1. One of us (Padmanabhan. J.) referred this revision to the Division Bench doubting the correctness of the Single Bench decision of this Court in David v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT. 849).

2. A synopsis of the relevant facts could be given thus. In relation to an incident that took place at 9 p.m. on 12-11-1983 a case was registered, investigated and charge-sheeted against the third respondent for offences punishable under S.279,337 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and S.89 (a) and (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The accused surrendered before court on 21-11-1983 and he was enlarged on bail. The case is one triable by the Magistrate as a summons case. It is said that investigation was completed within the crucial period on 24-4-1984, but filing the charge-sheet before court on 4-6-1984 alone was beyond the period provided under S.167(5). After taking cognizance the accused filed a petition to drop the proceedings. He placed reliance on S.167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the decision in Davids case (1984 KLT. 849). The magistrate accepted the contention and dropped the proceedings by order dated 19-12-1984. Cw. 2, the injured, has come up in revision. Respondents 1 and 2 are the State and the Sub Inspector, who charge-sheeted the case. We had the advantage of hearing counsel on either side and the Director of Public Prosecution elaborately.

3. S.167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads:

"If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons-case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested. the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfied the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary".

The starting point of six months is the date on which "the accused was arrested". Therefore it must naturally include arrests provided under S.41, 42, 43, and 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Police, private persons and the Magistrate also. The first question to be considered is whether arrest includes surrender before the magistrate. In all cases of arrest it is mandatory that the arrested person should be produced before the magistrate. Without an order from the magistrate detention cannot be had except to the limited extent provided for enabling the arrested person to be produced before the magistrate. Authorisation for detention, whether it be to police custody or judicial custody, must come from the magistrate subject to the restrictions imposed on him. Whether an accused is arrested and produced before the magistrate or he surrenders, his release is subject to the orders of the magistrate. In both cases he will be enlarged only if so ordered by the magistrate subject to the terms and conditions fixed by him. So also in both cases if he is not released on bail his freedom of movement is fettered and he will have to be either in police custody or judicial custody as ordered by the magistrate. In Velu Viswanathan & others v State, 1971 KLT. 80 and Jaganathan and others v. State 1983 Crl. L. J. 1748, the findings were that arrest includes surrender before court also. S.167(5) does not speak of arrest made by the police alone. When the accused surrenders before the magistrate he is either released on hail or taken to custody and remanded. Such taking into custody is also under S.167. When the accused has appeared and surrendered before the judge or the magistrate he will be treated as in custody for the purpose of considering his bail applications. That is physical custody and submission to the jurisdiction of the court. This position has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh and another v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and others (AIR. 1980 SC, 785). There is no distinction between arrest add appearance before court direct except that in the former case the additional process of production by the arresting officer before the magistrate is also there. S.167 equally applies both to arrest and surrender before court. Taking into custody by the magistrate on surrender will also come within the ambit of arrest and the period of six months will have to be reckoned from the date of arrest or surrender, as the case may be. The contrary view taken in Saullarlal Shaw v. The State (1983-84 (88) C. W. N. 205) relying on the wordings of S.167(l) and (2) was brought to our notice, but, with due respect, we are not able to subscribe to that view.

4. What S.167(5) provides is that in cases triable by the magistrate as a summons-case, if the investigation is not concluded within six months from the date of arrest or if the investigating agency does not satisfy him that for special reasons and in the interests of justice continuation of investigation beyond six months is necessary, the magistrate will have to order stopping further investigation. We are mainly concerned with the consequences of non-compliance of the provisions of S.167(5). In such consideration, one of the questions to be decided is which is the point of time at which investigation could be taken as concluded. We said so because even though charge was laid in this case before court only on 4-6-1984 there is a contention that investigation was concluded on 24-4-1984 within six months from the relevant point of time. Under S.2(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we find only an inclusive definition of investigation. It is defined to include all proceedings under the Code for collection of evidence. In that respect various procedures are provided. Ultimately S.163(2) of the Code says that as soon as investigation is completed the investigating officer shall forward his report to the magistrate. Only on getting such a report the magistrate gets jurisdiction to decide whether he has to take cognizance and proceed with inquiry or trial, as the case may be. S.173(2) shows that the statute does not contemplate a vaccum in between investigation and inquiry or trial. Chapter XII dealing with investigation is self-contained and it is an island in itself. Chapter XIV dealing with conditions required for initiation of proceedings in court is also self-contained. Framers of the Code made certain compartmentalisation making each Chapter self-contained. There is no interaction between investigation on the one hand and cognizance or inquiry or trial on the other. Even though under S.2(h) investigation includes collection of evidence, it cannot be said that by completing the process of collecting evidence alone investigation is over. What S.173(2) says is that as soon as investigation is completed the report will have to be forwarded to the magistrate. That means preparation and signing of the report are also parts of the process of investigation. After collection of evidence it is both the right and duty of the investigating agency to assess the evidence in order to form an opinion whether there are sufficient materials to place the accused for inquiry or trial before a competent magistrate or whether the evidence is not sufficient and a refer report has to be forwarded. Such assessment, the consequent formation of opinion and the preparation of the report are processes in investigation. If any opinion, which is legal or otherwise, has to be obtained before taking such a decision that must also be considered as part of investigation. As soon as collection of evidence is over the investigating officer cannot say that investigation is over and he can take time at his leisure to form an opinion and prepare and forward the report to the magistrate. If such a situation is allowed investigating officers can delay the report under S.173(2) indefinitely according to their own whims and fancies. There may be cases in which investigation may be complete only on forwarding further report or reports under S.173 (8) In the decision reported in P. V. Vijayaraghavan & Others v. C. B. 1. (1984 KLT. 522) it was held:

"Formation of opinion as to whether on the evidence collected there is a case to place accused before a court for trial and if so, taking necessary steps for the same by filing a charge-sheet are part of the process of investigation. In this case, on the date of filing the first charge-sheet the investigator was awaiting expert legal opinion on the question whether a charge would lie under S.201 IPC. In other words, he had not formed any definite opinion as to whether on the evidence collected there was a case to place the accused before a magistrate for trial of the particular offence. The investigator had not formed any opinion in regard to S.201 IPC. and consequently the investigation in the case was not complete when the first charge-sheet was filed. It must be taken that investigation was complete only with the second charge-sheet".

Therefore the argument that investigation was completed in time and the charge-sheet alone was delayed will not hold good.

5. On the consequences of non-compliance of S.167(5) judicial opinion is divided. In the decision reported in David v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT. 849) it was held:

"Sub-clause (5) of S.167 is mandatory, affects the jurisdiction to continue investigation and statutorily prescribes the period during which alone investigation can be conducted. Just as the police cannot continue investigation after the lapse of six months from the date of arrest of the accused in a summons case, so also the court cannot take cognizance of the case on the basis of an investigation continued thereafter. When there is a statutory termination of the investigation, prosecution which is a continuation of the investigation cannot also proceed. The cognizance taken subsequently in violation of S.167(5) does not validate the investigation continued after the statutory period."

6. The three decisions relied on therein are Ram Kumar Keshori v. The State Opposite Parry (1981 CRL L. J 1288), Jay Sankar Jha v. The State (1982 CRI. L J. 744) and Jagannathan and Others v. The State (1983 CRI.. L. J. 1748). The first decision (Ramkumars case, 1981 Crl. L. J. 1288) took the extreme view that the power of extension of time under S.167(5) must be exercised by the magistrate before the expiry of six months and any direction to continue investigation under S.167(5) after six months will be without jurisdiction. The decision in Jayssnkar Jhas case (1982 Crl. L. J. 744) reiterated the same view and added that by asking the investigator to expedite investigation and by taking cognizance after the expiry of six months the magistrate cannot be held to have impliedly allowed the investigation to continue. Both the decisions held that continuance of investigation beyond six months in contravention of S.167(5) and cognizance taken on such investigation are illegal and without jurisdiction. The decision in Jagannathans case (1983 Crl. L. J. 1748) agreed with the above decisions and further observed that failure of the magistrate to stop investigation cannot be taken as implied permission. But at the same time that decision did not agree with the other decisions that cognizance taken on such investigation is illegal. What was held therein was that the antecedent illegality or irregularity in the investigation on the basis of which the final report has been filed will not invalidate or vitiate the proceedings unless it is shown that prejudice has been caused to the accused or any miscarriage of justice resulted thereby. The decision in Ram Briksh v. State of W. B. (1983 Crl. L. J. 39) took the extreme view as in Ramkumars case (1981 Crl. L. J. 1288), Jayasankar Jhas case (1982 Crl. L. J. 744) and Daivds case (1984 KLT. 849) and held that both investigation and cognizance are illegal. The decision in Ali Hossain v. State of W. B. (1978-79(83) CWN. 559) also took the extreme view that investigation in violation of S.167(5) without order from magistrate vitiates the trial which will be an illegality and the accused will be entitled to discharge. The decision in Babulal v. The State of Rajasthan (1982 Crl.L J.1001), though did not take the self-same extreme view, held that the provision is in the interest of undertrial prisoner and S.167(5) is mandatory and it is the duty of the magistrate to see that no investigation is continued beyond six months. The decision in Pappa Rao v, The State (1985 Cr1.L.J. 546) agreed with the earlier Calcutta decisions that leave to continue investigation must be taken before the expiry of six months and no magistrate can try an accused on a charge in violation of S.167(5). At the same time it was held that filing of charge is not part of investigation and if the charge is drawn up before 180 days it is compliance of S.167(5) and its presentation before court after 180 days is not violative of S, 167(5).

7. State v. Jai Bhagwan (1985 Crl. L. J. 932) took a different view. Continuance of investigation beyond six months without permission from the magistrate was held not to nullify the investigation, but the only result is that the magistrate can look only into the materials collected within the period of six months and will have to ignore the rest. So also the magistrate was found having jurisdiction under S.167(5) to permit investigation beyond six months even on an application moved beyond that period. Even if permission is not granted, it was observed that it is open to the prosecution to file a charge if the investigation conducted till then warrants such a course, and acquittal of the accused on the sole ground that investigation went beyond six months will be illegal. So also that decision went on to say that before passing an order under S.167(5) stopping the investigation the magistrate must give an opportunity to the police to satisfy him that there are special reasons to continue the investigation. The decision in D. Kumars case (1985 Crl. L. J. 1347) is of the view that bar under S.167 (5) is for the investigation and not for the court taking cognizance. Even though the charge filed after six months was held to be illegal, the illegality was found not to affect the cognizance taken.

8. After having considered the above decisions in detail we do not feel that Davids case (1984 KLT. 849) has laid down the law correctly. We shall first proceed assuming, but not conceding, that under S.167 (5) continuance of investigation beyond six months from the date of arrest without permission from the magistrate is illegal. What will be the effect of that illegality Will it affect cognizance being taken on the police report Our answer is a definite no. A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Under S.190 Cr. P.C. a police report is one of the materials on which court can take cognizance. There is no provision of law which says that a valid and legal police report alone is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. S.193 and 195 to 199 regulate the competence of the court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases except after compliance of those provisions. But there is no such restriction in S.190 and the bar under S.167 (5) does not appear in any of these sections. Cognizance is not under S.167 (5) and that sub-section does not provide any bar to cognizance. All these sections appear in a group under the heading conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings." If ingredients constituting the offence or offences are made out in the police report and no legal bar is involved, courts may be entitled to take cognizance irrespective of the question whether there was any irregularity or illegality in the investigation. Such an invalid or irregular report may still fall under S.190 (l) (a) or (b) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of an error in a proceeding antecedent to trial and it is only curable. For the simple reason that cognizance was taken on a police report vitiated by breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation the result of the trial that follows will not become illegal or nonest unless the illegality is shown to have resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice. The illegality in investigation cannot affect the competence and jurisdiction of court for trial. Otherwise a mala fide investigator can achieve the desired result by committing some illegalities during investigation. (See the earliest decision on the point in H. N. Roshbud v. State of Delhi (AIR. 1955 SC. 196) [LQ/SC/1954/179] . Any defect relating to investigation under Chapter XII cannot project under Chapter XIV or the other Chapters dealing with inquiries or trials. Investigation involves collection of evidence and placing the accused for trial on the basis of the materials if they make out commission of offence or offences. Illegality in the matter of collection of such materials, unless it resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, cannot stand in the way of cognizance of the offence being taken and the offender being tried. The question is not whether in investigating the offence the police disregarded any legal provisions, but whether the accused has been prejudiced by the disregard in his defence at the trial. It is necessary for the accused to throw reasonable doubt that the prosecution evidence is such that it was manipulated or shaped by reason of the illegality or irregularity in investigation or that by reason of the said illegality or irregularity he was prevented from putting forward his defence or adducing evidence. There must be sufficient nexus either established or probabilised between the illegality or irregularity in investigation and the prejudice or miscarriage of justice. It was so held in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (AIR. 1964 SC. 221) [LQ/SC/1963/113] . The self-same question again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the decision reported in A. C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973 (3) SCR 477 [LQ/SC/1973/32] ) and it was affirmed that the function of investigation is merely to collect evidence and any irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection of evidence can scarcely be considered by itself to affect the legality of the trial by an otherwise competent court of the offence so investigated. It is not necessary to add authorities. There was absolutely no contention that violation, if any, of S 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the matter of investigation has in any way resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice. If so there was absolutely no irregularity or illegality in the judicial act of taking cognizance.

9. Now let us go back to S.167(5) again. That provision has not fixed any time limit beyond which investigation cannot continue. The main purpose of the provision is to avoid the serious abuse of an arrested person being kept in custody indefinitely while the investigation goes on leisurely. The object of that provision is mainly to protect the interest of under trial prisoners. But we do not mean to say that the restriction is applicable only in cases of investigation involving undertrial prisoners. It equally applies to investigation of cases where accused were either arrested and released on bail or surrendered and released on bail also. Even though the sub-section makes it obligatory on the investigator to satisfy the magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice continuation of investigation beyond six months is necessary and also casts a duty on the magistrate to stop further investigation in the absence of such satisfaction, the consequences of these two contingencies not happening are not provided. In this case the investigator has not satisfied the magistrate and the magistrate has also not ordered stopping further investigation. The sub-section does not provide for an automatic stoppage of investigation once when the time limit has expired. We do not mean to say that the provision is not mandatory. We are at the purport of that provision. That provision itself contemplates continuance of investigation beyond six months for special reasons and in the interests of justice. What is intended to be protected is interests of justice. It cannot be expected that, even in a case where interest of justice demands, the legislature intended investigation to be automatically closed for the mere laches of the investigating agency in not getting the requisite permission from the magistrate in exercising his powers.

10. A reading of S, 167(5) will satisfy anybody that if special reasons and interests of justice demand, the legislature wanted investigation to continue beyond six months also. It is the right as well as duty of the State and the citizen to bring offenders to justice. It is so because the interest of State and Society demand it. We do not think that the legislature wanted to forestall that right or duty to the detriment of the Society for technical reasons. At the same time citizen is entitled to protection against harassment through the machinery of law under the cover of mala fide and protracted investigation. S.167 (5) is intended only as a compromise between these two rights. That means in deserving cases the continuance of investigation beyond six months, in spite of the possible harassment, is not precluded under S.167 (5). It is true that S.167 (5) is intended as a mandate to the investigators to complete investigation is summons cases within six months of the arrest of the accused except in cases where the continuance beyond six months is necessary for special reasons and in the interests of justice. The authority to decide the existence of those special reasons and interests of justice is not the investigating agency but the magistrate. It is always the duty of the investigating agencies, whenever they feel that investigation cannot be completed within the prescribed period and special reasons and interests of justice demand continuance of investigation beyond six months, to bring those reasons to the notice of the magistrate and get orders for extension of time.

11. Investigation is within the province of the police to which the court cannot interfere except to the extent allowed by law. Merely for the reason that investigation in a summons case continued after six months of arrest without an order from the magistrate, the investigation conducted beyond six months or the evidence collected during that period will not become unacceptable by the court. If six months from the date of arrest, in the absence of an order from the magistrate, was treated as an automatic cessation of the investigation, making further investigation illegal or void, there need not have been a provision making it obligatory on the part of the magistrate to stop the investigation. That means a duty is cast on the magistrate even when the investigating agency fails to satisfy him of special reasons and interests of justice, to have his judicial satisfaction whether investigation has to be continued or not. Only when be exercises that jurisdiction and orders stoppage of investigation, the action of the investigating agency in continuing the investigation becomes illegal. Even then S.167(6) authorises the Sessions Judge to vacate that order in proper cases. Before ordering stoppage of investigation the magistrate will have to satisfy himself and for that reason he will have to call upon the investigator to state his reason also. A contingency of the investigation having continued after the magistrate passed an order for stoppage has not arisen and hence we need not consider the consequences of such an investigation.

12. Investigation conducted after six months without an order from the magistrate, at any rate, will not vitiate that part of the investigation, in the absence of prejudice or miscarriage of justice being shown. From the wordings of S.167 (5) we were not able to read a legislative intent that the investigator can approach the magistrate for extension of time or the magistrate can order extension of time only before the expiry of six months and not thereafter. Such an interpretation will defeat the very purpose of investigation and bringing offenders to justice. So also simply because six months have expired there is no question of the magistrate being divested of jurisdiction to extend time in deserving cases. It is the judicial satisfaction of the magistrate that has to decide whether continuance of the investigation has to be allowed due to existence of special reasons and in the interests of justice or stopped due to absence of these reasons. Such an order is justiciable also. That shows the anxiety of the legislature to have a further judicial scrutiny on the decision of the magistrate in stopping investigation. S.167(6) authorises the Sessions Judge on application or otherwise to vacate the order stopping investigation and direct further investigation if be is so satisfied. The provision is not intended as a technical bar to investigation or as a technical defence to the accused. It is intended only by way of public policy to avoid harassment to accused by unnecessarily delayed investigation.

13. If a magistrate, who is bound to stop the investigation after six months, directs the investigating agency after the expiry of six months consciously to expedite the investigation it could be taken as implied permission to continue the investigation in exercise of the power under S.167(5). Otherwise instead of exercising bis jurisdiction to stop the investigation why should he direct the investigation to be expedited. Direction to expedite investigation means permission to continue the investigation coupled with a direction to expedite it. That is well within his competence on satisfaction of the grounds mentioned in S.167(5) Till the charge-sheet is filed in court he continues to have the jurisdiction to stop investigation or allow it to be continued and expedited. Even at the time when the charge-sheet is filed after investigation beyond six months without permission, but not in cases where investigation is ordered to be stopped, the magistrate can have the requisite satisfaction under S.167(5) and take cognizance. If be is satisfied that investigation without permission was continued beyond six months without special reasons and without the interests of justice being served and it resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, he can refuse to take cognizance also. But reasons will have to be assigned. There appears to be no

reason behind the contention that while taking cognizance on a charge presented on the basis of investigation continued after six months the court can consider only materials collected by investigation within six months and will have to reject the balance. Investigation is a continuous process and there is no question of dissecting it, accepting a portion and rejecting the balance. Such a course is not provided. S.167(5) provides only a time limit for investigation subject to certain conditions and it does not in any way fetter cognizance being taken. At the time of taking cognizance also the magistrate can consider S.167(5) and decide whether investigation beyond six months is justified. S.167(5) is mainly intended to alert the investigating agency in order to avoid harassment by delayed investigation.

14. The view taken by the Supreme Court is not in agreement with Davids case 1984 KLT. 849 and the decisions relied on therein. In Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary. State of Bihar, Patna (AIR. 1979 SC. 1360) [LQ/SC/1979/115] , even though the question did not directly come up for consideration, in cases of undertrial prisoners against whom investigation has not been completed within six months and sanction from the magistrate was not obtained under S.167(5), the Government was only directed by the Supreme Court that unless necessary orders are obtained from the magistrate within one month they shall be released. That means the Supreme Court has not considered investigation as having been automatically terminated by expiry of six months. Permission granted to the Government to move the magistrate after the expiry of six months means the Supreme Court accepted the position that the magistrate is competent to extend the time even after the expiry of six months. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1979 SC. 1377) [LQ/SC/1979/243] also while granting time to get permission of the magistrate after expiry of six months, the Supreme Court said that reason for giving such permission was "The magistrate is bound to make an order stopping further investigation and in that event, only two courses will be open: either the police must immediately proceed to file a charge-sheet, if the investigation conducted till then warrants such a course, or if no case for proceeding against the under-trial prisoner is disclosed by the investigation, the undertrial prisoner must be released forthwith from detention". That means the Supreme Court is of opinion that it is compulsory that the magistrate should pass an order under S.167(5) and even after such an order the police could file a charge sheet if the investigation conducted till then warrants such a course. In other words the opinion of the Supreme Court seems to be that the provision of S.167(5) is intended only to alert the investigating agency and not to act as a bar on further investigation.

15. If Davids case (1984 KLT. 849) and the decisions laying down identical positions are accepted, there will be another anomaly. Summons cases coming within the ambit of S.167(5) include cases, the maximum punishment of which is imprisonment upto two years. Under S.468(2)(c) the period of limitation for prosecution in such cases is three years. Under S.190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cognizance could be taken on complaint, or police report or upon other information as detailed in S.190(1)(c). Complaint includes those under S.195(l) also. There is no prohibition in taking cognizance in any of those methods in point of time, except under S.468. Under S.473 of the Code the court is having the jurisdiction in appropriate cases to extend the time under S.468 also. The bar under S.167(5), if at all, could affect only police reports and not complaints or informations other than police reports. In this case the incident took place only on 12-11-1983 and the period of limitation under S.468 will expire only by 12-11-1986. That means the revision petitioner could even now file a private complaint which the magistrate may be bound to take cognizance even if cognizance on a police report is barred under S.167(5). We do not think that the legislature intended different periods of limitation in the matter of taking cognizance under the three different methods provided under S.190.

16. In the matter of taking cognizance the provisions of S.167,173,190,195 (l) and 468 will have to be considered together. These provisions will have to be interpreted harmoniously so that there is no clash between interpreting one provision in relation to the other. This position has been accepted in the decision reported in Bajmuddin and another v. State of U. P., Opposite Party (1983 ALL. L.J. 470). Let us assume that when cognizance on a private complaint is not barred the legislature did not intend to bar cognizance for the simple reason that police took up investigation. S.190, 193, 195,196, 197, 198, 198-A or 199 or any other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not provide non-compliance of S.167 (5) as a bar in taking cognizance in any of the forms known to law. When once investigation is started the two courses open to the investigating agency are to act either according to S.169 or under S.170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless the investigation is stopped by the magistrate under S.167(5). In any way he will have to submit a report to court and abide by the orders of court. After the report is filed the magistrate is the authority to decide in what manner he has to act on the report.

17. In this case after collection of evidence and formation of opinion the investigating agency decided to place the accused for trial and did so by his final report. On the final report the magistrate took cognizance also. At that time he did not consider the bar under S.167(5) and he did not decide that investigation continued beyond six months without permission was without special reasons and without being in the interests of justice. At the time of passing the impugned order also the magistrate did not find that continuance of investigation was without special reasons and without interests of justice being served. He also did not find that by continuance of such investigation and filing of the charge-sheet based on it any prejudice was caused to the accused or miscarriage of justice resulted. When once cognizance is taken after satisfaction that the offence is disclosed and no legal bar is involved, proceedings could be dropped only according to methods known to law. In this case the magistrate cannot be blamed because he was acting only on the basis of the decision in David v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT. 849). Since cognizance was already taken and there is no case of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, the impugned order is illegal and it has to be vacated.

The criminal revision petition is allowed and the order of the magistrate is set aside. The magistrate will take back the case to file and proceed with according to law. Allowed.