Courtney-Terrell, C.J.This is a miscellaneous second appeal against an order of the District Judge of Cuttack dealing with an appeal from the first Munsif at Cuttack who had dismissed an application for execration. The main point which we have to consider is a simple one of limitation. The judgment-debtor who is the appellant was the defendant in a suit by the Godipatna Co-operative Society to recover the principal and interest of a loan made by the society to the appellant. A decree was passed against the appellant for a sum which represented the principal and the bond rate of interest and interest was to run upon the decretal amount at a Court rate of interest from the date of judgment until the date of payment. The successful plaintiff, the respondent in the matter before us, took out execution which was finally disposed of on 7th August 1931.

2. There was a further application, the one with which we are now dealing, on 27th August, 1934, more than three years after the disposal of the earlier execration case and prima facie the decree Under execration was barred by limitation but the decree-holder relies upon a payment of two annas. The payment was made to the Society and the books of the Society recorded the payment and recorded also in connexion therewith the signature of the judgment-debtor.

3. It is contended on behalf of the judgment-debtor that whereas there is an entry in the minutes of the Society to the effect that the two annas was received by the Society and appropriated to the payment of interest, that the claim to the principal decretal amount is barred by limitation though the limitation may be saved in so far as the amount of interest is concerned and the argument is based upon Section 20, Limitation Act. The Act was amended by the Amendment Act of 1927. Prior to the amendment, payments to save limitation in respect of interest or in respect of principal differed. In the case of payments to commence a fresh period of limitation in respect of interest no writing was required on the part of the person liable to pay the debt whereas in the case of payments in respect of principal the requirement for writing was fixed. The Act made it clear that as to any given payment, if it was contended that the payment was towards interest, it must be clear that it was so intended and that the payment was not towards principal. Accordingly Sub-section (1) of the section reads as follows:

Where interest on a debt or legacy is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid as such by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy, or by his agent duly authorized in this behalf, or where part of the principal of a debt is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid by the debtor or by his agent duly authorized in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made.

5. This was in the old Act followed by the following proviso:

Provided that In the case of part payment of the principal of a debt the fact of payment appears in the hand writing of the person making the same.

6. It was thought desirable by the Legislature to amend the proviso so as to strike out the difference between payments towards interest and payments towards principal in the matter of the required writing. Accordingly the new proviso effected by the Amendment Act of 1927 is as follows:

Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the first day of January 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment.

7. The effect of the amendment was to remove the distinction between the two kinds of payment as to all payments made after the first day of January 1928. Therefore as to payments made before that date the words "as such" have some significance because they serve to make it clear that in the case of a payment towards interest which is not required to be evidenced by writing it should be clear that the payment was in fact towards interest and not left as a matter of doubt. As to payments made after 1st January 1928 they are now placed on an equality. Therefore the words "as such" are material when the Court has to consider a payment made before 1st January 1928 but they have no significance after the date mentioned.

8. This view of the section was taken by two of the Judges in the Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court in B. Udeypal Singh Vs. Lakshmi Chand and there although the other three Judges took the view that the words "as such" had significance even with respect to payments made after 1st January 1928 the two Judges in minority took the view that as regards such payments after 1st January 1928 the words had no significance at all. With the view of the minority, I respectfully agree and that view hag recently been taken by a Bench of this Court.

9. Further, the debt which is owing by the judgment-debtor does not consist of two debts but of one. It is subject to a decree that a certain sum shall be paid together with interest on that sum until the date of payment. It is not possible to separate the two and to say that it consists of principal and interest and that limitation might be saved as to one part of the debt, that is to say the interest, and yet be effective as against the other part of the debt, namely, the principal sum. The payment of the two annas in this case was towards the total debt. Any appropriation by the person to whom it was paid is immaterial. The payment was of a character which was dearly intended and was made for the purpose of saving the limitation and keeping the debt running. In my opinion the entire debt is saved from limitation and continues to run less the amount paid. The learned Judge was, in my opinion, correct in this matter.

10. There remains another point of quite a different character which has arisen owing to a slip either on the part of the parties at the time of the hearing before the learned Judge or possibly by a mistake of the learned Judge. One of the objections taken before the Munsif in the execution case was that a certain part of the property to be seized in execution namely lot No. 7 mentioned in the execution petition was exempt from the same by reason of the fact that it was the homestead land of an agriculturist. The learned Munsif found that this was the case and did not allow the sale to proceed in respect to that lot. When the case went before the District Judge he set aside the entire order. It is conceded that this was a slip and that the execution can only proceed with respect to the property other than this lot. The order of the learned District Judge will accordingly be amended to this extent.

11. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

James, J.

I agree.