VENKATACHALIAH, J.

1. These appeals, by special leave and petitions for grant of special leave pertaining to agrarian reform legislation in the State of Rajasthan, arise out of and are directed against the judgment dated October 21, 1976, of a Full Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan, dismissing a batch of special appeals and affirming the judgment dated December 2, 1975, of the learned Single Judge of the High Court rejecting appellants contentions against the legality of certain proceedings for the fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings initiated and continued under the Provisions of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. In the writ petition filed directly in this Court reliefs similar to those sought before the High Court are claimed.

2. The principal controversy before High Court in the proceedings, shorn of its niceties and embellishments, was whether the proceedings for fixation of ceiling area with reference to the appointed date i.e. April 1, 1966 under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, (1955 Act for short) could be initiated and continued after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act (Act 11 of 1973) (1973 Act for short) which w.e.f. January 1, 1973 repealed Section 5(6-A) and Chapter III-B of the old Act, i.e. 1955 Act.

Chapter III-B, pertaining to imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings, in the State of Rajasthan, was introduced into the 1955 Act by the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1960. As a sequential necessity Section 5 was amended by the introduction in it of clause (6-A) which defined "ceiling area". The notified date, as originally fixed, was April 1, 1965; but owing to the uncertainties imparted to the implementation of the law by the challenge made to the provisions of Chapter III-B before the High Court and the interim orders of the High Court staying the operation of the law, government had had to re-notify April 1, 1966 as the fresh notified date, after the challenge to the validity of Chapter III-B had been repelled by the High Court.

By the time the 1973 Act was brought into force disputes touching the determination of the dealing areas in 33, 471 cases had come to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III-B of the earlier 1955 Act. After the 1973 Act came into force on January 1, 1973, some 8494 cases for the determination of ceiling areas under Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act came to be initiated and were sought to be continued under said Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act on the view that the repeal of Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act by the 1973 Act did not affect the rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the old law. Appellants principal contention is that after the coming into force of the 1973 Act which, by its Section 40, repealed Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act, recourse could not be had to the repealed law for purposes of commencement, conduct and conclusion of any proceedings for fixation of ceiling by the Full Bench of the High Court in the judgment under appeal. The correctness of view of the Full Bench arises for consideration in these appeals.

3. The factual antecedents in which the controversy arose before the High Court may be illustrated by the facts of one of the appeals. In C.A. No. 1003 (N) of 1977, the appellants claim to have entered into possession and cultivation of certain parcels of land pursuant to alleged agreements to sell dated April 28, 1957 said to have been executed in their favour by the then landholder, a certain Sri Hari Singh. The same deeds were passed only on August 22, 1966, after the notified date. The sale deeds were passed only on August 22, 1966, after the notified date. Proceedings for the fixation of ceiling area in the hands of Sri Hari Singh were commenced under the Repealed Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act. Appellants purchases were held to be hit by section 30-DD of the said Chapter III-B, which prescribed certain residential qualifications, which appellants did not possess, for the eligibility for recognition of such transfers. Appellants contention is that if the new law had been applied to the case of the vendor, the transfer in the their favour would have been held valid and that invoking of Chapter III-B of the repealed law was impermissible. Apart from the facts of individual cases and their particularities the basic question is one of construction - whether the provisions of the old law are saved and survive to govern pending cases.

4. We have heard Sri A. K. Sen, Sri Tarkunde and Sri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior advocated for the appellants and Sri Lodha, learned senior advocate for the State of Rajasthan and its authorities. The appellants principal contention - which we perceive as one of construction of statutes - is that the later law made manifest, expressly and by necessary implication, an intention inconsistent with the continues of the rights and obligations under the repealed law and that, accordingly, after January 1, 1973, the date of coming into force of the 1973 Act, no proceedings under the old law could be initiated or continued.

5. The points that fall for consideration in these appeals are whether:

"(a) the scheme contemplated by and the different criteria and standards for the determination of "ceiling area" envisaged in the 1973 Act and, in particular, having regard to the limited scope of the saving provision of Section 40 thereof which, quite significantly, omits to invoke and attract Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 to the repeal of section 5(6-A) and Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act must be construed and held to manifest an intention contrary to and inconsistent with the keeping alive or saving of the repealed law so as to be invoked in relation to and applied for the pending cases which had not been concluded under the old law before the repeal; and

(b) that, at all events, even if Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 was attracted and the old law was saved for the purpose, provisions of the old law could not be invoked as no right had been "accrued" in favour of the State in relation to the surplus area determinable under the old law nor any liability "incurred" by the landholders under the old law so as to support the initiation of proceedings for fixation of ceiling area under the old law after its repealRe Contention (a)."

In order that this contention, which is presented with some perspicuity, is apprehended in its proper prospective a conspectus of the essential provisions of the earlier law and later law pertaining to prescription of ceiling on agricultural holdings is necessary.

6. In 1955, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was enacted. By the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, for the first time, provisions in Chapter III-B prescribing a ceiling on holdings of agricultural lands got introduced into the 1955 Act. This amending Act of 1960. Chapter III-B was, by an appropriate notification, brought into force with effect from December 15, 1963. The notified date, under the 1955 Act, as stated earlier, was April 1, 1966. Section 5(6-A) of the 1955 Act defined ceiling area:

"Ceiling area" in relation to land held anywhere throughout the State by a person in any capacity whatsoever, shall mean the maximum area of land that may be fixed as ceiling area under Section 30-C in relation to such person;

7. Section 30-B in chapter III-B provided:

"30-B. Definitions. - For the purpose of this Chapter -

(a) "family" shall mean a family consisting of a husband and wife, their children and grandchildren being dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so dependent, and

(b) "person" in the case of an individual shall include the family of such individual

Section 30-C providing for the extent of ceiling area said

30-C. Extent of ceiling area. - The ceiling area for a family consisting of five or less than five members shall be thirty standard acres of land.

Provided that, where the members of a family exceed five, the ceiling area in relation thereto shall be increased for each additional member by five standard acres, so however that it does not exceed sixty standard acres of landExplanation. - A standard acre shall mean the area of land which, with reference to its productive capacity, situation, soil classification and other prescribed particulars, is found in the prescribed manner to be likely to yield ten maunds of wheat yearly; and in case of land not capable of producing wheat, the other likely produce thereof shall, for the purpose of calculating a standard acre, be determined according to the prescribed scale so as to be equivalent in terms of money value to ten maunds of wheat.

Provided that, in determining a ceiling area in terms of standard acres, the money value of the produce of well-irrigated (chahi) land shall be taken as being equivalent to the money value of the produce of an equal area of un-irrigated (barani) land.

In exercise of the rule-making powers under the 1955 Act, the State Government framed and promulgated the Rajasthan Tenancy (fixation of Ceiling on Land) Government Rules, 1963, which came into force on and with effect from December 15, 1963. Rule 9 required that in order to enable the Sub-Divisional Officer to determine the ceiling area applicable to every person under Section 30-C of theand to enforce the provisions of section 30-E, every landholder and tenant in possession of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, shall file a declaration within six months from the notified date. The law fixed 30 standard acres as the ceiling area. Thereafter, successive amendments were made to Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act which, while maintaining the ceiling at 30 standard acres, however, recognised certain transfers effected after 1958, which were not originally so recognised in fixing the ceiling. Again (by an amendment) of the year 1970, Section 30(j) was deleted. The 1955 Act itself came to be included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution by a parliamentary law. The challenge to said includes was repelled by this Court. "

8. On January 1, 1973, the Governor of the State of Rajasthan promulgated the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 under Article 213 of the Constitution of India. The Ordinance repealed the corresponding provisions relating to ceiling on agricultural holdings contained in Section 5(6-A) and Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act except to the extent indicated in the second proviso to the Explanation to Section 4(1) and Section 15(2) of the said Ordinance. The Ordinance brought into existence a new concept of and standards for the "ceiling area". Certain transfers made by the landholders even during the operation of the old law were recognised as valid transfers for purposes of computation of ceiling area under the new dispensation brought about by the Ordinance. This Ordinance was replaced by the 1973 Act which was made operations retrospectively from January 1, 1973 being the date of promulgation of the Ordinance. Section 40 of the 1973 Act repealed, as did the predecessor Ordinance, both the old law in Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act and the earlier Ordinance for which it substituted.

Section 3, Section 4(1), second proviso to the Explanation and Section 40 of the 1973 Act require particular notice.

Section 3 provides:

"3. Act to override other laws, contracts, etc. - The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force, on any custom usage or contract or decree or order of a court or other authority."

The second proviso to the Explanation appended to Section 4(1) of thesays:

"Provided further that if the ceiling area applicable to any person or family in accordance with this section exceeds the ceiling area applicable to such person or family according to the provisions of law repealed by Section 40, in that case the ceiling area applicable to such person or family, will be the same as was under the provisions of the said repealed law."

Section 40 provides:

"40. Repeal and savings. - (1) Except as provided in second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 and in sub-section (2) of section 15 of this Act, the provisions of clause (6-A) of section 5 name Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955) are hereby repealed except in the Rajasthan Canal Project area wherein such provisions shall stand repealed on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area.

(2) The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 (Rajasthan Ordinance 1 of 1973) is hereby repealed.

(3) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Ordinance under sub-section (2), anything done or any action taken or any rules made under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under this Act and Section 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955) shall apply to such repeal and re-enactment."

Section 41 contains a statutory declaration that the Act is for giving effect to the directive principles of State policy towards securing the principles specified in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India.

9. Appellants learned counsel contend that when there is a repeal of a statute followed by a re-enactment of a new law on the same subject, with or without modifications, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not attracted and the question as to the extent to which the repealed law is saved would be dependent upon the express provisions of the later statute or what must be held to be its necessary and compelling implications. It was urged that where the repeal is accompanied by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the new law alone will determine if, and how far, the old law is saved and that in the absence of an express appeal to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act or of provisions to similar effect in the new law itself, the provisions of the old law must be held to have been effaced except whatever had been done, or having effect as if done. This argument has the familiar ring of what Sulaiman, C.J. had said on the matter in S. Rashid Ahmad v. Mt. Anis Fatima (AIR 1933 All 3 [LQ/AllHC/1932/75] : 1932 All LJ 764). But it must now be taken to be settled that the mere absence of an express reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not conclusive, unless such omission to invoke Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is attended with the circumstances that the provisions of the new law evince and make manifest an intention contrary to what would, otherwise, follow by the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the incidents and consequences of Section 6 would follow.

10. Appellants learned counsel submitted that the legislation in question pertaining, as it did, to the topic of agrarian reform was attendant with the difficulties naturally besetting a task so inextricably intermixed with complex and diverse and, indeed, often conflicting socio-economic interests had to go through stages of empirical evolution and that having regard to the wide diversity of policy options manifest between the earlier and the later legislations, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the later legislation made manifest an intention inconsistent with and contrary to the continuance of the rights and obligations under the repealed law. It was agreed that with the experience gained in the implementation of the policy of agrarian reforms embodied in the repealed law, the new policy considerations-reflected in the new and basically different thinking on some of the vital components the new policy - were evolved and incorporated in the new law, so much so that the repealed and repealing laws represented two entirely different systems and approaches to the policy of agrarian reforms and the two systems, with their marked differences one basic and essential criteria underlying their policies, could not co-exit. It was urged that the statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the 1973 Bill recognised that the legislative policy and technique underlying the old law were ineffective in removing the great disparity that persisted in the holdings of agricultural lands or in diluting the concentration of agricultural wealth in the hands of a few and recognised the necessity "to reduce such disparity and to re-fix the ceiling area on the agricultural holdings so that agricultural land may be available for distribution to landless persons".

11. It was pointed out that material criteria relevant to the effectuation of the new policy made manifest an intention contrary to the survival of the policy under the old law. Then wide changes in the policy of the later law which reflected a new and basically different approach to the matter, included (i) a fundamental rethinking on the concept of the "ceiling area" by reducing the 30 standards acres prescribed in the old law to 18 standard acres; (ii) the re-definition of the very concept of family and separate unit; (iii) the point of time with reference to which the composition and strength of the family would require to be ascertained; (iv) a rethinking, and a fresh policy as to the recognition of transfer made by landholders including even those transfers made during the period of operation of the old law; (v) the point of time of the vesting of the surplus land in government; (vi) the re-defining of the principles and priorities guiding the distributing of the surplus land to landless persons; and (vii) the amount to be paid to the landholders for the excess land vesting in the State under the new law.

12. It was submitted that the two laws - the old and the new - envisaged two totally different sets of values and policies and were so disparate in their context and effect as to yield the inevitable inference that the policy and the scheme of the later law, by reason alone of the peculiarities and distinction of its prescriptions, should be held to manifest an intention contrary to the saving of the old law even respecting pending cases. The ceiling laws, it was submitted. Envisage and provide an integrated and interconnected set of provisions and the marked distinctions in the vital provisions in the two sets of laws rendered the continued applicability of the old law to any case, not already finally concluded thereunder, as impermissible in law as unreasonable in its consequences if permitted. It was urged that Section 3 of the 1973 Act was a clinching indicator in this behalf when it provided that the provisions of the later law "shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any custom, usage, or contract or decree or order of a court or other authority" and that the old Act, even if it was, otherwise, held to be in force in relation to pending cases, was clearly over-borne by Section 3 of the new law.

13. When there is a repeal of a statute accompanied by re-enactment of a law on the same subject, the provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked into not for the purpose of ascertaining whether the consequences envisaged by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act ensued or not - Section 6 would indeed be attracted unless the new legislation manifests a contrary intention - but only for the purpose of determining whether the provisions in the new statue indicate a different intention. Referring to the way in which such incompatibility with the preservation of old rights and liabilities is to be ascertained this Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh ((1955) 1 SCR 893 [LQ/SC/1954/138] : AIR 1955 SC 84 [LQ/SC/1954/138] : 1955 Cri LJ 254) saidSuch incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. Of course, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of thewill apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed.

14. Addressing itself to the question whether, having regard to the particular provisions of the 1973 Act, the inference that the new law manifests such contrary intention could justifiably be drawn, the High Court observed:

"We have, therefore, to examine whether the new law expressly or otherwise manifests an intention to wipe out or sweep away those rights and liabilities which had accrued and incurred under the old law.

Having carefully gone through all the authorities cited by the parties as referred to above, we are of opinion that the new Act of 1973 does not have the sweeping effect of destroying all the rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the old law."

15. One of the indicia that the old law was not effaced is in Section 15(2) of the new Act. It provides that if the State Government was satisfied that the ceiling area in relation to a person as fixed under the old law had been determined in contravention of that law, a decided case could be reopened and inquired into it and the ceiling area and the surplus area determined afresh in accordance with the provisions of the old law. Another indicium is in Section 40(1) of read with the second proviso to Explanation to Section 4(1) of 1973 Act which provides that if the ceiling area applicable to a person or a family in accordance with the said Section 4(1) exceeds the ceiling area applicable to such person or family, under the old law, then, the ceiling area applicable to such person or family would be the same as was provided under the provisions of the old law.

16. The High Court relied upon and drew sustenance for its conclusion from, what it called, the internal evidence in the which, according to the High Court, indicated that pending cases were governed only by the old law. The High Court referred to Section 15(2) inserted by Act 8 of 1976 and what, according to it, necessarily flowed from it in support of its conclusion. Section 15(2) inserted by Act 8 of 1976 runs thus:

"15(2) Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955), if the State Government, after calling for the record or otherwise, is satisfied that any final order passed in any matter arising under the provisions repealed by Section 40, is in contravention of such repealed provisions and that such order is prejudicial to the State Government or that on account of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which has since come to its notice, such order is required to be reopened, it may, at any time within five years of the commencement of this Act, direct any officer subordinate to it to reopen such decided matter and to decide it afresh in accordance with such repealed provisions."

17. The High Court referring to the opening words of the above provision observed:

"The opening words of the section "without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act 3 of 1955) ", clearly show that the pending cases have to be governed by the old law. If transactions past and closed have to be reopened and decided afresh under the provisions of the repealed law, and the ceiling area under Chapter III of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, has to be fixed under its repealed provisions, then it must follow as a necessary corollary, that the pending cases must be decided under the old law."

18. Sri Lodha, learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan submitted that the ceiling area had to be fixed with reference to the notified date i.e. April 1, 1966 by the statutory standards prescribed under the Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act. The two legislations are complementary to each other and constitute two tier provisions. So Act, as on April 1, 1966, would continue to be governed by that law as the rights and obligations created by the said Chapter III-B amounted to create rights and incur liabilities. Sri Lodha submitted that the view taken by the High Court was unexceptionable.

19. On a careful consideration of the matter, we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the High Court on the point. The reliance placed by appellants learned counsel on the provisions of Section 3 of 1973 Act as detracting from the tenability of the conclusion reached by the High Court on the point is, in our opinion, somewhat tenuous. The contention of the learned counsel is that the expression "notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force" in Section 3 of the 1973 Act, would exclude the operation of Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act which, according to the contention, even if kept alive would yet be a law for the time being in force and, therefore, be excluded by virtue of Section 3. This contention has been negatived by the High Court - and in our opinion rightly - by placing reliance on the pronouncements of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh (1953 SCR 1188 [LQ/SC/1953/67] : AIR 1953 SC 394 [LQ/SC/1953/67] : 1953 Cri LJ 1480) and Chief Inspector of Mines v. K. C. Thapar (AIR 1961 SC 838 [LQ/SC/1961/60] : (1962) 1 SCR 9 [LQ/SC/1961/60] : (1961) 2 LLJ 146 [LQ/SC/1960/320] ). The High Court held that the expression "law for the time being in force" does not take within its sweep a law deemed to be in force and that, accordingly, the opening words of Section 3 relied upon by the appellants learned counsel will not have an overriding effect so as to exclude the old law.

20. A saving provision in a repealing statute is not exhaustive of the rights and obligations so saved or the rights that survive the repeal. It is observed by this Court in I. T. Commissioner v. Shah Sadiq & Sons ((1987) 3 SCC 516 [LQ/SC/1987/382] : 1987 SCC (Tax) 270 : AIR 1987 SC 1217 [LQ/SC/1987/382] , 1221) : (SCC p. 524, para 15)

"In other words whatever rights are expressly saved by the savings provision stand saved. But, that does not mean that rights which are not saved by the savings provision are extinguished or stand ipso facto terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing the old statute is enacted. Rights which have accrued are saved unless they are taken away expressly. This is the principle behind Section 6(c), General Clauses Act, 1897.

We agree with the High Court that the scheme of the 1973 Act does not manifest an intention contrary to, and inconsistent with, the saving of the repealed provisions of Section 5 (6-A) and Chapter III-B of 1955 Act so far as pending cases are concerned and that the rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the old law are not effaced. Appellants contention (a) is, in our opinion, insubstantial."

Re Contention (b)

21. This takes us to the next question whether in the present cases even if the provisions of Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, are attracted, the present cases did not involve any rights "accrued" or obligations "incurred" so as to attract the old law to them to support initiation or continuation of the proceedings against the landholders after the repeal. It was contended that even if the provisions of the old Act were held to have been saved it could not be said that there was any right accrued in favour of the State or any liability incurred by the landholders in the matter of determination of the ceiling area so as to attract to their cases the provisions of the old law. The point emphasised by the learned counsel is that the excess land would vest in the State only after the completion of the proceedings and upon the landholder signifying his choice as to the identity of the land to be surrendered. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, provide, respectively, that the repeal of an enactment shall not, unless a different intention appears, "affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed" or "affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid".

22. For purpose of these clauses the "right" must be "accrued" and not merely an inchoate one. The distinction between what is and what is not a right preserved by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it is said, if often one of great fineness. What is unaffected by the repeal is a right acquired or accrued under the repealed statute and not "a mere hope or expectation" of acquiring a right a right or liberty to apply for a right.

23. In Lalji Raja & Sons v. Firm Hansraj Nathuram ((1971) 1 SCC 721 [LQ/SC/1971/150] : (1971) 3 SCR 815 [LQ/SC/1971/150] ) this Court dealing with the distinction between the "abstract rights" and "specific rights" for the purpose of the operation of Section 6 of General Clauses Act said : (SCC p. 728, para 16)

"That a provision to preserve the right accrued under a repealed Act was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act .......... It only applies to specific rights given to an individual upon happening of one or the other of the events specified in statute - see Lord Atkins observations in Hamilton Gell v. White ((1922) 2 KB 422 : 38 TLR 829). The mere right, existing at the date of repealing statute, to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a right accrued within the meaning of the usual saving clause - see Abbot v. Minister for Lands (1895 AC 425 : 72 LT 402) and Ogden Industrial Pvt. Ltd. v. Lucas ((1969) 1 All ER 121 : (1970) AC 113)."

To ascertain whether these were accrued rights and incurred liabilities a reference to Section 30-E of the repealed law is necessary.

24. Section 30-E of 1955 Act provided:

"30-E. Maximum land that can be held and restriction on future acquisitions. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, as from a date notified by the State Government in this behalf -(a) continue to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, or

(b) acquire, by purchase, gift, mortgage, assignment, lease, surrender or otherwise or by devolution or bequest, any land so as to effect an increase in the extent of his holding over the area applicable to him

Provided that different dates may be so notified for different areas of the State

(2) Every person, who, on such date, is in possession of land in excess of the ceiling are applicable to him or who thereafter comes into possession of any land by acquisition under clause (b) of sub-section (1), shall, within six months of such date or within three months of acquisition, as the case may be, make a report of such possession or acquisition to, and shall surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate

(3) Any person failing intentionally to make a report or to surrender land as required by sub-section (2) shall, on conviction, be punishable with a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees

(4) Without prejudice and in addition to such conviction and fine the person retaining possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him shall be deemed to be a tresspasser liable to ejectment from such excess land to pay ejectment from such excess land to pay penalty in accordance with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 183

Provided that the lands, from which a person shall be so ejected shall, as for as may be, be unencumbered lands

5. All lands coming to the State Government by surrender under sub-section (2) or by ejectment under sub-section (4) shall vest in its free all encumbrances."

25. The rights obligations under this provision had to be determined with reference to the notified date i.e. April 1, 1966. Referring to analogous provision of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, this Court in Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra ((1971) 3 SCC 391 [LQ/SC/1971/369] : (1972) 1 SCR 48 [LQ/SC/1971/369] , 57) observed : (SCC p. 397, para 17)

"The scheme of the seems to be to determine the ceiling area of each person (including a family) with reference to the appointed day. The policy of the appears to be that on and after the appointed day no person in the State should be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area as determined under the and that ceiling area would be that which is determined as on the appointed day."

26. Again in Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed ((1982) 1 SCC 680 [LQ/SC/1982/42] , 687 : (1982) 3 SCR 218 [LQ/SC/1982/42] , 228), it was observed : (SCC p. 687, para 13)

"A close reading of the aforesaid provisions of the shows that the determination of the extent of surplus land of a holder has to be made as on the appointed day. If any person has at any time after August 4, 1959 but before the appointed day held any land (including any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area, such person should file a return within the prescribed period from the appointed day furnishing to each of the Collectors within whose jurisdiction any land in his holdings is situated, in the form prescribed containing the particulars of all land held by him. If any person acquires, holds or comes into possession of any land (including any exempted land) in excess of the ceiling area on or after the appointed day, such person has to furnish a return as stated above within the prescribed from the date of taking possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area."

27. A contention similar to the one urged for the appellants here that the title respecting the surplus land would vest in the government upon such land being possession of by government after the declaration regarding the surplus was noticed in that case. But, it was held that the liability to surrender the surplus land would date back to the appointed day. This Court said : (SCC p. 688, para 13)

"Any other construction would make the unworkable and the determination of the extent of surplus land of a holder ambulatory and indefinite."

This was again reiterated in State of Maharashtra v. Annapurnabai (1985 Supp SCC 273, 275). This Court said : (SCC p. 275, para 4)

"Section 21 of theno doubt states that the title of the holder of the surplus land would become vested in the State Government only on such land being taken possession of after a declaration regarding the surplus land is published in official Gazette. But the liability to surrender the surplus land relates back to the appointed day in case of those who held land in excess of the ceiling on the appointed day. Therefore, even if the holder dies before declaration of any part of his land as surplus land, the surplus land is liable to be determined with reference to his holding on the appointed day."

28. It is, therefore, seen that the right of the State to take over excess land vested in it as on the appointed day and only the quantification remained to be worked out. As observed by Lord Morris, in Director of Public Works v. Ho po Sang ((1961) 2 All ER 721 : (1961) AC 901) : (All ER p. 731)

"It may be, therefore, that, under some repealed enactment, a right has been given but that, in respect of it, some investigation or legal proceeding is necessary. The right is then unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary. But there is manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to decide whether some right should be or should not be given. On a repeal, the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. The latter is not."

29. The above passage was referred to with approval in M. S. Shivananda v. K. S. R. T. C. ((1980) 1 SCC 149 [LQ/SC/1979/379] , 156 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1980 SC 77 [LQ/SC/1979/379] , 81)

30. We agree with the High Court that the right of the State to the excess land was not merely an inchoate right under the, but a right "accrued" within the meaning of Section 6 (c) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, and the liability of the land owner to surrender the excess land as on April 1, 1966 was a liability "incurred" also within the meaning of the said provision. There is no substance in contention (b) either.

31. These appeals, special leave petition and the writ petition, accordingly, fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.