Harries, C.J.This is a judgment-debtors appeal from an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarpur allowing in part the judgment-debtors application. In his application, the judgment-debtor prayed that the Court should convert the decree into a decree for instalments u/s 15, Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938, and value the judgment-debtors property u/s 16 of that Act. The learned Subordinate Judge was prepared to grant instalments provided the judgment-debtor paid a sum of Rs. 3000 within a week. The learned Subordinate Judge however did not indicate what the further instalments would be if this sum of Rs. 3000 was paid. With regard to such part of the application as was concerned with Section 16, Bihar Money, lenders Act, 1938, the learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that this Section was repugnant to the general law and accordingly could not be enforced. The learned Subordinate Judge was in fact following a decision of this Court, namely Vishwanath Narayan Singh Vs. Harihar Gir,

2. The judgment-debtor failed to pay the sum of Rs. 3000 within the stipulated time, and accordingly the whole of the property was put up for sale and was purchased in the main by third parties though a small portion was purchased by the decree, holders. Against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge dismissing the application in so far as it was concerned with Section 16, Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938, the judgment-debtor has appealed to this Court. The only point for consideration is whether or not Section 16, Bihar Money-lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939, has any application to the case. Section 16, Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938, is in these terms:

(1) When an application is made for the execution of a deoree passed in respect of a loan or the interest on a loan by the sale of the judgment-debtors property, the Court executing the decree shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or in anything having the force of law, hear the parties to the decree and estimate the value of such property and of that portion of such property the proceeds of the sale of which it considers will be sufficient to satisfy the decree :

Provided that the Court may order the whole property of the judgment-debtor to be sold if it is satisfied that by reason of the nature of such property or any other special circumstances such property cannot reasonably and conveniently be sold in part.

(2) Any person aggrieved by an order passed under Sub-section (1) may appeal to the Court to which appeals from the Court executing the decree ordinarily lie.

3. Section 17, which followed, directed that only so much property should be included in the proclamation of the intended sale as the Court considered the proceeds to be sufficient to satisfy the decree. The application, as it originally stood, was u/s 16 of the 1938 Act and was rejected. While this appeal was pending in this Court, the Amending Act of 1939 was passed, and Sections 16 and 17 were repealed and were replaced by Sections 13 and 14 of the Amending Act. Section 13(1) of the Amending Act in terms applies to applications made before or after the commencement of the Act, and it has been held by the Federal Court in AIR 1939 74 (Federal Court) that Section 13 of the Amending Act of 1939 is retrospective in the sense that it applies to proceedings pending at the time when the Act came into force.

4. It has been argued by counsel on behalf of the appellant that S, 13 of the Amending Act must be given effect to by this Court. He has argued that this Section applies to pending applications, and his application, which was rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge, is still pending in this Court. We are bound to hold that the application of the judgment-debtor is pending, and accordingly it must now be decided in the light of the provisions of the Amending Act of 1939. In my view this case cannot be distinguished from the case in AIR 1939 74 (Federal Court) to which I have already referred. In that case an application u/s 16, Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938, had been dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge. On appeal this Court had upheld the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge upon the ground that this Section being repugnant to the general law was null and void.

5. During the pendency of the appeal to the Federal Court, the Amending Act of 1939 came into force, and the Federal Court unanimously held that the provisions of Section 13 of the Amending Act applied to the application, and their order is based upon this view. In my judgment this Court is bound to follow the Federal Court decision and to give effect in the present appeal to the provisions of Section 13 of the Amending Act.

6. It has been argued that there is one very material difference between the present case and the case in AIR 1939 74 (Federal Court) decided by the Federal Court. In the present case after the rejection of the judgment-debtors application the properties were put up to sale and purchased and possession given. In the proceedings which terminated in the Federal Court case the property was apparently not put up for sale because of a stay order, presumably, given by this Court during the pendency of the appeal. In my view there is no difference in principle between the two cases. In the present case, if we hold that the learned Judge was wrong in not valuing this property as directed by Section 16, Bihar Moneylenders Act, 1938, and Section 13 of the Amending Act, 1939, then the whole of the proceedings taken thereafter are liable to be set aside when the order of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge is reversed.

7. The sale took place subject to the result of this appeal, and the fact that no stay was granted and that the sale took place cannot affect the rights of the parties in this Court. In my judgment, the order of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot now be sustained and must be seaside. The case must be sent back to the learned Subordinate Judge to be decided according to law. He will bear in mind that Sections 13 and 14 of the Amending Act now apply. We make no order as to costs of this appeal.

Fazl Ali J.

I agree.