T. V. R. TATACHARI, J.

( 1 ) THIS is a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench a

to this Court under Section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter

referred to as the Act ).

( 2 ) THE assessee, a Hindu undivided family of which the Karta is Seth Banarsi Dass

Gupta, Meerut, filed two applications R. A. Nos. 945 and 946 of 1968-69, before the

Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench a, under Section 66 (1) of the Act, arising Out of

the Income-tax Appeals Nos. 1978 and 1979 of 1963-64, relating to the assessment

years 1956-57 and 1957-58. Similarly, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi

(Central), New Delhi, filed two applications, R. A. Nos. 12 and 13 of 1968-69, arising

out of the same Income-tax Appeals Nos. 1978 and 1979 of 1963-64, relating to the

assessment years 1956-57 and 195 7-5 8 under Section 66 (1) of the Act.

( 3 ) BY a common order, dated 28th March, 1969. the Appellate Tribunal referred

seven questions of law to this Court as arising out of the orders of the Tribunal,

dated 2nd March, 1968 in the aforesaid Income-tax Appeals Nos. 1978 and 1979 of

1963-64. The said reference has been numbered in this Court as. T. R. No. 68 of

1969. When the reference came up for hearing before us, Shri B. N. Kirptl, learned

counsel for the Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi (Central), New Delhi, raised a

preliminary objection that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the reference

under Section 66 (1) of the Act in view of the facts of the case. For a proper

appreciation of the objection, a few relevant facts have to be stated.

( 4 ) THE assessee is a Hindu undivided family consisting of Seth Banarsi Dass, the

Karta, his wife, Shrimati Rammurti Devi, and his four sons, Seth Mohan Lal, Seth Brij

Bhusan Lal, Seth Jatinder Lal and Seth Satinder Lal.

( 5 ) THE assessee filed its returns for the assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58.

The Income-tax Officer, Meerut, passed the assessment orders, dated 27th March,

1961, and 30th March, 1962, in respect of the aforesaid two assessment years.

( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the said assessment orders, the assessee preferred appeal No.

26 of 1962-63 in respect of the assessment year 1956-57 and appeal No. 55 of

1962-63 in respect of the assessment year 1957- 58, to the Appellate Assistant

Commissioner of Income-tax, Meerut. By his orders, dated 13th March, 1963, and

12th March, 1963, respectively, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Meerut,

allowed the appeals partly.

( 7 ) IN so far as the said appellate orders were against it, the asses- see preferred

appeals Nos. 1978 and 1979 of 1963-64, to the Income- tax Appellate Tribunal. By

two orders, both dated 2nd March, 1968. the Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench

allowed the appeals partly.

( 8 ) THEREUPON, as already stated, the assessee filed the applications, R. A. Nos.

945 and 946 of 1968-69, and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, (Central),

New Delhi filed applications, R. A. Nos. 12 and 13 of 1968-69, under Section 66 (1)

of the Act praying that the questions proposed by them respectively may be referred

to this High Court. By its order, dated 28th March, 1969, the Appellate Tribunal,

Delhi Bench, held that some of the questions proposed were questions of fact and

declined to refer the said questions. It however, held that seven other questions

were questions of law which arise of its impugned orders, and referred the same to

this Court.

( 9 ) THE objection raised by Shri Kirpal is that all the members of the H. U. F.

(Assessee) reside and carry on their business at Meerut, that the assessment orders

were passed by the Income-tax Officer at Meerut, that the appeals therefrom were

disposed of by the Appellate Asstt. Commissioner at Meerut, and that consequently,

Meerut being in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the High Court to which the reference

could be made by the Appellate Tribunal, would be the High Court of Allahabad and

not the High Court of Delhi, even though the Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench, is

situated at Delhi. In support of the objection he relied upon the decision of the High

Court of Madras in Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v. S. Sivaramakrishna Iyer

(1) 70. T. R. 860. In that case, a Division Bench (Veeraswami and Ramaprasada

Rao.) held that -"as there are no statutory provisions for determining the proper

High Court to which reference under Section 66 (2) should be made where the

Tribunal has jurisdiction over more Shan one State, the principles which apply to a

determination of the jurisdiction of a Court should be applied, and in this view,

where a Tribunal has jurisdiction over more States than One, and it has to make a

choice, it must be guided by the principles of Section 64, and make the reference to

the High Court which has jurisdiction over the place where the assessee carries on

business, profession, or vocation or resides". (Vide the head-note ).

( 10 ) THE correctness of the objection has to be considered in the light of the

relevant provisions of the Act regarding the jurisdiction of Income-tax Officers,

Appellate Assistant Commissioners of Income- tax and the Income-tax Appellate

Tribunal.

( 11 ) UNDER Section 5 (3) of the Act, the Central Government may appoint as

many Appellate Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax as it thinks fit, and

Commissioner of Income-tax may appoint as many Income-tax Officers as may,

from time to time, be sanctioned by the Central Government.

( 12 ) SECTION 5 (5) provides that the Income-tax Officers shall perform their

functions in respect of such persons or class of persons or such incomes or classes

of income or in respect of such areas as Commissioner of Income-tax may direct.

( 13 ) SECTION 5 (4) provides that the Appellate Assistant Commissioners of

Income-tax shall perform their functions in respect of such persons or classes of

persons or such income or classes of incomes or in respect of such areas as the

Central Board of Revenue may direct.

( 14 ) UNDER Section 5a (1), the Central Government is required to appoint an

Appellate Tribunal consisting of as many persons as it thinks fit to exercise the

functions conferred on the Appellate Tribunal by the Act, Section 5a (2) requires

that the said persons shall consist of judicial members and Accountant Members as

defined in section 5a (3 ). Section 5a (4) requires the Central Government to appoint

a judicial member of the Tribunal to be President thereof. Section 5a (5) provides

that the powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal may be exercised and

discharged by Benches constituted from Members of the Tribunal by the President of

the Tribunal.

( 15 ) SECTION 64 (1) deals with the place of assessment and provides that :-

"where an assessee carries on a business, profession or vocation at any place, he

shall be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in which that place is situate

or, where the business, profession or vocation is carried on in more places than one,

by the Income-tax Officer of the area in which the principal place of his business,

profession or vocation is. situate".

( 16 ) SECTION 64 (2) provides that - "in all other cases an assessee shall be

assessed by the Income- tax Officer of the area in which he resides".

( 17 ) SECTION 64 (3) provides-"where any question arises under this section as to

the place of assessment, such question shall be determined by the Commissioner, or

where the question is between places in more States than one, by the

Commissioners concerned, or, if they are not in agreement, by the Central Board of

Revenue".

( 18 ) SECTION 30 provides for an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner

against an order of assessment by an Income-tax Officer.

( 19 ) SECTION 33 provides for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against an

appellate order of an Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

( 20 ) SECTION 66 (1) provides that within the time mentioned therein, the assessee

or the Commissioner may "require" the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court

any question of law arising out of such order under Section 33, and that the

Appellate Tribunal shall within the time prescribed in the sub-section draw up a

statement of case and refer the question to the High Court.

( 21 ) SECTION 66 (2) provides that if the Appellate Tribunal refuses to state a case

on an application under Section 66 (1) on the ground that no question of law arises,

the assessee or the Commissioner, a9 the case may he. may within the time

mentioned in the sub-section, apply to the High Court, and the High Court, if it is

not satisfied with the correctness of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, require

the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer it.

( 22 ) SECTION 66 (8) provides that for the purposes of Section 66, "the High Court"

means-- (A) in relation to any State, the High Court of the State, and (B) in relation

to the Union Territories of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, the High Court of Punjab.

After the establishment of the Delhi High Court with effect from 1st November,

1966, the Clause (b) above was amended as "in relation to the Union Territories of

Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, the Delhi High Court". The reference to Himachal

Pradesh was omitted after the State of Himachal Pradesh was constituted, as the

case would be covered by clause (a ).

( 23 ) THE Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, were made in pursuance of Section 5a

(8) of the Act, Rule 3 thereof provides that a Bench (. e. a Bench of the Appellate

Tribunal) shall hold its sittings at its headquarters or such other place as it may

consider convenient. Rule 4 (1) provides that a Bench shall hear and determine such

appeals and applications made under the Act, as the President (. e. of the Appellate

Tribunal) may by General or Special Order direct.

( 24 ) WITH reference to am application under Section 66 (1) of the Act, Rule 39 of

the Appellate Tribunal Rules provides that the Bench which heard the appeal giving

rise to the application shall hear it unless the President (of the Appellate Tribunal)

directs otherwise. Rule 46 provides that when a requisition is received from the High

Court under Section 66 (2), or where the case is referred back under Section 66 (4),

it shall be dealt with by the Bench referred to in Rule 39 unless otherwise directed

by the President, Rule 47 provides that. when a copy of the judgment of a High

Court is received by the Tribunal under Section 66 (5), it shall be sent to the Bench

referred to in Rule 39 for such orders as may be necessary unless the President

directs otherwise.

( 25 ) IN pursuance of Rule 4 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, the President of

the Tribunal issued Standing Order No. 1 of 1954. In Clause I thereof, it was

provided that all appeals and applications under the Act from the States specified in

Column 2 therein shall be heard and determined by the Benches specified in Column

1 with effect from 11-6-1954. The relevant entries in Columns 1 and 2 are- 1 2

Allahabad Bench Uttar Pradesh and Vindhya Pradesh. Delhi Bench Punjab, Pepsu,

Himachal Pradesh, Bilaspur, Delhi, Ajmer Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat. Delhi Bench

Jammu and Kashmir.

( 26 ) CLAUSE 3 of the Standing Order provides that with reference to Rules 39 and

46 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, reference applications under Section 66 (1) and

matters arising under Sections 66 (2 ). 66 (3), 66 (4) and 66 (5) of the Act arising

out of orders passed by the Bench from which the jurisdiction is transferred by the

Standing Order shall be heard and decided by the Bench to whom the jurisdiction is

now transferred. There is an explanation after clause 3 slating that by this Standing

Order, the ordinary jurisdiction of a Bench will be determined not by the place of

residence or business of the assessee, but by the location of the office of the

assessing officer.

( 27 ) AFTER the Incomes-tax Act of 1961 was enacted on 13th January, 1961, the

Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, were made by the Appellate Tribunal

under Section 255 (5) of the said new Act with effect from 17th April, 1963. Rules 3

and 4 in the said Rules of 1963 are substantially the same as Rules 3 and 4 in the

1946 Rules. The provisions in Rules 40 and 47 of the 1963 Rules provide in the

same manner as the Rules 39 and 46 of the 1946 Rules. By Rule 51, the Appellate

Tribunal Rules, 1946, were repealed except as to proceedings to which the Act

(Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) applied. In pursuance of Rule 4 of the Appellate

Tribunal Rules, 1946, and Rule 4 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, the

President of the Appellate Tribunal issued Standing Order No. 1 of 1967 with effect

from 1st March, 1967. In clause 1 thereof, it is provided that all appeals and

applications under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the Income-tax Act, 1961,

from the Districts and States specified in Column 2 therein shall, with effect from 1st

March, 1967, be heard and determined by the Benches specified in Column I

therein. The relevant cn- tries in Columns 1 and 2 are - Allahabad Bench-Uttar

Pradesh (excluding all Districts of Rohilkhand Division except Shahjahanpur District,

Meerut and Kumaon Divisions, and Agra, Aligarh and Mathura Districts of Agra

Division) and Rewa Division of Madbya Pradesh. Delhi Benches-Delhi, Punjab,

Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Rohilkhand Division except Shajahanpur District,

Meerut and Kumaon Division and Agra, Aligarh and Mathura Districts of Agra

Division of Uttar Pradesh, Gwalior Division of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jammu

and Kashmir, and the Union Territory of Chandigarh.

( 28 ) CLAUSE 3 of the Standing Order provides that with reference to Rules 39 and

46 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, and Rules 40 and 47 of the Appellate

Tribunal Rules, 1963, reference applications under section 66 (1) and matters arising

under Sections 66 (2) 66 (3), 66 (4), 66 (5) and 66a (4) of the Act, and reference

applications and connected matters arising under the corresponding sections of the

Income-tax Act, 1961, shall be heard and decided by the Bench to which the

jurisdiction is now transferred. There is an explanation after clause 3 which states

that by this Standing Order, the Ordinary jurisdiction of a Bench will be determined

not by the place of business or residence of the assessee but by the location of the

office of the assessing officer.

( 29 ) THE above are all the provisions that need to be noticed. As the present case

relates to assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58, we are concerned with the

provisions in the Act, the Appellate Tribunal Rules Of 1946, the Standing Order I of

1954, and the Standing Order I of 1967 as it was made applicable to proceedings to

which the Act applies.

( 30 ) SO far as the jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer to assess an assessee is

concerned, sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 5 merely provide for the appointment

of Income-tax Officers and state that the former are to perform their functions in

respect of such persons or class of persons or such incomes or classes of income or

in respect of such areas as the Commissioner of Income Tax may direct. Subsections

(1), (2) and (3) of section "64, however, prescribe the place of assessment:

of an assessee and lay down that where an assessee carries on a business or.

profession or vocation at anyplace, he shall be assessed by the Income Tax Officer

of the area in which such place is situate or, where the business, profession or

vocation is carried on in more places than one, by the Income-tax Officer of the area

in which the principal place of his business, profession or vocation is situate, and

that in all other cases, an assessee shall be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of

the area in which he resides. Thus, the jurisdiction of ah Income-tax Officer to.

assess an assessee is to be determined by the place of business, profession or

vocation, or by the location of the residence of the assessee, as the case may be.

( 31 ) AS regards the jurisdiction of an Appellate Assistant Commissioner to hear an

appeal against an assessment order of any Income-tax Officer, the only provision in

the Act is section 5 (4) according to which he performs his functions in respect of

such persons or classes of persons or of such incomes or classes of income or in

respect of such areas as the Central Board of Revenue may direct. Thus, the

jurisdiction to hear an appeal against an assessment order of an Income-tax Officer

would be with that Appellate Assistant Commissioner Who has been given such

jurisdiction by the directions issued by the Central Board of Revenue in that regard,

which may be class-wise or area-wise.

( 32 ) WE next come to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. Section 5a of the

Act shows that there is only one Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. Is

powers and functions conferred by the E Act are to be exercised by Benches

constituted from the Members of the Tribunal by the President of the Tribunal. One

of the functions of the Appellate Tribunal is to hear an appeal preferred under

section 33 of the Act against the appellate order of an Appellate Assistant

Commissioner. As the Tribunal functions through its Benches, such an appeal has to

be heard by one of the Benches. Rule 4 (1) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946,

lays down that a Bench shall hear and determine such appeals and applications

made under the Act as the President of the Tribunal may by general or special order

direct.

( 33 ) CLAUSE I of Standing Order No.-1 of 1954 issued by the President of :he

Tribunal shows that only a limited number of Benches have been constituted, and

no separate Bench has been constituted for each State or Union Territory. One or

more of those Benches were located at Bombay, Allahabad, Madras, Calcutta, Delhi

and Patna. They are set out in column I of the tabular form clause 1. Against each

of them arc set out in column 2 of the tabular form, the States from which appeals

or applications under the Act are to be heard and determined by the Bench. Thus,

the Bench or Benches at some of the above places have to hear appeals or

applications under the Act from more than one State.

( 34 ) IN the present case, we are concerned with the Allahabad Bench and the

Delhi Benches. We have earlier set out the States mentioned in Column 2 against

each of the said Benches. According to it, the Allahabad Bench had to hear appeals

and applications under, the Act from the State of Uttar Pradesh and Vindbya

Pradesh, while the Delhi Benches have to hear appeals and applications from Delhi,

Jammu and Kashmir and certain other Districts and States. The explanation after

clause 3 of the aforesaid Standing Order makes it clear that, by this order, the

ordinary jurisdiction of a Bench will be determined not by the place of the residence

or business of the assessee, but by the location of the office of the Assessing

Officer. The "assessing officer", though not defined anywhere, obviously means, in

the context, the Income-tax Officer making the assessment. Thus, the jurisdiction of

a Bench to hear an appeal or an application under the Act is to be determined by

the location of the office of the assessing Income-tax Officer in the particular case,

and not by the criterion mentioned in section 64 viz. , the place of business or

residence of the assessee.

( 35 ) THE above was the position under the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, read

with the Standing Order No. 1 of 1954. The Appellate Tribunal Rules of 1963, no

doubt, by Rule 51 thereof, repealed the 1946 Rules, but expressly continued the

applicability of the 1946 Rules to proceedings to which the Act (Indian Income-tax

Act, 1922) applied. Thus the Standing Order No. 1 of 1954 continued to be in force

till 1st March, 1967 when the Standing Order No. 1 of 1967 was made. Therefore,

according to the position explained in the previous paragraph, in the present case,

the location of the office of the assessing Income-tax Officer being Meerut in the

State of Uttar Pradesh, the appeals from the appellate orders of the Appellate

Assistant Commissioner, dated 12th and 13th March, 1963, lay at that time to the

Allahabad Bench of the Appellate Tribunal. It is not clear from the record as to

whether they were so preferred to the Allahabad Bench. What the record shows is

that the said appeals were numbered as Income-tax Appeals Nos. 1978 and 1979 of

1963-64, and they were heard and disposed of by the Delhi Bench on 2nd March,

1968.

( 36 ) IT has to be recalled that Rule 4 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules of 1946 (like

Rule 4 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules of 1963) provided that a Bench shall hear and

determine such appeals and applications made under the Act (Indian Income-tax

Act, 1922), as the President of the Appellate Tribunal may by general or special

order direct. Accordingly, the President issued the Standing Order I of 1967, with

effect from 1st March, 1967, in pursuance of both Rule 4 of the 1946 Rules and Rule

4 of the 1963 Rules. The said order expressly superseded all existing orders on the

subject. It, therefore, governed the appeals Nos. 1978 and 1979 of 1963-64 from

and after 1st March, 1967. By clause I of the said Order, the President directed that

all appeals and applications under the Act (Indian Income-tax Act, 1922), as well as

Income-tax Act, 1961, from the Districts and States specified in Column 2 of the

tabular form in that clause, shall, with effect from 1st March, 1967, be heard and

determined by the Benches specified in column I of the said tabular form. We have

earlier set out the relevant entries in that tabular form. They show that Meerut has

been excluded from the jurisdiction of the Allahabad Bench and included in the

jurisdiction of the Delhi Benches. In other words, from and after 1st March 1967, it

was the Delhi Benches that had to hear and determine all appeals and applications

under the Acts of 1922 and 1961 from Meerut. It has to also to be noted that clause

2 of the said Standing Order 1 of 1957 provided that :-"all pending appeals and

applications except those in which orders have been reserved after hearing, will be

governed by the above order. Appeals and applications already fixed for hearing will

be heard by the Bench before which they are so fixed". Therefore, in the present

case, the fact is apparent from the record that the appeals 1978 and 1979 of 1963-

64 were heard and determined by the Delhi Bench suggests that the appeals must

have been originally preferred to the Allahabad Bench according to the provisions in

the Standing Order I of 1954 and subsequently transferred to and heard and

determined by one of the Delhi Benches in compliance with the provisions in the

Standing Order I of 1967. The same has also to be presumed according to the

principle, the official acts have to be presumed to have been performed in

accordance with the requirements of law, and nothing to the contrary has been

shown to us to rebut that presumption. We, therefore, proceed an the basis that the

Delhi Bench had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeals Nos. 1978 and

1979 of 1963-64, and consequently, as the Bench that heard the appeals, had the

jurisdiction to hear and determine the applications under section 66 (1) of the Act by

virtue of the provisions in Rules 39 and 46 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946

read with clause (3) Of the Standing Order 1 of 1967 to which we have made

reference earlier.

( 37 ) THE question then arises as to which High Court the Delhi Bench could refer

the questions of law proposed in the applications under section 66 (1) of the Act.

( 38 ) THE only relevant provisions in the Act are those in Section 66. Section 66 (1)

merely states that within the time mentioned therein, the assessee or the

Commissioner may require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to "the High Court" any

question of law arising out of an order under Section 33, and that the Appellate

Tribunal shall within the time prescribed in the sub-section draw up a statement of

case and refer the question to "the High Court" Section 66 (2) provides that if the

Appellate Tribunal refuses to state a case on an application under Section 66 (1) on

the ground that no question of law arises, the assessee or the Commissioner, as the

case maybe, may, within the time mentioned in the sub-section, apply to "the High

Court", and "the High Court" if it is not satisfied with the correctness of the decision

of the Appellate Tribunal, require the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer

it. Section 66 (8) provides that for the purposes of Section 66, "the High Court"

means - (a) in relation to any State, the High Court of the State, and (b) in relations

to the Union Territory of Delhi, the High Court of Delhi.

( 39 ) THE aforesaid provisions do not clearly indicate to which particular High Court

the Appellate Tribunal has to make a reference under Section 66 (1) or which High

Court can call for a reference under Section 66 (2), in a case where a Bench of the

Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction over more than one State. This has been noticed

in the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v.

S. Sivaramakrishna Iyer (Supra ). The learned Judges, after pointing out that either

Section 66 (1) or Section 66 (2) or Section 66 (8) or the Appellate Tribunal Rules do

not throw much light, observed as follows :-"all that appears from them (Appellate

Tribunal Rules) is that by Standing Order made under Rule 4 of these Rules the

Madras Bench of the Tribunal has jurisdiction over Madras and Kerala States. There

is an explanation to the Standing Order which is to the effect that by that order the

ordinary jurisdiction of a Bench would be determined not by the place of business or

residence of the assessee but by the location of the office of the assessing officer.

We do not find it possible to apply this principle in deciding the jurisdiction of the

High Court for purposes of Section 66 (2)""section 64 deals with place of

assessment and this is determined by the place where the assessee carries on a

business or profession or vocation and, in other cases, the assessee shall be

assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in which he resides. We are inclined

to think that since there is no direct statutory provision governing the matter,

notions which apply to a determination of the jurisdiction of a Court should be called

in aid. On that view, we think that, where a Tribunal has jurisdiction over more

States than one, and it has got to make a choice, in the absence of a statutory

provision relating to the matter it must be guided by the principal of Section 64, that

is to say, the place where the assessee carries on his business, profession or

vocation or resides".

( 40 ) THE Standing Order referred to by the learned Judges is obviously Standing

Order I of 1967 as it is that order that refers to the States of Madras and Kerala as

being within the jurisdiction of the Madras Bench, and not the Standing Order No. 1

of 1954. The learned Judges, however, after referring. to the explanation to the

Standing Order, merely stated that they do not find it possible to apply the principle

in the explanation in deciding the jurisdiction of the High Court for purposes of

Section 66 (2), but did not give any reason as to why they did not find it possible to

so apply.

( 41 ) IT seems to us that, when there is no direct statutory provision governing the

matter, the proper course would be to apply the same basis that has been adopted

already with regard to the jurisdiction of a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal for the

following reasons. Firstly, as already noticed, the jurisdiction of an income-tax

Officer,. e. , the place of assessment, has been required under Section 64 to be

determined on the basis of the place where the assessee carries on a business or

profession or vocation and, in other cases, the area in which the assessee resides.

"this basis, however, has not been adopted in providing the basis for the

determination of the jurisdiction of a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal. Under the

explanation to the Standing Order I of 1954 as well as to the Standing Order I of

1967, the aforesaid basis under Section 64 was expressly given a go by, and the

basis of the location of the office of the Assessing Officer has been adopted.

Therefore, in considering the question as to the High Court to which a Bench having

jurisdiction over more than one State has to make a reference, the basis adopted for

determining the jurisdiction of the Bench would be more appropriate than the basis

adopted for determining the jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer.

( 42 ) SECONDLY, according to the said basis provided in the explanation to the

Standing Order for determining the jurisdiction of a Bench, the Bench deals with

appeals and applications arising out of the orders of the Assessing Income-tax

Officers in the various States mentioned as against the Bench in Column 2 of the

tabular form in clause 1 of the Standing Order. In other words, the Bench hears

appeals and applications in the cases coming from the States over which it has been

given jurisdiction. Therefore, when it hears and determines an appeal as an appeal

from a particular State, it would be quite appropriate for the Bench to refer a

question of law arising out of its order in that appeal to the High Court of the State

from which the appeal had come.

( 43 ) THIRDLY, this view, in our opinion, would also be in accord with and give a

meaning and effect to the words "in relation to any State, the High Court of that

State" in Section 66 (8) of the Act.

( 44 ) FOURTHLY, Section 33 (6) of the Act provides that "save as provided in

Section 66, orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal shall be final", and

Section 66 (5) provides that "the High Court upon the hearing of any such case shall

decide the questions of law raised thereby and shall deliver its judgment thereon

containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and shall send a copy of

such judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the

Appellate Tribunal which shall pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the

case conformably to such judgment". The said provisions show that in a case where

a reference is made to a High Court by a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal under

section 66 of the Act the reference is just an intermediate stage, and the case

(appeal before the Bench) would be finally disposed of by the Bench after receiving

the judgment of the High Court in the reference. So, instead of adopting a different

basis for that intermediate stage, if would be quite appropriate to adopt the same

basis as the one adopted for determining the jurisdiction of the Bench.

( 45 ) THUS, it would be appropriate and in consonance with the aforesaid

provisions of the Act and the Standing Orders if the basis for the jurisdiction of the

Bench is adopted, instead of adopting the basis mentioned in Section 64 of the Act,

as suggested in the decision of the Madras High Court in the case. Commissioner of

Income-tax, Madars v. S. Sivaramakrishna Iyer (Supra ).

( 46 ) A suggestion was made by the learned counsel for the assessee that the place

of location of the Bench which hears and determines an appeal may be adopted as

the basis for the determination of the jurisdiction of the High Court to which a

question of law arising out ot its order should be referred, and on that basis the

reference to the Delhi High Court in the present case was in order as the Delhi

Bench is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. We are

unable to accept the suggestion. It has to be noted that there is no statutory

requirement that there should be a separate Bench of the Appellate Tribunal for

each State or Union Territory. In fact, by the Standing Orders I of 1954 and I of

1967, only a limited number of Benches had been constituted by the President of

the Tribunal and located at the places mentioned in Column I of the tabular form in

clause 1 of the said Standing Orders. If the basis suggested by the learned counsel

is adopted, it would result in only the aforesaid few High Courts, within whose

territorial jurisdiction the aforesaid limited number of Benches were located, having

the jurisdiction to deal with all the references under Section 66 to the exclusion of

the various other High Courts, which obviously is to be avoided. The basis pointed

out by us above would avoid such a situation.

( 47 ) IN the view taken by us, it would follow that in the present case, since the

Income-tax appeals Nos. 1978 and 1979 of 1963-64 had arisen out of the

assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer at Meerut which is in the State of Uttar

Pradesh, it is the High Court of Allahabad to which the reference should have been

made and not the Delhi High Court. As the Delhi High Court has no jurisdiction to

entertain the reference, we decline to answer the reference and return the

statement of case to the Delhi Bench for taking such appropriate action as it thinks

fit in the light of his judgment. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the

parties to bear their own costs in this reference.