1.  Gwyer, C.J.:— In this case the appellant appeals against an order of, the High Court at Patna setting aside an acquittal in a Magistrate's Court and convicting the appellant of an offence under section 47(a) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, and a Government notification, dated 18th November, 1940, issued under the powers conferred by section 19(4) of that Act. To understand the issues involved in the appeal, it is necessary to give some account of the history of the legislation under which the appellant was charged and has now been convicted.

2. The Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (Act no. II of 1915), was a consolidating and amending Act, replacing in Bihar and Orissa an earlier Bengal consolidating and amending Act, the Bengal Excise Act, 1909. Section 19 of the Act of 1915 prohibits unlicensed person (with certain exceptions) from having in their possession, without a permit granted by the Collector, any excisable article in excess of such quantity as the Board of Revenue may, under the powers given to it by the Act, have declared to be the limit of a retail sale. Licensed vendors are similarly prohibited from having in their possession at any place other than that authorized by their licence any quantity of excisable liquor in excess of the same amount. Sub-section (4) of the section then provides as follows:—

“(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, the local Government may, by notification, prohibit the possession by any person or class of persons, either in the Province of Bihar and Orissa or in any specified local area, of any excisable article either absolutely or subject, to such conditions as it may prescribe.”

3. By section 47 of the Act, any person who, in contravention of the Act, or of any notification made under it, “imports, exports, transports, manufactures, possesses or sells any excisable article” is liable to be imprisoned or to be fined, or to be both imprisoned and fined.

4. By a notification, dated March 26th, 1939, and made under the sub-section quoted above, the local Government purported to prohibit the possession of country liquor and of certain drugs in the areas specified in the notification. One Kanhai Sahu was prosecuted and convicted under this notification on a charge of illegal possession of country liquor in a prohibited area; but the High Court at Patna on appeal set aside the conviction on the ground that the Provincial Government hd no power, as the law then stood, to make a notification prohibiting the public generally within the Province or any part thereof from possessing intoxicating liquor: Kanhai Sahu v. King Emperor The main ground of the decision was that on the true construction of the sub-section the local Government only had power to impose prohibition on specified persons or classes of persons, and that the words “any person or class of persons” could not be interpreted as meaning “all persons or any class of persons”. The High Court also laid stress on the fact that, as it appeared to them, the Act of 1915 was an Excise Act, designed mainly for the benefit of the provincial fisc, and that it did not appear from the preamble to the Act or its provisions generally that the Legislature had intended that the Act should be used for the purpose of introducing the policy of what is commonly known as Prohibition.

5. As a consequence of this decision of the High Court, the Governor of Bihar, in the exercise of the legislative powers which he had assumed by his Proclamation of 3rd November, 1939, under section 93 of the Constitution Act, enacted a Governor's Act entitled the Bihar Excise (Amendment) Act, 1940. By section 2 of this Act a paragraph was inserted in the preamble to the original Act of 1915 to the following effect:

“Whereas in order to promote, enforce and carry into effect the policy of prohibition, it is necessary to prohibit the import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and possession of liquor and of intoxicating drugs in the Province of Bihar or any specified areas thereof:”

Then by section 3 of the Act, it was provided that section 19(4) of the Act of 1915 should be so amended as to prohibit the possession of intoxicating liquor “by any person or class of persons or, subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, by all persons either in the Province of Bihar or in any specified local area”. The words in italics are those added by the amending. Act to the sub-section. The amending Act was followed by a fresh notification, dated November 18, 1940, in the same terms as the notification which had been held by the High Court to be invalid, and it was on a charge under this notification that the Magistrate's order of acquittal was subsequently reversed by the High Court, who held that in view of the amending Act the appellant had no defence in law.

6. Counsel for the appellant first contended that the amending Act of 1940 was in any case ultra vires the Provincial Legislature, and therefore equally ultra vires the Governor of Bihar, exercising the powers of the Legislature by virtue of a proclamation under section 93 of the Constitution Act. He contended also that the Act was invalid because it contravened the provisions of paragraph (a) of section 297(1) of the Constitution Act. His third contention was that the Act of 1915 was a Governor-General's Act within the meaning of paragraph (b) of section 108(2) of the Constitution Act and that, therefore, the Act of 1940 which amended it ought to have had the previous sanction of the Governor-General under that sub-section, the omission not having been made good by the subsequent assent of the Governor-General to the Act, to which the Governor had alone assented: see section 109 of the Constitution Act. It will be convenient to deal with each of these contentions separately and in the same order.

7. In support of his first contention, Counsel boldly argued that section 100(3) of the Constitution Act, which gives a Provincial Legislature power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof “with respect to” any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List, has not given power to introduce either total or partial prohibition in the Province by reason only that among the matters in the List with respect to which a Provincial Legislature is empowered to legislate are those set out in entry no. 31: “intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs”. A power to legislate “with respect to intoxicating liquors” could not well be expressed in wider terms, and would, in our opinion, unless the meaning of the words used is restricted or controlled by the context or by other provisions in the Act, undoubtedly include the power to prohibit intoxicating liquors throughout the Province or in any specified part of the Province. This Court has already held in The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum that the power to legislate with respect to the collection of rents (List II, entry no. 21) includes the power to legislate with respect to the emission of rents as well as their collection, and there is a dictum in one of the judgments in that case that the power to legislate with respect to “fisheries” (List II, entry no. 24) would include the prohibition of fishing altogether in particular places or at particular times. But, it is said, the context does in fact require a more restricted meaning to be given to the general words at the beginning of entry no. 31, inasmuch as “intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs” is followed by the words “that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs”. In our opinion these words are explanatory or illustrative words, and not words either of amplification or limitation. It is difficult to conceive of legislation with respect to intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs which did not deal in some way ore other with their production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase or sale; and these words seem apt to cover the whole field of possible legislation on the subject. We were, however, referred to three English authorities which, it was alleged, justified a different conclusion. These authorities do not seem to us to be relevant, for they were concerned with the meaning and effect of a statutory power to “regulate”; and it was held in all three cases that a power to regulate does not include a power to prohibit. The first case was Dick v. Badart. In that case a dock company, who were undertakers under a special Act, had made by-laws prohibiting workmen of a specified class from working on board any vessel in the dock, unless authorized by the company or unless permission in writing had previously been obtained from the superintendent of the dock. The company had statutory powers to make by-laws (among other purposes) for regulating shipping, unshipping and removing of all goods within the limits of the dock and for regulating the duties and conduct of all persons, whether the servants of the undertakers or not, employed in the dock. It was held that the by-law excluding that particular class of workmen was beyond the powers conferred by the Act: first, because section 33 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847, which was incorporated in the Special Act, had declared that, subject to certain specified conditions in any special Act authorizing the construction of any dock, the harbour, docks and pier should be open to all persons for the shipping and unshipping of goods, and secondly, because a power to make by-laws for regulating the duties and conduct of persons employed in the docks could not authorize a by-law excluding a specified class of persons. In Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo, an Act of the Ontario Legislature had given local authorities the power to make by-laws for licensing, regulating and governing hawkers and petty chapmen; and this was held not to authorize a by-law prohibiting hawkers from plying their trade at all in a substantial and important portion of the city, Lord Davey observing:—“Their Lordships think there is marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it and indeed the power to regulate and govern seems to imply a continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed Attention was also drawn to other sections of the Act, which gave power to make bylaws “preventing or regulating”, or “preventing or regulating and licensing”, thus indicating that a power to prohibit, when it was intended that it should be given, was always given by express words. The observations of Lord Davey were quoted with approval by Lord Watson, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, in which it was decided that the power given to the Dominion Parliament by section 91(2) of the British North America Act to make laws for the regulation of trade and commerce did not enable the Dominion Legislature to enact legislation to prohibit the traffic in intoxicating liquors. We see no reason to dissent from the view that a power to regulate does not include a power to prohibit; but since neither the word “regulation” itself nor any other comparable expression appears in entry no. 31, it does not appear necessary to pursue the argument further. A power to regulate may well imply the continued existence of the thing to be regulated; but no such implication can arise from the words in the entry which, as we have said, only explain or illustrate the more concise expression which immediately precedes them.

8. We must again refer to the fundamental proposition enunciated in The Queen v. Burah, that Indian Legislatures within their own sphere have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself. If that was true in 1878, it cannot be less true in 1942. Every intendment ought therefore to be made in favour of a Legislature which is exercising the powers conferred on it. Its enactments ought not to be subjected to the minute scrutiny which may be appropriate to an examination of the by-laws of a body exercising only delegated powers, nor is the generality of its power to legislate on a particular subject to be cut down by the arbitrary introduction of far-fetched and impertinent limitations. It was even contended on behalf of the appellant that the specifying of a particular subject-matter of legislation necessarily indicated the intention of Parliament that subject-matter should be preserved, since, unless it were preserved, there would be no subject-matter about which to legislate. This argument is sufficiently refuted by the presence in List II of such legislative subjects as “unemployment” in entry no. 32 or “gambling” in entry no. 36.

9. The second point raised on behalf of the appellant was that section 19(4) of the Act of 1915, as amended by the Act of 1940, is invalid because repugnant to section 297(1)(a) of the Constitution Act. We confess that we have difficulty in appreciating this argument. Section 297(2)(a) enacts that no Provincial Legislature or Government shall, by virtue of the entry in the Provincial Legislative List relating to trade and commerce within the Province, or the entry in the List relating to the production, supply and distribution of commodities, have power to pass any law or take any executive action prohibiting or restricting the entry into, or export from, the Province of goods of any class or description. It is plain beyond words that this provision only refers to legislation with respect to entry no. 27 and entry no. 29 in the Provincial Legislative List; it has no application to legislation with respect to anything in entry no. 31. A provincial Legislature, if it desires to pass a law prohibiting export from, or import into, the Province, must therefore seek for legislative authority to do so in entries other than entry no. 27 or entry no. 29. If it can point to legislative powers for the purpose derived from any other entry in the Provincial Legislative List, then its legislation cannot be challenged under section 297(2)(a). There is no substance at all in the appellant's argument on this point.

10. The appellant's third point is no less unsubstantial. The Act of 1915 required, as the law then stood, and in fact received, the assent of the Governor-General. This, according to the appellant, made it a Governor-General's Act within the meaning of section 108(2)(b) of the Constitution Act, and therefore the introduction of any Bill amending it required the previous sanction of the Governor-General. The amending Act of 1940 did not receive this previous sanction, and since it received the Governor's assent only, the defect was not cured by the provisions of section 109(2) of the Constitution Act. The Governor-General's Act, however, to which section 108 of the Constitution Act refers means, and can only mean, an Act such as the Governor-General is empowered to enact under section 44 of the Constitution Act. The appellant seems to have forgotten that all Acts required, the Governor-General's assent before the present Constitution Act came into force; and that therefore, if his argument is sound, this strange result would follow, that every Act passed by the Central or any local Legislature before April 1st, 1987, would be a Govern or General's Act, and no Bill repealing or amending it could be introduced without the previous sanction of the Governor-General. It is preposterous to suppose that Parliament intended to place fetters of this kind on the general legislative powers of Legislatures in India.

11. It was faintly suggested that, in the absence of any provision for compensating those whose livelihood might be taken away by the enactment of Prohibition, it ought to be assumed that the Legislature had not been given power to enact it. Where a statute is ambiguous, the presumption that a Legislature does not intend to interfere with vested rights is no doubt reinforced by the absence of provisions for compensation; but where the language is clear and there is no ambiguity, as we hold to be the case here, there is no room for such arguments.

12. For the above reasons we are of opinion that the Bihar Excise (Amendment) Act, 1940, which amended section 19(4) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, was a valid Act and was within the powers conferred upon the Provincial Legislature by section 100(3) of the Constitution Act and entry no. 31 of the Provincial Legislative List.

13. Having regard to the view which we have taken of the effect of the Act of 1940, it is not necessary for us to consider, as we might otherwise have found ourselves compelled to do, the earlier judgment of the Patna High Court to which we have already referred and which followed a judgment of the High Court of Bombay in which similar questions were raised: Sheth Chinubhai Lalbhai v. Emperor. We do not, therefore, express any opinion with regard to those two judgments, except in respect of one matter on which we think it desirable to say a few words, because it was also the foundation of part of the argument addressed to us in the present case. Both the Bombay and Patna High Courts seem to have been a good deal influenced by the view that the Acts they were considering were exclusively excise or revenue Acts and that nothing was to be found in them indicating the intention of the Legislature that they were to be, or could be, used for the purpose of promoting a policy of total or partial Prohibition. In the case of Bihar, it was sought to overcome this difficulty at a later date by the insertion in the amending Act of 1940 of the additional paragraph in the preamble to the original Act of 1915, which we have already cited. The purpose for which resort may be had to the preamble of a statute has been stated in a well-known passage: “If any doubt arises from the terms employed by the Legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which, according to Chief Justice Dyer, is a ‘key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress’”: Income-Tax Commissioners v. Pemset. But we doubt very much whether a preamble retrospectively inserted in 1940 in an Act passed 25 years before can be looked at by the Court for the purpose of discovering what the true intention of the Legislature was at the earlier date.

14. A Legislature can always enact that the law is, and shall be deemed always to have been, such andsuch; but that is a wholly different thing from imputing to dead and gone legislators a particular intention merely because their successors' at the present day think that they might or ought to have had it.

15. It is, however, by no means clear to us that the Legislature of Bihar and Orissa (as the Province then was) in 1915 never had in mind the possible use of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, for the promotion of a policy of total or partial prohibition. The Act of 1915 was, as we have said, a consolidating and amending Act which replaced an earlier consolidating and amending Act, the Bengal Excise Act, 1909. An examination of the statutes which were consolidated in the latter Act shows that the provision which is now section 19(4) of the Act of 1915, and which the Act of 1940 amended, first made its appearance on the statute-book in 1909; that is, it never formed part of the original Excise Code. A sub-section similarly expressed is to be found in the legislation of other Provinces; and, so far as we can ascertain, it was in every case an addition to the original Code. Thus, in Madras, where it now appears as section 13-A of the Madras Abkari Act, 1886, it was inserted as a separate and substantive section by the Madras Abkari (Amendment) Act, 1913. In Bombay it appears as section 14B(2) of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, but it was inserted in that Act for the first time by the Bombay Abkari (Amendment) Act, 1912. Its history in other Provinces also will be found to be the same.

16. There is no reason in theory or principle why an Excise Act should not have a double object, the benefit of the revenue and the improvement of public health or morals by a greater control of the liquor trade; the Licensing Acts in England are an example. We find it not easy to understand the purpose or object of section 19(4), if it were not intended for the purpose of promoting the cause of temperance, whether by means of the policy which used to be known as local option or by means of total Prohibition; and its appearance on the statute-book in so many Provinces in the course of the same generation is a proof that temperance doctrines were, as indeed is common knowledge, attracting public notice at that period over a considerable part of India. The only novelty about more recent legislation is that it goes further and is more radical in character.

17. If it were necessary for us to do so, we should not hesitate, in construing the Bihar Act of 1915, to reject the argument sought to be based on the assumed absence of any intention on the part of the Legislature to deal with the question of Prohibition in its excise legislation. For the reasons which we have given, we should be disposed rather to draw from the language of the Act a different inference altogether; but the view we take in the present appeal makes the question no longer important.

18. The appeal must be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.