Ahmad, J.

1. This application arises out of a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the point raised is whether the com-potency of a Civil Court, as provided in Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure consists in its territorial jurisdiction alone or also in its pecuniary jurisdiction.

2. The facts, as stated in the order under revision, show that the value of the property in dispute was perhaps more than Rs. 4,000/- and the reference, as provided under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had been made by the Magistrate, before whom the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was originally pending, to a munsif whose pecuniary jurisdiction., admittedly extended only up to Rs. 1000/- in those circumstances a preliminary objection was raised in the Court of the Munsif that as the value of the property involved in the reference was more than Rs. 1,000/- that court had no jurisdiction to hear the reference.

The Munsif, however, on hearing the parties came to the view that "the word competent means the competent court of territorial jurisdiction and Section 6 of the C. P. C. will apply to suits and not to a proceeding" and accordingly held that the objection was not tenable in law. And it is against this order that the present rule has been issued.

3. Before however, I enter into the discussion of the question raised, I think it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure bearing on the subject. Clause (6) of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides :.

"145(6) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was or should under the second proviso to Sub-section (4) be treated as being in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction and when he proceeds under the second proviso to Sub-section (4) may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed."

4. Thereafter Section 146 (1), so far as is relevant for the purpose of this case, states :.

"146(1): If the Magistrate is of opinion that none of the parties was then in such possession, or is unable to decide as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach it, and draw up a statement of the facts of the case and forward the record of the proceedings to a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction to decide the question whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute at the date of the order as explained in Sub-section (4) of Section 145, and he shall direct the parties to appear before the Civil Court on a date to be fixed by him."

And finally Sub-clause (IB) of that section directs that on the conclusion of the inquiry the Civil Court will "transmit its finding together with the record of the proceeding to the Magistrate by whom the reference was made and the Magistrate shall, on receipt thereof, proceed to dispose of the proceeding under Section 145 in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court." These provisions, in my opinion, make it clear that notwithstanding the reference, if any, made to the Civil Court, for a finding on the point of possession, the proceeding itself at no stage is ever transferred as a whole to the civil Court, so much so that on receipt of the opinion from the Civil Court, it is again the criminal Court which finally disposes of that application.

Further, even while it is pending there it lies within the discretion of the criminal Court, if it so likes as is provided in the proviso to Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to drop the proceeding finally and to withdraw the attachment. That means, the proceeding even on reference made to the Civil Court on the point of possession retains its old moorings and does not change its character from a criminal proceeding to a civil proceeding and is as such all along kept in the seizin of the criminal Court for its final conclusion.

If that is so then what is referred to a Civil Court under Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is neither a suit, as contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure, nor a proceeding as provided in its Section 141, for Section 141, as interpreted by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur Prasad v. Fakir Ullah 22 Ind App 44 (PC) (A), is meant to include original matters in the nature of stilts, namely, matters which originate in themselves and not those which spring up from a suit or from some other proceeding or arise in connection therewith Sarat Krishna Base v. Bisweswar Mitra : AIR 1927 Cal 534 (B). Therefore, in coming to a true decision on the point raised here what has to be considered is whether in a proceeding like the one stated above the jurisdiction of a Civil Court rests exclusively on territorial consideration or both on territorial and pecuniary.

5. Generally speaking, no doubt, it is true that the competency of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be determined irrespective of its pecuniary jurisdiction. But the language of Section 6 whereunder the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Court is rather limited in its scope. It says :

"6. Save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction."

This shows that the consideration of pecuniary jurisdiction in the case of jurisdiction oi a Civil Court arises in the case of suits alone or at best for that reason in the case of tho e proceedings which are in continuation of suits or arise therefrom but in no case in the case of those which are neither suits nor arise therefrom or are connected therewith. Therefore, in my opinion, a reference made under Section 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to a Civil Court not being either a suit or a proceeding, as held above, cannot be put to any limitation of pecuniary jurisdiction nor there is any indication either in that section or in Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure in support of any construction like that, That being so, the contention, raised in this case 011 behalf of the petitioner that the learned Munsif to whom the reference was made is not competent to hear it fails. As for the decisions relied upon in support of that contention, namely, those in Shams under Saha v. Anath Bandhu Saba ILR CM 574 (C); Gokul Kristo Chundar v. Ankil Chunder Chatterjee ILR Cal 457 (D); Amrit Lal v. Murlidhar : AIR 1922 Pat 188 [LQ/PatHC/1922/123] (E); Firm Ganeshdas Badrinarain v. Amuluk Chand, : AIR 1940 Cal 161 [LQ/CalHC/1939/203] (F); Basant Lal v. Mt. Chiranji, : AIR 1934 All 86 (G) and Rameshwar Singh v. Raghunath Singh ILR Cal 571 (H), it is enough to say that they do not apply to the facts of this case. The first four cases deal with the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court to which a decree is transferred for execution either under Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure or some such similar provision provided in other Acts and the decision in those cases is broadly speaking based on the principle that the word suit as contemplated in Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not limited only to the proceedings in cause up to the passing of the decree hut on the other hand covers all its proceedings including those in execution. Therefore, they are not of any assistance in disposing of the present case. In the case reported in : AIR 1934 All 86 (G), the reference made to the Civil Court was by a revenue Court, and in those circumstances the question raised was whether the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure applied to that proceeding. In answer thereto the learned Judges held that it was a proceeding of a character as contemplated under Section 141 and therefore the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure did apply to it. So the decision in that case is not based on the consideration of jurisdiction. In the last case, namely, the one reported in ILR Cal 571 (H), the reference was under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act and originally the Land Registration Court had referred it to the District Judge. The District Judge in his own turn, however, transferred it to the Court of the Munsif whose pecuniary jurisdiction was less than Rs. 2000/-. But as the value of the property involved in the proceeding was more than Rs. 2,000/- an objection was taken in that Court that it was not competent to hear the reference. The objector having failed there brought that question to High Court. But unfortunately by the time the case came up for decision in the High Court, the Civil Court became functus officio in that matter and so the proceeding in the High Court had to be finally disposed of without any relief to the objector. Yet in the course of discussion, their Lordships expressed the view that the objection taken on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction was a valid one. But the discussion on this point is rather scanty and is based on the general proposition that the competency of a Court consists both in territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction without any detailed discussion on the consideration as to whether the provisions of Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure did at all apply to a case like that. Therefore, these cases do not throw any light on the point raised here.

6. Lastly, our attention has also been drawn by the petitioners to the difficulties, which may arise in cases where Civil Courts of different grades having the same territorial jurisdiction are found situated in the same area. In that case no doubt a ticklish question may arise as to which of the different Courts a reference under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will have to be made. The section, as it stands, is silent, on that point and this certainly may give rise to some unnecessary controversy. Therefore, perhaps it is better if the Legislature removes this lacuna as early as possible. But on the language as it stands at present, it has to be held that in such cases all these Courts will have concurrent jurisdiction and in law the reference to any of them shall be a valid reference. So it will be open to the referring Magistrate to choose either of them for the matter of reference. Generally, however, I think it would be better if the Magistrate in making the reference avoid in over-crowding the Courts of higher grade with unnecessary burdens. That means, in cases of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it would be better if the reference to the Civil Court be as a rule, made to a Court of the lowest grade unless otherwise the Magistrate is of opinion that the reference to a Court of higher grade is necessary in the circumstances of the case.

7. For the reasons stated above, I think it has to be held that this application is one without substance. It is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.

Misra, J.

8. I agree. In my opinion, the question of pecuniary jurisdiction of a Civil Court in order to make it a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 116 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot reasonably arise. It is plain that pecuniary jurisdiction is out of place under Section 145 and for that matter under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is exclusively concerned with territorial jurisdiction. The legislature while amending the Code of Criminal Procedure under the 1955 Act and introducing these words hat not defined competent jurisdiction. It has no doubt introduced some ambiguity. But to import the notion of pecuniary jurisdiction along with territorial in construing the scope of this expression is not warranted. The cases relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are all of them of a character which could be finally disposed of by the Civil Court to which they were referred either for execution or under the Bengal Land Registration Act of 1876 or under the Revenue Law. My learned brother has already pointed out that it is not so in respect of the reference under Section 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A finding by the Civil Court on the dispute as to which party is in possession is again sent back to the Criminal Court which has to pass the final order.

9. The Legislature appears to have adopted this procedure in view of the fact that a Civil Court is in a better position to record a finding in such contentions disputes than the Criminal Court. The Civil Court acts thus for a limited purpose in aid of the Criminal Court as a friendly Tribunal, as an amicus curiae, of that Court. This conclusion is further fortified by the fact that the legislature has carefully excluded any right of appeal, review or revision to the aggrieved party against the finding of a Civil Court on such reference under Sub-section 1 (c) of that section. There is yet another pertinent question of practical value. If this expression Civil Court of competent jurisdiction were to include pecuniary jurisdiction as well, the referring Magistrate in every case will have to determine the value of the subject matter in dispute before him which may necessitate the recording of fresh evidence. It will, in any case, give rise to a new proceeding of an incidental character which may be open to challenge in a superior Court. If the Civil Court to which the reference is made has to determine the issue, the position, is worse still as that Court after recording evidence on the point may have to transmit back the record to me Magistrate making the reference if it finds that it is beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction.

10. In my opinion, therefore, any consideration of pecuniary jurisdiction which is relevant when the Civil Court after the case is transferred to it for execution of a decree or for other matters to record a final decision disposing of the rights of the parties in so far as it is concerned does not arise in the reference under Section 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.