(Prayer: This second appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated 24.07.2009 passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Pondicherry in A.S.No.3 of 2009 reversing the judgment and decree dated 28.11.2008 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Mahe in O.S.No.44 of 2006.)

1. This second appeal is focussed by the defendants, animadverting upon the judgement and decree dated 24.07.2009 passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Pondicherry in A.S.No.3 of 2009 reversing the judgment and decree dated 28.11.2008 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Mahe in O.S.No.44 of 2006.

2. The parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.

3. Heard both sides.

4. The factual matrix would run thus:

a)The respondent/ plaintiff filed the suit O.S.No.44 of 2006 seeking the following reliefs:

- to direct the defendants jointly or severally to pay Rs.90,000/- with interest as compensation for damages to the plaintiff and

- for costs

(extracted as such)

b) Written statement was filed by the defendants resisting the suit.

c) Whereupon issues were framed. On the side of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 along with P.Ws.2 to 5 and marked Exs.A1 to A4. The first defendant examined himself as DW1 and marked Exs.B1 to B6.

d) Ultimately the trial court dismissed the suit. As against which, appeal was filed. Whereupon, the first appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the original suit.

5. Challenging and impugning the judgment of the first appellate court, this second appeal has been focussed on various grounds inter alia to the effect that the first appellate court, failed to furnish adequate reasons for reversing the reasoned judgment of the trial court.

- The findings given by the trial court based on evidence were not considered by the first appellate court in reversing the judgment of the trial court.

6. Accordingly, in the memorandum of second appeal the following substantial questions of law are found set out:

1. Is the first appellate court correct in granting Rs.50,000/- as damages more so when the respondent has failed to prove the damages as mandated under Sec.73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act

2. Is the first appellate court correct in rejecting the evidence Ex.B3 the gold loan pledge form cum ledger sheet which is a prima facie evidence as per Sec.4 of Bankers Book Evidence Act

3. Is the first appellate court correct in relying upon Ex.A1 alone in decreeing the suit more especially when the ledger Ex.B3 mentioned by the bank speaks of the terms and conditions of the loan

4. Are not the plaintiff entitled to recall the loan at any point of time despite the agreed period for redemption under Sec.108 of Transfer of Property Act

(extracted as such)

7. After hearing both sides, I am of the view that the following substantial questions of law are involved in this matter.

1. Whether the first appellate court was justified in reversing the findings of the trial court without referring to the various factual findings rendered by the trial court and whether the first appellate court adhered to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC

2. Whether the first appellate court was right in placing reliance on Ex.A1, which is only an unauthenticated photocopy and thereby finding fault with Ex.B2, which was admittedly signed by the plaintiff in four places, viz., three places in the front page and one place in the back of it

3. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the judgment rendered by the first appellate court

8. A resume of facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this second appeal would run thus:

The second defendant is the Branch of the South Indian Bank operating in Mahe and D1 is the Senior Manager of the said Bank at the relevant time. The plaintiff, being a police constable, approached the Bank for availing gold loan and the following gold jewels

1. Long chain (1) of 4 > sovereigns

2. Necklace (1) of 2 < sovereigns

3. Bangles (2) of 1 = sovereigns (> sovereigns each)

4. Bangles (2) of 4 sovereigns, 1 sovereigns each

Total 12 = sovereigns

were pledged by him with the bank and thereby he availed loan to the tune of Rs.33,000/-. According to him, the loan had to repaid within a period of one year with effect from 29.11.2002, so to say, according to him, on or before 29.11.2003 and up to that date he had the right to redeem the pledged jewels after paying the dues under the loan. However, the plaintiffs main contention was that the first defendant illegally, throwing to winds the rules, simply brought the pledged jewels for auction and sold them, despite objection raised by the plaintiff.

9. The contention on the side of the defendant-Bank is that even though the maximum period contemplated as per the Bank practice was 12 months, yet it could be restricted of individual loan transaction and accordingly, so far the loan transaction involved in this case is concerned, the period fixed for repayment was five months and that was found spelt out in the relevant document and Ex.A1 cannot be interpreted in the way that the plaintiff had interpreted in his plaint.

Accordingly, he prays for the dismissal of the suit.

10. The learned counsel for the defendants/appellants would put forth and set forth his argument, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus:

The trial court adverting to the relevant documents as well as the oral evidence correctly arrived at the conclusion. Whereas the first appellate court, simply placing reliance on Ex.A1 and also furnishing his own reasons not backed by pleadings or evidence, reversed the reasoned judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the original suit, warranting interference in the second appeal.

11. By way of torpedoing and pulverising the arguments as put forth on the side of the defendants/appellants, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would submit as under:

a. The first appellate court was justified in placing reliance on Ex.A1 as in fact at the time of issuing Ex.A1, the bank did not specify that the duration of the loan was only for five months and the versions found printed in Ex.A1 would clearly display and demonstrate that the duration of the loan was for 12 months and prematurely, the defendants went to the extent of bringing the property for sale despite objection raised by the plaintiff.

b. The first appellate court correctly adverted to the fact that Ex.B2, the loan ledger was available with the defendants and so the defendants had the opportunity of making interpolations and also of filling up the gaps and accordingly, they did, mulcting the plaintiff with undue liability and whereupon alone, the first appellate court corrected the error committed by the trial court, warranting no interference in this second appeal.

12. At the first instance itself, I would like to point out that Ex.A1, ex facie and prima facie is an inadmissible piece of evidence, which was unworthy of being produced before the trial court.

13. I recollect and call up the recent decision of the Honble Apex Court reported in (2010) 8 SCC 423 [LQ/SC/2010/889] [ Shalimar Chemical Works Limited vs. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries and others) ]. Certain excerpts from it would run thus:

10. ....................."An objection to the admissibility of the document can be raised before such endorsement is made and the court is obliged to form its opinion would depend, the document being endorsed, admitted or not admitted in evidence. In support of the submission he relied upon a decision of this Court in R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P.Temple where it was observed as follows: (SCC p.764, para 20)

"20. .....The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself is inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as an exhibit, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court." (emphasis in original).

15. On a careful consideration of the whole matter, we feel that serious mistakes were committed in the case at all stages. The trial court should not have "marked" as exhibits the xerox copies of the certificates of registration of trade mark in face of the objection raised by the defendants. It should have declined to take them on record as evidence and left the plaintiff to support its case by whatever means it proposed rather than leaving the issue of admissibility of those copies open and hanging, by marking them as exhibits subject to objection of proof and admissibility. The appellant, therefore, had a legitimate grievance in appeal about the way the trial proceeded."

A mere perusal of it would evince and evidence that the Honble Apex Court categorises the documents into two sets. One set of documents cannot be produced at all as evidence before the court of law and even at the time of filing or at the time of marking, such documents the court is expected to reject the same. However, relating to the second set of documents, some amount of further probe and scrutiny might be required and those are on a different footing.

14. Trite the proposition of law is that in a civil court, a mere un-authenticated photocopy of a document cannot be produced as evidence. I am at a loss to understand, as to how the trial court simply entertained it and gave a marking to it as Ex.A1. No doubt, it is found mentioned in the relevant chief examination affidavit itself that the original of Ex.A1 was filed in the connected criminal case and if that be so, it was the bounden duty of the plaintiff to apply for a certified copy of the same and produce it before the civil court and get it marked and that will be treated as a secondary evidence. But, in this case, that was not done so. However, the plaintiff would place heavy reliance on such Ex.A1 and the first appellate courts judgment itself is based on such Ex.A1, which is ex facie and prima facie an inadmissible piece of evidence.

15. Be that as it may, for the purpose of comprehensively deciding the issues involved in this matter, I would like to refer to Ex.A1. No doubt, in the column relating to "due date of closure", the period of five months is not found specified. However, Ex.B2, the Gold loan pledge form cum ledger sheet would refer to all the details including the stipulation that even though the maximum period of loan could be for twelve months, it could be curtailed to a shorter period. But, in this case, the duration of loan was only five months and the plaintiff, who availed the loan was expected to discharge the loan within a period of five months. Strictly in accordance with that, notice was issued by the bank to the plaintiff calling upon him to discharge the loan, as otherwise, the pledged jewels would be auctioned.

16. Indubitably and indisputably, the plaintiff would admit such receipt of notice. However, he would state that as per Ex.A3, he sent reply seeking extension of time for repayment. However, the defendants would state that such a reply was not at all given by the plaintiff. Even for argument sake, it is taken that such a reply was given, the said reply in no way would enure to the benefit of the plaintiff and hence, it is just and necessary to extract here under the reply given by the plaintiff under Ex.A3.

"Before the Manager of Mahe South Indian Bank for his kind consideration:

Sir,

I have pledged gold jewellery belonging to my wife and took a loan of Rs.33,000/-. The loan No.is GL.No.311/09-03.

As I am working as a police constable in Pondicherry Police and as I have to take part in the August 15 Independence Day Police parade, I will get leave only from the police department only after August 15. As such, I will come personally to the South Indian Bank, Mahe and would pay the full amount due from me and would thus take back the gold jewellery belonging to my wife from the bank before August 30th and I humbly request you to kindly oblige.

Humbly yours,

sd/-

C.Gangadharan"

(emphasis supplied)

A bare perusal of it would clearly exemplify and demonstrate that on receipt of auction notice, the plaintiff had not in any way contended that the duration of the loan was for twelve months and prematurely the jewels were sought to be brought for sale. He simply prayed for granting some time for payment, so to say, up to 30th August 2003. Whereas, now according to the plaintiff, he was entitled to discharge the loan by the end of November 2003. If really that was his case and that he was in dark about the duration of the loan, certainly, in the reply, he would have stated so, but, he supinely agreed to the demand notice sent by the bank and prayed time till 30th August 2003.

17. My mind is reminiscent of the following concept "principiis obsta - [Withstand beginnings; oppose a thing in its early stages, if you would do so with success] as well as the maxim qui non negat fatetur - [He who does not deny, admits], which means that at the earliest point of time a fact has to be denied as otherwise it would be construed that it was accepted by the party concerned.

18. But, in this case, if really the case as now contended by the plaintiff is true, then in Ex.A3 those contentions, at least in a sketchy manner should have been found spelt out. But that was not done so. As such, it is crystal clear that it is nothing but an after thought on the part of the plaintiff to contend that the duration of the loan was not for five months, but it was for twelve months. Over and above that one Ranjit-PW2 was relied upon by the plaintiff to prove that Ex.A3 in original was handed over to the bank. Whereas the Bank would deny the same. In such a case, had really, Ex.A3 was given to the bank, then there should be some acknowledgement or seal etc.

19. It is a common or garden principle known to everyone that whenever any letter or representation is given to a bank or any organisation, certainly, acknowledgement would be received at the despatch/arrival section. Here, no such acknowledgement has been produced. Accordingly, the lower court found fault with the deposition of PW2 Ranjith, who allegedly acted as a messenger of the plaintiff and approached the Bank and gave Ex.A3, and by disbelieving his evidence, rendered its judgment based on the finding of fact and the first appellate court should have considered it. But, it failed to do so. As correctly pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendants, the first appellate court while reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court never adverted to these facts at all and simply placed reliance on Ex.A1, which is an inadmissible piece of evidence.

20. The learned counsel for the plaintiff inviting the attention of this court to Ex.B2 would develop her argument that Ex.B2 was filled up subsequently by the bank to suit their convenience and no reliance could be placed on that and that the first appellate court correctly held that such filling up of the format would not in any way be used for mulcting the plaintiff with the liability and legal responsibility.

21. I would like to recollect the decision of the Division Bench of this court reported in (1980) 2 MLJ 398 [LQ/MadHC/1980/69] [ K.M.Madhavakrishnan vs. S.R.Sami and others]. An excerpt from it would run thus:

"14. The general rule of law is that a party of full age and understanding is normally bound by his signature to a document whether he reads it or understands it or not. Equity does not save people from the consequences of their own folly but will save them from being victimised by other people. Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R.has observed in Tufton v. Sperm, as follows:

"Extravagant liberality and immoderate folly do not of themselves provide a passport to equitable relief."

16. ...................................."The correct rule as regards carelessness which emerges from the decision of House of Lords in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society, is

"leaving aside negotiable instruments to which special rules may apply, a person who signs a document, and parts with it so that it may come into other hands, has a responsibility, that of the normal man of prudence, to take care what he signs, which if neglected, prevents him from denying his liability under the document according to its tenor. The onus of proof in this matter rests upon him i.e., to prove that he acted carefully and not upon the third party to prove the contrary."

Whenever a person of full age and understanding puts his signature to a legal document without taking the trouble of reading it or without asking the document to be read and explained to him but signs it relying on the word of another as to its character, content or effect, he cannot be heard to say that it is not his document."

A mere perusal of it would exemplify and convey that once an educated person signs a document, then he cannot have a volte face and turn turtle and contend that he was not aware of the contents.

22. Pithily and precisely, the ratio decidendi of the Division Bench judgment of this court is that, an educated person who signs the document should hold responsibility as otherwise, there will be no meaning in any document emerging, evidencing the transaction.

23. Here, in Ex.B2 in three places in the front page, the plaintiffs signatures are there and it is found mentioned that the duration of the loan was only for five months and the due date for closure was 29.04.2003. The first appellate court went to the extent of discussing certain facts based on his subjective satisfaction as though the filling up of the columns in Ex.B2 were not by one and the same hand etc.

24. It is a trite proposition of law that courts should be reluctant to compare the disputed signatures with the admitted signatures as though they are experts by themselves. However, in certain circumstances, once the court resorts to comparison of the signatures invoking Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, by themselves, then certainly they should play the role of an handwriting expert in stricto sensu. A Judge cannot as per Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act express his subjective satisfaction concerning the disputed signature. If the Judge desires to act as an expert in handwriting science, then he should assume the role of a handwriting expert in stricto sensu and analyse it by referring to the various characteristics as found in the treatises relating to Science of Handwriting and arrive at a conclusion, so that objectively, the appellate court as well as the higher courts would be in a position to verify and analyse as to whether the trial court was justified in arriving at such a conclusion.

25. But here, the findings in the judgment of the first appellate court is far from satisfactory, because, the first appellate court Judge went to the extent of observing that the writings on the right side of the document, Ex.B2 did not tally with the left side writings of the same document. But the fact remains that on both sides, viz., on the left side as well as on the right side, the plaintiff had admittedly signed the said document. Over and above that, below that document also in the front page, the plaintiff had signed on the stamp paper. In such a case, simply because in Ex.A1, the column "due date" was not filled up, the plaintiff cannot try to make a mountain out of a mole hill.

26. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would invite the attention of this court to the back side of Ex.B2 and point out that in the first condition in the printed format, No.12 was corrected as 5, without any initial. I would like to point out that in fact such correction, viz., striking of 12 and specifying over it as 5, were not germane in this case. In fact that need not even be corrected at all as it is the printed condition just to highlight that the maximum period of loan could be 12 months and in some transactions, it could be even lesser. Absolutely there is no overwriting or erasure in Ex.B2 and in such a case, the decision cited on the side of the plaintiff is having no bearing on the issue. However, I would like to refer to the said decision of this court reported in AIR 1981 Madras 29 [ Rani Leela Kumar and others vs. J.Zamberlal ] and an excerpt from it would run thus:

"9.. It is in this context that we have to scrutinize the entries in Ex.B3 Column.1 of Ex.B3 give the number of the pledge as 6685 in the present cam there is no dispute about it. The name and address of the pawner is given in column 2 and the date of loan, the amount of principal loan and the rate of interest are all given in columns 2 to 5. Running across columns 3 to 6 there is a narration of the payment of Rs.11,000 on 26.4.1970. It is below that narration there is recording of a receipt of Rs.19,760. There is an erasure in the entry and there is also a correction even in the entry made after the erasure. There is no mention of any date in columns 2 to 5, as regards the receipt of Rs.19,760. This is in contrast to the recording of the receipt of Rs.11,000 where the date is given as 26.4.1970. In the entry relating to the receipt of Rs.11,000, there is narration of interest for one month having been paid while in respect of the sum of Rs.19,760, there is no such narration. In column 7 there is a description of the articles pledged and in column 8 their value. Column 9 sets out the time for repayment as 12 months and in column 10 the date of repayment is shown as 7.8.1970. Even here, there is a correction and overwriting. Thus, Ex.B3 itself contains internal evidence of the entry therein not having been recorded in the normal course."

The factual matrix involved in the cited decision is entirely different from the one involved in this case, as in that case, there were corrections and over writings relating to the subsequent payments. Whereupon the learned Division Bench of this court held that such corrections and erasures are untenable in law. But here, my discussion supra would reveal that the factual matrix here is entirely different.

27. I would also like to point out that the first appellate court being the last court of fact, was expected to adhere to Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC. When concurring judgment is given, absence of elaborate discussion might not be fatal. But on the other hand, if the trial courts judgment is sought to be reversed, then on each and every findings of facts, rendered by the trial court, there should be discussion and reason found spelt out in the first appellate courts judgment for disagreeing with the findings of the trial court. But, in this case, as has been already held supra, the first appellate court furnished its own reasons and never dealt with the trial courts findings point by point and furnished its reason for disagreement.

28. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that Ex.B4 publication relating to auction sale was effected in a newspaper having circulation not in Mahe the place, where the defendant bank is situated.

29. The learned counsel for the defendants/appellants would appropriately and appositely, correctly and convincingly reply that such a plea was not at all taken in the plaint and there is also nothing in the plaint to show that the auction conducted by the bank got vitiated because of inadequate publication or absence of publication in the newspaper in the concerned area.

30. I recollect the following maxim:

"Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probata - It is the duty of a Judge to decide according to facts alleged and proved.

31. This court could very well take judicial notice of the fact that the said newspaper was printed in Tellicherry, which is just adjacent to Mahe area. However, these are all extempore submissions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. However, I considered this point also.

32. In view of my discussion supra, the auction conducted by the defendants cannot be found fault with on the ground that there was absence of adequate publication of the auction.

33. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would submit that the connected criminal case, which the plaintiff filed was quashed by this court and in the typed set of papers, the said judgment of this court is found enclosed.

34. As per the decision of the Honble Apex Court, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775 [LQ/SC/2010/831 ;] [ Kishan Singh (dead) through Lrs. vs. Gurpal Singh and others] independently, the civil case and the criminal case should be processed for the reason that the ratiocination and the evidence expected in the criminal case is different from the civil case, where the preponderance of probabilities should govern the adjudication. An excerpt from the said decision would run thus:

"18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases, it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject-matter and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration."

35. As such, I am of the considered view that the lower court adverting to all relevant facts correctly rendered its judgment. Whereas the first appellate court, unjustifiably reversed the findings and simply decreed the original suit, warranting interference in this second appeal.

36. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the defendants/appellants and as against the plaintiff/respondent and the judgment and decree of the first appellate court are set aside and the judgment and the decree of the trial court are restored and the original suit shall stand dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.