Jwala Prasad, J.
1. This is an application against an order of the District Magistrate of Gaya, dated the 20th August 1917, affirming an order of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Gaya, passed under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. The order of the Magistrate of the 16th August 1917 was passed under the following circumstances:--
On the report of the Police of an imminent danger of a breach of the peace impending between the petitioners and the opposite party, a notice under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on the 19th July 1917. In obedience to that notice the parties showed cause. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, upon the materials that were placed before him, came to the conclusion that the land indispute was in the possession of the opposite party. He accordingly discharged the notice under section 144 against that party and made the notice absolute against the petitioners. Against that order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the petitioners moved the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate also came to the same conclusion. After setting forth the reasons, the District Magistrate concluded that the crop of 1916 was grown by the Mohunt and possession had rightly or wrongly remained with him ever since. Accordingly the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate was affirmed by him.
3. There is no question regarding the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to pass the, order under section 144. In this case the order passed by the Magistrate is therefore, not subject to revision by this Court.
4. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order, of the District Magistrate is bad, inasmuch as it decided possession in a proceeding under section 144, and that the proper, proceeding to be instituted in this case was under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Certain authorities have also been placed before me by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention, that in a case where a dispute was regarding the possession over a property the proper section to be adopted is section 145 of the Code and not section 107 or section 141 of the Code.
5. After reviewing the authorities cited to me, I do not think that any hard and fast rule can be laid down upon this point. It has to be determined in the circumstances of each case what section is the proper section to be adopted. No doubt, when there is a dispute as to the possession of the property between the parties, section 145 is the proper section which would, in a proper enquiry, determine once for all the right of possession of the party to the property in dispute; but in cases where the possession of the property is with any of the parties, it would be equally hard to institute a protracted enquiry under section 145 against him. The party in possession is entitled to be maintained in possession and to invoke the aid of the Magistrate to prevent disturbance of his possession by all possible means provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the Magistrate is satisfied that one of the parties is in possession and that an imminent danger of a breach of the peace is impending, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to maintain the party in possession and forbid the party who is not in possession by an order under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question is one for the Magistrate to decide which party was in possession at that stage. If there is no material before the Magistrate, then the High Court can interfere upon the ground that there was no material before the Magistrate to decide possession in favour of one of the parties, and to take action against the other party under section 143; but if there is material before the Magistrate be is the only Judge as to whether the material is sufficient or not, and if upon the materials placed before him he is satisfied that one of the parties is in possession the order under section 144 against the party interfering with his possession is not without jurisdiction at all.
6. In the present case the report of the Police was to the effect that the opposite party was in possession of the land; that the crop was grown by him in the year 1916; and that the land was cultivated by him in the present year. Upon that report the Magistrate did not think it desirable to hold that the possession was with the opposite party. He issued notice upon both parties in order to give them an opportunity to appear before him and to show whether the report of the Police was correct or not in favour of the opposite party. The cause was shown, as I have said before, and from the summary of the materials that the Magistrate has given in the judgment, it appears that in about May or June 1916, the land in dispute along with the entire village in which the land is situate was in the possession of the opposite party by means of a thicca which was to expire in the year 1323, corresponding to 1916, May or June. The lease expired and possession of the village was surrendered to the petitioners who are the proprietors of the village. This was about May or June 1916.
7. In November 1916, a report was made to the Police by the doffadar of the circle that the opposite party, the Mohunt, was cutting the crop of the land in dispute. The land in dispute was recorded in the survey as in possession of the opposite party, but his status was entered as that of a thiccadar whereas he claimed to be the jogirdar of the land in dispute. The Magistrate, therefore, had before him the fact that the opposite party was in possession of the land prior to the year 1916 and that he continued in possession of it in November 1916 after the lease had expired, although the village was surrendered to the opposite party. Upon these materials he was satisfied that there was clear possession with the opposite party over the land in dispute. There was thus material before the Magistrate; but whether it was sufficient or not it is not for me to say.
8. We cannot interfere in revision with the findings of possession arrived at under section 144 for the purpose of taking action under that section. Whatever be the effect of that finding it is not for me to discuss it here. It is sufficient for the purpose of disposing of this Rule to say that the Magistrate had jurisdiction and that he had materials before him to enable him to come to a certain conclusion regarding the party in whose favour the order under section 144 was passed. In the circumstances I decline to interfere. The application is rejected.