Agarwala, J.These are two appeals by the defendants.

2. The facts are as follows: The plaintiffs second party owed Rs. 495-9-6 to Puran Rai on two mortgages and two handnotes. Being pressed by their creditor to repay their debts they executed in favour of the defendants two documents in order to raise the necessary money on 2nd July 1928. One was a sale deed for Rs. 300 and the other a sudbharna bond for Rs. 195-9-6. The defendants were put in possession of the land thus sold to them and of the land mortgaged to them. The consideration for the sale of the land and the mortgage was not paid to the plaintiffs second party but left with the defendants for payment to Puran Rai. Defendants failed to pay to Puran Rai. Plaintiffs second party themselves paid off the hand-notes on 25th March 1929 and Puran Rai sued them on the mortgages and obtained a decree on 7th February 1934. On 6th August of the same year, in order to meet the costs of this litigation, the plaintiffs executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs first party for a consideration of Rs. 700 in respect both of the lands which had been sold to the defendants and of the land which had been mortgaged to them in 1928. Subsequently, the lands mortgaged in 1928 to the defendants were put up for sale in execution of a money decree against the plaintiffs second party and purchased by plaintiffs third party. The present suit was instituted on 24th September 1935. The plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the land covered by the sale deed and mortgage of 1928 and the consideration which the defendants had failed to pay.

3. The defence was that Puran Rais hand-notes had been paid off by the defendants and that the money due on Puran Rais mortgages had been paid to the plaintiffs second party at their request when they were in need of money for the expenses of a sradh ceremony. Neither of the Courts below has accepted either of these defences. So far as the lands sold to the defendants in 1928 are concerned, the first Court held that as the title had passed to the defendants the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover them. So far as the lands mortgaged with the defendants in 1928 are concerned, the trial Court gave the plaintiffs a decree for possession and mesne profits.

4. Against the decision of the trial Court two appeals were preferred. Plaintiffs appealed against the decree disallowing their claim to the recovery of the lands which were the subject-matter of the sale deed and out of that appeal has arisen Second Appeal No. 575. The defendants appealed with regard to the lands which were the subject-matter of the mortgage and out of that appeal has arisen Second Appeal No. 576. It will be convenient to deal with these two appeals separately.

Second Appeal No. 575 of 1939.

5. The sale deed of 1928 provided that out of the consideration of Rs. 300, Rs. 185 was to be paid to Puran Rai in respect of the dues on a mortgage of 6th July 1924, Rs. 19-0-9 in respect of a mortgage of 30th April 1922 and Rs. 95-15-3 in respect of the dues on a hand-note of ohaith 2, 1333 Fasli. The dues on the handnote were in fact paid not by the defendants but by the plaintiffs second party on 25th March 1929. Puran Rai obtained a decree in the suit on his mortgages on 7th February 1934. The appellate Court held that the plaintiffs claim to recover the consideration was barred so far as the amount on Puran Rais handnote was concerned, but so far as the money due on Puran Rais mortgages was concerned it was held that the suit was within time. The plaintiffs were, therefore, given a decree "for com-pensation for breach of the contract in regard to the mortgage bonds" with interest at 6 per cent, from 2nd July 1928, till 24th September 1935, the date of the suit.

6. In second appeal it is contended on be half of the defendants that the plaintiffs claim in respect of the mortgage money of Puran Rai was also barred by limitation. The contention is that the consideration for the sale deed of 1928 was one and that there was a breach of the contract to pay Puran Rai as soon as the defendants repudiated their liability to pay his handnotes, or at the latest on 25th March 1929, when these handnotes were discharged by the plaintiffs second party.

7. For the respondents, however, it was contended that the handnotes were payable on demand and that in view of the defence raised, there could be no finding of the Courts below that there ever was a demand for the payment of the dues on Puran Rais handnote. The appellate Court, however, has accepted the evidence given by P.W. 4, who was one of the plaintiffs second, party, describing how he asked defendant 1 to pay the demands of Puran Rai on the handnote and how the latter put off the matter until the plaintiffs were forced to raise the money elsewhere and to pay Puran Rai. The appellate Court observed that this evidence was amply corroborated by the evidence of Puran Rai himself and other witnesses.

8. In this view of the matter, it must be held that on or before 25th March 1929, there had been a demand made to the defendants to fulfil the obligation which they had undertaken by the terms of the sale deed to pay the money due from the plaintiffs second party to Puran Rai. Nor do I think that it can be held that the consideration for the sale deed can be split up into two parts, namely the amount payable on the handnotes and the amount payable on the mortgages of Puran Rai. The consideration for the sale deed was Rs. 800, and it is immaterial that part was to be used for the payment of the dues on the handnote and part for the payment of dues on the mortgages. The position would have been different if the due dates of the mortgages in favour of Puran Rai were subsequent to the date on which the payment of the dues on the handnote was demanded; but it is the admitted case of both parties that the mortgage debts had fallen due prior to the execution of the sale deed of 1928.

9. In my view, therefore, there was a breach on the part of the defendants to pay the consideration money for the sale deed when they declined to pay the debts on the handnote. As there was an express agreement to pay the consideration money and as this agreement was contained in a registered document the period of limitation is that provided by Article III read with Article 116, namely 6 years: Ram Rachhya Singh Thakur and Others Vs. Raghunath Prasad Misser and Others, . As the present suit was not instituted until 24th September 1935, the result is that the plaintiffs claim to recover the unpaid consideration money for the sale deed is barred. It was suggested that the suit should be viewed as a suit on a contract of indemnity to which case Article 83 would apply.

10. Such a contention was negatived in Keshwar Sao and Others Vs. Guni Singh and Others, , but was accepted in Mt. Mehdatunnissa Begum Vs. Mt. Halimatunissa Begum, . That article provides for a period of three years from the date when the plaintiffs were actually damnified. Even so regarded, the plaintiffs were damnified on 25th March 1929: Mt. Mehdatunnissa Begum Vs. Mt. Halimatunissa Begum, . Whether the plaintiffs claim in respect of the sale deed of 1928 be viewed as governed by Article 83 or Article 97 read with Article 116, the claim is barred. If Article 83 applies, the plaintiffs were damnified on 25th March 1929 and if Article 97 applies, the defendants must be held to have failed to pay the consideration money on that date, and as that date is more than six years before the institution of the suit, this claim is barred.

11. Similarly, if the claim be viewed as a claim for compensation for breach of a contract the contract was broken on 25th March 1929 and time runs from that date. It was suggested on behalf of the respondents that the date on which Puran Rai instituted the suits on his mortgage should be regarded as the date on which the defendants broke their contract. So far as this part of the consideration of the sale deed was concerned, that appears to have been the view taken by the Court below. But, as I have already held, the consideration for the sale deed was one and it was payable to one person, Puran Rai. As soon as the defendants refused to pay the debts on the handnote there was a breach of the contract and that occurred at the latest on 25th March 1929: see Keshwar Sao and Others Vs. Guni Singh and Others, . A reference was made to the language of the third column of Article 115, which refers to successive breaches of contract. It has been held that the term "successive breaches" in this article refers only to cases in which there is a promise to pay periodically, as for instance, payment of rent, annuities, interest, maintenance, etc.

12. The result, therefore, is that Appeal No. 575 must be allowed. In view of the false defence set up by the appellants regarding the payment of the consideration money I disallow costs.

Second Appeal No. 576 of 1939.

13. Out of the consideration for the sudbharna of 2nd July 1928, the defendants agreed to pay Rs. 127-8-9 to Puran Rai on account of a mortgage of 30th April 1922 and Rs. 69-0-9 on account of a handnote of 15th Baisakh 1334. The sudbharna is a registered document and the defendants were actually given possession. It is, therefore, contended on behalf of the defendants-appellant that the plaintiffs remedy was by a suit for redemption.

14. On behalf of the plaintiffs, respondents, on the other hand, it is pointed out that the mortgagor was entitled to redeem in 1341 Fasli, that is to say, before the date of the present suit and that the consideration for the mortgage not having been paid there was nothing to redeem. From the judgment of the trial Court it appears that at the trial the defendants admitted that if it were found that they had not paid off Puran Rai the plaintiffs would be entitled to possession and mesne profits for 3 years prior to the institution of the suit. Apart from this admission, however, the present suit, I think, should be regarded, in the circumstances of the case, as a suit for redemption after taking of accounts.

15. In such a suit the mortgagor would be entitled to possession on payment of the consideration and such other sums as might be due to him after taking of the accounts. In the present case nothing is payable by the mortgagor on account of the principal, for the consideration was never paid by the mortgagee. As to accounts, as the mortgagee never parted with the consideration, he is not entitled to any interest on it. He was put in possession in lieu of interest; as no interest was payable on account of the consideration not having been paid he is liable to account for the income of the property during the time he was in possession as mortgagee.

16. In other words, he is liable to accounts for the income of the property during the period of his possession. The decree of the Court below awarding mesne profits in effect ensures that the plaintiff will obtain the profits of the property during the time when the defendants were in possession as mortgagees and nothing more. Although, therefore, the form of the decree is wrong in substance it is not open to objection, for the same result will follow if the decree be in form a decree for redemption on taking accounts, except that such a decree would work out more favourably for the respondents as they would be entitled to bring into account the income for the entire period of the defendants possession, whereas the defendants liability for mesne profits is limited.

17. The plaintiffs, however, have not appealed against the decree awarding them mesne profits only. Second appeal No. 576 of 1939 is dismissed with costs.