(Appeal (disposed of on 5-9-1944) against the order of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tenali dated 22-7-1943 and made in A.S. No. 115 of 1941 (O.S. No. 143 of 1939 D.M.C. Tenali.)

The plaintiffs are the appellants and the appeal arose out of a suit, filed by them for ejecting the defendant from one acre of land covered by D. No. 46 of Sripuram Agraharam. The plaintiffs case was that the land had been leased to the defendant under a kaboliat dated 13th March, 1939 and that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same. They also filed a small cause suit for recovery of the rent for faslis 1345 to 1348 and also filed the suit out of which this appeal arises (O.S. No. 143 of 1939) on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Tenali, for recovery of possession of the land.

The defendant pleaded that he had occupancy right in the land and that the land formed part of the estate and that the suit was not cognizable by a Civil Court.

The first Court found that the land was not part of an estate, that the suit was maintainable in a Civil Court and decreed the suit holding that the defendant had no occupancy rights.

On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of Tenali held that the land formed part of an estate, as it was part of a minor inam which formed part of the agraharam that was originally granted to the agraharamdars found it was an estate and returned the plaint for being presented to the proper Court.

The only point therefore for consideration is whether the land which is the subject-matter of this litigation formed part of an estate.

It was admitted before the learned Subordinate Judge that title deed No. 1004 related to the suit inam of 1 acre: and it was also admitted that the suit land was a minor inam. It is not disputed and is also clear from Exs. I and II that a large extent of land was granted as inam to Vedachala Rangacharlu as Bhatavrutti Shrotriam inam for which Rs. 320 was payable. It was out of the land granted as the shrotriam inam that there was a subsequent grant by the agraharamdars of the land in respect of which title deed No. 1004 has been issued. That this land, therefore, forms part of the original grant is undisputed but what is stated is that after the original grant there was a grant by the grantee of some portion of it which was treated as minor inam and at the time of the Inam Settlement the inam of the agraharam apart from minor inams was confirmed separately, that these minor inams which were grants by the agraharamdars were separately treated and confirmed as inams and that separate title deeds have be en issued. This is clear from Exs. I and II. The next question then for consideration is whether this 1 acre out of land which formed the minor inam and in respect of which separate title deed was granted, could be said to be portion of an estate. The only provision of law under which the lessee could claim that this is part of an estate is S. 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act. Under that section estate means any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Gover nment, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees. The answer to the question as to whether the confirmation or recognition by the British Government was in respect of the entire inam village or of only a portion is the basis for the decision as to whether the land was an estate or not. In this case Exs. I and II show that the grants were confirmed separately and independently of each other. Admittedly the land in dispute forms part of the land to which title deed No. 1004 relates and that title deed does not relate to the entire village but only to a portion of it. So merely because it formed part of the original grant of an entire village or agraharam it cannot be said that at the time when it was recognised this was part of the inam in favour of the agraharam which was recognised or confirmed by the British Government. The learned Subordinate Judge was not, therefore, justified in finding that it formed part of an estate.

The decree of the lower appellate Court is accordingly set aside and that of the first Court restored with costs in all the three Courts.

Leave refused.