Anant Singh, J.

(1) Defendant No. 1 is the appellant in a suit for compensation for injury, short of death, caused to the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 at the relevant date was the owner of the bus BRJ 1002, and defendant No. 2 was its driver. Defendant No. 3 was the Insurance Company with which the bus was insured by defendant No. 1 covering risk against third party.

(2) The plaintiff was travelling in the bus on the 16th April 1955, having boarded it at Babhangama and was bound for Boria in Santal Parganas, where he was carrying some ready-made clothes for sale in Boria hat. The bus turned turtle causing some injuries to the plaintiff resuling in ultimate amputation of his left leg. He claimed damages of Rs. 20,500/- having filed a suit in forma pauperis.

(3) The suit was dismissed against defendant No. 2, but was decreed against defendant No. 3 for Rs. 2,000/-, and defendant No. 3 has not preferred any appeal. The suit was decreed for Rs. 3000/- against defendant No. 1 on equitable grounds, though the plaintiff had not been able to prove the extent of the damages suffered by him on account of the injury. Defendant No. 1 has filed this appeal. 3a. The plaintiff-respondent is not represented, although notice of this appeal had been personally served on him.

(4) Mr. J.C. Sinha, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, has raised only two points one is of limitation and the second is that unless the quantum of damages was proved, the suit could not be decreed on equitable grounds.

(5) The contention regarding limitation appears to be quite tenable. The cause of action arose on the 16th April 1955, when the injury was caused to the plaintiff. The suit was filed on the 10th March 1958, long after one year which is the period of limitation under Article 22 of the Limitation Act. The learned trial court, however, thought that either Article 86 or Article 115 would apply. The provisions of the three Articles are as follows: Description of suit. Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run. 22. For compensation for any other injury to the persons. One year. When the injury is committed. 86. (a) On a policy of insurance when thesum insured is payable after proof of the death has been given to or received by the insurers. Three years. (a) The date of the death of the deceased. (b) On a policy of insurance when the sum insured is payable after proof of the loss has been given to or received by the insurers. (b) The date of the occurrence causing the loss. 115. For compensationfor the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided. Three years. When the contract is broken, or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases. It is clear that Article 86 applies to a suit brought by the insured against an insurance company, and it does not apply to a suit by a third party either against the insured or the insurance company.

(6) Article 115 is a residuary provision for any breach of any contract, express or implied, provided there is no any specific provision made for such a, breach. But Article 22 is the appropriate provision governing a suit for compensation for any other injury to the person suing and by "other injury" the Article refers to injury o her than death, as referred to in Art. 21, which governs compensation for fatal accidents. The learned trial Court, on the basis of the decision in the East Indian Rly. Co. v. Kally Dass Mookerjee, ILR 26 Cal 465 [LQ/CalHC/1899/22] , thought that the carrier had entered into implied contract, and, therefore, the breach of such a contract would be covered by Article 115. The Calcutta High Court, however, did not decide the question of limitation, and it is clear from the terms of Article 115 that this is a residuary provision to be applied when there is no special provision for any contract, express or implied. As I have already pointed out, Article 22 is the appropriate provision to be applied to a suit for compensation for injury. I am supported in my view from the decision in Barrala Ramaswamy v. Bhamidipati Satyanarayana, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 309. The suit was, therefore, clearly barred by limitation.

(7) The other point raised on behalf of the appellant also seems to be quite weighty, though in view of the decision on the first point, it need not be decided.

(8) The appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed against the appellant defendant-No. 1 are set aside. There will be no order as to the cost of this appeal.