M. JAGANNADHA RAO. J. -

1. Leave granted

2. These appeals all arise out of the common judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 24-4-1997. By that judgment the writ petition filed by the appellants questioning the validity of land acquis tion proceedings were all dismissed.

3. The following are the facts common to all the matters. On 25-9-1991, the District Magistrate, Agra sent proposals to the U.P. Government for acquisition of 10.175 hectares of land in Village Bai pur, U.P. for construction of a market yard for fruits and vegetables. Various plots of land were included in the notification. The Section 4(1) notification was issued under the Land Acquisition A t, 1894 (hereinunder called the Act) on 5-10-1993 for acquisition of 7.334 hectares. The notification stated that the provisions of Section 5-A were being dispensed with in view of the urgency of t e matter and this was being done in exercise of powers under Section 17(4) of the Act. the notification insofar as it related to urgency and dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry read as follows.

"Being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to the said land inasmuch as the said land is urgently required for the construction of fru t and vegetable market yard District Agra and that in view of the pressing urgency, it is an well necessary to eliminate delay likely to be caused by an inquiry under Section 5-A of the said Act, t e Government is further pleased to direct under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act shall not apply
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For what purpose required. - For the construction of fruit and vegetable market yard in District Agra

Note A. - Site plan of the land may be inspected in the Office of the Collector, Agra."

4. Thereafter, the Section 6 declaration was issued on 6-10-1994 acquiring the land for the above market under a planned development scheme and the notification directed the Collector to take posse sion of the land in 15 days under Section 9(1) of the Act.

5. It was this acquisition that was question in the batch of writ petitions in the High Court. The writ petition raised general issues, namely, that there was no such urgency which required dispens ng with the inquiry under section 5-A of the Act and that the land of the petitioners which was sought to be acquired was marked in the Master Plan for Agra for the use of "light industries" and la er belt" and it was therefore not permissible to acquire the same for locating the fruit and vegetable market yard for that amount to violating the Master Plan. Some special points were raised in s me of the writ petitions.

6. The High Court of Allahabad in an elaborate judgment rejected the above contentions and referred to reasons given by the respondents in their respective counter-affidavits as sufficient for disp nsing with the Section 5-A inquiry. The High Court also held, following the rulings of this Court and of the Allahabad High Court, that even if the user for a market yard not one of the permissible uses of the land as per the Master Plan, still once the land acquired, the Market Committee could take steps to have the Master Plan suitably amended. The High Court also rejected the special point raised in some of the writ petitions.

7. In these appeals, we have heard the arguments of Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing in the civil appeals arising out of SLPs Nos. 14921-22 of 1997, Shri R. K. Khanna in app als arising out of SLPs Nos. 14513 and 14848 of 1997 and Mr Vinay Kumar Garg in the appeals arising out of SLPs Nos. 17203-17207 of 1997 and in Contempt Petition No. 381 of 1998. For the respondent , the Mandi Market was represented by Senior Advocate, Shri O. P. Rana and State of U.P. was represented by Ms Niti Dikshit.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant Shri Raju Ramachandran urged that there was no such urgency as required dispensing with the inquiry under the Act, that the acquired land was reserved for "ligh industries" (later amended as green belt) in the Master Plan and, therefore, it was not permissible to acquire the land for fruit and vegetable market yard, and in any event, the appellant must be permitted to make a representation to the Government for withdrawal of the acquisition so far as his client's land was concerned. Some special points based on the location of the plots or present u er were also raised. These submissions were countered by the learned Senior Counsel for the Market Committee and counsel appearing for the State. We shall first deal with these general points which are common to all the appeals.

9. On the question of urgency, the following facts and contentions emerge from the counter-affidavits. The establishment of a market yard is not merely one of mere urgency but one which makes it ne essary to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A. The existing market yard is situated in a very congested locality having no scope for expansion and the place where the market is now located s not sufficient to cater to the growing needs of its constituents. There is no adequate space for free movement and parking of trucks/bullock-carts etc. nor for providing necessary shelter for tho e who come to the market. The existing market is also devoid of any amenities necessary for hundreds of people who visit the market every day or for the bullocks which are being used to draw the ca ts. During the rainy season, it becomes well-nigh impossible to find out suitable shelters for the farmers and producers of vegetables. It has become necessary to provide amenities and also constru t roads in a planned manner.

10. In our view, the subject satisfaction for dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A is based on sufficient material and cannot be faulted. The photographs as to the filthy state of the pres nt mandi with garbage and stray cattle and pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be precarious and perhaps hazardous to store vegetable or foodgrains in the existing market. We are, therefore, of the view that the urgency clause was rightly invoked by the Government. There are also enough precedents in connection with acquisitions of land for markets where Section 5-A has been dispensed with and such action was upheld.

11. In connection with a similar acquisition for a market yard, when the Section 5-A inquiry was dispensed with on the ground of urgency, the Allahabad High Court in Satyendra Prasad Jain v. State f U.P. (1987 AWC 382 [LQ/AllHC/1987/29] ) observed.

"The question herein is whether the State was justified in dispensing the requirements of enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A. It cold be taken judicial notice of that in regard to agricultural roduce there were no proper market facilities. There were innumerable charges, levies and exactions which the agriculturists were required to pay without having any say in the proper utilisation of the amount paid by them. The Government of India and the various committees and commissions appointed to study the condition of agricultural markets in the country had stressed the need to provide roper market yard for the sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The Planning Commission also stressed long ago in this regard. The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 has been e acted to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of market therefore, in Uttar Pradesh. The proposed construct on of market and market yard by tIt was further stated (p. 384) as follows"

"[I]t cannot be said that there is no urgency in the matter of acquiring the land in question."

12. The same question arose again in Kailashwati v. State of U.P. (AIR 1978 All 181 [LQ/AllHC/1977/328] : (1977) 3 All LR 665). That was a case where land was acquired for the purpose of a market yard to be constructe by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Meerut. The inquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with. The same was upheld and it was held that there was immediate urgency as there was acute scarcity of go owns and warehouses where foodgrains purchased by the Government had to be stocked. In our opinion, the above judgment if also in point. When in such circumstances, market yards are proposed to be stablished, it is, in our view, permissible to invoke the provisions of Section 17(4) and dispense with the Section 5-A inquiry.

13. The decisions of this Court in Hari Singh v. State of U.P. ((1984) 2 SCC 624 [LQ/SC/1984/102] ) where acquisition was made for a market yard and Union of India v. Praveen Gupta ((1997) 9 SCC 78 [LQ/SC/1996/1648] : JT (1996) 9 SC 24) where the acquisition was for a timber yard show that the establishment of markets has been treated as one of grave urgency to remove congestion. The dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry was upheld in these cases
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14. An additional points was made before us by the respondents that in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India (WP (C) No. 13381 of 1984) this Court had directed inspection in regard to pollution in Agra and submission of reports by the Central Pollution Control Board other senior officials of the Municipal Corporation and that a team of officials inspected Agra city on 29-11-1996 and made various obse vations in the second Report dated 20-11-1996 and one of the observations related to the shifting of this very mandi in Agra and read as follows : (see p. 6 of the Report)"The officials from the Mandi Samiti stated that the vegetable market, which is responsible for generating a huge quantity of garbage, is being shifted. The shifting is likely to be done by June 19 7."

15. Thereafter this Court issued directions on 3-12-1996 that the authorities must take steps to remedy the ills which have come to light from the abovesaid Report

16. No doubt, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is right in his submission that these are events of 1996 and cannot have any retrospective bearing on the events of 1993 when the Section 5-A inquiry was dispensed with. It is true that these facts may not retrospectively justify the above action but, in our view, they reveal a state of environmental degradation in Agra city which was co tinuing from several years before 1996. Further, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that, in any event, the directions issued by this Court in the above public interest case on 3-12-1996 will certainly come in the way of this Court in the present proceedings in holding that the Section 5-A inquiry should have been conducted or that such an inquiry should be now conducted. It is als submitted for the respondents that these facts are being relied upon to show that, at any rate, this Court should not interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. e find sufficient force in these.

17. It was then urged for the appellant that there was a delay of a full one year between the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration and this showed the lethargy of the Government nd this would reveal that the Government would not have lost anything if only a hearing under Section 5-A was given to the owners so that they could place their grievances before the Government. In this connection, we may state that the respondents have explained the delay as having been caused inasmuch as various steps were required to be taken to finalise the proceedings. It was necessary t issue newspaper publications and also make local publication of the substance of the Section 4(1) notification. There was also delay on account of following other administrative procedures. In vie of the above explanation, we are not prepared to hold that the latter delay between the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration has any great impact on the subjective satisfaction rrived at when orders dispensing.

18. For the aforesaid reasons, we agree .with the High Court that the respondents were amply justified in dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A by exercising powers under Section 17(4) of th Act.

19. The next question relates to the contention of the appellants that under the Master Plan for Agra city, the land of the appellants which is proposed for acquisition is in an area where the perm tted use is for "light industries" and, therefore, it will not be permissible to use the acquired land for purposes of a market yard. It is pointed out that in fact later on, the permitted use was odified and the land is now shown as "green belt". On the other hand, it is submitted for the respondents that if the land is proved to have been acquired for a valid purpose, then the beneficiary f the land acquisition can later on move the authority concerned for change of land use

20. An analogous issue arose in the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi ((1975) 4 SCC 285 [LQ/SC/1974/251] ). In that case, a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the act for acquisition of a vast ext nt of land for the planned development of Delhi. The said acquisition was questioned. One of the contentions was that for such a purpose, development action had to be taken only under the Delhi Dev lopment Act, 1957 and that too by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi under that Act and not by the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. It was there argued that inasmuch as there w s no Master Plan nor Zonal Plan in existence on the date of notification, the acquisition was bad. This Court rejected objection raised by the owners and observed, after referring to Sections 12 an 15 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, as follows : (SCC pp. 194-95, para 23).
.

"23. The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by the Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development Act came into force. It is true that there could be no planned dev lopment of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force but there was no inhibition in acquiring land for planned development of Delhi nder the Act before the Master Plan was ready (see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Lakshmi Devi (AIR 1963 SC 1077 [LQ/SC/1962/417] : 1963 Supp (2) SCR 812). In other words, the fact that actual developme t is permissible in an area other than a development area with the approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the land for planned developmen under Act. Section 12 is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development"

."This Court observed : (SCC p. 295, para 23).

"For planned development in an area other than a development area, it is only necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority as provided in Section 12(3). The Central Governmen could acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining the necessary approval of the local authority."

21. The above decision of this Court was followed by the Allahabad High Court in Kendriya Even Mura Sahkari Avas Samithi Ltd. v. State if U.P. (1988 UPLBEC 645). It was held in that case that the G vernment could acquire any property under the Act and later develop the same after obtaining the necessary approval of the local authority concerned under the Development Act. It was stated : (at p 651)

"Amendment of the Master Plan is permissible with the approval of the State Government under Section 13 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and in the present case, the Master Plan showing the area in question as green belt was modified with the approval of the State Government which approval no doubt was accorded subsequent to the issue of notification under Sections 4 and 6 However, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the mere fact that till the date of the issue of the notification under Section 4 the necessary approval of the Government had not bee obtained cannot preclude the Government from acquiring the land for planned development under the Land Acquisition Act. Acquisition generally precedes development and consequently the land in ques ion could be acquired in anticipation of the approval of the State Government for the change of the land use of the Master Plan prepared by the Development Authority."

22. As pointed out in the above judgments, there is no need that the land proposed to be acquired by the Government for a particular public purpose should be for the same purpose or use mentioned i the Master Plan or Zonal Plan for the said area. Nor will the acquisition be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Pla or Zonal Plan applicable to that locality. Acquisition will be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of user permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the time the acquisition is made. It will be for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitable odification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. In fact, it may be difficult for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under und.

23. For the aforesaid reasons this contention of the appellants is rejected.

24. It was then argued that as done in the case of Om Prakash v. State of U.P. ((1998) 6 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/1998/630] ) appellants be permitted to move the competent authority under the Land Acquisition Act for withdrawal of these plots of land from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. This request is opposed by the respondents. In our opinion, the procedure adopted in Om Prakash ((1998) 6 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/1998/630] ) cannot be treat d as a precedent in all land acquisition cases where the Section 5-A inquiry is dispensed with. The procedure adopted in that case is based upon the special circumstances obtaining there. In the ca e before us, there are no such circumstances which warrant a similar procedure to be followed. In that case, the land was acquired in a village in U.P. under a notification of 5-1-1991 for the purp se of industrial development. The appellants contended before this Court that the land was abadi land as per a report submitted by an officer of the Department as late as on 11-3-1996, that the lan was being used in 1996 for resid.

25. We shall now deal with certain supplementary points raised in the individual cases.

26. In civil appeal arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 14921-14922 of 1997, it was argued by the learned Senior Counsel, Shri Raju Ramachandran that as seen from the map of the Master Plan, it was clear hat some other property is earmarked for the mandi and that instead of using that area, the Market Committee had sought the acquisition of the appellants' land. It was also pointed out that a 5-12- 995/6-12-1995, the Director of the mandi had addressed a letter to the Joint Secretary, Agricultural Department, Government of U.P. that on Plot No. 1324, the appellant had been running a bakery an inasmuch as the compensation to be paid for acquisition thereof was likely to be higher, the land might be released from acquisition. Learned senior counsel also relied upon a similar letter dated 18-7-1996 by the same Director of the mandi to the Government. We find from the counter-affidavit of the respondent in para 3(viii) that the State Government has since not accepted the advice of th Mandi Director. In the light of.

27. In the civil appeals arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 14512, 14513 and 14848 of 1997, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri R. K. Khanna argued that the plots of his clients were on the extreme w stern side of the land sought to be acquired and were in fact separated by a road which runs from north to south, that the market is now proposed on the eastern side of the road to large extent and that there was no immediate need for this land and hence, Section 5-A ought not to have been dispensed with so far as his client's plots were concerned. He pointed out that the proposed constructio of the market was in two phases, each phase divided into four sub-phases and that each sub-phase would take considerable time and therefore, his client's land which was away from the main area in he eastern side of the north-south road, should have been excluded and that if Section 5-A were held, it would have certainly been excluded. He also contended that in the remaining land, i.e., excl ding his client's lands, all the.

28. It has to be stated that the appellant has not alleged mala fides against the respondents. It is not for this Court to decide whether these plots are necessary or not for the proposed market. L arned counsel for the State, Ms Niti Dikshit argued, - with reference to the plan, - that the plots of these appellants were necessary inasmuch as the market had to be approached from this side whe e the appellants' property was located. The vacant land on the other side not being adjacent to be the proposed market, could not be required. The Government was able to get some land in land ceili g proceedings and from the Gaon Sabha and therefore with the monies available and earmarked for the market, it was considered that more land should be acquired keeping in view the future plans for he development of the market. It is now planned that in the first phase, there will be four sub-phases in the following manner for 24 shops : 24 shops, 40 shops and 4 auction halls. Nearly Rs. 2 cr res were set apart for developmen.

29. We are of the view that the above facts do show that development of the market is in various phases and the future development of the market in a growing town like Agra was kept in mind while a quiring this area. It is not for this Court to say that there was no need to acquire the appellants' lands for the market and that the remaining land was sufficient. If such a contention wer.e to be accepted, each of the owners could equally advance such an argument making the scheme wholly workable. These appeals are therefore liable to be dismissed.

30. In the appeals arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 17203-17207, it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants had obtained a status quo order on 22-9-1997 and in spite of that, a boundary wall wall was constructed in such a manner that the appellant was unable to enter his plot or take any trucks into the said land. In fact, on these allegations, the appellant has f led the contempt case which is also now before us.

31. The respondents have pointed out that admittedly no construction was made by the respondents in the appellants' plot. The wall was built by the respondents in their own property in respect of w ich the status quo order would not apply. The wall was actually put up in August 1998 to prevent encroachment and to safeguard the respondents' property. It is pointed out that there is enough spac between the said wall and the gate of the appellants' property for egress and ingress and the appellant was not precluded from reaching his property. It is also pointed out that the 2 rooms constr cted by the appellant in his property are vacant, none is living there and no business is being conducted there. On the merits, the appellants' case is no different from the case of the appellants n other cases. We are of the view that these appeals also deserve to be dismissed.

32. The learned counsel in the remaining case adopted the general arguments in the above cases. For the reasons already given, these appeals also deserve to be dismissed.

33. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed.
34. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs