22 of the Limitation Act, it could not be urged that a suit as regards the added party should be regarded as having been instituted when he was so made a party. But Section 22 of the Limitation Act provides that "where, after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall as regards him be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party." This is a special provision for suite, but not for applications. I regard the use of the word "deemed" in Section 22 as significant. It indicates that a statutory fiction is resorted to for a particular purpose. As has been said more than once, when a thing is to be "deemed" to be something else, it is in truth not that something else, but is treated as that something else by a statutory fiction for the purpose of that particular Statute.

3. Therefore, when we are asked to apply the statutory fiction, we are entitled and even bound to enquire for what purposes the statutory fiction is to be resorted to. When we come to Section 22, it is clear that it can be resorted to only when, after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added. J must allow the application, set aside the order passed by the Court below, and remand the matter to that Court for decision according to law. Petitioner is entitled to his costs of this application--hearing fee one gold mohur.

Bucknill, J.

4. I agree.