Bhagwati Prasad, J.

1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

2. The suit was instituted by plaintiff for ejectment, mense profits and fixing of standard rent. The appellant has challenged the fixation of provisional rent, which is claimed to be on the higher side. According to the learned Counsel, in 1970 the premises was let out at the rate of Rs. 125/- per month. The learned Counsel submits that the premises which was let out for Rs. 125/- in 1970 its rent has been enhanced to Rs. 2,000/-. According to the learned Counsel, this increase is disproportionate. The learned Counsel has further submitted that increase of Rs. 2000/- is only for the period starting from January, 2004. Prior to this the rent has been enhanced from Rs. 125/- to Rs. 300/-. That too again is in the higher side. The rent has been fixed in many multiplies of the original rent. Provisional rent is to be fixed in terms of Section 7 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the)-

3. It has been urged that while deciding the question of fixation of provisional rent the trial court has taken into consideration such parameters which could not have been looked into. The determination is, therefore, not justified.

4. The learned Counsel for the respondent, controverting the allegations of the appellant, submitted that it is not correct to say that the rent fixed is not within the Scheme, provided by the. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant, as and when a court is to consider fixation of provisional rent, under the Scheme of the of 1950, it has to do so in summary manner. While doing so it can look into the Scheme of the as provided in Section 6(3) of the. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 7 of thethe Court is to hold summary enquiry. It is for holding such enquiry, broader view of the provision in Section 6(3) of theis taken into consideration though it cannot be said to be out of place for that. Expression standard rent in Section 6(3) of thecan be construed to be provisional rent. The whole exercise, therefore, can be taken in that light. In terms of these provisions, the Court has to see that standard rent (read provisional) of any premise if not possible to be determined in view of the provisions of Section 6(2), Section 6(3) of theis to be resorted to. Thus, the standard (rent provisional) rent has to be fixed in terms of Section 6(3) of theof 1950. Now, that provision of Section 6(2) of thehas been struck down by this Court in Khem Chand v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. , the court has to look into the scheme of Section 6(3). In the scheme of Section 6(3) the court has to take into consideration the following factors-

(1) having due regard to the prevailing rent or standard rent for similar premises in the same locality the various amenities (such as electricity, water connection, sanitary fittings and the like) attached to the premises,

(2) the cost of construction, maintenance and repairs thereof.

(3) the special reason, if any, proved by the plaintiff and

(4) other relevant considerations.

5. The learned Counsel emphasised that as and when the courts consider the question of fixation of standard (read provisional) rent under the of 1950 it has to consider the four factors enumerated herein above as delineated in Sub-section (3) of Section 6. In the instant case in 1970 the rent was Rs. 125A. In 1970 the gold prices were less than Rs. 100/- per tola. In 2004, when the order impugned was passed, the gold prices were escalating in between Rs. 6,000/- and Rs. 7,000/-. This is almost 60 to 70 times of the price of gold in 1970, If the escalation of price is computed in terms of gold, the standard rent fixed by the trial court is below the level of inflation which has occurred in the price of gold. This can be one of the considerations, as delineated in Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of theof 1950.

6. In the instant case the trial court has noticed that other considerations being consideration Nos. 1, 2 and 3, regarding these facts no evidence was produced by the plaintiff. In that background the trial court has taken into consideration the factor of price rise to commodities in eight years. The price index almost gets doubled in eight years. Taking 32 years to be the total period, the trial court has come to the conclusion that Rs. 2,000/- should be the rent. The trial court has considered one of the factors which is a relevant consideration in fixing the standard rent, i.e. escalation of the price in index. This Court in Khem Chands case (supra), has taken into consideration the various factors, including the price index, to be a relevant consideration for enhancing the rent and, therefore, the learned Counsel for the respondent justified the judgment claiming that the rent which was Rs. 125A in 1970, if is enhanced to Rs. 2,000/-, this would only mean a compensatory enhancement because the property prices have gone much high. Whatever land was available for few thousand rupees is now available in lacs of rupees. Thus, the property price have seen an upsurge which is phenomenal. The prices have gone by lacs and in that background if Rs. 2,000/- is considered to be the standard rent, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent, is on the lesser side and that being the position, the learned Counsel has emphasised that the case is one which is liable to be rejected and the findings of the trial court deserves to be approved.

7. I have given my thoughtful consideration and have perused the record.

8. As and when a summary enquiry is to be held in the matter for fixing provisional rent it has to be guided by some legal principles. Section 7 of thespeaks of summary enquiry. This enquiry is to be held in relation to a suit instituted for fixing standard rent under Section 6 of the. The ultimate out come of the suit will have to be in consonance with Section 6 of the. For that, detailed enquiry will have to be under taken as required in the suit. When the jurisdiction is exercised in relation to fixation of provisional rent under Section 7 of theit can keep broader limits in mind as delineated in Section 6 of the. That would keep the provisional rent in the line of the standard rent which will be fixed ultimately. This would thus be a proposition which will be one, faced by the parties ultimately.

9. At the time when the trial court exercises jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Act, it will generally have less material before it. Major evidence will only come at the trial. A summary enquiry is required to be undertaken. A correct note can be struck only if objective appreciation is made of the circumstances. A pragmatic view will be required to be taken keeping in view rational thoughts. A landlord cannot be permitted to get more than what he can chew. Similarly a tenant cannot be made to ridicule the landlord by not offering a reasonable rent.

10. In view of the aforesaid, if an analytical reading is given to Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act, then we find that many parameters have been delineated in the Section to determine the standard rent. The section clearly speaks that the court should have due regard to the prevailing rent or standard rent for similar premises in the same locality for various amenities. The consideration can be one of the safest consideration available. But when this aspect is not suitably available then other parameters can be pressed into service. Another aspect available can be in the shape of cost of construction, maintenance and repairs etc. The premises can be valued for. determining the current level of property prices for its maintenance and construction and this has to be read with such reasons which would be inclusive of the price of land, which goes on increasing periodically. These factors have to be proved by the plaintiff as special reasons. Apart from all these considerations, the Court is empowered to look into the other relevant considerations. For the purposes of looking into the other relevant considerations. For the purposes of looking into the relevancy of the other relevant considerations, the judicial notice could be taken of the market conditions and the prevailing circumstances.

11. Here it would be relevant to notice the treatment given by this Court to Section 6(2) in the case of Khem Chand (supra). This Court has considered the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in the Motor General Traders v. State of A.P. : AIR1984SC120 , wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held:

What was once a non-discriminatory piece of legislation may in course of time become discriminatory and be exposed to a successful challenge on the ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus it cannot be said that if at the time when the was enacted Section 32(b) was not unconstitutional, it cannot at any time thereafter be challenged on the ground of constitutionality. The long period that has elapsed after the passing of the itself serves as a crucial factor in deciding the question whether the impugned law has become discriminatory or not because the ground on which the classification of buildings into two categories is made is not a historical or geographical one but is an economic one. Exemption was granted by way of an incentive to encourage building activity and in the circumstances such exemption cannot be allowed to last for ever.

12. This Court has further considered in Khem Chands case (supra) another Supreme Court can in the matter of Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna : [1987]3SCR765 , wherein the Honble Supreme Court has observed that there is no presumption that in all cases the tenants are weaker sections. By lapse of time the tenants (at least many of them) doing business in commercial buildings taken on rent are for more affluent financially than the owners of the building in which they do business.

13. In the instant case the tenant is using the premises commercially which is more than 1800 sq. ft. and to grant a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per month as rent is only a little more than one rupees per square ft., which is not a commercially viable rate, yet the court has only allowed that, therefore, cannot be found fault with.

14. The Honble Supreme Court in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1998SC602 has taken note of various factors which are considered necessary for increase in rent. The rent, as increased by the lower court, is not considered to be less by any standard.

15. In the instant case, the trial court has considered the increase in price Index which is very commonly used factor in enhancing various payments, one of them being grant of Dearness Allowance of the employees which determine the dearness pay. The price index having roughly gone double, in every eight years, if for 32 years the court has calculated that method then it cannot be said that the method applied by the court is not in conformity with the valid consideration required for a summary determination,

16. In this view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the consideration which have prevailed with the trial court are not liable to be judicially interfered with. In that view of the matter, the findings for fixation of standard rent appears to be justified and deserves to be confirmed.

17. In the result, these is no force in the appeal, the same is dismissed.