G.F. COUTO, J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal by the original plaintiff is directed against the judgment dated July 30, 1987, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, whereby he partly decreed the suit inasmuch as he allowed it only against the first respondent herein.

( 2 ) THE appellant-bank has filed a suit for recovery of money against respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that a loan of Rs. 42,000 has been granted by the first respondent on April 9, 1976, the second respondent having stood as a surety. The said loan was meant for the purchase of a matador Mini Bus and was granted on the execution of a promissory note carrying interest at the rate of 4 1/2% per annum above the Reserve Bank of India rate with a minimum of 13 1/2%. The said loan was to be paid along with interest by monthly instalments of Rs. 1,000 commencing on may 9, 1976. In addition to that demand promissory note, the first respondent executed a deed of hypothecation in respect of the Mini Bus No. GDL-4535. After making some payments, the first respondent stopped making payment of the instalments and in spite of reminders, he did not pay the dues to the plaintiff-bank. Therefore, banks notice was given and, thereafter, the suit was filed.

( 3 ) ONLY respondent No. 1 resisted the suit by stating that he could not regularly make payment of the instalments due to frequent breakdowns of the vehicle.

( 4 ) THE learned trial judge, after recording the evidence, decreed the suit only as against respondent No. 1 and dismissed it so far as respondent No. 2 is concerned on the ground that the same was barred by limitation so far as he was concerned.

( 5 ) NOW, it is this part of the impugned judgment and decree that has been challenged in this appeal. Mr. Timble, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, invited my attention to the letter, exhibit P-2, whereby, inter alia, both the respondents had declared that the payment or acknowledgment made or given by any one or more of them shall be binding on all of them jointly and/or severally and that the said payment or acknowledgment so made or given by any one or more to them shall save limitation against all of them jointly or severally for the purpose of the law of limitation. He submitted that respondent No. 1 has acknowledged his debt by letters dated July 12, 1979, September 23, 1981, and May 17, 1982, the suit having been filed on september 8, 1982. Therefore, by virtue of the letter, exhibit P-2, the said acknowledgment of the debt by the aforesaid letters by defendant No. 1 had the effect of extending the limitation in respect of both the respondents. That apart, learned counsel, placing reliance on the decision of the Kerala High Court in Wandoor Jupiter Chits (P.) Ltd. v. K. P. Mathew, AIR 1980 Ker 190 , [LQ/KerHC/1979/128] submitted that acknowledgment of the debt under section 18 of the Limitation Act which provides for a fresh period of limitation would itself be sufficient in the context of a contract of guarantee, to keep the suretys liability alive. Though duly served, the respondents did not put in appearance at the hearing, nor were they represented.

( 6 ) I have already mentioned that the learned judge has decreed the suit only against the first respondent, having dismissed it as regards the second respondent on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. To arrive at this finding, the learned judge observed in para 6 of the impugned judgment that the demand promissory note was executed on April 9, 1976, and as such, the suit for recovery of money on the said promissory note was required to be filed within three years from April 9, 1976. However, the first respondent made partial payments of the loan and, in addition, executed a letter of acknowledgment of debt on July 28, 1978. The said letter of acknowledgment was sent by both the respondents and, therefore, according to the learned judge, the provision of section 19 of the Limitation Act was coming into operation and the period of limitation was to be counted from that date. He also observed that there are three other letters of acknowledgment signed only by the first respondent and dated July 17, 1979, September 23, 1981, and May 17, 1982. On the basis of this and considering that the suit was filed on september 8, 1987, the learned judge held that the suit against respondent No. 1 was filed well within the period of limitation, but that the same was barred as against respondent No. 2. Strictly speaking, it would appear, in view of exhibit P-2, that the aforesaid reasoning of the learned judge is vitiated and that irrespective of whether or not the acknowledgment letters were signed by the two defendants in the suit, the acknowledgment made by the first respondent was binding on the second respondent. However, it is pertinent to note that in terms of the contract as alleged by the appellant in the plaint, in the event any instalment was not paid, the whole amount of loan would become due and the bank could act against the body (sic ). It is the case of the appellant that the first respondent was always irregular since, after making some payments, he stopped paying further instalments, but curiously enough, the appellant not only did not say how many instalments were paid and from which date the first respondent stopped making the payments, but also did not take any action as was available to it under the agreement to recover the amount of the loan. Strange also that the appellant, after having obtained the acknowledgment of the dues signed by both the respondents on July 28, 1978, did not follow the same procedure but proceeded to obtain fresh acknowledgements signed only by the first respondent and thereafter decided to take action against both of them. In addition, the bank did not at all try to take possession of the vehicle but allowed it to disappear, as was fairly conceded in the course of his arguments by learned counsel appearing for the appellant. These being the facts, the glaring omission committed by the manager of the bank to act timely under the agreement becomes most relevant. The appellants present attempt to rope in the second responded on the basis of exhibit p-2 is entirely against the rules of fairplay and it will thus be against justice, equity and good conscience for this court to interfere with the impugned judgment. The stand of the appellant in this appeal is too technical and unacceptable in the context of the conduct of the bank itself.

( 7 ) THE result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is, consequently, dismissed with costs.