Authored By : T. Ameer Ali, Robert Fulton Rampini

T. Ameer Ali and Robert Fulton Rampini, JJ.

1. The question involved in this appeal is extremely simple,although a considerable time has been occupied in its argument. Thedecree-holder appears to have purchased the property belonging to hisjudgment-debtor in execution of his decree. The judgment-debtor applied to havethe sale set aside on various grounds-amongst others on the ground that thedecree-holder had purchased the property without obtaining the permission of theCourt. The Munsif before whom this application was made rejected it. On appealthe District Judge has, on the ground that the purchase was made by thedecree-holder without the permission of the Court, set aside the sale. So faras the question of permission is concerned, whether the permission was obtainedor not, the finding of the learned Judge is one of fact into which we cannotenter. The decree-holder has appealed to this Court, and an objection has beentaken on behalf of the respondent that no second appeal lies from the order ofthe District Judge under Section 294. Mr. Gregory who appears for the appellanthas argued that the question between the parties falls under s 244, andtherefore, independently of any provisions in the Code and-irrespective ofSection 294, he has a right to a second appeal. Now, Section 294 provides thatno holder of a decree, in execution of which property is sold, shall, withoutthe express permission of the Court, bid for or purchase the property, andClause 3 of that section provides that when a decree-holder purchases, byhimself or through another person, without such permission, the Court may, ifit thinks fit, on the application of the judgment-debtor or any other personinterested in the sale, by order set aside the sale. Section 588, Clause 16,gives an appeal from orders under Section 294, and the last clause of Section588 provides that an order passed in appeal under this section shall be final.Therefore, unless the matter comes under any other provision of the Code, it isclear that there is only one appeal and no more. Section 244, referred to asjustifying the second appeal, declares that all questions arising between theparties to a suit in execution should be dealt with by orders of the Courtexecuting the decree and not by a separate suit, and the case of Viraraghava v.Venkata I.L.R. Mad. 287 to which Mr. Gregory has referred, shows that in a casewhen an order is made under Section 294 the judgment-debtor cannot proceed byseparate suit, because the matter falls under Section 244; but that case doesnot show that Section 244 enlarges the right of appeal, which is restricted bySection 588. It is clear that Section 588, Clause 16, is restrictive in itscharacter, and gives one appeal only to the parties aggrieved or dissatisfiedwith any order confirming, setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale ofImmovable property. To suggest that because Section 2-14 precludes a right ofsuit it enlarges the right of appeal is untenable and no authority is shown forit.

2. As at present advised we think that no second appeal liesfrom this order, and we therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.

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Bhagbut Lall vs.Narku Roy (02.04.1894 - CALHC)