KAILASAM, J.

1. This appeal is by special leave by the second party in S. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code proceedings against the judgment of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 765 of 1976.

2. On receipt of a Police Report dated 29-2-1968, proceedings under S. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code were started on 18-3-1968. The appellants in this Court are the Second Party and the respondents the First Party. The proceedings were converted into one under S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code and the lands in dispute were attached on 14-5-1968. Both the parties claimed title as well as possession of the disputed land with them. The First Party, respondents, filed their documents and nine affidavits in support of their claim while the appellants, Second Party, filed several documents and 12 affidavits in support of their case. The Magistrate on a consideration of the material placed before him found himself unable to decide as to which of the parties had been in possession of the disputed land and referred the matter to the civil court for a finding on the issue. On a dated 22-12-1975 found that the appellants, Second Party, were in possession and sent back the records to the Magistrate for disposal according to law. The Magistrate passed an order dated 7-4-1976 in accordance with the finding on the issue as to possession by the Munsif, holding that the appellants, Second Party, was in possession.

3. Aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate, the First Party filed a Revision Petition to the High Court. The High Court found that the Munsif had failed to consider the affidavits of either party but decided the question of possession only on the documents. As the Munsif failed to consider the affidavits, the High Court was of the view that the finding as to possession on the basis of documents alone without applying its mind to the affidavits, cannot be sustained. The appellants, Second Party, being aggrieved by the order has come up to this Court by special leave.

4. The questions that arise for consideration in this appeal are (1) whether the finding of Civil Court under S. 146(1B) can be challenged by way of an appeal or by review or revision, (2) whether an order which is passed by the Magistrate on the receipt of the finding of the Civil Court, in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court, can be challenged before the High Court under Ss. 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code and (3) whether an order passed by the Magistrate under S. 146(1B) can be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India.

5. There is conflict of views between various High Courts regarding the points raised. We would content ourselves by referring to three Full Bench decisions wherein the decisions of all the High Courts are referred to. The two Full Bench decisions of the Patna High Court are reported in AIR 1963 Pat 243 [LQ/PatHC/1963/16] (Raja Singh v. Mahendra Singh), Dewani Choudhary v. Chaturi Manjhi (1971 BLJR 116) : (1972 Cri LJ 134). The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court is reported in AIR 1971 All 12 [LQ/AllHC/1970/9] (Farzand Ali v. Shaukat Ali).

6. In Raja Singh v. Mahendra Singh (supra), the Full Bench of the Patna High Court by a majority of 2 to 1 held that in exercise of its revisional powers under Ss. 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court can, in suitable cases, interfere with the decision of the Civil Court given by it under sub-sec. (1-A) upon a reference made to it under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 146 of the Code after the referring Magistrate has disposed of the proceeding under S. 145 under sub-sec. (1-B) and that the bar as to appeal, review and revision imposed by sub-sec. (1-D) operates only so long as the Magistrate has not passed his order under sub-sec. (1-B) of S. 146. The minority view on the other hand, is that the bar of sub-sec. (1-D) continues even after the Magistrate has disposed of the proceeding under sub-sec. (1-B). All the three learned Judges constituting the Full Bench are, however, agreed that nothing in sub-sec. (1-D) affects the power of superintendence which the High Court enjoys under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The correctness of this decision was considered by a Full Bench of five Judges in the Dewani Choudharys case (supra). The Full Bench upheld the unanimous view in Raja Singhs case (supra) that sub-sec. (1-D) does not take away the power of judicial interference which the High Court possesses under Art. 227 of the Constitution with the decision of the Civil Court given under sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code in cases involving flagrant violation of legal principles or principles of natural justice.

7. The second question that was considered in Choudharys case (1972 Cri LJ 134 (Pat) (FB) was whether the High Court was competent to interfere with the findings of the Civil Court under sub-s. (1-A) of S. 146 in the exercise of its powers of criminal revision; the Full Bench held that there is no scope for interference with the findings of the Civil Court in exercise of the criminal revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, not by reason of the bar enacted in sub-sec. (1-D) of S. 146, but upon the express term of Ss. 435 and 439 of the Code. The power of the High Court is confined against the final order which the Magistrate is enjoined to pass in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court. In doing so, the High Court can examine whether the Magistrate passed the final order in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court or not. But it cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the legality or propriety of the decision of the Civil Court which is the basis of the Magistrates final order. On this question the Full Bench did not accept the majority view in Raja Singhs case (AIR 1963 Pat 243 [LQ/PatHC/1963/16] ) (supra).

8. The Allahabad High Court AIR 1971 All 12 [LQ/AllHC/1970/9] (FB) (supra) considering the question whether the bar contemplated under S. 146(1-D) is a bar against the finding being interfered with in revision even against the order of the Magistrate who decides the proceeding before him in accordance with the finding of the Civil Court, the Court held that even in revision from the ultimate order which disposes of the proceedings in accordance with the findings of the Civil Court, the finding of the Civil Court cannot be interfered with.

9. An examination of the provisions of Section 146 of Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 would show that the finding of the Civil Court on a reference by the Magistrate regarding possession cannot be appealed against or challenged by way of review of revision. Though the Civil Court acting under Section 146(1A) and (1B) of Section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, has not ceased to be a Civil Court, the finding regarding possession given by the Civil Court cannot be challenged by an appeal, revision or review. In other words, the finding given by the Civil Court is final. This Court in Ramchandra Aggarwals case 1966 SCR (Supp) 393 : (AIR 1966 SC 1888 [LQ/SC/1966/136] ) held that neither an appeal nor a revision lies against the finding of the Civil Court in the reference because of the express provision in Section 146(1D) and not because the proceeding before the Civil Court is not a civil proceeding. The wording of Section 146(1D) puts the matter beyond any controversy. Sub-section (1-D) reads as follows :-

"No appeal shall lie from any finding of the Civil Court given on a reference under this Section nor shall any review or revision of any such finding be allowed."

The sub-section makes it clear that the finding of the Civil Court cannot be questioned by way of an appeal. It also prohibits any challenge to the finding by way of review or revision. The answer therefore to the first question is that the finding of the Civil Court given under S. 146(1-B) regarding possession is final and cannot be challenged by way of appeal, review or revision.

10. The second question that arises is whether when the Magistrate passes an order on receipt of a finding, from the civil court that order can be challenged by way of revision before the High Court. The plea that was put forward was the bar to the challenge of the finding of the civil court is lifted when the Magistrate passes his order requires the Magistrate on receipt of the findings by the civil court to proceed and dispose of the proceedings under S. 145 in conformity with the decision of the civil court. If the order of the Magistrate is in conformity with the decision of the civil court, the Magistrate will be complying with the requirements of S. 146(1-B) and the order thus passed cannot be challenged. It will of course be open to the High Court to interfere if the order of the Magistrate is not in conformity with the finding of the civil court. When the order of the Magistrate is in conformity with the finding of the civil court, the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere under Ss. 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code. When there is an express provision sub-sec. (1-D) in the Code against the challenge of the finding of the civil court other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be relied on for doing what is expressly prohibited. The answer therefore to the second question is that an order passed by the Magistrate under S. 146(1-B) in conformity with the decision of the civil court cannot be challenged under Ss. 435 and 439.

11. The only other question that remains to be considered is whether an order under S. 146(1-B) can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. It is admitted that the powers conferred on the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution cannot in any way be curtailed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the powers of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution can be invoked in spite of the restrictions placed under S. 146(1-D) of the Criminal Procedure Code. But the scope of interference by the High Court under Art. 227 is restricted. This Court has repeatedly held that "the power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors vide 1954 SCR 565 : (AIR 1954 SC 215 [LQ/SC/1954/7] ) (Waryam Singh v. Amar Nath). In a later decision, 1958 SCR 1240 [LQ/SC/1958/7] : (AIR 1958 SC 398 [LQ/SC/1958/7] ) (Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division), the view was reiterated and it was held that the powers of judicial interference under Art. 227 of the Constitution are not greater than the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution and that under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. In a recent decision AIR 1975 SC 1297 [LQ/SC/1975/60] (Babhutmal Raichand v. Laxmibai) this Court reiterated the view stated in the earlier decisions referred to and held that the power of superintendence under Art. 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the Court of appeal and that the High Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 227 convert itself into a court of appeal.

12. The High Court has interfered with the order of the Magistrate which is in conformity with the finding of the civil court regarding possession on the ground that the civil court has failed to consider the affidavits filed by the parties. The High Court on a reading of a passage in the judgment of the civil court came to the conclusion that the Munsif failed to consider the affidavits. In dealing with the affidavits, the civil court observed that as persons who had sworn to the affidavits, are highly interested persons, undue importance cannot be attached upon their oath. After referring to the persons on both sides, who had sworn to the affidavits, the civil court stated that "I do not think that these affidavits and counter-affidavits will be of any help to either party." We find that the civil court has taken into persons who had sworn to the affidavits were interested and belonged to one party or the other, it found that no weight can be given to the affidavits. We do not agree that the rejection of the affidavits under the circumstances can be termed as failure to consider the affidavits. Apart from finding that the reason given by the High Court is not convincing, we are of opinion that the High Court has no power under Ss. 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code to interfere with the findings of the civil court regarding possession in a reference under S. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the result we hold that the High Court was in error in invoking Ss. 435 and 439 for interfering with the finding of the civil court. In fact, Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, with his usual fairness conceded that he cannot contend that the High Court can in exercise of its power under Ss. 435 and 439 interfere with the finding of the civil court regarding possession.

13. But Mr. Lal Narain Sinha submitted that the order of the High Court could be sustained as the power of the High Court under Art. 227 cannot be questioned. While there could be no dispute that the power of the High Court under Art. 227 cannot be curtailed under S. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we do not think that the facts of the case would justify the High Court to interfere under Art. 227.

14. Before concluding the judgment, we may point out that Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is no longer in force having been replaced by the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). Under the new Section 146(1), if the Magistrate is unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. Art. 227 has also been since amended by 42nd Amendment further restricting the powers of the High Court to interfere under Art. 227. The question thus dealt with by us can no longer arise after the coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 2 of 1974). In the result the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Magistrate is restored.

15. Appeal allowed.