1. This appeal has been preferred by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), being aggrieved by the order dated 11.7.2014 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP.No.32186/2010 (LA-BDA) and other connected matters. In the present appeal, the BDA’s challenge pertains to particularly W.P.Nos.37190- 37191/2012. By the said order, the learned Single Judge has quashed the notifications issued under the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 for acquisition of lands intended for the formation of a residential layout known as "The Nadaprabhu Kempegowda Layout."

2. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Shri G.S. Kannur who has been engaged in the matter to represent the Learned Counsel Sri G.Lakshmeesh Rao for the BDA / Authority, as well as the learned Senior Counsel Shri D.L. Jagadeesh representing the learned counsel Shri

Lohitaswa Banakar who is on record for the respondent Nos.1 and 2, inclusive of the learned AGA Shri B. Ravindranath for Respondent No.3.

3. The factual matrix of the appeal is as under:

The Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BDA’, for brevity), had intended to form a residential layout known as "The Nadaprabhu Kempegowda Layout" for the benefit of acquiring and allotting sites to the general public. In furtherance of its intention, the BDA had issued a resolution dated 3.9.2007, addressing a letter dated 18.9.2007 to the State Government with all the relevant particulars, seeking its approval for the scheme. On 02.04.2008, the State Government had accorded approval and as on 21.05.2008, the BDA issued a Preliminary Notification under Section 17 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BDA Act’, for brevity), proposing to acquire an extent of 4814 acres and 15 guntas of land. Vide resolution bearing No.340/09 dated 12.01.2010, the BDA had furnished the details as noticed in the said resolution and sought approval for issuance of notification under Section 18 of the BDA Act in respect of acquisition of 4043 acres and 27 guntas of land and vide letter dated 27.1.2010, the BDA sent its request to the Government enclosing a copy of the said resolution dated 12.1.2010. The Government of Karnataka, by its proceedings dated 16.02.2010, accorded approval and sanctioned the scheme under Section 18(3) of the BDA Act for acquisition of 4043 acres and 27 guntas of land. Accordingly, on 18.02.2010 a Final Notification was issued under Section 19 of the BDA Act and 4043 acres and 27 guntas were declared as notified for the formation of the layout. The details of the lands proposed to be acquired, are depicted in the Table below for clarity.

4. A significant factual matter in this case, is the inclusion of the land bearing survey number 160/3, which measures 5.00 acres and is classified as “Pure Garden Land” morefully described in the schedule below, which is utilized for agricultural purposes, including the cultivation of coconut and areca nut trees, and it also accommodates Four residential buildings and pump houses. This particular parcel was not included in the preliminary notification but was included in the final notification. As a result, the landowners were denied the opportunity to object at the initial stage, as mandated by Section 17(5) of the BDA Act, raising concern regarding the overall methodology adopted by the BDA, which appears to be selective, having excluded significant portions of land—reportedly around 800 acres in one instance and 270 acres on another, without clear justification, leading to legal questions as to whether the BDA’s procedural actions were in accordance with law or not.

5. The Respondent Nos.1 and 2 being aggrieved by the acquisition notifications issued by the BDA, had questioned the said acquisition notifications, by way of filing writ petitions in W.P.Nos.37190-37191/2012 before a learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Single Judge, by its common order dated 11.07.2014, had allowed the said writ petitions and had quashed the acquisition notifications. It is this order which is under challenge in the present appeal by the BDA, seeking to allow the present appeal and thereby to set aside the said common order passed by the learned Single Judge.

6. The learned Senior Counsel Shri G.S. Kannur representing the appellant / BDA, contends that the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, which quashed the acquisition notification, is erroneous and contrary to law, warranting its reversal. The Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) Act, particularly Chapter III, outlines the procedural framework for development schemes. Section 15(1)(b) empowers the BDA to undertake development works with prior Government approval, while Section 16 mandates that every development scheme must include land acquisition details. Further, Section 17(1) requires the BDA to issue a notification upon preparing a development scheme, specifying the land proposed for acquisition. The learned Senior Counsel for appellants emphasizes that a combined reading of these provisions necessitates obtaining prior Government approval for a development scheme, before issuing a preliminary notification. He asserts that obtaining such approval is merely an administrative step and does not prejudice landowners. The BDA is duly authorized to issue the preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act, while the State Government issues the final declaration under Section 19 of the BDA Act as the acquiring authority.

7. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that the Learned Single Judge’s finding that the State Government and the BDA wrongly assumed that lands notified under Section 17 of the BDA Act were available for acquisition, without considering landowners' objections. He contends that this conclusion is factually incorrect, as the BDA duly allowed landowners to file their objections to the preliminary notification, considered them, and obtained further approval under Section 18 of the BDA Act from the State Government before issuing the final notification under Section 19 of the BDA Act.

8. Additionally, learned Senior counsel opposes the conclusion arrived at by the Learned Single Judge that the appointment of an Additional Land Acquisition Officer (ALAO) under Section 40 of the Land Acquisition Act, 2013 renders actions under Section 19 of the BDA Act illegal. He submits that Section 36(1) of the BDA Act specifically applies to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in instances where the BDA Act is silent. Since the BDA Act does not address the appointment of an ALAO and staff to perform the duties of the Deputy Commissioner, he contends that the appointment is entirely valid. Moreover, Section 52 of the BDA Act expressly empowers the Authority to authorize individuals to enter land or buildings for purposes such as surveys or inspections. The BDA Commissioner, who issued the preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act, was well within his rights to appoint an ALAO and staff under Section 52 to exercise powers akin to those of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 4(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The absence of a corresponding provision in the BDA Act does not prohibit such an appointment, making the Learned Single Judge’s finding factually and legally unsustainable.

9. The learned Senior Counsel for the BDA further disputes the Learned Single Judge’s conclusion that the BDA exceeded its jurisdiction by proposing compensation in kind (40% of the developed residential area) to landowners. They submit that, through a letter dated September 18, 2007, the BDA sought Government approval to acquire approximately 4,814 acres for the Nadaprabhu Kempegowda Layout and proposed offering landowners 40% of the developed area instead of monetary compensation. The Government granted administrative approval on April 2, 2008, allowing the BDA to include this proposal in the preliminary notification. The learned Senior Counsel emphasised that this offer was entirely optional, and landowners could choose between developed land and monetary compensation. Hence, it is his contention that the inclusion of this offer does not constitute a jurisdictional error or invalidate the acquisition proceedings, rendering the Learned Single Judge’s finding unsustainable.

10. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the Learned Single Judge erred in quashing the entire acquisition process when only a subset of landowners (covering about 700 acres out of the 4,043 acres notified) challenged it. Many landowners accepted the 40:60 compensation scheme or acquiesced to the acquisition, making it unjustifiable to extend relief to those who did not approach the court.

11. The learned Counsel also has opposed the allegations of arbitrariness or malice in the acquisition process, stating that the exclusion of certain lands followed Supreme Court guidelines in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy and others v. Bangalore Development Authority and others ((2010) 7 SCC 129)), which was made after a thorough inquiry and inspection. The learned Senior Counsel denies that the acquisition process was discriminatory or selectively applied.

12. It is further contended that the Land Acquisition Officer strictly adhered to procedural requirements, conducting inquiries as mandated by the Land Acquisition Act and Section 36 of the BDA Act. Further, all objections were duly considered, and the notifications were issued in accordance with law. Regarding compensation, the learned Senior Counsel reiterated that offering developed land was optional, with landowners retaining the right to opt for monetary compensation. The compensation was calculated based on the nature of the land and prevailing guideline values, rendering the Learned Single Judge’s findings erroneous.

13. The learned Senior Counsel highlights that many landowners have already accepted compensation and surrendered their lands to the BDA, with approximately 529 crores disbursed. These landowners have not contested the acquisition. The Learned Single Judge has failed to consider this aspect of the matter, further necessitating the setting aside of the impugned order.

14. Furthermore, the learned Counsel asserts that the right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India is not absolute and can be curtailed by lawful authority. The acquisition of land for public purposes aligns with established legal principles, and the Learned Single Judge’s order overlooks this settled position. It is his further contention that the first Respondent / Jayalakshmamma, transferred the disputed lands to the second respondent / R.V. Shamanna, after the issuance of the Final Notification, which, according to the Appellants, under Section 3 of The Karnataka Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1991, renders the transfer void. Consequently, it is contended that the Respondents lack the standing to challenge the acquisition proceedings.

15. The relevant Provision of Section 3 of the said Act, is extracted below for reference:

“Section 3: Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by Government.- No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in any urban area which has been acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) or any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose.”

16. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that at the time of issuance of Preliminary Notification, the revenue records did not list the respondents as owners, and their names were only reflected later through a subsequent mutation. The absence of the first respondent’s name in the Preliminary Notification does not invalidate the acquisition, as the land itself was duly notified. The BDA was under no legal obligation to conduct an extensive inquiry beyond existing records.

17. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that adequate public notice of the acquisition was provided, and the respondents, having filed objections, were fully aware of the process. The right to hearing was not denied, and the principles of natural justice were upheld. He further contends that Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act does not mandate a detailed inquiry in cases where the BDA initiates the acquisition process. It is his contention that the Land Acquisition Officer exercised due diligence in considering objections, including those concerning garden land, thus rendering the Learned Single Judge’s conclusion erroneous.

18. Learned Senior Counsel for the BDA further contends that public interest must be prioritized over minor procedural irregularities, particularly in large-scale land acquisition for public purposes. It is his contention that the Learned Single Judge has overlooked this fundamental principle, leading to an erroneous quashing of the acquisition process. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Bangalore Development Authority & Anr Vs. R Shankaran & Anr [WA No. 1783 of 2014 (LA-BDA)], has previously upheld the legality of the Nadaprabhu Kempegowda Layout’s acquisition process, reinforcing the validity of the current acquisition. The Respondents had the option to accept compensation or seek redressal before the BDA, but their challenge to the entire acquisition, lacks merit.

“41.1.1 The Division Bench while considering the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the acquisition proceedings which are in public interest, has held as follows:

“77. Therefore, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just cause. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable.

78. A memo filed by the BDA discloses that, in the total extent of 2,750 acres which is notified for acquisition in the final notification, challenge to the acquisition is only to the extent of about 748 acres. There is no challenge to the acquisition regarding rest of the land. About 538 acres of land belongs to the Government itself.

In respect of 92 acres, no objections were filed. It is on record that to the extent of about 1228 acres awards have been passed; compensation paid, possession taken; layout is formed. 14,103 sites carved out. 2,29,000 applications received for allotment of sites. Under these circumstances to quash acquisition proceedings of this magnitude on the aforesaid grounds would be wholly unjustified and would be against public interest.”

19. The learned Senior Counsel in furtherance of his arguments has relied on the following cases of various Courts:-

i) Shiv Kumar and Another vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 229. The relevant portion of the said Apex Court judgment reads thus:

“8. It has been laid down that the purchasers on any ground whatsoever cannot question proceedings for taking possession. A purchaser after Section 4 notification does not acquire any right in the land as the sale is ab initio void and has no right to claim land under the Policy.

19. The 2013 Act presupposes that a person is required to be rehabilitated and resettled. Such a person who has purchased after Section 4 notification as sale deed is void under the Act of 1894, cannot claim rehabilitation and resettlement as per policy envisaged under the Act of 2013, as his land has not been acquired, but he has purchased a property which has already been acquired by the State Government, he cannot claim even higher compensation, as per proviso to Section 24(2) under the Act of 2013. An original landowner cannot be deprived of higher value under the Act of 2013, which higher compensation was not so contemplated when the void transaction of sale had been entered, and right is conferred under proviso to Section 24(2) on recorded owners under Act of 1894. We have come across instances in which after notifications Under Section 4 were issued and, the property was purchased at throwaway prices by the builders and unscrupulous persons, such purchases are void and confer no right even to claim higher compensation Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as it is to be given to the owner as mentioned in the notification.

20. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after Section 4 notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the land, such incumbents cannot invoke the provisions of Section 24. As the sale transaction did not clothe them with the title when the purchase was made; they cannot claim 'possession' and challenge the acquisition as having lapsed Under Section 24 by questioning the legality or regularity of proceedings of taking over of possession under the Act of 1894. It would be unfair and profoundly unjust and against the policy of the law to permit such a person to claim resettlement or claim the land back as envisaged under the Act of 2013. When he has not been deprived of his livelihood but is a purchaser under a void transaction, the outcome of exploitative tactics played upon poor farmers who were unable to defend themselves.

21. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over of possession under the Act of 1894 cannot be made, based on a void transaction nor declaration can be sought Under Section 24(2) by such incumbents to obtain the land. The declaration that acquisition has lapsed under the Act of 2013 is to get the property back whereas, the transaction once void, is always a void transaction, as no title can be acquired in the land as such no such declaration can be sought.

It would not be legal, just and equitable to give the land back to purchaser as land was not capable of being sold which was in process of acquisition under the Act of 1894. The Act of 2013 does not confer any right on purchaser whose sale is ab initio void. Such void transactions are not validated under the Act of 2013. No rights are conferred by the provisions contained in the 2013 Act on such a purchaser as against the State.”

ii) Delhi Development Authority vs. Manpreet Singh and Ors., AIR 2023 SC 454. The relevant portion of the said Apex Court judgment reads thus:

“6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that it was the specific case on behalf of the Appellants before the High Court that the original writ Petitioner is a subsequent purchaser, who has acquired the right, title or interest in the land in the year 2018. The original writ Petitioner was not the recorded owner at the time when the award with respect to the land in question under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred

to as "Act, 1894") was issued. From the material on record, it appears that before the High Court, the original writ Petitioner claimed the right, title or interest on the basis of the Assignment Deed of 2015. In the present case, the notification Under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 25.11.1980 and the award was declared on 05.06.1987. Therefore, the short question, which is posed for the consideration of this Court is:

‘Whether the original writ Petitioner being a subsequent purchaser had locus to challenge the acquisition and/or lapsing of the acquisition’

6.1. The aforesaid issue is now not res integra in view of the Three Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar and Anr. (supra), which has been subsequently followed by another Bench of this Court in the cases of Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. and Ors. (supra) and Pawan Kumar and Ors. (supra). The decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar and Anr. (supra) is a Three Judge Bench decision by which a contrary view taken by the Two Judge Bench of this Court in the case of

Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust and Anr., MANU/SC/0578/2017 : (2017) 6 SCC 751 has not been accepted and is found to be not a good law. That thereafter after following the Three Judge Bench decision in the case of Shiv Kumar and Anr. (supra) in the cases of Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. and Ors. (supra) and Pawan Kumar and Ors. (supra), this Court has subsequently observed and held that a subsequent purchaser has no locus to challenge the acquisition proceedings/lapsing of the acquisition under the Act, 2013.

6.2. In that view of the matter, the High Court has committed a serious error in entertaining the writ petition at the instance of the Respondent No. 1 herein - original writ Petitioner and has materially erred in declaring that the acquisition with respect to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed Under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 in a writ petition filed by the Respondent No. 1 herein - original writ Petitioner, who is a subsequent purchaser. Under the circumstances and on that ground alone, the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court is required to be quashed and set aside.

iii) Bangalore Development Authority vs. Aslam

S. and Ors. MANU/KA/5472/2022. The relevant portion of the said judgment passed by this Court reads thus:

“7. The material on record would go to show that respondent No.4 herein i.e., B.K.Dwarakanath who was the original owner of the land in question whose name was reflected in acquisition notification as Khatedar, had filed W.P.No.2208/2003 before this Court challenging the very same acquisition proceedings. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 08.09.2003 directing the appellant to pass the award and pay compensation within two months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. Respondent No.4, thereafter, has sold the land in question to one Sri Rama Subba Rao on 27.07.2004, who in turn had sold land in question in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein under the registered sale deed dated 10.09.2009. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein thereafter filed W.P.No.41124-41126/2011 challenging the acquisition notification with a prayer to declare the acquisition insofar it relates to land in question as lapsed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SHIVKUMAR AND ANOTHER vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS – ((2019) 10 SCC 299) has held that subsequent purchaser of the land which is the subject matter of the acquisition has no right to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings. The said view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (supra). Undisputedly, the writ petition was initially filed by respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein, who are subsequent purchasers of land in question. The appellant authority had raised a contention regarding maintainability of the writ petition in its statement of objections. It is only thereafter, to get over the question of maintainability, respondent No.4 who is the original owner of the land in question was impleaded as petitioner No.4 before the learned Single Judge. The original respondent No.4 had earlier filed W.P.No.2208/2003 challenging the very same notification unsuccessfully before this Court. After having failed in his writ petition, he had sold the land in question in favour of Rama Subba Rao, who in turn had sold the land in question in favour of

respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein. Therefore, it is very clear that as on the date of filing of the writ petition, respondent No.4 herein had no right, title or interest in the land in question and merely for the reason that he has been impleaded as a petitioner to writ petition, the writ petition filed by subsequent purchasers cannot be held to be maintainable. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate this aspect of matter and has erred in holding that writ petition filed by subsequent purchasers was maintainable and the defect in the writ petition was cured by impleading the original owner.

20. On all the above grounds urged, the learned Senior Counsel Shri G.S. Kannur for the BDAs pleads to Allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order dated July 11, 2014, passed by the Learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 37190-37191/2012 and thereby to uphold the acquisition process as valid, lawful, and in the larger public interest and consequently to dismiss the respondents’ challenge to the acquisition, as it lacks merit.

21. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Shri. D.L. Jagadeesh representing the respondents, countered the submissions made by the learned Senior counsel for the appellant as follows:

He submits that the land in question has been in the continuous possession of Respondent No.1 / Smt. Jayalakshmamma, who acquired it through a registered sale deed dated 11.07.1981 from Venkatappa (Annexure A, Pg. 327). At the time of issuance of both the Preliminary and Final Notifications, she was the rightful owner and khathedar of the said land. However, despite not being included in the Preliminary Notification, her land was arbitrarily included in the Final Notification without allowing her to object before issuance of the final notification.

22. The learned Senior counsel for the Respondents contends that the acquisition of land bearing Survey No. 160/3 (Re-survey No. 160), measuring 5 acres and situated in Ramasandra Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bengaluru, is vitiated due to non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) Act and the Land Acquisition Act. The fundamental defect in the acquisition process is that the said land was not included in the Preliminary Notification dated 21.05.2008 but was later included for the first time in the Final Notification dated 18.02.2010 at Serial No. 1209. The omission of the land from the Preliminary Notification deprived the Respondents of their statutory right to file objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, thereby vitiating the entire acquisition proceedings. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent further emphasised that the Appellants have incorrectly contended in their statement of objections that the land was notified in the Preliminary Notification of 2008 and subsequently confirmed in the Final Notification of 2010. This contention is demonstrably false, as neither the land nor the name of Respondent No.1 appeared in the Preliminary Notification. As a result, the Respondents were denied their right to object, rendering the entire acquisition process legally untenable. As a result, The appellant / BDA has also failed to comply with Section 17(5) of the BDA Act, which mandates that landowners must be provided an opportunity to object to the proposed acquisition. Since the land was never included in the Preliminary Notification, Respondent No.1 was deprived of this fundamental right. This clear non-compliance with Sections 17(1) and 17(5) of the BDA Act vitiates the entire acquisition process. Consequently, learned Senior Counsel contends that the BDA has violated Section 18(3) of the BDA Act by failing to secure proper approval for the scheme. Since the scheme lacks legal sanction, the Final Notification itself becomes unsustainable in law.

23. Furthermore, the BDA has selectively dropped over 800 acres of land from acquisition without providing any justification, thereby adopting a discriminatory and arbitrary approach. This has resulted in the Respondents being unfairly deprived of their only source of livelihood. The Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents emphasised that the land is a pure garden land, consisting of a significant number of coconut trees, areca nut trees, and a nursery. It is further stated that the Respondents have been continuously engaged in agricultural activities and have no intention of alienating the land. The land also contains four residential buildings and pump houses, which the Respondents actively use.

24. The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents further emphasised that the Appellant / BDA, selectively excluded 270 acres of land on the ground that they contained garden land with coconut trees. This arbitrary action, contradicts the Land Acquisition Act and amounts to an unlawful "pick and choose" method, which has no basis in law. The arbitrary deletion of certain lands while selectively including the Respondents’ land highlights a discriminatory and unreasonable exercise of power by the appellant / BDA. The land in question is adjacent to Survey Nos. 160/4, 160/5, and 08, which were de-notified by the BDA. Despite being similarly situated, the Respondents’ land has been wrongfully retained for acquisition. The Respondents’ land is also situated at the border end of the layout and near a lake, making it unsuitable for urban development. This further highlights the arbitrary and unreasonable nature of the acquisition.

25. Further, to substantiate his arguments the Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent relied on various judgments of various courts as follows:

"i) P.Sabitha Pai vs. State of Karnataka., ILR 2000 KAR 2409. The relevant portion of the said judgment of this Court, reads thus:

“Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Division Bench in W.P No- 10570/87 and other connected matters, disposed of on 19.1.1998 submitted that any mistake crept in the publication of the notification could be corrected by issuing erratum Here, the facts in this case are that the land in survey No-122 is not included in the preliminary notification and in the absence of such inclusion, no final notification could be issued, as the same is resulted in taking away the right of the land owner to the object the acquisition proceedings. This illegality cannot be cured by issuing an addendum. Therefore, the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the B.D.A has no application to the facts of this case, in result the writ petition is allowed. The final notification dt. 19.10.1994 issued under Section 19(1) of the Act is quashed in so far as it relates to the land measuring 9,800 sq.ft. belonging to the petitioner in survey No. 122 of Kothanur Village"

ii) Bangalore Development Authority Vs Sabitha Pai and Ors Writ Appeal No-3692/2000. In the said judgment of this Court, this Court had upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge by dismissing the appeal as being without any merit.

iii) Bondu Ramaswamy and others vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. (AIR ONLINE 2010 SC 216) :: (2010) 7 SCC 129. The relevant portion of the said Apex Court judgment reads thus:

“90. Where arbitrary and unexplained deletions and exclusions from acquisition, of large extents of notified lands, render the acquisitions meaningless, or totally unworkable, the court will have no alternative but to quash the entire acquisition. But where many land losers have accepted the acquisition and received the compensation, and where possession of considerable portions of acquired lands has already been taken, and development activities have been carried out by laying plots and even making provisional or actual allotments, those factors have to be taken note of while granting relief. The division bench has made an effort to protect the interests of all parties, on facts and circumstances, by issuing detailed directions. But implementation of these directions may lead to further litigations and complications".

iv) Hariram and Another Vs The State of Haryana and ors. (2010 SCC Online SC 282). The relevant portion of the said Apex Court judgment reads thus:

"43. It is unfair on the part of the State Government in not considering representation of the appellants by applying the same standards which were applied to other land owners while withdrawing from acquisition of their land under the same acquisition proceedings. if this court does not correct the wrong action of the State Government, it, may leave citizens with belief that what counts for the citizens is right contacts with right persons in the State Government in treating the present appellants differently although they are situated similar to the landowners whose lands have been released can not be countenanced and has to be declared bad in law.”

v) Madhya Pradesh Housing Board vs. Mohd. Shafi & ors ((1992) 2 SCC 168)). The relevant portion of the said Apex Court judgment reads thus:

"The notification is, thus, required to give with sufficient clarity not only the public purpose for which the acquisition proceedings are being commenced but also the "locality" where the land is situate with as full a description as possible of the land proposed to be acquired to enable the "interested persons to know as to which land is being acquired and for what purpose and to take further steps under the Act by filing objections etc., since it is open to such persons to canvass the non- suitability of the land for the alleged 'public purpose" also. If a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is defective and does not comply with the requirements of the Act, it not only vitiates the notification, but also renders all subsequent proceedings connected with the acquisition, bad.”

vi) Sharadamma and Others vs. State of Karnataka., (2005(4) Kar.L.J.481). The relevant portion of the said judgment of this Court, reads thus:

“Everything done in guise of enquiry are contrary to the procedure prescribed in section 5-A. The fact of having submitted the report shall be communicated to the objectors to have their voice in the matter or to question the legality or correctness of the reports. such reports are neither served not communicated to the objectors, which is serious statutory infirmity. This has vitiated the enquiry and further action thereon is ab initio void. Thus there is non-compliance of aforementioned provision. The so-called enquires conducted were all in blatant violation of law. Theprocedural safeguards given to the owners and persons interested in the lands have not at all been scrupulously followed."

vii) Siddamma vs. State of Karnataka W.P.No.28508/1996. The relevant portion of the said judgment of this Court, reads thus:

“That, in order to give sanction to the scheme there shall be a proposal from the authority and in submitting the proposal the authority shall consider the representation of the persons interested in the lands and the representations received under sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act shall form part of parcel of the proposal. In view of the sanction having been given even before the submission of the proposals, it is no sanction at all in the eye of law. The acquisition proceedings from the stage of consideration of representations is, therefore, invalid and inoperative"

viii) Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Another Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and Ors. ((2024)10 SCC 533)). The relevant portion of the said judgment of the Apex Court, reads thus:

“30. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non exhaustive. These are:

i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property the right to notice,

ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition- the right to be heard,

iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire - the right to a reasoned decision,

iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose - the duty to acquire only for public purpose,

v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate the right of restitution or fair compensation,

vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings - the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and

vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting - the right of conclusion.

31. These seven rights are foundational components of a law that is tune with Article 300A, and the absence of one of these or some of them would render the law susceptible to challenge. The judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra) declares that the law envisaged Under Article 300A must be in line with the overarching principles of Rule of law, and must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is, of course, precedentially sound to describe some of these sub-rights as 'procedural', a nomenclature that often tends to undermine the inherent worth of these safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be procedures, but they do constitute the real content of the right to property Under Article 300A, non- compliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law. 29. These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions for compulsory acquisition of private property. The following will demonstrate how these seven principles have seamlessly become an integral part of our Union and State statutes concerning acquisition and also the constitutional and administrative law culture that our courts have evolved from time to time.”

ix) U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Chandra Shekhar and Others. (2024 SCC OnLine SC 277)

“16. The 1965 Act mandates issuance of a pre-acquisition notice to such individuals whose land/property falls within the purview of the proposed Scheme. On a liberal reading to such provision, the appellant, at best, could have claimed deemed or substantial compliance of audi alteram partem rule provided that Khasra No. 673 was expressly notified in the public notice dated 17.07.2004. Unfortunately, Khasra Nos. 672 and 673 are conspicuously missing in the public notice dated 17.07.2004. No individual notices were indisputably served on the respondents for the reason that they were not recorded as tenure-holders of the subject land immediately before the issuance of a notice under Section 29 of the 1965 Act. In the absence of any public or individual notice proposing to acquire Khasra No. 673, we find merit in the cause espoused on behalf of the respondents.

17. Nevertheless, we are equally conscious of the fact that there is a combative title dispute between the respondents on one hand, and Chandrika and others on the other. We, therefore, decline to hold or declare the respondents to be the true tenure-holders of the subject land. All that we say is that in the absence of any public or individual notice proposing to acquire Khasra No. 673, the observations made by the High Court to the extent that the respondents have been denied an effective opportunity to submit objections to oppose the acquisition in question, appears to be correct and based upon the record. That being so, the impugned judgment to the extent it holds that the acquisition process qua Khasra No. 673 stands vitiated on account of non- compliance with the prescribed procedure, does not call for any interference.

19. Consequently, we hold that the tenure-holders/owners of Khasra No. 673, which was still under the acquisition process when 2013 Act came into force, shall be entitled to be paid compensation in accordance with Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act.

20. We may hasten to add that the procedure prescribed under Chapter-II of the 2013 Act, mandates to carry out the Social Impact Assessment Study in certain situations. The adherence to such a cumbersome procedure in the instant case will be an exercise in futility for two reasons. Firstly, a major part of the acquired land has already been utilized for the notified public purpose. Secondly, the study referred to above, will delay the assessment and payment of compensation to the true tenure-holders/owners of Khasra No. 673. Consequently, we direct the appropriate Government to dispense with the procedure contemplated under Chapter II of the 2013 Act. The Prescribed Authority is permitted to accord an opportunity to submit objections under Section 15 of the 2013 Act and, thereafter, pass an award as per Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. The Prescribed Authority/Collector shall give notice to the respondents as well as to other persons who claim interest in Khasra Nos. 672 and 673, within a period of six weeks. The objections, if any, shall be filed within four weeks and on consideration of such objections, the Collector shall be obligated to pass an award on or before 30.06.2024.

21. We further direct that the awarded amount shall be kept in a nationalized bank in the FDR where it can fetch the maximum rate of interest. The FDR shall be renewed from time to time till the title dispute between the respondents and other claimants is resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. Whosoever is found entitled to, the appellant-Board shall release the compensation to them as early as possible but not later than four weeks after the final adjudication of the title dispute.”

26. Concluding his submissions, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents prays to dismiss the writ appeal and thus to uphold the order of the learned Single Judge quashing the final Notification issued by the BDA insofar as it pertains to the land of the Respondents and to hold that the acquisition of the land in question is vitiated due to non-compliance with the statutory provisions of the BDA Act and the Land Acquisition Act.

27. In the context of the contentions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant / BDA and the learned Senior Counsel Shri D.L. Jagadeesh for the respondents, and upon reviewing the facts, arguments, and relevant legal provisions, the following reasoning and findings are set out to address the issues raised in this case:

28. The first respondent’s primary contention is that the land in question, bearing Survey No. 160/3, was not included in the preliminary notification dated 21.05.2008, and only appeared for the first time in the final notification dated 18.02.2010 issued by the BDA. Under Section 17(1) and (5) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, all development schemes must begin with the issuance of a preliminary notification that informs landowners of the proposed acquisition, enabling them to file objections to the same. The absence of the respondent’s land in the preliminary notification, has deprived them of their right to raise objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which applies through Section 36(1) of the BDA Act where the latter is silent.

29. The respondent’s right to a fair hearing, as reinforced by the judgments cited supra in P. Sabitha Pai vs. State of Karnataka and others (ILR 2000 KAR 2409) and Madhya Pradesh Housing Board vs. Mohd. Shafi and others ((1992) 2 SCC 168), has effectively been denied. These rulings establish that if a landowner’s name or their land is not included in the preliminary notification, the subsequent acquisition is rendered invalid.

30. Further, it is to be noticed that Section 17(5) of the BDA Act requires that objections to the proposed acquisition be considered before proceeding further. Since the land in question was not included in the preliminary notification, the respondent was unable to object at the initial stage. This procedural deficiency, undermines the entire acquisition process, as it has denied the respondent their statutorily guaranteed right to be heard. This view is consistent with the ruling of this Court in Sharadamma & Others vs. State of Karnataka (2005 (4) Kar.L.J.481), which held that, a failure to allow landowners to voice objections constitutes a serious statutory infirmity, vitiating the acquisition process.

31. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent highlighted that the BDA arbitrarily had excluded significant portions of land—such as 800 acres and, in another instance, 270 acres—without a clear rationale. The respondent’s land was included despite being similarly situated as that of the other garden lands which were excluded from acquisition. This selective inclusion contravenes the principles of fairness and equality, as emphasized in the case of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Hari Ram & Another vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (2010 SCC Online SC 282). The Supreme Court in this case held that discriminatory treatment in acquisition proceedings cannot be justified and must be struck down. The respondent’s land, being a pure garden land actively cultivated and containing residential structures, should have been treated on par with the excluded lands. The respondent’s assertion that the BDA used a "pick and choose" method is credible, thus undermining the validity of the acquisition.

32. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent had contended that the scheme lacked proper legal sanction under Section 18(3) of the BDA Act. The BDA was required to submit all objections received at the preliminary stage along with the scheme, for Government approval. As no objections could have been considered for the respondent’s land (since it was not included in the preliminary notification), the subsequent approval and final notification are rendered unsustainable. The precedent set in the case of Siddamma vs. State of Karnataka (W.P. No. 28508/1996) confirms that any sanction given before the proper submission of proposals— including objections—renders the entire process invalid.

33. While the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant / BDA emphasized that minor procedural irregularities should not defeat the overarching public purpose of the acquisition, it must not be lost sight of that this Court must weigh the public interest against the procedural safeguards guaranteed to landowners under the law. The ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation and another vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and others ((2024) 10 SCC 533)), underscores that procedural safeguards—such as the right to notice, the right to object, and the right to a reasoned decision— are not merely technicalities but integral components of a landowner’s constitutional rights under Article 300A. In the present case, the absence of issuance of a preliminary notification and the failure to provide an opportunity to the respondent to file objections and failure to consider the same, cannot be dismissed as minor procedural defects. They strike at the root of the respondent’s statutory and constitutional rights.

34. In the case of Bondu Ramaswamy (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that unexplained and arbitrary exclusions or inclusions render acquisitions unworkable and invalid. Furthermore, the decision in Sharadamma vs. State of Karnataka (supra), reiterated that procedural safeguards must be rigorously observed, failing which the acquisition process becomes void. The reliance on the case of P. Sabitha Pai and Madhya Pradesh Housing Board (supra), further strengthens the conclusion that the omission of the respondent’s land from the preliminary notification, fatally undermines the acquisition.

35. Be that as it may, it is significant that there are legal contentions raised in between the appellant / BDA and the respondents insofar as the illegality of the acquisition proceedings. In this regard, it is relevant to extract Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the BDA Act, which reads thus:

“15. Power of Authority to undertake works and incur expenditure for development, etc.- (1) The Authority may,-

(a) draw up detailed schemes (hereinafter referred to as “development scheme”) for the development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area ; and

(b) with the previous approval of the Government, undertake from time to time any works for the development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and incur expenditure therefor and also for the framing and execution of development schemes.

(2) The Authority may also from time to time make and take up any new or additional development schemes,-

(i) on its own initiative, if satisfied of the sufficiency of its resources, or

(ii) on the recommendation of the local authority if the local authority places at the disposal of the Authority the necessary funds for framing and carrying out any scheme; or

(iii) otherwise.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the Government may, whenever it deems it necessary require the Authority to take up any development scheme or work and execute it subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified by the Government.

16. Particulars to be provided for in a development scheme.- Every development scheme under section 15,

(1) shall, within the limits of the area comprised in the scheme, provide for ,-

(a) the acquisition of any land which, in the opinion of the Authority, will be necessary for or affected by the execution of the scheme ;

(b) laying and re-laying out all or any land including the construction and reconstruction of buildings and formation and alteration of streets ;

(c) drainage, water supply and electricity ;

(d) the reservation of not less than fifteen percent of the total area of the layout for public parks and playgrounds and an additional area of not less than ten percent of the total area of the layout for civic amenities.

(2) may, within the limits aforesaid, provide for,-

(a) raising any land which the Authority may consider expedient to raise to facilitate better drainage ;

(b) forming open spaces for the better ventilation of the area comprised in the scheme or any adjoining area ;

(c) the sanitary arrangements required ;

(3) may, within and without the limits aforesaid provide for the construction of houses.

17. Procedure on completion of scheme.-

(1) When a development scheme has been prepared, the Authority shall draw up a notification stating the fact of a scheme having been made and the limits of the area comprised therein, and naming a place where particulars of the scheme, a map of the area comprised therein, a statement specifying the land which is proposed to be acquired and of the land in regard to which a betterment tax may be levied may be seen at all reasonable hours.

(2) A copy of the said notification shall be sent to the Corporation which shall, within thirty days from the date of receipt thereof, forward to the Authority for transmission to the Government as hereinafter provided, any representation which the Corporation may think fit to make with regard to the scheme.

(3) The Authority shall also cause a copy of the said notification to be published in the official Gazette and affixed in some conspicuous part of its own office, the Deputy Commissioner’s Office, the office of the Corporation and in such other places as the Authority may consider necessary.

(4) If no representation is received from the Corporation within the time specified in sub-section (2), the concurrence of the Corporation to the scheme shall be deemed to have been given.

(5) During the thirty days next following the day on which such notification is published in the official Gazette the Authority shall serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the local authority or in the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay the property tax or land revenue assessment on any building or land which is proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme or in regard to which the Authority proposes to recover betterment tax requiring such person to show cause within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the notice why

such acquisition of the building or land and the recovery of betterment tax should not be made.

(6) The notice shall be signed by or by the order of the Commissioner, and shall be served.

(a) by personal delivery or if such person is absent or cannot be found, on his agent, or if no agent can be found, then by leaving the same on the land or the building ; or

(b) by leaving the same at the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person ; or

(c) by registered post addressed to the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person.”

36. It is evident from the above, Section 15(1)(b) empowers the BDA to undertake development works with prior Government approval, while Section 16 mandates that every development scheme must include land acquisition details. Further, Section 17(1) requires the BDA to issue a notification upon preparing a development scheme, specifying the land proposed for acquisition. Thus, the BDA is duly authorized to issue preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act, while the State Government issues the final declaration under Section 19 of the BDA Act as the acquiring authority.

37. Hence, the Learned Single Judge’s finding that the State Government and the BDA wrongly assumed that lands notified under Section 17 of the BDA Act were available for acquisition, without considering landowners' objections, is justifiable. As the BDA duly allowed landowners to file their objections to the preliminary notification, considered them, and obtained further approval under Section 18 of the BDA Act from the State Government before issuing the final notification under Section 19 of the BDA Act but the said opportunity has been deprived to the respondent in the instant case.

38. In the case of Khoday Distilleries Ltd and others v. The State of Karnataka and others (ILR 1997 Karnataka 1419), a Division Bench of this court meticulously analyzed the provisions of the BDA Act and the LA Act with reference to the primary contention raised therein, namely, that the LA Act as amended by Mysore Act 17/1961, was no longer in force in view of Act No. 68 of 1984, amending the provisions of the LA Act and that, that LA Act alone was applicable. Hence a preliminary notification published in the Gazette on 12.01.1989, under Section 17 of the BDA Act and the Notification under Section 19 having been published on 27.7.1991 in the Gazette insofar as the said case, was beyond the period of one year provided under proviso (2) to Section 6(1) of the LA Act. The learned Single Judge of this Court by its order dated 11.07.2014 itself has extensively addressed the issues and has held the acquisition of the subject land is bad in law. We find no illegality or absurdity in the said order rendered by the learned Single Judge.

39. In the light of the foregoing reasons, we find that the acquisition of the respondent’s land was vitiated by multiple procedural irregularities, statutory violations, and discriminatory actions. The failure to include the land in question in the preliminary notification, denied the respondents their right to object, thereby invalidating the final notification. The BDA’s arbitrary treatment of the respondent’s land and failure to obtain proper sanction under the BDA Act, further compounds these deficiencies.

40. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the final notification issued by the BDA, insofar as it pertains to the respondent’s land, is invalid and unsustainable. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following:

ORDER

i) The appeal filed by the BDA is dismissed;

ii) The order dated 11.07.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge pertaining to WP.No.37190- 37191/2012 (LA-BDA) quashing the Final Notification issued by the BDA insofar as it pertains to the land of the first Respondent bearing Sy No. 160/3 measuring 5 acres, is hereby upheld.

Before parting with this judgment, this Court places on record its deep appreciation for the able research and assistance rendered by its Research Assistants, namely Mr.Pranav.K.B, Ms. Sushmithaa Roshini R and Mr. Mohammed Sulaiman.