Heard learned counsel for the parties.

This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment dated 30.11.2004 passed by the Delhi High court.

The facts in detail have been set out in the impugned judgment and hence we are not repeating the same here.

The dispute in this case is about interest. The submission of Mr. Gaurab Banerji, learned Additional Solicitor General for the appellant is that interest can only be awarded from the date of the award and not before the date of award, in view of clause 3.3(ix) of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) which states as follows:

"No interest shall be payable by the Employer on Earnest Money, Security Deposit or on any money due to the Contractor by the Employer."

In support of his proposition, Mr. Banerji has relied upon the judgment of this Court in M/s. Sayeed Ahmed & Co. Vs. State of U.P.& Ors. 2009 (9) SCALE 261. [LQ/SC/2009/1426]

On the other hand, Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned senior counsel for the respondent has submitted that clause 3.3(ix) has to be read ejusdem generis and hence a literal interpretation cannot be given to the words "or on any money due to the contractor by the employer". We do not agree with the same.

It is settled law that the principle of ejusdem generis does not apply in every situation. In Justice G.P. Singhs Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 11th Edition, it has been stated at pages 480-486:

"It is essential for application of the ejusdem generis rule that the enumerated things before the general words must constitute a category or a genus or a family which admits of a number of species or members. "It is requisite" said Chandrashekhar Aiyar, J. "that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species;" and "it is clearly laid down by decided cases", said Subbarao, J. "that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category". If the specified things preceding general words belong to different categories, this principle of construction will not apply.

Further, mention of a single species does not constitute a genus. Thus, in the phrase a salary or income as it finds place in Section 60(2)of the Presidency Insolvency Act, 1909 the word income has not been construed ejusdem generis for the preceding word salary signifies only one species and does not constitute a genus. Similarly, the expression discharge or dismissal in item 1 of Schedule IV of Maharashtra (Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practice)Act, has not been construed by the rule of ejusdem generis to limit the word discharge to discharge as a matter of penalty on the reasoning that the wider word discharge does not follow the more limited word dismissal and neither of them is a genus nor species of the same very genus.

In construing the definition of workmen in the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, which reads: means any person who entered into or works under a contract with an employer whether the contract be by way of manual labour, clerical work or otherwise-: VISCOUNT SIMON, L.C.said: "the use of words or otherwise does not bring into play the ejusdem generis principle for manual labour and clerical work do not belong to a single limited genus."

And, said LORD SIMONDS in another case:

"Indeed if a collection of items is heterogeneous, it almost seems a conflict in words to say that they belong to the same genus".

In interpreting Section 20 of the United Town Electrical Company Act, which reads:

the company shall be liable for water rates on all lands and buildingss owned by it in the aforesaid town, but otherwise the company shall be exempt from taxation; the Privy Council rejected the contention that the word taxation should be construed ejusdem generis with water rate; LORD THANKERTON said: There is no room for the application of the principle of ejusdem generis in the absence of any mention of a genus, since the mention of a single species for example of water rates does not constitute a genus".

In construing Section 33 of the Barrow-in-Furness Corporation Extension Act, 1872, which provided: "No theatre or other place of public entertainment (other than such places of entertainment as are now subject to the provisions of the Barrow-in-Furness Corporation Act, 1868, Section 164, and which last mentioned places are to continue subject to the provisions of that Act) shall be opened or used unless the same shall first have been licensed-"; ASQUITH, J., rejected the contention that other place of public entertainment should be read as subject to ejusdem generis rule and gave three reasons in support of his conclusion which may usefully be quoted: "(a) Words excepting a species from a genus are meaningless unless the species in question prima facie falls within the genus. All hats other than top hats make sense. All top hats other than bowler hats does not. Equally little does all top hats and other articles except gloves, if other articles are to be read as ejusdem generis with top hats. Here the places covered by Section 164 of the 1868 Act the places excepted ­do not fall within the assumed genus theatre or other similar place of public entertainment although there may be an overlap between the two. (b) No case was cited to us in which a genus has been held to be constituted, not by the enumeration of a number of classes followed by the words or other, but by the mention of a single class (in this case theatre) followed by those words. (c) The tendency of more modern authorities is to attenuate the application of the ejusdem generis rule."

Section 49(3) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 empowers the Electricity Board to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person-having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which the supply is required and any other relevant factors. In construing this section the Supreme Court declined to apply the rule of ejusdem generis for limiting the ambit of other relevant factors on the ground that there was no genus of the relevant factors. The enumerated factors viz. geographical position of the area and the nature and purpose of the supply could not be related to any common genus to enable the application of the ejusdem generis rule.

In construing the words a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from contract, occurring in Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the Supreme Court refused to limit the generality of other proceeding and to apply the ejusdem generis rule as the preceding phrase a claim of set-off, did not constitute a genus or category. In that case, HIDAYATULLAH, J., in explaining the principle that the rule cannot be applied unless there be "a genus constituted or a category disclosed", gave the following illustration: "In the expression books, pamphlets, newspapers and other documents, private letters may not be held included if other documents be interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes before. But in a provision which reads newspapers or other documents, likely to convey secrets to the enemy,the words other documents would include document of any kind and would not take their colour from newspaper."

If the preceding words do not constitute mere specifications of a genus but constitute description of a complete genus, the rule has no application. In a policy of insurance, the insurers were given an option to terminate the policy if they so desired by reason of such change or from any other cause whatever; the words by reason of such change in the context referred to any and every act done to the insured property whereby the risk of fire was increased; the Privy Council in these circumstances refused to construe the words or from any other cause whatever by rule of ejusdem generis. LORD WATSON said: "In the present case, there appears no room for its application. The antecedent clause does not contain a mere specification of particulars but the description of a complete genus". It was held that the insurers could terminate the policy at will. Similarly, if the preceding words and the general words in question constitute description of two categories or genera or the general words in question in themselves constitute description of a distinct category, the rule will have no application. In construing the words for the purpose of a State or any other public purpose in Section 6(4) (a), of the Bombay Land Requisition act, 1948, the Supreme Court declined to apply the rule of ejusdem generis for the construction of the words or any other public purpose and pointed out by referring to the legislative entries in the lists that State purposes and any other public purpose were in themselves two distinct categories.

The rule of ejusdem generis has to be applied with care and caution. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but it is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary, and where context and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import, it becomes the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning. As stated by LORD SCARMAN: "If the legislative purpose of a statute is such that a statutory series should be read ejusdem generis, so be it, the rule is helpful. But, if it is not, the rule is more likely to defeat than to fulfil the purpose of the statute. The rule like many other rules of statutory interpretation, is a useful servant but a bad master." so a narrow construction on the basis of ejusdem generis rule may have to give way to a broader construction to give effect to the intention of Parliament by adopting a purposive construction. In interpreting, Section 1 of the Sunday Observance Act, 1780, which reads any house, room or other place which shall be opened or used for public entertainment on any part of Lords Day shall be deemed a disorderly house, the Court of Queens Bench Division rejected the argument that the word place should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding words house and room. It was held that looking to the mischief aimed at, the intention of Parliament in the use of the word place was deliberate to give it a wider meaning that the words house and room. This case may be compared with a decision of the House of Lords where the words other place were construed ejusdem generis in the phrase house, office, room or other place. The conflicting results illustrate the principle that the rule of ejusdem generis like many other rules is merely a canon of construction which gives way to the clear intention of the Legislature.

It may also be noticed that the rule of ejusdem generis has, it appears, no inverse application. General words preceding the enumeration of specific instances are not governed by this rule and their import cannot be limited by any such principle. At any rate, when the Legislature before enumerating specific examples uses the words without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision the preceding general provision cannot be restricted by applying the rule of ejusdem generis.

A word of caution is here necessary. The fact that the ejusdem generis rule is not applicable does not necessarily mean that the prima facie wide meaning of the word other or similar general words cannot be restricted if the language or the context and the policy of the demand a restricted construction. In the expression defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature as they occur in Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act the generality of the words other cause is cut down expressly by the words of a like nature, though the rule of ejusdem generis is strictly not applicable as mention of a single species defect of jurisdiction does not constitute a genus. Another example that may here be mentioned is Section 129 of the Motor Vehicles Act which empowers any police officer authorised in this behalf or other person authorised in this behalf by the State Government to detain and seize vehicles used without certification of registration or permit. The words other person in this section cannot be construed by the rule of ejusdem generis for mention of single species namely police officer does not constitute a genus but having regard to the importance of the power to detain and seize vehicles it is proper to infer that the words other person were restricted to the category of Government Officers. In the same category falls the case interpreting the words before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings as they occur in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. In the context in which the expression any other steps finds place it has been rightly construed to mean a step clearly and unambiguously manifesting an intention to waive the benefit of arbitration agreement, although the rule of ejusdem generis has no application for mention of a single species viz. written statement does not constitute a genus"

In the present case we noticed that the clause barring interest is very widely worded. It uses the words any amount due to the contractor by the employer. In our opinion, these words cannot be read as ejusdem generis alongwith the earlier words "earnest money" or "security deposit".

On the facts of the case we agree with the submission of Mr. Gaurab Banerji that interest is only payable from the date of the award. However, we do not agree with him that the interest should be reduced because of Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 which clearly states that rate of interest will be 18% per annum.

Shri Gaurab Banerji submitted that in some decisions, a lesser interest has been awarded. We cannot see how a lesser interest can be awarded when the statute specifically provides that the rate of interest will be 18% per annum and the arbitrator has accepted and awarded this rate of interest. Judges cannot legislate or amend the law by judicial decisions. They have to maintain judicial discipline and give their decisions in accordance with law.

Hence the lesser rate of interest cannot be awarded because that would be amending the law which is not within the powers of the judiciary.

We modify the impugned judgment in the light of the observations made above.

Mr. Gaurab Banerji submitted that the appellant had deposited the entire amount in the High Court under the order of this Court. The respondent can withdraw the amount at the rate of 18% per annum for the period after the date of award. The remaining amount will be returned to the appellant.

Appeal allowed to the extent indicated above.

No costs.