Kulwant Sahay, J.The petitioner was one of the second party in a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The dispute related to the possession of 8 bighas, 19 katahs, 4 dhurs of land in village Pakri Sham. This piece of land originally formed the holding of one Moti Koiri who died leaving a widow Mb. Parbatia and two daughters Mt. Baudhi and Mt. Dimini. Mt. Domini died leaving a son Jadu. After the death of Moti Koiri and his widow, the holding oame into the possession of Mt. Baudhi. It is alleged that Mt. Baudhi made a gift of this holding to her sisters son Jadu and to her own, minor daughter Mt. Marachia by a deed of gift, dated the 12th March 1920. The first party claim possession; under a usufructuary mortgage, dated the 10th November, 1921, executed in their favour by Jadu and the second party claim possession under a usufructuary mortgage executed in their favour in respect of the same land by Mt. Baudhi in December 1921, which deed was registered on 3rd January, 1922. The proceeding was initiated on a report submitted by the Sub-Inspector of Police to the effect that there was an apprehension of immediate breach of the peace relating to the possession of the holding in dispute. On the 27th October, 1922, the Magistrate made an order for drawing up proceedings u/s 145 and for attachment of the land m dispute. After the proceeding had been started a Criminal case of rioting cropped op, in which some of the second party were accused by the first party of carrying away certain rope grown on a portion of the land in dispute by the first party. This case was disposed of some time in March, 1923, and resulted in an acquittal of these caused persons. The proceeding u/s 145 was kept in abeyance till the decision of the rioting case and was taken up again after the disposal of that rioting case. The learned Sub-divisional Magistrate of Gopalganj who tried the case u/s 145 has held that the first party are in possession and he has declared that their possession will be maintained until they are evicted therefrom in due course of law. The second party has come up to this Court in Revision against this order and the points taken by their learned Vakil are: first, that the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate has not considered the evidence accused by the second party; secondly, that the written statement filed by Mt. Baudhi could not be used as evidence in the case; and thirdly, the it if the evidence adduced by the parties before the learned Magistrate was not satisfactory, he ought to have taken further evidence in order to come to a satisfactory finding on the question of possession.

2. It appears that the first party examined two witnesses and the second party examined one witness and both parties filed some documents. The learned Magistrate refers to the documents produced by the second party and he refers to the judgment of the rioting case referred to above and that of another rioting case which was disposed of some time in the year 1922 and he says that the position taken up by the parties hi these rioting cases has an important bearing in the case. He considers the fact that in the rioting case of 1923 the second party had filed a written statement to the effect that the land in dispute had all along been in the possession of Mt. Baudhi, and she used to give them half the crop of the land in lieu of interest for the money advanced by them. On the 15th May, 1923, the second party filed a petition in the Court below wherein they stated that having regard to the result of the two rioting cases referred to above the present proceedings ought to be dropped, and they further stated that Mt. Baudhi was a necessary party to she present proceedings. Mt. Baudhi was thereupon made a party and on the 31st May, 1923, she filed a petition saying that she was not in possession and the first party were in possession. She was thereupon examined by the learned Magistrate and she reiterated the statement made by bar in the petition and stated that the statement was made by her voluntarily. The learned Magistrate has considered all these facts and has come to the finding that the first party are in possession of the land in dispute. No doubt he does not refer to the findings arrived at in the previous rioting oases, but it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate has not taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration, and that he has not taken the judgments in the two rioting cases into consideration. Besides the judgments in the two rioting cases and the usufructuary mortgage bond executed by Mt. Baudhi, there was no other document produced by the second party. It is admitted that the one witness examined by the second party was merely a formal witness who was called to prove certain documents. Mr. Gour Chandra Pal for the petitioner further contends that the question of possession had been already decided in the rioting cases and the learned Magistrate was bound to respect the said decisions and that he has acted without jurisdiction in not doing so. He relies on the decisions of the Special Bench in the case of Parmeshwar Singh v. Kailaspati (1917) 1 P.L.J. 336. It is pointed out by Mr. Abani Bhusan Mukbarji for the opposite party that the question of possession was gone into incidentally in those cases and the finding was that Mt. Baudi was in possession. When Mt. Baudhi comes and states that she is not in possession the learned Magistrate was nos bound to follow the decisions in the rioting oases. As has been laid down in the same Special Bench case it is not always incumbent upon the Magistrate to give effect to the decision of a civil or criminal Court, and no hard and fast Rule can be laid down in this respect. Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in not accepting the decision as to possession in the rioting oases. The first coo tent ion of the learned Vakil for c petitioner must therefore be overruled.

3. As regards the second contention, the learned Magistrate was entitled to consider the written statement filed by Mt. Baudhi. Her written statement was moreover supported by her own evidence in Court and there is no ground for the contention that the learned Magistrate has acted without jurisdiction in relying upon the statement of Mt. Baudhi.

4. As regards the third contention, it is to be noted that it was in the discretion of the Magistrate to take further evidence, if he thought it necessary to do so. If he was satisfied upon the evidence produced in the case that the first party were in actual possession of the land, it was not necessary for him to take further evidence. On the whole, although the judgment of the learned Magistrate is not as satisfactory as it ought to have been, yet I cannot say that the final order made by him is without jurisdiction. This application must therefore be dismissed.