Bihar State Electricity Board And Another
v.
Messrs Dhanawat Rice And Oil Mills
(Supreme Court Of India)
Civil Appeal No. 156 Of 1988 -164 Of 1988 | 17-01-1989
1. Leave granted.
2. These special leave petitions have been filed against the judgment of the High Court of Patna by which several writ petitions were disposed of. All these special leave petitions have been preferred in this Court aggrieved by that judgment. The common question which arises in all these SLPs is that under the agreement arrived at between the consumers and the Bihar State Electricity Board there is a clause for payment of minimum guarantee which indicates that even if the consumer does not consume electricity above the minimum guarantee then it will be incumbent upon the consumer to pay charges for energy which is the annual minimum guarantee provided in the agreement pertaining to industrial units.
3. The relevant facts are that for the years 1973-74 to 1982-83 the bills for annual minimum guarantee were severed on the appellants by the Electricity Supply Division, Forbesganj and on receipt thereto the appellants filed their claims as provide under Clause 13 of the agreement on the ground that appellant was not liable to pay any such charges because the appellant did not supply constant electricity as provided in the agreement during the period in question and there were tripping, load-shedding, and power cut which resulted in a great loss to the petitioners and as the supply was not in accordance with the agreement liability to pay annual minimum guarantee bills could not be fastened on the consumer. The Chief Engineer who was the authority under the agreement negatived the claim and so the filed writ petitions in the High Court.
4. The High Court by the impugned judgment came to the conclusion that under Clause 1 of the agreement if was incumbent for the Electricity Board to supply constant electricity and the consumer will be liable to pay annual minimum guarantee charges only if in spite of the fact that the Board supplies power as contemplated in the agreement and the consumer does not utilise the power then the liability to pay annual minimum guarantee charges will arise and on this basis the High Court quashed the demands made for the these years on the basis of annual minimum guarantee as it found that power was not supplied according to the agreement.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the Electricity Board contended that Clause 1 of the agreement does not it any manner mean that there should be a continuous supply. The term used in Clause 1 of the agreement only talks of constants supply of electrical energy at the pressure of volts, cycles, 3 phase, 3 wire etc. but it does not talk of continuous supply without any break and it therefore could not be contended that if there was no supply for a few minutes it will amount to failure on the part of the Electricity Board to provide constant supply. It was contended that the constant supply cannot mean continuous supply. It was also contented that Clause 4 of the agreement clear talks of the payments of annual minimum guarantee charges and therefore it could not be said that because of the power cut or situation beyond the control of the Electricity Board if the power could not supplied for all the 24 hours every day the respondent-consumer can deny the liability to pay annual minimum guarantee bills. It was also contended that in view of Clause 13 of the agreement which provides that if there was shortage of supply and that shortage resulted in short supply then the consumer was entitled to a proportionate reduction of the annual minimum guarantee bill as determined by the Chief Engineer, Bihar State Electricity Board and consequently the respondent in this case went to the Chief Engineer who ultimately decided on the basis of facts that respondents were not entitled to any proportionate reduction and it was because of this that the petitions were filed before the High Court. It was contended that the learned Judges of the High Court have failed to appreciated Clause 13 of the agreement Learned counsel also placed reliance on the decisions in Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Jalgaon Borough Municipality ((1975) 2 SCC 508 [LQ/SC/1975/326] : (1976) 1 SCR 636 [LQ/SC/1975/326] : AIR 1975 SC 2235 [LQ/SC/1975/326] ), Northern India Iron & Steel Co. v. State of Haryana ((1976) 2 SCC 877 [LQ/SC/1975/440 ;] : (1976) 2 SCR 677 [LQ/SC/1975/440 ;] : AIR 1976 SC 1100 [LQ/SC/1975/440 ;] ), Man Industrial Corporation v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board (AIR 1986 Raj 137 [LQ/RajHC/1985/434] : 1985 Raj LR 830) and Mukund Iron and Steel Works Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board (AIR 1982 Bom 580 [LQ/BomHC/1982/358] ).
6. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that Clause 1 provides for constant supply of power, the variations permitted have been indicated in this clause itself and it is contended that is is only where the Electricity Board discharges its duty to supply power as contemplated in Clause 1 and the consumer because of his difficulties is not able to utilise power even up to the level of minimum guarantee that the liability to pay annual minimum guarantee bills could be fastened on the consumer but if the Board fails to discharge its responsibilities as contemplated in Clause 1 of the agreement it could not compel the consumer to pay the annual minimum guarantee. It was frankly conceded that in the petition itself originally relief sought was proportionate reduction of the annual minimum guarantee bills but in view of the interpretation of Clauses 1, 4 and 13 the High Court came to the conclusion that there is no liability on the consumer to pay annual minimum guarantee bills as the Electricity Board has failed to supply power as contemplated in Clause 1 of the agreement. Learned counsel however contended that the Chief Engineer in his order has misunderstood the whole situation but before the High Court the facts were not disputed and in each case average hours of supply per year during the disputed period have been stated which have not been disputed by the Electricity Board and if at all the High Court judgment is not maintained the respondents are entitled to proportionate reduction of the annual minimum guarantee bills in the light of the hours of supply per year which have been stated in the High Court judgment and is not disputed.
7. Clause 1 of the agreement reads as under:
"1(a) The Board shall furnish to the consumer and the consumer shall accept at the point of supply mentioned in the schedule hereto, on and from the date on which the said premises shall be connected with the supply distributing mains and during the continuance of the agreement, a constant supply of electrical energy at the pressure of ... Volts, 50 cycles, 3 phases, 3 wires, alternating current system subject to standard variations as provided in Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 or any other statutory modification thereof as may be in force from time to time for the purpose and up to the maximum specified (hereinafter referred to as the contract demand) and under the conditions laid down in the ScheduleThis clause talks of constant supply of electrical energy providing for voltage, cycles, phases and wires. It is clear that it does not talk of continuous supply nor does it talk of non-continuous or intermittent supply. In fact this clause in our opinion is not very material for the decision of the case as the sole controversy pertains to interpretation of Clause 13."
8. Clause 4 of the agreement provides of the minimum guarantee and there is no dispute that if the consumer is not able to utilise electricity even up to the level of minimum guarantee, this clause provides for payment of charges of minimum guarantee. The real controversy pertains to the interpretation of Clause 13. In fact in Northern India Iron & Steel Co. case ((1976) 2 SCC 877 [LQ/SC/1975/440 ;] : (1976) 2 SCR 677 [LQ/SC/1975/440 ;] : AIR 1976 SC 1100 [LQ/SC/1975/440 ;] ) this Court had the occasion to consider situation of this kind where this Court on this aspect of the matter has observed that where the Electricity Board fails to supply power because of shortage of energy, power cut or any other circumstance as per demand of the consumer according to the contract it will be considered as a circumstance beyond the control of the consumer which prevented it from consuming electricity as per the contract. Their Lordships observed ads under : (SCC p. 882, para 9)
We are, therefore, of the view that the inability of the Board to supply electric energy due to power cut or any other circumstance beyond its control as per the demand of the consumer according to the contract will be reflected in and considered as a circumstance beyond the control of the consumer which prevented it from consuming electricity as per the contract and to the extent it wanted to consume. The monthly demand charge for a particular month will have to be assessed in accordance with sub-clause (b) of Clause 4 of the tariff and therefrom a proportionate reduction will have to be made as per sub-clause (f). We hope, in the light of the judgment, there will be no difficulty in working out the figures of the proportionate reduction in any of the cases and for any period. In case of any difference or dispute as to the quantum of the demand charge or the proportionate reduction, parties will be at liberty to pursue their remedy as may be available to them in accordance with lawIt appears that reading Clause 13 in the present case clearly provide for the contingency and it provides for the failure on the part of the supplier and also failure on the part of consumer in the circumstances like strike, riot, fire, flood, explosion or act of God or any other reason beyond the control of either of the parties.
Clause 13 of the agreement reads:
"If at any time the consumer is prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy to be supplied under this agreement either in whole, or in part due to strikes, riots, fire, floods, explosions, act of God or any other cause-reasonably beyond control or if the Board is prevented from supplying or unable to supply such electrical energy owing to any or all of the causes mentioned above then the demand charge and guaranteed energy charge set out in the schedule shall be reduced in proportion to the ability of the consumer to take or the Board to supply such power and the decision of the Chief Engineer, Bihar State Electricity Board, in this respect shall be final."
In view of this language of the clause clearly providing for the proportionate reduction of the annual minimum guarantee bills it could not be doubted that the High Court was not right in coming to the conclusion that the respondents were not liable to pay annual minimum guarantee bills at all. The judgment of this Court also clearly indicated that the respondents-consumers are entitled to a proportionate reduction of the minimum guarantee bills. In Clause 13 of the agreement this is clearly stated that the authority competent to determine the proportionate reduction is the Chief Engineer and it appears that it was because of this that the respondents-consumers approached the Chief Engineer for consideration. But it appears that the learned Chief Engineer also did not clearly understand the meaning of Clause 13. The judgment of the High Court on which reliance is placed have only followed the judgment referred to above.
9. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was not right in coming to the conclusion that the respondents were not liable at all to pay annual minimum guarantee charges. In fact they are only entitled to the proportionate reduction. The judgment of the High Court clearly states the hours every year in dispute when the power was not supplied and on this basis the respondents-consumers will be entitled to proportionate reduction as ordinarily the consumers are expected to have continuous power supply. It is therefore directed that the Chief Engineer of the Electricity Board on the basis of hours of non-supply as indicated in the High Court judgment and not disputed in the High Court will assess the proportionate reduction of the annual minimum guarantee bills in respect of disputed years indicated above and it is also directed that until this is not done the power supply will not be disconnected on the basis of failure to pay the annual minimum guarantee bills for the periods stated above. However, after the proportionate reduction is made and fresh demand is made, Electricity Board will be entitled to take recourse to the normal procedure if the consumers fail to pay
10. In the circumstances no order as to costs.
Advocates List
For
For Petitioner
- Shekhar Naphade
- Mahesh Agrawal
- Tarun Dua
For Respondent
- S. Vani
- B. Sunita Rao
- Sushil Kumar Pathak
Bench List
HON'BLE JUSTICE G.L. OZA
HON'BLE JUSTICE K.N. SAIKIA
Eq Citation
(1989) 1 SCC 452
[1989] 1 SCR 168
AIR 1989 SC 1030
1989 PLJR 19
1989 (37) 2 BLJR 59
JT 1989 (1) SC 425
1989 (1) SCALE 162
1989 (1) UJ 379
LQ/SC/1989/24
HeadNote
Evidence Act, 1872 — S. 3 — Criminal Trial — Witnesses — Partisan witnesses — Their evidence — Appreciation of — Held, should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution — Evidence — Witnesses — Partisan witnesses — Their evidence — Appreciation of (Paras 10 and 11) . Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/149, 307/149 and 148 — Culpable homicide not amounting to murder — Conviction for — When warranted — Accused never went there to kill Dharmoo and Jawala — Accused in fact had nothing against them — Something must have happened suddenly — Conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, held, warranted (Paras 19 to 22)