1. We have heard Sri M.D. Singh Shekhar, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 76722 of 2005 and Sri M.K. Gupta, assisted by Sri Pankaj Dubey for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2692 of 2009. Learned standing counsel appears for the State respondents. Sri Navin Sinha assisted by Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh appears for the Greater Noida Industrial Development (GNIDA).

2. In Writ Petition No. 76722 of 2005 - Bunda and others have challenged the entire proceedings of acquisition of their land initiated by the State Government vide notification dated 27.08.2004, issued under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (1) and (4), dispensing with the provisions of Section 5-A, and the notification dated 19.07.2005, under Section 6 read with Section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (in short the Act) in acquiring plot Nos. 404 - area 0.6055 hectares; 406 - area 0.5311 hectares; 407 - area 0.1036 hectares; 417 - area 0.1138 hectares; and 418 - area 0.4173 hectares in village Surajpur, Pargana Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial Development (GNIDA).

3. In Writ Petition No. 2692 of 2009 - M/s. Saraswati Builders have challenged the same notifications, in acquiring plot Nos. 399 - area 0.4047 hectares, 400 - area 0.4174 hectares plot No. 403 - area 0.3414 hectares.

4. The Writ Petition No. 76722 of 2005 was filed on 15.12.2005, in which by order dated 19.12.2005, the Court directed the parties, to maintain status quo as on date with respect to the land in question. The Writ Petition No. 2692 of 2009 was filed on 19.01.2009, in which by order dated 19.04.2012, it was directed to be connected with Writ Petition No. 76722 of 2005, and the counsel for the respondents were given time to find out whether 80 % amount was deposited by the GNIDA, for the acquisition of the land. The award in respect of the land, for which notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act was issued on 19.07.2005, has been made on 22.07.2011, i.e. after six years and three days.

5. In Writ Petition No. 76722 of 2005 Bunda, Ibraheem and Taj Mohammad are all residents of village Surajpur. They are owners of the disputed land since time of their ancestors. It is stated in para 3 of the writ petition that the land in dispute is in the nature of pond, in which the petitioners rear and catch fish to earn their livelihood. In khatauni of 1399 F and kasra (record of possession) of 1411 F, the plots are recorded as pond. The petitioners have also annexed khataunies of 1400-F, 1401-F, 1402-F, 1403-F and kasras of 1404-F and 1411-F, in which the land is still recorded as pond, used for fishing.

6. In Writ Petition No. 2692 of 2009 - M/s. Saraswati Builders purchased the land in question vide registered sale deed dated 20.06.1989. The petitioners name was mutated in the revenue records. The partners of the firm have executed a registered power of attorney in the year 2007 in favour of Sri Naresh Kumar Agrawal, to safeguard their interest over the land in question. The petitioners have raised certain constructions including several rooms and bath rooms, and have applied for converting the land into abadi land. The permission was granted by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation by his order dated 4.4.1989. The petitioner thereafter on 30.06.2003, applied for no objection, to make certain other constructions in the abadi land, which was denied by GNIDA vide letter dated 24.09.2003, on the ground that the land was proposed to be acquired. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 9666 of 2004, which was dismissed by order dated 10.03.2004, with directions that in case notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act are not issued within six months, the authorities will consider the application of the petitioner and decide the same in accordance with law.

7. The petitioners have challenged the acquisition on the ground that since the land of Bunda and others is recorded as pond of which the user cannot be changed and the land owned by M/s. Saraswati Builders is in use as abadi since 1989, there was no urgency, for the acquisition of land. The planned industrial development to be carried out by GNIDA is not of such nature, for which provisions of Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act could be invoked dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. It is alleged that the acquisition proceedings are tainted with malafides, and have been initiated by abusing power vested in the respondents. The satisfaction recorded by the State Government for invoking urgency for planned development and to dispense with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, is illegal, arbitrary and malafide. The enquiry under Section 5-A can be exempted only in case where the urgency cannot brook any delay. The enquiry provides an opportunity to the owner of land to convince the authorities concerned that the land in question is not suitable for the purpose for which it is sought to be acquired, or the same sought to be acquired for the collateral purposes. In the present case, it is alleged that enquiry has been dispensed with on mechanical application of mind and on reports and materials which is identical as in the case of Radhey Shyam (dead) through Lrs Vs. State of U.P., Civil Appeal No.3261 of 2011 decided on 18.4.2011, and in which dispensation of enquiry was not accepted to be made in bonafide exercise of power.

8. The petitioners have relied upon judgment in Radhey Shyam v. State of U.P., (2011) 5 SCC 553 [LQ/SC/2011/573] ; and Greater Nodia Industrial Development Authority v. Devendra Kumar, (2011) 6 ADJ 480 [LQ/SC/2011/865] this Court had in Har Karan Singh v. State of U.P. (Writ Petition No.17068 of 2009) decided on 19.7.2011, in which the Courts have quashed similar notifications in respect of Village Patwari in the same District Gautam Budh Nagar, after holding that in the case of acquisition of land for planned industrial development, the provisions of Section 5-A could not be dispensed with, as there could be no urgency for planned industrial development to dispense with the minimal enquiry required under Section 5A of the Act, serving the principles of natural justice.

9. A Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 37443 of 2011 noticed that there was some conflict in the opinion expressed in Har Karan Singh v. State of U.P. (Supra) and Harish Chandra & Ors. v. State of U.P. ( Writ Petition No.45777 of 2008 decided on 25.11.2008) and referred the matter to be considered by a larger bench. Honble the Chief Justice by his order dated 6.8.2011 referred the matter to the Larger Bench. The referring order, however, did not frame any question of law. A large number of similar matters were filed after the judgment in Har Karan Singh v. State of U.P. dated 19.7.2011.

10. The Division Bench hearing all other matters coming before the Court challenging the notification for acquisition of land for planned industrial development on the ground of invoking the provisions of Section 17 (4) of the Act and dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, directed that all such matters be connected together. More than 400 writ petitions challenging the land acquisition proceedings for acquiring the land for planned industrial development of GNIDA were connected together and were decided by the Full Bench judgment dated 21.10.2010, rendered in leading writ petition no.37443 of 2011 titled as Gajraj & ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2011) 11 ADJ 1 (FB).

11. The three Judges Bench for its convenience to decide the cases classified the acquisition under challenge, into villages. It first considered the question of delay and latches and recorded the conclusions as follows:-

"In view of the foregoing conclusions we order as follows:

1. The Writ Petition No. 45933 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47545 of 2011 relating to village Nithari, Writ Petition No. 47522 of 2011 relating to village Sadarpur, Writ Petition No. 45196 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45208 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45211 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45213 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45216 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45223 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45224 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45226 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45229 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45230 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45235 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45238 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45283 of 2011 relating to village Khoda, Writ Petition No. 46764 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 46785 of 2011 relating to village Sultanpur, Writ Petition No. 46407 of 2011 relating to village Chaura Sadatpur and Writ Petition No. 46470 of 2011 relating to village Alaverdipur which have been filed with inordinate delay and laches are dismissed.

2 (i). The writ petitions of Group 40 (Village Devla) being Writ Petition No. 31126 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 59131 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 22800 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37118 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 42812 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 50417 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 54424 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 54652 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 55650 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 57032 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 58318 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 22798 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37784 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37787 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 31124 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 31125 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 32234 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 32987 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 35648 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 38059 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 41339 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47427 of 2011 and Writ Petition No. 47412 of 2011 are allowed and the notifications dated 26.5.2009 and 22.6.2009 and all consequential actions are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their land subject to deposit of compensation which they had received under agreement/award before the authority/Collector.

2 (ii). Writ petition No. 17725 of 2010 Omveer and others Vs. State of U.P. (Group 38) relating to village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi is allowed. Notifications dated 10.4.2006 and 6.9.2007 and all consequential actions are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their land subject to return of compensation received by them under agreement/award to the Collector.

2 (iii) Writ Petition No.47486 of 2011 (Rajee and others vs. State of U.P. and others) of Group-42 relating to village Asdullapur is allowed. The notification dated 27.1.2010 and 4.2.2010 as well as all subsequent proceedings are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled to restoration of their land.

3. All other writ petitions except as mentioned above at (1) and (2) are disposed of with following directions:

(a) The petitioners shall be entitled for payment of additional compensation to the extent of same ratio (i.e. 64.70%) as paid for village Patwari in addition to the compensation received by them under 1997 Rules/award which payment shall be ensured by the Authority at an early date. It may be open for Authority to take a decision as to what proportion of additional compensation be asked to be paid by allottees. Those petitioners who have not yet been paid compensation may be paid the compensation as well as additional compensation as ordered above. The payment of additional compensation shall be without any prejudice to rights of land owners under section 18 of the Act, if any.

(b) All the petitioners shall be entitled for allotment of developed Abadi plot to the extent of 10% of their acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 square meters. We however, leave it open to the Authority in cases where allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 6% or 8% have already been made either to make allotment of the balance of the area or may compensate the land owners by payment of the amount equivalent to balance area as per average rate of allotment made of developed residential plots.

4. The Authority may also take a decision as to whether benefit of additional compensation and allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 10% be also given to ;

(a) those land holders whose earlier writ petition challenging the notifications have been dismissed upholding the notifications; and

(b) those land holders who have not come to the Court, relating to the notifications which are subject matter of challenge in writ petitions mentioned at direction No.3.

5. The Greater NOIDA and its allottees are directed not to carry on development and not to implement the Master Plan 2021 till the observations and directions of the National Capital Regional Planning Board are incorporated in Master Plan 2021 to the satisfaction of the National Capital Regional Planning Board. We make it clear that this direction shall not be applicable in those cases where the development is being carried on in accordance with the earlier Master Plan of the Greater NOIDA duly approved by the National Capital Regional Planning Board.

6. We direct the Chief Secretary of the State to appoint officers not below the level of Principal Secretary (except the officers of Industrial Development Department who have dealt with the relevant files) to conduct a thorough inquiry regarding the acts of Greater Noida (a) in proceeding to implement Master Plan 2021 without approval of N.C.R.P. Board, (b) decisions taken to change the land use, (c) allotment made to the builders and (d) indiscriminate proposals for acquisition of land, and thereafter the State Government shall take appropriate action in the matter."

12. The Three Judges Bench in Gajraj v. State of U.P. (Supra) following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Anand Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 11 SCC 242 [LQ/SC/2010/745] ; Dev Sharan v. State of U.P., (2011) 4 SCC 769 [LQ/SC/2011/365] ; Radhey Shyam (dead) through LRs. V. State of U.P., (2011) 5 SCC 553 [LQ/SC/2011/573] , observed in para 311 that the reasons given for invoking urgency clause in all the cases were the same, which were given in Radhey Shyams case and thereafter noticing the reasons given in the judgment in Greater Nodia Industrial Development Authority v. Devendra Kumar, (2011) 6 ADJ 480 (SC) held in paras 321, 322 and 323 that in all the cases the invocation of Section 17 (4) of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, while issuing notification under Section 4, is vitiated. The dispensation of enquiry being invalid, all the petitioners were entitled for an opportunity to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act.

13. In respect of pre-notification and post notification delay, the three Judges Bench in Gajraj Singh held in para 332 that in the event there is sufficient material to explain the delay prior to issuing notification under Section 4 or subsequent to the notification under Section 6 the delay itself does not vitiate the acquisition. In Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Devendra Kumar (Supra) the Apex Court had held that the delay in proceedings itself shall not create a ground or cause for urgency but increase the already existing urgency for acquisition of land for any public purpose. It was held that the delay may be by objections filed by interested persons or by lethargy of officers, which itself should not be a ground, but has material bearing on the question of urgency particularly in a situation where no material is placed before the appropriate government justifying that the urgency was of such nature that necessitated elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A. The crux of the matter is whether urgency was such that summary enquiry under Section 5A was necessary to be dispensed with, since acquisition could not have waited for few days or few weeks. In large number of cases before the three Judges Bench the pre-notification and post notification delay caused clearly indicated that cases were not such, so as to invoke Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act.

14. In para 349 the three judges Bench in Gajraj Singhs case (Supra) held that the authority acted in colourable exercise of powers in exercising its statutory function of acquiring the land as per Section 6 (2) (a) of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. The authority on the pretext of carrying planned industrial development as it was statutorily obliged to carry, pursued different objects and purpose that the transferring the land to private persons dehorse the industrial development. The malafides, it was held in para 350, were not successfully pleaded or proved.

15. The three judges Bench thereafter held in para 362 that in many cases the possession was not taken by the State authorities in accordance with law and possession memos filed by State authorities could not be treated to be valid possession memo evidencing the possession. On the vesting of the land and its consequence on the validity of the acquisition the Court in Gajraj Singh (Supra) held that in view of Kesari Singh v. Government of U.P. (Civil Appeal No.1331 of 2010) decided on 1.2.2010, even if the cases in which possession was taken, it may be possible to the Court to grant other reliefs, and that restitution was permissible. On the question whether the non-declaration of award within the statutory period under Section 11A would affect the acquisition the Court followed the ratio in Satyendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., 1993 4 SCC 369 [LQ/SC/1993/759] ; and Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agrawal, (2011) 5 SCC 394 [LQ/SC/2011/628] and repelled the argument on the basis of Section 11A.

16. The three Judges Bench in Gajraj Singh noticed that there was difference of opinion on the applicability of Section 17 (3A) in M/s Delhi Air Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors., JT (2011) 9 SC 440 [LQ/SC/2011/1087] , and found that since the matter is referred to the Larger Bench, the judgment in Satyendra Prasad Jains case will hold the field and hence it held that the non compliance of Section 17 (3A) of the Act, will not vitiate the acquisition. The plea of waiver was also not accepted. In para 406 the three judges Bench held that it cannot be presumed that the petitioners/land owners have waived their rights and cannot be non-suited on that ground. The plea of acquiescence, argued on behalf of GNIDA, for having accepted compensation was also repelled. The Court thereafter proceeded on the question of third party rights and construction and noticed that in many cases after taking possession the land was allotted to builders for group housing. A number of applications were filed by interveners, which were allotted different group housing plots, and that many plots were also allotted in Village Patwari. The Court noticed in para 422 that after creation of third party rights the allottees have also proceeded to carry on building activities and substantial constructions have been made on some of the place. The flat owners association claimed that large number of members of public have booked their flats and most of them have taken financial assistance from banks and other financial institutions. The three judges Bench also noticed that in respect of Village Pali, Malakpur, Roja Yakubpur, Birondi Chakrasenpur, Dabara, Yusufpur Chak Shahberi, Khanpur, Tusiyana the acquisitions were upheld by the Court. In respect of Birondi Chakrasenpur in Writ Petition No.23244 of 2003, Bhopal Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. by judgment dated 5.3.2004 the acquisition affected notification dated 28.11.2002 and the declaration dated 29.1.2003 was upheld. The Court thereafter noticed that the judgment in Harish Chands case, which was alleged to be in conflict with Har Karan Sighs case was not in accordance with law laid down in Narain Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra and Union of India v. Mukesh Hans. The judgment in Har Karan Singh was upheld. In para 456 the Court observed that in view of the discussion the Division Bench judgment in Harish Chandra is not to be approved, whereas view taken by the Division Bench in Har Karan Singh that the invocation of Section 17 (4), was not justified is approved.

17. Thereafter the Court picked up the matter of individual villages and observed in para 463 to 478 following Bondu Ramaswamy & Ors. v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2010) 7 SCC 129 [LQ/SC/2010/502] , that though the land owners of the village Patwari were called for negotiation and agreement was reached with them, the GNIDA did not call the land owners of other villages for negotiation, an amount of Rs.550/- per sq. mtr. in addition to Rs.850/- per sq. mtr., which comes to 64.70%, and the allotment of 10% of land by way of developed plots, to such land owners, where constructions have started, would meet the ends of justice. This arrangement was made only in respect of land on which the development had taken place or had started, and third party rights had intervened.

18. In the present case, other than the issue of dispensing enquiry under Section 5-A on the ground that there is no such urgency, the petitioners submit that delay of six years in declaring the award under Section 11, the proceedings for acquisitions have lapsed. Section 11-A of the Act provides that the Collector shall make an award under Section 11 of the Act within a period of two years form the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. The explanation to Section 11-A provides that in computing the period of two years referred to in Section 11, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.

19. It is submitted that the opinion of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain Vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1994 SC 2517]; Awadh Behari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar [AIR 1996 SC 122 [LQ/SC/1995/859] ] and Allahabad Development Authority Vs. Nasiruz-Zaman [1996 (6) SCC 424 [LQ/SC/1996/1403] ] are not attracted inasmuch as in the present case, dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A was illegal, arbitrary and in malafide exercise of powers. If the Court holds that dispensation of Section 5-A and then notifications under Sections 4 and 6, invoking Section 17 (1) are illegal, and without jurisdiction, the land would not vest under Section 17 of the Act in the State free from all encumbrances and consequently the award declared after six years would not survive the vice of Section 11-A of the Act.

20. It is further submitted that the interim order of the Court dated 19.12.2005 in writ petition No 76722 of 2005 will not arrest the limitation in declaring the award under Section 11 of the Act nor it will attract explanation to Section 11-A inasmuch as maintenance of status quo was in respect of the land in question, which referred to possession and had no effect of restraining the respondents from making the award.

21. In the counter affidavit of Sri Harnam Singh, Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition), GNIDA, it is stated in paragraph Nos. 33 and 43 as follows:-

"33. That in reply to paragraph Nos. 9, 10, and 11 of the writ petition it is submitted that in the request submitted by the Grater Noida Development Authority to Additional District magistrate (Land Acquisition), District Gautam Buddh Nagar for the purposes of initiating proceedings for acquisition of land of Village Surajpur, Pargana dadri, Tehsil Sadar, it was specifically stated that the land in question was proposed to be acquired for planned industrial development in district Gautam Budh Nagar, through Greater Noida Development Authority. Upon receipt of the said request letter and the Note containing justification for invocation of urgency, the District Magistrate/Collector Gaudam Buddh Nagar on being satisfied recommended for acquisition of 6.9330 hectares of land in Village Surajpur, Pargana Dadri, Tehsil Sadar by invoking of the urgency provisions as contained in Section 17 of Land Acquisition Act. The complete records were placed before the State Government through the Directorate of Land Acquisition with recommendation for acquisition of 6.9330 hectares, and upon consideration of the complete materials, the State Government recorded its subjective satisfaction for invoking of the urgency clause under Section 17, and approval was granted by the State Government for issuance of notification under Section 4(1)/17 (4) and initiation of acquisition proceedings for 6.9330 hectares. The State Government has applied its mind on the material available on record before the invocation of the urgency clause under section 17 (4) of the land acquisition Act. The land acquired has been put to use for which it has been acquired. Once the urgency clause is invoked for the acquisition of the land, the right to file and hear the objections under Section 5 (A) of land acquisition act is dispensed with.

43. That the contents of paragraph No.5 of the supplementary affidavit as stated are not admitted. The acquisition of the land has been made for Planned Industrial Development and in particular for development of natural Water Body for Boating Purposes and for development of Natural Water Resources. As the acquired area is in the vicinity of district Collectorate, C.D.O. Office and as District Judicial Center, therefore, the land is being developed for providing facilities for food and tourism for coming persons. Part of he acquired area is being used for development of Aqua Village and for Children Park".

22. In the counter affidavit of G.P. Srivatava, posted as Land Consultant in GNIDA it is stated in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6 as follows:-

"5. That in reply to the averments of para 3 of the writ petition it is stated that the notification for acquiring the land of plot No. 399 area 0.4047 hectare, Plot No. 400 area 0.4174 hectare and plot No. 403 area 0.3414 hectare Village Surajpur has been issued under Section 4/17 dated 27.08.2004, the same was published in widely circulated newspapers Vartman Satta and dainik Pralayankar on 29.08.2004. The people of the area were also informed about acquisition of land by beating of drums and notices were pasted in public building on 21.09.2004. The declaration under Section 6/17 issued on 19.7.2005 and same was published in widely circulated newspapers Dainik Jagran & Amar Ujala on 28.07.2005. The possession of the land was taken by the State Govt and handed over the physical possession on 1.6.2006. The land has vested in Respondent Greater Noida Authority free from all encumbrances. The Annexure filed by the petitioner which is Annexure 1 of the writ petition is of 17.2.2002, i.e. before the issuance of notification under Section 4/17 and section 6/17 of the land Acquisition act. The Greater Noida was constituted on 28.01.1991 under Section 3 of U.P. Act No.6 of 1976. The Village Surajpur came in the notified area of Greater Noida Authority and Section 9 of U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976 bans on erection of buildings in contravention of regulations. It is further submitted that at the time when Greater Noida was constituted, the plot No. 399, 400 ad 403 of Village Surajpur were agricultural land and no construction was found on the aforesaid plot numbers. The photocopy of the possession memo dated 1.6.2006 and Khasra 1398 fasli are being filed herewith and marked as Annexure CA-1 and CA-2 to this counter affidavit collectively.

6. That the contents of para 4 and 5 of the writ petition are not admitted hence specifically denied. After the acquisition of the land the possession was taken by the State Govt., and handed over the possession of the land to the Greater Noida Authority, the land has vested in Greater Noida Authority free from all encumbrances with the provision of Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner has not annexed the power of attorney in the writ petition. It is further submitted that from the perusal of Khatauni 1398 fasli, the plot number 399, 400 and 403 of village Surajpur were agricultural land and were not abadi. Before the acquisition, a survey was made from plot to plot and in the survey report, no construction was found in plot No. 399; in Plot No. 400 a 6 feet high wall was constructed on 3 sides, 1 Iron gate and 2 rooms of 10 x 8 feet; and in plot no. 303 1 wall of 6 feet in height on the east side on the plot were found. It is specifically stated that the petitioner himself has stated in para 3 of the writ petition that he purchased the land on 20.06.1989 and in para under reply has filed an annexure-2 dated 4.4.1989, which is according to the petitioners affidavit is before the petitioner purchased the land. It is pertinent to mention here that before the petitioner purchased the land, how can he get the permission of the land for abadi. Although, the order itself was valid only for 4 months. It is specifically stated that the land has been defined under section 3 (a) of the Land Acquisition Act and there is no prohibition to acquire the abadi according to the Land Acquisition Act."

23. A Supplementary Affidavit of Sri Vijay Shanker, posted as Naib Tehsildar in GNIDA has been filed stating in paragraph No.6 that 10 % of compensation amount was deposited on 21.1.2011, another 10 % on 30.12.04, and 70 % on 29.09.2004. An amount of Rs.29,97,250/- was deposited on 2.6.05, according to National Rehabilitation policy and in this manner 80 % of the compensation amount was deposited. Thereafter, it is stated in paragraph Nos. 7, 8 & 9 as follows:-

"7. That it is pertinent to mention that as per Master Plan the village Surajpur falls in Sector Ecoteh-II, BZP, R-Green, Institution. These Sectors have been earmarked for industrial institutional and recreational green. Several industries and institutional plots have been allotted plots and are functional. On he infrastructure development the Authority has spent over Rs.7612 lacs. the infrastructure development has been carried out in the village Surajpur. The road, sewer line, electrification, overhead tanks, drainage, lanes, bylanes, sector roads, parks etc., have been constructed. The land has also been reserved for Advocates Chamber. The important industries which has been allotted plots are Moserbear, Kaparo India, Yamaha Motors, Hindustan Times, Dawoo Anchor, Videcon, Anmol Baker,V-Lonfilaments.

8. That the office which are in Surajpur are the office of Collector District Court Vikas Bhawan Sale Tax Office Police Line and other Govt. officers are also here in the village Surajpur

9. That it is also pertinent to mention that on the Gata No. 399, 400 and 403,no development work has been carried out by the Authority. But these plots are important for the planned industrial development, as the important Govt. offices area in this Sector like District Court, Collectorate, Vikas Bhawan etc."

24. We have considered the respective submissions.

25. In Anand Singh & anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & another JT 2010 (8) SC 15 [LQ/SC/2010/745] decided on 28.7.2010; State of West Bengal and others v. Prafulla Churan Law 2011 (3) AD (SC) 296 decided on 4.2.2011and Dev Sharan & ors vs. State of UP & ors (2011) SCC L.Com 189 decided on 3.7.2011, the Supreme Court has considered the matter of invoking the urgency clause under Section 17 (1) and (4) along with Section 4 of the Act dispensing with hearing of objections under Section 5A. The Supreme Court, considering its earlier judgments held in paragraphs 29, 30, 31 of the Anand Singhs case (Supra) as follows:-

29. `Eminent domain is right or power of a sovereign State to appropriate the private property within the territorial sovereignty to public uses or purposes. It is exercise of strong arm of government to take property for public uses without owners consent. It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty and essential to the sovereign government. (Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 14, 1952 (West Publishing Co.,).

30. The power of eminent domain, being inherent in the government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for public purpose. Acquisition of private property by the State in the public interest or for public purpose is nothing but an enforcement of the right of eminent domain. In India, the Act provides directly for acquisition of particular property for public purpose. Though right to property is no longer fundamental right but Article 300A of the Constitution mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. That Section 5A of the Act confers a valuable right to an individual is beyond any doubt. As a matter of fact, this Court has time and again reiterated that Section 5A confers an important right in favour of a person whose land is sought to be acquired. When the government proceeds for compulsory acquisition of particular property for public purpose, the only right that the owner or the person interested in the property has, is to submit his objections within the prescribed time under Section 5A of the Act and persuade the State authorities to drop the acquisition of that particular land by setting forth the reasons such as the unsuitability of the land for the stated public purpose; the grave hardship that may be caused to him by such expropriation, availability of alternative land for achieving public purpose etc. Moreover, right conferred on the owner or person interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not only an important and valuable right but also makes the provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural justice. The exceptional and extraordinary power of doing away with an enquiry under Section 5A in a case where possession of the land is required urgently or in unforeseen emergency is provided in Section 17 of the Act. Such power is not a routine power and save circumstances warranting immediate possession it should not be lightly invoked. The guideline is inbuilt in Section 17 itself for exercise of the exceptional power in dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A. Exceptional the power, the more circumspect the government must be in its exercise. The government obviously, therefore, has to apply its mind before it dispenses with enquiry under Section 5A on the aspect whether the urgency is of such a nature that justifies elimination of summary enquiry under Section 5A. A repetition of statutory phrase in the notification that the state government is satisfied that the land specified in the notification is urgently needed and provision contained in Section 5A shall not apply, though may initially raise a presumption in favour of the government that pre-requisite conditions for exercise of such power have been satisfied, but such presumption may be displaced by the circumstances themselves having no reasonable nexus with the purpose for which power has been exercised. Upon challenge being made to the use of power under Section 17, the government must produce appropriate material before the court that the opinion for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A has been formed by the government after due application of mind on the material placed before it. It is true that power conferred upon the government under Section 17 is administrative and its opinion is entitled to due weight, but in a case where the opinion is formed regarding the urgency based on considerations not germane to the purpose, the judicial review of such administrative decision may become necessary. As to in what circumstances the power of emergency can be invoked are specified in Section 17(2) but circumstances necessitating invocation of urgency under Section 17(1) are not stated in the provision itself. Generally speaking, the development of an area (for residential purposes) or a planned development of city, takes many years if not decades and, therefore, there is no reason why summary enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A may not be held and objections of land owners/persons interested may not be considered. In many cases on general assumption, likely delay in completion of enquiry under Section 5A is set up as a reason for invocation of extraordinary power in dispensing with the enquiry little realizing that an important and valuable right of the person interested in the land is being taken away and with some effort enquiry could always be completed expeditiously. The special provision has been made in Section 17 to eliminate enquiry under Section 5A in deserving and cases of real urgency. The government has to apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is of such nature that necessitates dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A. We have already noticed few decisions of this Court. There is conflict of view in the two decisions of this Court viz.; Narayan Govind Gavate and Pista Devi. In Om Prakash this Court held that decision in Pista Devi must be confined to the fact situation in those days when it was rendered and the two-Judge Bench could not have laid down a proposition contrary to the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate. We agree. As regards the issue whether pre- notification and post-notification delay would render the invocation of urgency power void, again the case law is not consistent. The view of this Court has differed on this aspect due to different fact-situation prevailing in those cases. In our opinion such delay will have material bearing on the question of invocation of urgency power, particularly in a situation where no material has been placed by the appropriate government before the court justifying that urgency was of such nature that necessitated elimination of enquiry under Section 5A.

31. In a country as big as ours, the roof over head is a distant dream for large number of people. The urban development continues to be haphazard. There is no doubt that planned development and housing are matters of priority in developing nation. The question is as to whether in all cases of `planned development of the city or `for the development of residential area, the power of urgency may be invoked by the government and even where such power is invoked, should the enquiry contemplated under Section 5A be dispensed with invariably. We do not think so. Whether `planned development of city or `development of residential area cannot brook delay of few months to complete the enquiry under Section 5A In our opinion, ordinarily it can. The government must, therefore, do a balancing act and resort to the special power of urgency under Section 17 in the matters of acquisition of land for the public purpose viz.; `planned development of city or `for development of residential area in exceptional situation. Use of the power by the government under Section 17 for `planned development of the city or `the development of residential area or for `housing must not be as a rule but by way of an exception. Such exceptional situation may be for the public purpose viz., rehabilitation of natural calamity affected persons; rehabilitation of persons uprooted due to commissioning of dam or housing for lower strata of the society urgently; rehabilitation of persons affected by time bound projects, etc. The list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In any case, sans real urgency and need for immediate possession of the land for carrying out the stated purpose, heavy onus lies on the government to justify exercise of such power. It must, therefore, be held that the use of the power of urgency and dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A by the government in a routine manner for the `planned development of city or `development of residential area and thereby depriving the owner or person interested a very valuable right under Section 5A may not meet the statutory test nor could be readily sustained."

26. The pleadings and material for dispensing the enquiry under Section 5-A, in the present case are same as in the case of Sri Radhey Shyam (Dead) through LR vs. State of UP [Civil Appeal No. 3261 of 2011, decided on 18.4.2011]. The Supreme Court noticed all the previous judgments delivered by the Supreme Court in the past and laid down following principles:-

"53. From the analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and interpretation thereof by this Court in different cases, the following principles can be culled out:

(i) Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for public use. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owners consent provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good. - Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR (1954) SC 119 [LQ/SC/1953/119] , Chiranjit Lal 65Chowdhuri v. Union of India AIR (1951) SC 41 [LQ/SC/1950/51] and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat (1995) Supp. (1) SCC 596.

(ii) The legislations which provide for compulsory acquisition of private property by the State fall in the category of expropriatory legislation and such legislation must be construed strictly - DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622 [LQ/SC/2003/232] ; State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria (2003) 7 SCC 336 [LQ/SC/2003/788] and Dev Sharan v. State of U.P., Civil Appeal No.2334 of 2011 decided on 7.3.2011.

(iii) Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the Government can acquire the private property for public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking of ones property is a serious matter. If the property belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of the society or people suffering from other handicaps, then the Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to scrutinize the action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the land owner is likely to become landless and deprived of the only source of his livelihood and/or shelter.

(iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right to property without being heard. Only in a case of real urgency, the State can invoke the urgency provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing the land owner or other interested persons.

(v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5-A, the concerned authority must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will, in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired.

(vi) The satisfaction of the Government on the issue of urgency is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and the same can be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the private property is sought to be acquired is not a public purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due to mala fides or that the concerned authorities did not apply mind to the relevant factors and the records.

(vii) The exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of Section 5-A of the Act in terms of which any person interested in land can file objection and is entitled to be heard in support of his objection.

The use of word "may" in sub-section (4) of Section 17 makes it clear that it merely enables the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5-A would not apply to the cases covered under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17. In other words, invoking of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant of the exercise of power under Section 17(1).

(viii) The acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4).

The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years.

Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Section 5-A (1) and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters.

(ix) If land is acquired for the benefit of private persons, the Court should view the invoking of Section 17(1) and/or 17(4) with suspicion and carefully scrutinize the relevant record before adjudicating upon the legality of such acquisition."

27. The Supreme Court thereafter observed in the facts of that case, that there was no justification for the State Government to invoke the urgency provisions contained in Section 17 (1) excluding the application of Section 5A for the acquisition of land for planned industrial development of District Gautam Budh Nagar. Paragraphs 54 to 62 of the judgment are quoted:-

"54. The stage is now set for consideration of the issue whether the State Government was justified in invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1) and excluding the application of Section 5-A for the acquisition of land for planned industrial development of District Gautam Budh Nagar. A recapitulation of the facts shows that upon receipt of proposal from the Development Authority, the State Government issued directions to the concerned authorities to take action for the acquisition of land in different villages including village Makora. The comments/certificate signed by three officers, which was submitted in the context of Government Order dated 21.12.2006 was accompanied by several documents including proposal for the acquisition of land, preliminary inquiry report submitted by the Amin, Land Acquisition, copies of khasra, 69 khatauni and lay out plan, 10 per cent of the estimated compensation and a host of other documents. In the note dated nil jointly signed by Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida, Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar and four other officers/officials, the following factors were cited in justification of invoking the urgency provisions:

a. The area was notified under Uttar Pradesh Industrial Areas Development Act, 1976 for planned industrial development.

b. If there is any delay in the acquisition of land then the same is likely to be encroached and that will adversely affect the concept of planned industrial development of the district.

c. Large tracts of land of the nearby villages have already been acquired and in respect of some villages, the acquisition proceedings are under progress.

d. The Development Authority urgently requires land for overall development, i.e. construction of roads, laying of sewerages, providing electricity, etc. in the area.

e. The development scheme has been duly approved by the State Government but the work has been stalled due to non- acquisition of land of village Makora.

f. Numerous reputed and leading industrial units of the country want to invest in the State of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, it is 70 extremely urgent and necessary that land is acquired immediately.

g. If land is not made available to the incoming leading and reputed industrial concerns of the country, then they will definitely establish their units in other States and if this happens, then it will adversely affect employment opportunities in the State and will also go against the investment policy of the Government.

h. If written/oral objections are invited from the farmers and are scrutinized, then it will take unprecedented long time and disposal thereof will hamper planned development of the area.

i. As per the provisions of the Act, there shall be at least one years time gap between publication of the notifications under Sections 4 and 17 and Section 6.

55. In our view, the above noted factors do not furnish legally acceptable justification for the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(1) because the acquisition is primarily meant to cater private interest in the name of industrial development of the district. It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor any evidence has been produced before the Court to show that the State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities of the State are intending to establish industrial 71units on the acquired land either by itself or through its agencies/instrumentalities. The respondents have justified the invoking of urgency provisions by making assertions, which are usually made in such cases by the executive authorities i.e. the inflow of funds in the State in the form of investment by private entrepreneurs and availability of larger employment opportunities to the people of the area. However, we do not find any plausible reason to accept this tailor-made justification for approving the impugned action which has resulted in depriving the appellants of their constitutional right to property.

Even if planned industrial development of the district is treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(1) and 17(4). The objective of industrial development of an area cannot be achieved by pressing some buttons on computer screen. It needs lot of deliberations and planning keeping in view various scientific and technical parameters and environmental concerns. The private entrepreneurs, who are desirous of making investment in the State, take their own time in setting up the industrial units. Usually, the State Government and its agencies/instrumentalities would give them two to three years to put up their factories, establishments etc.

Therefore, time required for ensuring compliance of the provisions contained in Section 5-A cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be portrayed as delay which will frustrate the purpose of 72acquisition. In this context, it is apposite to note that the time limit for filing objection under Section 5-A (1) is only 30 days from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Of course, in terms of sub-section (2), the Collector is required to give opportunity of hearing to the objector and submit report to the Government after making such further inquiry, as he thinks necessary. This procedure is likely to consume some time, but as has been well said, "Principles of natural justice are to some minds burdensome but this price-a small price indeed-has to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of law."

56. In this case, the Development Authority sent proposal some time in 2006. The authorities up to the level of the Commissioner completed the exercise of survey and preparation of documents by the end of December, 2006 but it took one year and almost three months to the State Government to issue notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4). If this much time was consumed between the receipt of proposal for the acquisition of land and issue of notification, it is not possible to accept the argument that four to five weeks within which the objections could be filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A and the time spent by the Collector in making inquiry under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A would have defeated the object of acquisition.

57. The apprehension of the respondents that delay in the acquisition of land will lead to enormous encroachment is totally unfounded. It is beyond the comprehension of any person of ordinary prudence to think that the land owners would encroach their own land with a view to frustrate the concept of planned industrial development of the district.

58. The perception of the respondents that there should be atleast one years time gap between the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 is clearly misconceived. The time limit of one year specified in clause (ii)) of the proviso to Section 6(1) is the outer limit for issue of declaration. This necessarily means that the State Government can complete the exercise under Sections 5-A and 6 in a shorter period.

59. The only possible conclusion which can be drawn from the above discussion is that there was no real and substantive urgency which could justify invoking of the urgency provision under Section 17(1) and in any case, there was no warrant to exclude the application of Section 5-A which, as mentioned above, represent the statutory embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem.

60. We also find merit in the appellants plea that the acquisition of their land is vitiated due to violation of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. A reading of the survey report shows that the committee constituted by the State Government had recommended release of land measuring 18.9725 hectares. Many parcels of land were released from acquisition because the land owners had already raised constructions and were using the same as dwelling units. A large chunk of land measuring 4.3840 hectares was not acquired apparently because the same belong to an ex-member of the legislative assembly. The appellants had also raised constructions on their land and were using the same for residential and agricultural purposes. Why their land was not left out from acquisition has not been explained in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. The High Court should have treated this as sufficient for recording a finding that the respondents had adopted the policy of pick and choose in acquiring some parcels of land and this amounted to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Indeed it has not been pleaded by the respondents that the appellants cannot invoke the doctrine of equality because the other parcels of land were illegally left out from acquisition.

61. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the respondents that the Court may not annul the impugned acquisition because land of other villages had already been acquired and other land owners of village Makora have not come forward to challenge the acquisition of their land cannot be entertained and the Court cannot refuse to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the appellants merely because the others have not come forward to challenge the illegitimate exercise of power by the State Government. It is quite possible that others may have, due to sheer poverty, ignorance and similar handicaps not been able to avail legal remedies for protection of their rights, but that cannot be made basis to deny what is due to the appellants.

62. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellants is allowed. Respondent No.1 is directed to pay cost of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the appellants for forcing unwarranted litigation on them. It is, however, made clear that the respondents shall be free to proceed from the stage of Section 4 notification and take appropriate action after complying with Section 5-A (1) and (2) of the Act. It is needless to say if the appellants feel aggrieved by the fresh exercise undertaken by the State Government then they shall be free to avail appropriate legal remedy."

28. In Darshan Lal (dead) by Lrs Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and others, Civil Appeal No. 11169 of 2001 decided on 3.1.2012, the Supreme Court again considered the question whether State Government can justify invocation of urgency provision contained in Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act for the acquisition of the land reiterated the principles laid down in Anand Singh (Supra), Radhey Shyam (Supra), Dev Sharan (Supra), State of West Bengal Vs. Prafulla Churan Law (Supra) and Devendra Kumar Tyagi (Supra) and held that the acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4; but that by itself, does not justify the exercise of powers of the Government under Section 17 (1) and/ or Section 17 (4), The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution, implementation of the scheme relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17 (1) In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodies in Section 5-A (1) and (2) is not warranted in such matters.

29. In the present case, we further find that plot Nos. 404, 406, 407, 417, 418, 421-Ka are recorded as Talab (pond) for machali palan (fisheries). It is admitted in the counter affidavit of Harnam Singh, Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition), GNIDA that these plots are recorded as talab and are proposed to be developed as natural water body for boating purposes and for development of natural water resources. He has also stated that part of the acquired area is being used for development of acqua village and for children park. The development of water body, acqua village and children park cannot be treated nor was proposed for planned industrial development. The State Government should have been appraised by GNIDA of the user of the land to apply its mind to the dispensation with the provisions of Section 5-A.

30. We are of the view that on the material on record, the acquisition of pond was not contemplated in the acquisition for planned industrial development and in any case the development of acqua park and children park around the natural water body in public purpose, is not so urgent that the provisions of Section 5-A could be dispensed with.

31. In Hinch Lal Tiwari Vs. Kamala Devi [AIR 2001 SC 3215 [LQ/SC/2001/1509] ] followed in Jagpal Singh Vs. State of Punjab [2011 (3) AWC 2379 (SC), the Supreme Court held that the land recorded as a pond, which is a part of habitant of the village and essential to maintain ecosystem must not be allowed to be allotted to anybody for construction of a house or any allied purpose.

32. In the present case there is no such averments made by the respondents that the petitioners Bunda and others had exploited or diverted the land use for any other purpose. There are no allegations to the effect that the petitioners were creating any nuisance or allowing garbage to be collected or using the land for abadi purpose. The acquisition of land, which is recorded and used as pond, for an urgent planned industrial development is thus held to be illegal, arbitrary and for malafide purposes.

33. We are further of the view that in the present case, after having found that there was no urgency and thus Section 17 (1) and (4) could not be invoked, and the provisions of Section 5-A could not have been dispensed with, the acquisition of land is illegal and consequently by operation of Section 11-A of the Act, since the award was not declared within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of land have lapsed. The award has been made six years after the notification under Section 6 of the Act.

34. In the present case, it is stated in para 8 of the counter affidavit of Harnam Singh, posted as Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)/Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) GNIDIA that possession of an area of 4.9915 hectares was taken on 1.6.2006 and that only three tenure holders out of 14, have accepted compensation for an area of 1.9185 hectares out of 6.9330 hectares, and that the award was declared on 27.04.2011.

35. We also find that there was no stay of dispossession or of declaration of award. The order dated 19.12.2005 in writ petition No. 76722 of 2005 was with regard to maintaining status quo with respect to the land in question. The order of status quo does not amount to staying any action or proceeding and thus there was no stay operating against declaration of award. The State Government had also clearly understood that there was no stay of making award, as the interim order dated 19.12.2005, has not been vacated, and that an award has been made on 27.4.2011, covering entire land in dispute in these two writ petitions.

36. Sri Harnam Singh, the Special Land Acquisition Officer has observed in the award dated 27.4.2011 that Section 11-A of the Act will not be applicable in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain (Supra). The reasoning is incorrect inasmuch as for the reasons given above, the invocation of Section 17 (1) was without authority.

37. We may also observe that the objection taken by the State Government and the GNIDA on the delay in filing the writ petition No. 2692 of 2009 is not valid inasmuch as the award was declared on 27.4.2011, and the writ petition was filed on 19.01.2009. The writ petition No. 76722 of 2005 filed by Bunda and others was pending at that time. The petitioners in both the writ petitions have not accepted the compensation.

38. We are of the view that in the proceedings for acquisition of land in these two cases vide notification dated 27.08.2004 under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17(1) and (4) and notification dated 19.7.2005 under Section 6 read with Section 17 (1) of the Act, the application of Section 17 (1) dispensing with enquiries under Section 17 (4) was without any real or actual urgency. The powers to dispense with enquiries under Section 5-A purportedly for industrial development of GNIDA were exercised mechanically, arbitrarily and with malafide purposes. The entire acquisition of land in the present case was for oblique purpose as major portion of the area was covered with water, recorded as pond and was used for fishing. The respondents have now in the counter affidavit pleaded and proposed to maintain only water body, acqua park and children park which was not the purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired, dispensing with Section 5-A. We further find that the entire acquisition proceedings has lapsed as the award under Section 11 has been declared on 27.4.2011, whereas the notification under Section 6 was published more than six years ago on 19.7.2005.

39. Both the writ petitions are allowed. The notification dated 27.08.2004, under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17(1) and (4) and notification dated 19.7.2005, under Section 6 read with Section 17 (1) of the Act are quashed. The respondents will return the land to the petitioners. The petitioners will be entitled to receive Rs.25,000/- each, as costs of litigation.