M.P. Singh, J.The following concurrent findings of facts have been recorded by authorities below against the petitioner, who was a tenant :-
1. The need of respondent No. 3 is bonafide.
2. After comparing the hardship, it was found that in case if the garage was not released, greater hardship would be caused to the landlord.
2. The petitioner was a tenant of the accommodation which is in the nature of a garage. It was let out to him on 6.4.1978 at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month as rent. At that time, the landlord did not own and possess any car. The accommodation was let out to the petitioner to use it as a godown.
3. The respondent No. 3 who is the landlord, is having a degree of D. Lit. He is working as Reader in Education Department. He purchased a Fiat car and then made a request to the petitioner to vacate the accommodation so that he may keep his car there. The petitioner gave (sic) months, but he did not keep his promise.
4. Ultimately, the landlord filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the). The need set up was that he needed the accommodation to keep his car. According to him he was keeping his car either in the open land or in the passage of the house where he was living.
5. The said application was contested by the petitioner stating that he has a shop (No. 944/1) at P.L. Sharma Road, Meerut where he was doing his business. It was a very small accommodation to store the goods. The accommodation in dispute was being used as a godown which is situated at a distance of about 100 paces from the said shop. It was denied that the need of the landlord was bonafide. The purpose of the application was to get the enhanced rent. There was sufficient accommodation in front of the house of the landlord where he could keep two or three cars at a time. It was further alleged that the landlord got two other shops vacated and they are in his possession. He could keep his car in any one of the said shops.
6. The prescribed Authority on the basis of the evidence allowed the release application holding that the need of the landlord was bonafide. The finding on the question of comparative hardship was also recorded in his favour.
7. The petitioner filed an appeal under Section 22 of thebefore the learned District Judge. This appeal too, has been dismissed. The present writ petition is directed against this appellate order.
8. Heard Sri B.D. Madhvan, learned counsel for the petitioner.
9. The main contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the need of the landlord was not bonafide inasmuch as he has got two other shops vacated which were in his possession and he could easily convert these shops into a garage. The need if there was any could be satisfied in that way. I do not find any merit in the submission for the following reasons :-
(a) The petitioner has not led any evidence to show that the six of the shops so released was such that it could be used as a garage.
(b) Admittedly, these two shops, were got released by the landlord. The purpose for which they were released has not been brought to the notice of this Court by the petitioner. No evidence has been led by him as to when and for what purpose the said shops were released and further the purpose for which they were released still exists or has come to an end.
(c) There is no law under which the landlord can be compelled to convert these two shops into a garage.
10. The only question to be considered in this case is if the landlord has got a garage, it has to be released or not for keeping his car. In my opinion, these two shops which came in possession of the landlord will not at all be relevant while deciding the controversy in hand.
11. Another submission raised by the learned counsel was that there was no absolute necessity of the garage. According to him, unless need was absolute, the application for release could not have been allowed. On this basis he submitted that the need of the landlord was not bonafide.
12. Under these circumstances, it has to be seen what does the expression bonafide required mean. This expression has been interpreted in a number of cases. The expression signifies that there should not be a mere desire on the part of the landlord but in addition to that there should be an element of need and that also should be a genuine need.
13. In a case reported in 1979 (UP) RCC 599, Smt. Gindori Devi v. II Additional District Judge and others, it was held :-
"It would suffice to mention that a person is said to need a premises bonafide if he requires it honestly. Similarly, the word required has also been interpreted in several cases, and the connotation of the said word shows that the landlord must need the premises. In order to succeed in such an application, it is not necessary that the landlord must be on the streets. The connotation of the word need or requirement should not be unnecessarily or artificially extended so as to give it a meaning that a landlord cannot get a premises released unless his requirement is absolute. No doubt, the question of need of a landlord is to be decided objectively and its decision should not mean that he must stand or extreme need before he could succeed."
14. In another case reported in the same at p. 132, Jayant Kumar v. Prescribed Authority and others, the Court took the view :-
"It is, however, not necessary that the landlord must stand in absolute need of the property. The requirement of law is that the need of a landlord must be honest and in good faith. It is not correct that a landlord cannot succeed unless he is found in an extreme need."
15. The word bonafide means genuinely, sincerely i.e., in good faith in contradiction to mala fide. This very phrase has been subject matter of interpretation in a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1976 Allahabad 328, Chandra Kumar Shah v. District Judge, Varanasi. The Court held this phrase to mean to need genuinely or in good faith and conveying an idea of absence of any intent to deceive.
16. In another case reported in 1984(1) ARC 113, N.S. Dutta v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad similar view was taken. Same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan and others, reported in 1986 SCFBRC 346.
17. In the light of principle enunciated in various judgments mentioned in the preceding paragraphs and looking into the facts of the present case, I am satisfied that findings of fact recorded by both the authorities below on the question of bonafide need are correct and need no interference.
18. The next submission raised by learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner gave an offer to the landlord to exchange the accommodation in dispute with one of the shops which he has got released. On this point, on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Authority has recorded a finding that the son of the landlord, who is a doctor needs one shop for his clinic. The other shop would be needed by his daughter-in-law who is also a doctor. The Court below was perfectly justified in recording the finding that they needed separate clinics. Naturally, the daughter-in-law would need a separate clinic to attend to female patients. I do not find the said finding to be erroneous in any manner. There was no question of offering any alternative accommodation to him.
19. In the last, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the present days for want of the accommodation most of the people are keeping their cars in open on the road, and why special treatment should be given to the landlord. The submission is also devoid of merit. In a case reported in AIR 1971 Delhi 272, Sudhershan Lal Aggarwal v. Girdhari Lal Jain, the Court had the occasion to consider a similar contingency and found :-
"The need of the landlord to keep his car in the garage is a necessary incident of the residence of the landlord in the main house and, therefore, the garage is wanted by the landlord, for occupation as a residence.
Whether he needs it bonafide be judged from his status and the way of his life which would show whether he is using the car in the ordinary way and not in any forced or mala fide way. The open compound of the house is not a reasonable accommodation because the car will be exposed to sun and rain. Security for the car and convenience of the landlord should also be considered."
20. The view taken in the case of Sudhershan Lal Aggarwal (supra) is a complete answer to the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and needs no further discussion, being devoid of merit is rejected.
21. On the question of comparative hardship both the authorities below have applied their minds and then recorded a finding that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord in case the accommodation was not released. The said finding is also a finding of fact and no convincing illegality has been pointed out to me.
23, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed in limine.
24. After dismissal of the writ petition, I proposed to grant some time to the petitioner to vacate the premises, but it was not accepted.