RAMA RAO, J.

(1) THE constitution of the Full Bench is a sequel to the doubt entertained as to the correctness of Full Bench decision in S. Sahawala vs. Director of Public Instruction in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagatram. The seminal issue for consideration is whether osmania College, Kurnool is a State within the coverage of Article 12 of the Constitution. In respect of the same college the Division Bench of this Court in Osmania College, Kurnool vs. D. V. Subba Sastry held that the college can be considered as a public body amenable to writ jurisdiction but the Full Bench held that even if the institution is held to be a public body writ cannot be issued in the absence of statutory rules governing the institu-tution. In another writ petition impugning the termination order dated 25-4-1978 learned brother P. A. Choudary, J referred the matter to the Fuller bench as it was considered that a fresh look to the ratiocination by the Full bench is necessitated in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukhdev singhs case (supra). The Full Bench comprising Madhava Reddy, ramachandra Rao and P. A. Choudary, JJ reiterated the same view and the Fuller Bench is thus seized of the matter to consider the parameters of the State envisaged in Article 12 of the Constitution.

(2) THE Full Bench of this Court in Sahawalas case (supra) held that the writ is not maintainable against society registered under Hyderabad non-trading Societies Registration Act managing the aided institution notwithstanding the aid received under the Grant-in-aid Code from the Govt. Referring to the earlier Full Bench decision in Harijandar Singh vs. Kakatiya medical College and also the Division Bench decision in Osmania College, kurnool vs. D. V. Subba Sastry (supra) the Full Bench held "that the distinction between the statutory and public bodies is not borne out by any of the Supreme Court decisions". The Supreme Court decisions which prompted the conclusion of the Full Bench are State of Assam vs. Ajit Kumar sarma and Regina vs. St. A. H. E. School wherein the issue in the first case is whether executive instructions for giving grant-in-aid to the educational institutions have statutory force and can be enforced and in the second case the rules for recognition of aided private school can be enforced at the instance of the teacher and in both the decisions the Supreme Court held that the rules governing the grant-in-aid arc executive instructions and have no statutory force and the recognition is a matter between the management and the Government and the teacher has no say in the matter. Relying upon the above decisions and other two Supreme Court decisions Divan, C. J. , voicing the opinion of the Court held as follows :"in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above it is clear that even if the edu ational institutions considered to be a public body, no writ or direction can be issued so long as the private institution is not governed by statutory rules and there is no question of any enforcement of statutory rules. However, as against a Government servant, who is functioning under administrative orders of administrative instructions, a writ can issue if there is violation of principles of natural justice or if the administrative instructions, which are binding on him have not been followed by him. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can always direct a public servant to abide by the rule of law and the administrative instructions binding on him are part of the rule of law. It is only to the limited extent that the High Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution in matters of this kind. We are constrained to hold, in view of the decisions of the supreme Court referred to above, that even on the basis of the distinction between a statutory body and a public body that a private institution like the 2nd respondent, registered under the Co-operative societies Act or the Companies Act or Non-trading Societies Registration act, is a public body, it is not open to the High Court to issue a writ or direction against such a body for breach of any administrative executive instructions". The Full Bench thus wound up by holding that statutory body alone can be considered as State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. In the Division Bench decision in Osmania College, Kurnool vs. D. V. Subba Sastry (supra) the retrenchment of the services of few lecturers in the Telugu department of the University College, Kurnool is questioned by filing a writ petition. The Collegt has been receiving full teaching grants and administered by the Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, and it has been affiliated to Sri Venkateswara University and recognised by the government of Andhra Pradesh. After survey of several decisions the Division bench comprising Sambasiva Rao and Madhusudan Rao, JJ held that the writ petition is maintainable against the college since it is a public body though not a statutory body following the decisions of the Supreme Court in sirsi Municipality vs. C. K. F. Teltis and the Full Bench decision in Harijander singhs case. (supra).

(3) THE definition of the state in Art 12 of the Constitution by inclusive texture comprehends the Union and State Legislatures and Governments of India and State and local authorities and other authorities. The coverage of the State in this Article is confined to Part III only and the same expression is used in Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16 and this definition is adopted in Part IV concerned with Directive Principles. The authorities preceding the expression "other authorities" are quite familiar and the identification of of contours of the said authorities does not present difficulty. The lay out of article 12 broadly comprises three categories of authorities namely the legislative and executive authorities at the Centre and the State, local authorities and other authorities. Considered from linguistic perspective the other can be considered as compendious expression embracing the entities other than the authorities specifically adverted to The off-shoot of this approach is that the other authorities should be considered as residual taking in its fold the bodies or authorities invested with the power to perform manifold activities of the State in furtherance of the concept of welfare State including the trading or business operations pursuant to Article 298 of the Constitution. The slant towards increasing governmental activities in all spheres is clearly discernible and the passage from the constitution and Planned Economy by henry Rottschaeffer may be extracted :"the net effect has been a shift in political economic and social philosophies from individualism towards socialism, from acceptance of an economic system operating in response to the profit motive to belief in one in which governing planning and directions to play an increased role, from a social philosophy which admitted the duty of government to intervene in the distribution of income to a limited extent to one urging government to interpose on an ever-increasing scale and from a political and constitutional theory of rather restricted federal activity to one in which the federal government was assigned the major role in realizing the social objectives explicit or implicit in the new approaches to our social and economic problems". As early as in 1935 the State is considered to comprehend every repository of state power in the enforcement of fundamental rights in America as disclosed from the decisions in Brinkerhoftparis Trux and Sav. Co. vs. Hiu and soney Holobshan. Way back in Ramjayawa Kapur vs. State of Punjab while considering the ambit of executive power of the State and Union of India under Articles 154 (1), 73 and 53 (1), Mukherjee J held as follows :"a modern State is certainly expected to engage in all activities necessary for the promotion of the social and economic welfare of the community".

(4) THE expression "other authorities" is interpreted as the chip of the block of the preceding authorities invoking the rule of ejus Jem generis. It is held that all the authorities are stringed by the common thread of performing functions of the Government or intimately associated with governmental activities. Along with this the other interpretation which held the field for some time is that the expression authority inhere a body exercising power to issue rules, bye-laws or regulations having the sanction of law.

(5) THE invocation of rule of ejusdem generis withered away by the decision of the Supreme Court in Electricity Board, Rajasthan vs. Mohanbal wherein it is held that there is no occasion to invoke rule of ejusdem generis as there is no genus running through the bodies preceding the other authorities. In this case Bhargava, J delivering the majority judgment held that the other authorities comprehend the statutory authorities deposited with powers to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions including the powers to facilitate carrying on commercial activities and such powers include the power to issue directions the disobedience of which is entailed with penal consequences. Shah, J concurring with the majority adopted a slightly different route and held that the authority can be considered to be within the realm of other authorities if such authority is a delegate of the sovereign power of the State invested with power to make rules or regulations and enforce them. Pursuant to this decision the legal position that prevailed is that statutory corporations alone with power to issue directions the disobedience of which is visited with penal consequences are considered as State within the meaning of Article 12. In Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagatram (supra)two issues for consideration are: (1) whether an order of removal from service contrary to regulations framed under the Oil and Natural Gas commission Act, 1959; the Industria Finance Corporation Act, 1948; and the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 would enable the employees to a declaration against the statutory corporation of continuance in service or would only give rise to a claim for damages. (2) whether an employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to claim protection under Articles 14 and 16 and whether these statutory corporations are authorities within the meaning of Article 12 or the Constitution. After analying the provisions of the Oil ana Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 Raja, C. J. speaking for himself, chandrachud and Gupta, JJ held as follows :"all these provisions indicate at each stage that the creation, composition of membership, the functions and powers, the financial powers, the audit of accounts, the returns, the capital, the borrowing powers, the dissolution of the Commission and acquisition of land for the purpose of the company and the powers of entry are all authority and agency of the Central Government". In so far as the Life Insurance Corporation created under the Life Insurance act it is held as follows :"the structure of the Life Insurance Corporation indicates that the Corporation is an agency of the Government carrying on the exclusive business of life insurance. Each and every provision shows in no uncertain terms that the voice is that of the Central Government and the hands are also of the Central Government". In so far as Industrial r Finance Corporation Act it is held that the Corporation is in managed, and controlled by the Central Government. Having deference to the principles propounded in Rajasthan Electricity case (supra)it is summed up as follows:"for the foregoing reasons, we hold that rules and regulations framed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation have the force of law. The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions. By way of abundant caution we state that these employees are not servants of the Union or the State. The statutory bodies are "authorities" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution". Mathew, J agreeing with the conclusion of the majority projected a new dimension of instrumentality or agency and held that the test propounded in rajasthan Electricity case is satisfied in so far as Oil and Natural Gas commission but in so far as other two corporations the question is posed whether the Corporations constituted to carry on business of public importance, or fundamental life of the people can be labelled as State. Mathew, J adverted to modern concept of State as follows :"the concept of State has undergone drastic changes in recent years. Today state cannot be conceived of simply a co-ercive machinery wielding the thunderbolt of authority. It has to be viewed mainly as a service corporation. If we clearly grasp the character of the state as a social agent, understanding it rationally as a form of service and not mystically as an ultimate power we shall differ only in respect of the limits of its ability to render service". Part IV of the Constitution gives a picture of the services which the state is expected to undertake and render for the welfare of the people. Art. 298 provides that the executive power of the Union and state extends to the carrying on of any business or trade. As 1 said, the question for consideration is whether a public corporation set up under a special statute to carry on a business or service which Parliament thinks necessary to be carried on in the interest of the nation is an agency or instrumentality of the State and would be subject to the limitations expressed in Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution. A State is an abstract entity. It can only act through the instrumentality or agency of natural or judicial persons. Therefore, there is nothing strange in the notion of the state acting through a corporation and making it an agency or instrumentality of the State". The concept of agency or instrumentality of the Government is elucidated as follows :"does any amount of State help, however inconsequential, make an act something more than an individual act Suppose, a privately owned and managed operation receives direct financial aid from the state, is an act of such an agency an act of State It would be difficult to give a categorical answer to this question. Any operation or purpose of value to the public may be encouraged by appropriation of public money and the resulting publicly supported operation can be characterised as a state operation. But such a rule would seem to go to the extreme. There seems to be no formula which would provide the correct division of cases of this type into neat categories of State action and private action. Some clue however, to the considerations which might impel the Court in one direction or the other may be obtained from an examination of the cases in this area. The decision of the state Courts in U. S. A. seem to establish that a private agency, if supported by public money for its operation would be "state". But in all these cases, it has been found that there was an element of control exercised by the State. Therefore, it may be stated generally that State financial aid alone does not render the institution receiving such aid a state agency. Financial aid plus some additional factor might lead to a different conclusion. A mere finding of state control also is not determinative of the question, since a state has considerable measure of control under its police power over all types of business operations. It is not possible to assume that the monopoly of law and authority of a state under which people carry on ordinary business or their private affairs or own property, each enjoying equality in terms of legal capacity would be extraordinary assistance. A finding of state financial support plus an unusual degree of control over the management and policies might lead one to characterize an operation as state action". "another factor which might be considered is whether the operation is an important public function. The combination of state aid and the furnishing of an important public service may result in a conclusion that the operation would be classified as a state agency. If a given function is of such public importance and so clearly related to governmental functions as to be classified as a governmental agency, then even the presence or absence of State financial aid might be irrelevant in making a finding of state action. If the function does not fall within such a description, then mere addition of state money would not influence the conclusion". Mathew, J summed up as follows:"the crux of the matter is that public corporation is a new type of institution which has sprung from the new social and economic functions of government and that it therefore does not neatly fit into old legal categories. Instead of forcing it into them, the latter should be adopted to the needs of changing times and conditions. Mathew, J dilated upon the nature of employment under such corporations and held as follows: "even assuming that the regulations have no force of law, I think since the employment under these corporations is public employment, an employee would get a statute which would enable him to obtain declaration for continuance in service if he was dismissed or discharged contrary to the regulations". It is significant that on the same day the same Bench held that the Council of scientific and Industrial Research is not an authority in Sabrajit Tewarry vs. Union of India by observing as follows :"the society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and natural Gas Commission or the Life Insurance Corporation or industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The fact that the Prime Minister, Minister is the president or that the government appoints nominees/ to the governing body or that the government may terminate the membership will not establish any thing more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation and scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches, establishment or development and assistance to special institutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problem effecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researchers conducted under the auspices of the council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner. "in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Air Port Authority of India while considering the contention whether the action of the International Airport authority being a corporate body constituted under the International Airport authority Act, 1970 acted arbitrarily in accepting the tender of one of the persons contrary to the conditions of the notice, the issue whether International air Port Authority is the State within the meaning of Art. 12 is considered preliminarily and Bhagwathi, J developed the concept of instrumentality or agency projected by Mathew, J and held as follows :"it will thus be seen that there are several factors which may have to be considered in determining whether a corporations is an agency or instrumentality of Government. We have referred to some of these factors and they may be summarised as under: whether there is any financial assistance given by the State, and if so, what is the magnitude of such assistance whether there is any other form of assistance, given by the State, and if so, whether it is of the usual kind or it is extraordinary, whether there is any control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State and what is the nature and extent of such control, whether the corporation enjoys State-conferred or State protected monopoly status and whether the functions carried out by the corporation or public functions closely related to governmental functions. This particularisation of relevant factors is however not exhaustive and by its very nature it cannot be because with increasing assumption of new tasks, growing complexities of management and administration and the necessity of continuing adjustment in relations between the corporation and Government calling for flexibility adaptability and innovative skills, it is not possible to make an exhaustive enumeration of the tests which would invariably and in all. cases provide an unfailing answer to the question whether a corporation is governmental instrumentality or agency. Moreover even amongst these factors which we have aescribed, no one single factor will yield a satisfactory answer to the question and the court will have to consider the cumulative effect of these various factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a particularised inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case. ,"the dispositive question in any State action case" as pointed out by Dougles, J. , in Jackson vs. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1974-419 US 345) (supra) is not whether any single fact or relationship presents a sufficient degree of State involvement, but rather whether the aggregate of all relevant factors compels a finding of State responsibility. It is not enough to examine seriatim each of the factors upon which a corporation is claimed to be an instrumentality or agency of government and to dismiss each individually as being insufficient to support a finding to that effect, it is the aggregate or cumulative effect of all the relevant factors that is controlling". In The Managing Director, U. P. Warehousing Corpn. vs. Vijay Narayan vajpayee the employee of the U. P. Warehousing Corporation filed a writ petition challenging the order of dismissal as violative of principles of natural justice and in the context of considering whether the Corporation is other authority within the umbrella of Article 12 of the Constitution, Sarkaria, J while referring to U. P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. vs. Chandra Kiran tyagi (1979 (2) S. C. R. 250) relating to the same Corporation held as follows:"the authority of the rule in Tyagis case, to the effect, that an employee of such a statutory body even if to be owned and managed by the Government does not enjoy a statutory status, appears to have been eroded by the later decisions of this Court, particularly the pronouncement in Sukhdev Singhs case". After profusely referring to the decision in Sukhdev Singhs case it is held that the Corporation is a statutory body wholly controlled and managed by the government and its status is analogous to the Corporations considered in sukhdev Singhs ccase. Chinnappa Reddy. J. referring to the concept of agency or instrumentality highlighted in Sukhdev Singh and Air Port cases, held as follows :"1 find it very hard indeed to discover any distinction on principle, between a person directly under the employment of the Government a nd a person under the employment of an agency of instrumentality of the Government or a Corporation, set up under a statute or incorporated but wholly owned by the Government. It is self evident and trite to say that the function of the State has long since ceased to be confined to the preservation of the public peace, the exaction of taxes and the defence of its frontiers. It is now the function of the State to secure social, economic and political justice, to preserve liberty of thought, expression, belief faith and worship, and to ensure equality of status and of opportunity. That is the proclamation of the people in the preamble to the Constitution. The desire to attain these objectives has necessarily resulted in intense Governmental activity in manifold ways. Legislative and executive activity have reached very far and have touched very many aspeets of a citizens life. The Government, directly or through the Corporations, set up by it or owned by it, now owns or manages, a large number of industies and institutions". "in Som Prakash vs. Union of India while considering the maintainability of writ petition assailing the cut in pension payable to the employee by Bharat Petroleum Corporation, Krishna Iyer, J held as follows :"for purposes of the Companies Acts, 1956, a government company has a distinct personality which cannot be confused with the state. Likewise, a statutory corporation constituted to carry on commercial or other activity is for many purposes distinct juristic entity not drowned in the sea of State, although, in substance, its existence may be but a projection of the State. What we wish to emphasise is that merely because a company or other legal person has functional and jural individuality for certain purposes and in certain area of law, it does not necessarily follow that for the effective enforcement of fundamental rights under our constitutional scheme, we should not scan the real character of that entity; and if it is found to be a mere agent or surrogate of the State, in fact owned by the State, in truth controlled by the State and in effect an incarnation of the State, constitutional lawyers must not blink at these facts and frustrate the enforcement of fundamental rights despite the inclusive definition of article 12 that any authority controlled by the Government of India is itself State, Law has many dimensions and fundamental facts must overrun the applicability of fundamental rights in a given situation". While considering the impacc of the provisions of the burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976, it is held as follows :"whatever its character antecedent to the, the provisions we have adverted to have transformed it into an instrumentality of the central Government with a strong statutory flavour superadded and clear indicia of power to make it an "authority", although registered as a company under the Indian Companies Act, the second respondent is clearly a creature of the statute, the undertaking having vested in it by force of Section 7 of the. The various provisions to which our attention was drawn, an elaboration of which is no: called for, emphasise the fact that the second respondent is not a mere company but much more than that and has a statutory flavour in its operations and functions, in its powers and duties, and in its personality itself, apart from being functionally and administratively under the thumb of government. It is a limb of Government, an agency of the State, a vicarious creature of statute working on the wheels of the Acquisition act. We do not mean to say that for purposes of Articles 309 or otherwise this Government company is State but limit our holding to article 12 and part III". Considering the recent trend of decisions of the Supreme Court widening the concept of authorities and after analysing the principles in Air Port case, u. P. Warehousing Corporation case, Rajasthan Electricity Board case and sukhdev Singh case, it is held as follows : "these decisions of the Court support our view that the expression "other authorities" in Art. 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the state is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or business as mentioned in Art. 19 (1) (g). In Part IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Art. 12 and one of the Directive principles laid down in Art. 46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The State, as defined in Art. 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under Art. 298 to carry on any trade or business. The circumstances that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word"state" as used in Art. 12. The meanining of the learned judge is unmistakably that "the State" in Art. 12 comprehends bodies created for the purpose of promoting economic activities. These bodies may be statutory corporations, registered societies, government companies or other like entities. The Court was not called upon to consider this latter aspect but to the extent to which the holding goes, it supports the stand of the petitioners". Dealing with the contention that in view of Air Port Authority created by the Statute there was no necessity to go beyond the needs of the situation in that case and irreconcilability with Sukhdev Singhs case, it is held as follows : a study of Sukhdevs case, (1975) 3 SCR 619 [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] ">(1975) 3 SCR 619 [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] ">(1975) 3 SCR 619 [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] ">(1975) 3 SCR 619 [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] : (AIR 1975 SC 1331 [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] ">AIR 1975 SC 1331 [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] ">AIR 1975 SC 1331 [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] ">AIR 1975 SC 1331 [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] [LQ/SC/1975/80 ;] ) (a Constitution Bench decision of this Court) yields the clear result that the considerations for pronouncing an entity as State agency or instrumentality are (1) financial sources of the State being the chief funding source, (2) functional character being governmental in essence, (3) plenary control "residing in Government, (4) prior history of the same activity having been carried on by Government and made over to the new body and (5) some element of authority or command. Whether the legal person is a corporation created by a statute, as distinguished from under a statute, is not an important criterion although it may be an indicium. Applying the constellation of criteria collected by us from Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 [LQ/SC/1979/277] (AIR-1979 SC 1628) [LQ/SC/1979/277] , on a cumulative basis, to the given case, there is enough material to hold that the Bharat Petroieum Corporation is state within the enlarged meaning of Art. 12". It is further held as follows :"the commonsensc signification of the expression" other authorities under the control of the Government of India" is plain and there is no reason to make exclusions on sophisticated grounds such as that the legal person must be a statutory corporation, must be created by and not under a statute and so on. The jurisprudence of Third World countries cannot afford the luxury against which Salmond cavilled, salmond, Jurisprudence, 10th Edn. p. 51". Pathak, J concurred with the majority view not without hesitation and the observations may be excerpted :"i must confess to some hesitation in accepting the proposition that the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited is a "state" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. But in view of the direction taken by the law in this Court since Ramana Jayaram Shetty vs. International airport Authority (1979) 3 SCR 489 : (AIR 1979 SC 1628 [LQ/SC/1979/277] ), i find I must lean in favour of that conclusion. I would have welcomed a wider range of debate before us on the fundamental principles involved in the issue and on the implications flowing from the defininition in the Companies Act, 1956 of a "government Company", but perhaps a future case may provide that". "as regards the. Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in india) Act, 1976 I am unable to see any support for the proposition in the provisions of that Act. The provisions will apply to any Government company, and they do not alter the basic nature of that company. They are provisions which could well have been applied to a private corporation, if the had selected one for vesting the undertaking in it. Would that have made the private corporation a "state " oa the same day, i. e. , 13-11-1980 a land-mark decision is handed down by the supreme Court in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib wherein for the first time the society registered under the Societies Registration Act is considered as state within the meaning of Article 12. In this case the validity of the admissions to the Regional Engineering College is questioned by a writ petition under article, 32 of the Constitution. The preliminary objection is raised regarding the maintainability of writ petition on the ground that the College is run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act not a corporation created under the statute and it cannot be considered as an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Bhagwati, J. referring to the extensive forays into commercial ventures and economic activities by the government held as follows :"the constitutional philosophy of a democratic socialist republic requires the Government to undertake a multitude of* socio-econmic operations and the Government, having regard to the practical advantages of functioning through the legal device of a corporation embarks on myriad commercial and economic activities by resorting to the instrumentality or agency of a corporation, but this contrivance of carrying on such activities through a corporation cannot exonerate the Government from impact obedience to the Fundamental Rights. To use the corporate methodology is not to liberate the Government from its basic obligation to respect the Fundamental Rights and not to override them. The mantle of a corporation may be adopted in order to free the Government from the inevitable constraints of red-tapism ands low motion but by doing so, the Government cannot be allowed to play truant with the basic human rights. Otherwise it would be the easiest thing for the Government to assign to a plurality of corporations almost every State business such as Post and Telegraph, tv and Radio, Rail Road and Telephones in short every economic activityand thereby cheat the people of India out of the fundamental Rights guaranteed to them". The relevant tests for determining the corporation or entity as instrumentality cr agency are summarised as follows :" (1) "one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government". (2) "where the-financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character". (3) "it may also be a relevant factor. . . . whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected". (4) "existence of "deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality". (5) "if the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government". (6) "specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of government". Regarding the relevancy of the origin or modalities of the creation of corporation it is held as follows:"we may point out that it is immaterial for this purpose whether the corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The corporation may be a statutory corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government company or a company formed uuder the Companies act, 1956 or it may be a society registered under the Societies registration Act, 1860 or any other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an "authority" within the meaning of article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression "authority" in Article 12". Regarding the contention that the Supreme Court in AIR 1975 SC 1329 [LQ/SC/1975/79] (supra) held that the society registered under the Societies Registration act cannot be considered as State the decision is distinguished as follows:"the Court implicitly assented to the proposition that if the council were an agency of the Government, it would undoubtedly be an "authority". But, having regard to the various features enumerated in the judgment, the Court held that the Council was not an agency of the Government and hence could not be regarded as an authority. The Court did not rest conclusion on the ground that the Council was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, out proceeded to consider various other features of the Council for arriving at the conclusion that it was not an agency of the Government and therefore not an "authority". There would have been totally unnecessary if the view of the Court were that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act can never be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12". In the light of the principles formulated the factual picture emerging from the memorandum of association and rules of the society is considered. It is stated that the composition of the society is dominated by the representatives appointed by the Central Government, the Government of Jammu and kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Utter Pradesh with the approval of the central Government. The monies required for running the college are provided entirely by the Central Government and the Government of jammu and Kashmir and even if any other monies are to be received by the society, it can be done only with the approval of the State and the Central government and the accounts of the society have also to be submitted to both the Governments for their scrutiny and satisfaction. The society has to comply with all such directions as may be issued by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government in respect of any matters dealt with in the report of the Reviewing Committee. It is also noticed that the control of the State and the Central Government is indeed a deep and pervasive that no immovable property of the society can be disposed of in any manner without the approval of both the Governments. Further, the state and Central Governments have power to appoint any other person or persons to the members of the Society and any member of the society can be removed from the membership of the society and thus the State Government and Central Government also have rull control of working of the society. On these tacts it is held the society is merely a projection of the State and the central Government and therefore instrumentality or agency of the State.

(6) IN B. S. Minhas vs. Indian Statistical Institute while considering whether the writ petition challenging the appointment of the Director of the institute is maintainable and whether the Indian Statistical Institute registered under the Societies Registration Act is the State, R. B. Misra, J. , referring to the Ajay Uasias case held as follows:"the Constitution Bench in that case took the view that the expression "other authorities" in Article 12 must be given a broad and liberal interpretation, where constitutional fundamentals vital to the maintenance of human rights are at stake and functional realism and not facial cosmetics must be the diagnostic tool, for constitutional law must seek the substance and not the form. The Court pointed out that the Government may act through the instrumentality or agency of juridical persons to carry out its functions, since, with the advent of the welfare State, its new tasks have increased manifold and such juridical persons acting as the instrumentality or agency of the government must therefore be subject to the same discipline of fundamental rights as the State". In this case it is found that the money required for running the institute is provided entirely with the Central Government and even if any other monies also have to be received with the approval of the Central Government and the accounts have to be submitted to the Central Government for its scrutiny and satisfaction and the society nas to comply with the directions as may be issued by the Central Government, and on these facts it is held that the society is instrumentality of the Central Government. In P. K. Ramachandra Iyer vs. Union of India (18) the issue is whether the Indian Council of Agricultural research is comprehended in the expression "other authority" in Article 12 of the Constitution. Regarding the contention that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research registered under the Societies Registration Act and having an identical set up as well as Constitution was heki not to be instrumtality of the State in Subhajit Tewarys case, D. A. Desai, J held as follows :"much water has flown down the Jamuna since the dicta in sabhajit Tewarys case and conceding that it is not specifically overruled in later decision, its ratio is considerably watered down so as to be a decision confined to its own facts". It is further held as follows :"the ratio, if any, of the decision in Sabhajit Tewarys case (AIR 1975 SC 1329 [LQ/SC/1975/79] ) was examined by a Constitution Bench of this Court in ajay Hasias case (AIR 1981 S. C. 487) and it was held that decision is not an authority for the proposition that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can never be regarded as an authority within the meaning of Article 12. The Court further held that having regard to the various features enumerated in the judgment in Sabhajit Tewarys case, the conclusion was reached that the CSIR was not an agency of the Government but the Court did not rest its conclusion on the sole ground that CSIR was a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 and on the contrary proceeded to consider various other features of the Council for arriving at the conclusion that it was not an agency of the Government and, therefore, it was not an authority for the proposition that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act for that reason alone would not be comprehended in the expression other authority ". In Manmohan Singh vs. Commr. U. T. Chandigarh the services of the headmaster of the aided school governed by the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of service) Act, 19 of 1969 are terminated. Admittedly the school receives 95 per cent of the expenditure as grant from the Government. The High Court declined to grant the relief on the ground that the aided school is not an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In the context of considering whether the aided school can be considered as an other authority under article 12 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court comprising D. A. Desai and V. Khalid, JJ held as follows :"after the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 2 SCR 79 [LQ/SC/1980/459] : (AIR 1981 S. C. 487) tne aided school receiving 95% of expenses by way of grant from the public exchequer and whose employees have received the statutory protection under the 1969 Act and who is subject to the regulations made by the Education department of the Union Territory of Chandigarh as also the appointment of Headmaster to be valid must be approved by the Director of Public Instruction, would certainly be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court unfortunately did not even refer to the decision of the Constitution bench in Ajay Hasias case rendered on November 13, 1980 while disposing of the writ petition in 1983. In Ajay Hasias case, Bhagwati, j speaking for the Constitution Beach inter alia observed that the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of tne corporation it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. Add to this "the existance of deep and pervasive State control which may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality". In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn Ltd. Brojo Nath the issue for consideration is whether a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the companies Act is a State within the meaning of Article 12 and the principal contention is that the Government company stands on a different footing from statutory corporation as the Government company is incorporated like any other company and the statutory corporation is established by a statuted and in the context of considering this contention and with reference to consititution of companies or corporations in furtherance of Article 298, Madon j held as follows ,"the immunities and privileges possessed by bodies so set up the the Government in India cannot, however, be the same as these possesnal sed by similar bodies established in the private sector because the setting of such bodies is referable to the executive power of the Govervnment under Article 298 to carry on any trade or business". Regarding the extensive forays to the expression "other authorities" made be the decisions it is observed as follows :"when we consider these authorities, we will see how as Constitutional thinking developed and the conceptual horizon widened, new, vistas, till then shrouded in the mist of conventional legal phraseology and traditional orthodoxy, opened out to the eye of judicial interpretation, and many different facts of several Articles of the Constitution, including Arts 12 and 14, hitherto unperceived, became visible there, however, still remains vistas yet to be opened up, veils beyond which we today cannot see to be lifted, and doors to which we stih have found no key to be unlocked". After surveying the decisions from Rajastan State Electricity Board uprd ajay Hasias cases, it is held as follows :"as pointed out earlier, the Corporation which is the First Appellant in these appeals is not only a Government company as defined in S. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, but is wholly owned by three governments jointly. It is financed entirely by these three Governments and is completely under the control of the Central Government, and is managed by the Chairman and Board of Directors appointed by the Central Government and removeable by it. In every respect it is thus a veil behind which the Central Government operates through the instrumentality of a Government company". Even though it is the Government company it is observed that it has got all the attainments of the State envisaged under Art. 12 of the Constitution, and held as follows:"if there is an instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government company as defined in S. 617 of the Companies Act, it does not follow that it thereby ceases to be as instrumentality or agency of the State. For the puiposes of Art. 12 one must necessarily see through the corporate veil to ascertain whether behind that veil is the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State. The Corporation, which is the Appellant in these two appeals before us, squarely falls within these observations and it also satisfies the various tests which have been laid down. Merely because it has so far not the monopoly of inland water transportation is not sufficient to divest it of its character of an instrumentality or agency of the State. It is nothing but the Government operating behind a corporate veil, carrying out a governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance. There can thus be no doubt that the Corporation is "the State" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the constitution". In B. Satyanaravana vs. State the issue is whether the Andhra Pradesh irrigation Development Corporation and the Andhra Pradesh Leather industries Development Corporation can be considered as instrumentalities or agencies of the State. It is held that the financial aid given by the State coupled with unusual control by the State and the performance of public functions by the corporation are indicia to clothe the corporation with the character of instrumentality or agency. After referring to the tests evolved by the Supreme Court in AIR 1979 S. C. 1628 and AIR 1981 S. C. 212 (13 and 15 supra respectively) Jeevan Reddy, J speaking for the majority held as follows :"we respectfully adopt the said tests, and add clarification, which really emerge from the above decisions and logically flow from them : (i) in applying the above tests, it is not very much relevant whether the corporation is created by a statute or is incorporated under a statute ; eg,, Companies Act, Societies Registration Act etc, The fact that a Corporation is a statutory Corporation may perhaps be a factor supporting the conclusion of the Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of the State ; but, it does not follow that every statutory Corporation is ipso facto an instrumentality or agency of the state. Similarly, every Government Company cannot be called an instrumentality or agency of the State, Again the above tests have to be a applied ; (ii) it is not necessary that all the tests pointed out above should be satisfied, It would be a question to be determined in a given case on an aggregate of the relevant circumstances"

(7) THE role of State is not pickled in old concepts of maintenance of law and order etc. limited Government and minimum interference in the current climate of proliferation of socio-economic activities in furtherance of concept of welfare state. The fidelity to limited functions of state is outmoded in the present context of new orientation of carrying on manifold and varied activities in the course of trimming social justice pursuant to constitutional mandate and involving in business or trading operations blessed by article 298 of the Constitution and honouring the directive principle of promoting education and ecnomic interests of weaker segments in consonance with Article 46. In view of multitude of functions including economic activities the Government is trying to sub-contract out the bulk of the work through corporations or other entities, Thus in the course of channeling the socio-ecnomic steps and commercial activities the sprouting of orporations or similar bodies as instrumentalities, agents or conduit pipes has been necessary for effective implementation. The creation of corporations, bodies and similar entities are necessary spin-off of the expansive role of the State. Article 12 by inclusive definition encompasses the categories intimately associated with governmental activities and other authorities. Initially it was considered that the other authorities is a tail-end of the preceding categories taking colour from them but on intensive probe and churning diverse shades of opinion it is realised that this expression is pregnant with tremendous potentialities.

(8) BEFORE dilating upon the correctness of the Full Bench decision the principles emerging from the decisions herein above may be sketched out and the discovery of diverse facets and dimensions of the other authorities embodied in Article 12 may be recapitulated, The decision in Rajasthan Electricity board case is the first mile stone in the development of law. The principle of ejusdem generis attributing trappings of purely governmental functions akin to the preceding entities is dismantled. It is held that the statutory corporations or authorities invested with power to issue directions the disobedience of which is visited with penal consequences or have the sovereign power to make roles having the force of law have to be considered as State. It is further held that the other authorities comprehend every authority created by a statute on which powers are conferred enabling them to carry on commercial activities in conjunction with Government or quasi-governmental functions. The decision in Sukhdev Singh case constitutes king-pin in the series of Supreme Court decisions as new dimension of the concept of instrumentality or agency is evolved for the first time. The majority reiterating the view in Rajasthan Electricity Board case heid that statutory corporations deposued with power to frame rules and regulations having the force of law should be considered as State and the bodies created for the purpose of promoting economic interests of the people or involving in the activities of the nature of trade or commerce are also within the sweep of other authorities. The crucial test is that the provisions of the Corporation should indicate that the "voice is that of the Government and hands are also of the Government", mathew, J. projected a new concept of instrumentality or agency on the functional basis that the other authorities should be read as including the entities or bodies springing up at the instance of the State to carry on manifold activities in furtherance of welfare state in the present context of modern concept of State and should not be considered as merely "a coercive; machinery wielding the thunderbolt of authority". Initially the question prosed by mathew, J. is whether the corporation set up to carry on business of public importance or fundamental to the. life of the people can be considered as state notwithstanding the statutory flavour espoused by the majority in rajasthan Electricity Board case. The accent is upon functionality in conjunction with Government control. The tests formulated broadly are financial aid constituting the major chunk of the finances of the corporation, functional character being governmental in essence and plenary control with the Government and antecedents of the same activity being carried on by the government and brought over to the new body and some element of authority or command. The main focus is upon these tests nimely State financial aid, unusual degree of control by the Government and rendering important public service. While considering this three-dimension test Mathew, J. adverted to permutations and combinations and held that financial aid plus un-usual degree of control by the Government are sufficient. The State aid plus rendering important public service is also held to be sufficient. It is further observed that public function closely associated with or entwined with governmental activity despite the absence of State financial aid is considered to he sufficient. It is further held that the formation of the Corporation by the statute or under a statute is not the criterion but the criterion is functional. The state control should not be confused with the control of the state over all types of business operations under its police power and any autonomous body which has some nexus with Government should not be considered as State. The necessary feeler is that the entities other than statutory corporations can be considered as State on functional basis. The emphasis on the manner of incorporation and the corporation being the creature of State to be elevated to the status of State is nteatly sidelined by directing focus upon functional aspect. In the Airport case the doctrine of agency and instrumentality evolved by Mathew, J, is echoed and beefed up by Bhagwati, J. It is held that the corporation may be created by statute or incorporated under the Companies Act and this does not detract the consideration of the corporation being a statute within the meaning of Article 12. The broad tests formulated by Bhagwati, J are the financial assistance of the Government and the magnitude of such assistance, the nature and extent of the control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State and enjoyment of monopoly status or substantial benefits or concessions and the discharge of public functions. It is held that no one single factor yields a satisfactory answer and the cumulative effect of these factors has to be considered. It can be seen that the tests formulated by Mathew, J, are chiselled and shaped by Bhagwathi, J and the aspect of cumulative effect of the factors has been developed. It is held that the agent or instrumentality means a part of the governing power of the State is located in the corporation, The concept of agency or instrumentality is lapped up in Ajay Hasias case and the doubts entertained as to obiter on the ground that the observations of Mathew, J in Sukhdev Singh case, Bhagwati, J in Airport case and Krishna, Iyer, J in burmah shell case spilled over, the requirements as the corporations concerned in those cases are statutory corporations are given queitus in Hasias case, the only consideration is whether it is instrumentality and the origin is not relevant. The accent on functional concept without reference to origin and structure of the entity or corporation for the purpose of identifying the authority as to state within article 12 is germinated by Mathew, J, nourished by Bhagwati, J and finally blossomed in Hasias case. In Hasias case Bhagwati, J mustered the concept of functionality by adverting to the possibility of creating corporations and assigning governmental functions and by-passing the constitutional remedies and "thereby cheat the people of India out of fundamental rights granted to them". The apparent clevage of opinion etween two decisions of the Bench of five Judges of Supreme Court i. e. , hasias case and Tewarys case (AIR 1975 SC 1329 [LQ/SC/1975/79] ) continued to be sticky wicket tor some time as the Supreme Court in Tewarys case eluded the society registered under the Societies Registration Act to attain the status of state as distinct from the later view in Hasias case that the society is also within the purview of other authorities on functional basis. The mist is cleared by bhagwati, J who held that there is no conflict as there was no discussion in the case as to the data for considering the authority as State and it should be confined to its own facts and circumstances. Desai, J in Ramchandra Iyers case (supra) while chorussing this view went a step further by stating that "much wafer has flown down Jamuna" since Tewarys case thereby suggesting the inundation of enunciation of taboo against society registered under the Societies Registration Act being considered as State by flood of light thrown by subsequent decisions on the hitherto unexposed dark dimensions in article 12. The essence of the tests that can be gathered from the decisions are substantial financial aid, control by the Government, performance of public functions and the entrustment of governmental activities, the full-fledged presence of each of the factors is not necessary and the combination of one or other may land in the conclusion of label of State. The look and cumulative effect of all aspects is the determinative factor. The financial aid must be substantial but not merely firsr-aid. The control of the Government through finance or otherwise should permeate the activities of the Corporation by appropriate strings and the litmus test is that interruption or halting or limping aid should not result in gasping by the corporation or body. The origin or geneology or modalities of creation of the corporation is not germane and the authority need not be creature or tributary of the Government.

(9) IT is obvious that the decision of the Full Bench holding that in so far asthe other authorities in Article 12 should be funnelled or confined to statutory bodies alone is silently over-ruled by implication by decision of the supreme Court. We hold that the decision of the Full Bench in so far as holding that statutory corporations alone can be considered as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution is no longer good law in view of the subsequens decisions of the Supreme Court.

(10) BEARING in mind the principles set out above it has to be considered whether the respondent society is a State within the meaning of Art. 12. The petitioner filed the writ petition for quashing compulsory retirement order issued by the 2nd respondent ie. , Osmania College, Kurnool by proceedings roc. 250/78-79 dated 25-4-1978. It is stated by the petitioner that the society running the college has been receiving full teaching grant. In the counter-affidavit it is stated that the institution is receiving 80 per cent of the teaching grant and the society is registered under the Societies Registration act and it has been recognised by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and since the recognition it has been receiving full teaching grant. As a condition of affiliation, the University laid down certain conditions of service for teachers in the affiliated colleges. In G. O. Ms. No. 72 dated 16-2-1973 the Government passed an order that every member of the non-teaching staff except attender in all the private affiliated colleges shall retire from service on his attaining the age of 55 years. It is stated in the additional affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the college is a fully aided college and the aid is received tor the teaching as well as non-teaching staff and also receiving building grant as well as the library grant. The petitioner was admitted to grant-in-aid and during his service his salary was paid by the Government. Further, the teaching and non-teaching as well who retire from the college are getting their pension from the Government as per the Pension Rules applicable to them. It is also stated that this college came into existence for the purpose ol imparting education and it is an important public function which is closely related to governmental functions in Articles 41 and 45 read with Article 46 of the Constitution. In the additional counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the college it is stated that the college is an aided college but the financial aid received from the Government does not cover the entire expenses for the maintenance and upkeep of the college. The receipt of aid of grant by way of building and library grant is denied. The reference is made to the proceedings of the Direcror dated 29-6-1981 that the college is receiving aid for 80 per cent of the posts and it is stated that the aid does not cover all the posts in the College. In G. O. Ms. No. 544 dated 10-6-1981 with respect to the private aided colleges it is stated that the orders issued ing. O. Ms. No. 658 dated 13-7-1979 with respect to reservation of seats to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and back-ward classes and others shall not apply to the private aided colleges established and administered by a minority community. The 2nd respondent college is admittedly a minority institution. In another g. O. Ms. No. 765 dated 30-7-1981 it is stated that G. O. Ms. No. 905 dated 21-9-1976 is issued prescribing procedure for appointment of teaching staff on a stop-gap basis in private affiliated colleges through a selection committee and it is stated that the minority institutions are exempted from the procedure prescribed in the said G. O. In G. O. Ms. No. 328 relating to the rule of reservation it is stated that in respect of the recruitment made in non-governmental (private) junior colleges it does not apply to the institutions administered by the minorities. The expose of the facts set out above disclose that the college is receiving substantial financial aid and performing public function of imparting education and the service conditions are regulated and modulated from time to time by the Government. Therefore, substantial aid by the Government, performance of public function and control by the government are present and in view of these features the college can be easily accommodated within the precincts of other authorities. Sri P. L. N. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that imparting education is a function of the State and therefore the society should be considered as State on this score alone. We are unable to subscribe to this view. The imparting of education alone by the private institution without any aid or control by the Government cannot be considered as State. Sri P. Rnmachandra Reddy contended that there is no deep and pervasive control by the Government. As already stated substantial financial aid in conjunction with Government control and perfomance of public function clothe the society with the character of State.

(11) THE writ petition shall be posted before the learned single Judge for consideration of the validity of the impugned order of compulsory retirement on merits. We are sure that the writ petition will be disposed of by the end of February, 1987.