(1.) AGGRIEVED by a decree and judgment dated 25-6-2001 pronounced by 9th Additional District Judge, Gwalior for his eviction on the ground under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, i. e,, on the ground of denial of title in favour of the respondent No. 1, in an appeal preferred by the said respondent No. 1 against judgment and decree dated 11-12-2000 of 10th Civil Judge Class-2, Gwalior dismissing her suit for eviction and arrears of rent, this second appeal has been preferred by the appellant/tenant.

(2.) THE undisputed facts of the case are that the appellant was a tenant in a portion of a house bearing Municipal No. 30/1608/1 (hereinafter referred as "suit Premises"). The appellant was inducted as a tenant in it by one Manorama Devi Falke who died issueless. Ramchandra Rao and Man Singh Rao were the sons of her only sister. No notice of any kind of transfer by Ram Chandra Rao etc. or by the respondents was ever given to the appellant.

(3.) ONE Smt. Gyaso Bai, now deceased, had submitted an application under Section 23 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, in respect to the suit premises before the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior, against the appellant on the ground of requirement for her adopted son Raman Lal respondent No. 1. That application being not filed by landlord of the categories enumerated in Section 23 (J) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as " the") was transferred and ultimately was registered as a civil suit in the Court of 10th Civil Judge Class-2, Gwalior.

(4.) IN the said civil suit before the 10th Civil Judge Class-2, Gwalior (hereinafter referred as "trial Court"). The respondent No. 1 contending that he was the adopted son of late Gyaso Bai who alongwith respondent Nos. 2 to 4 had bought the suit premises from Ramchandra Rao etc. , has become the landlord of the suit premises, prayed for eviction of the appellant on various grounds falling under Clause (a), Clause (f), Clause (o) and Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the said Act. Later on, he gave up his claim of eviction of appellant on the grounds mentioned under said Clauses (o) and (f). Subsequently, during the hearing of appeal, claim for eviction of appellant under said Clauses (a) and (o) was also given up by the respondent No. 1. Thus, his claim remained for eviction of appellant on the ground mentioned under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of theonly.

(5.) WITH respect to the said ground under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, it is not disputed that the appellant had denied the title of respondent No. 1 Raman Lal contending firstly that the transfer deed dated 8-9-87 by Ramchandra Rao, Man Singh Rao and Uday Singh Rao in favour of Gyaso Bai and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 was not a transfer by all previous owners of the said premises and secondly that the respondent No. 1 Raman Lal was not a validly adopted son of Gyaso Bai.

(6.) THE learned Trial Court held that respondent No. 1 Raman Lal was the land lord of appellant and was the validly adopted son of late Gyaso Bai who had in turn bought the premises from the previous landlord. At the same time, the learned Trial Court further held that since the appellant has not: disputed that originally Smt. Manorama Devi Falke and thereafter, Ramchandra Rao etc. were his landlords and has not claimed title in himself, there was no disclaimer of title as required for a ground of eviction under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, Thus, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit of the respondent No. 1. However, the learned 9th Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in an appeal by the respondent No. 1 holding that as the appellant. has denied even the title of Ram Chandra Rao, Man Singh Rao and Uday Singh Rao also by asserting that besides them, there were other persons who were joint-owners of the suit premises and of respondent No. 1, by challenging the fact of adoption, he became liable for revision under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, reversed the impugned judgment and decree by the learned Trial Court.

(7.) IT is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the said finding of the learned First Court of Appeal was erroneous. According to the appellant, he had not denied the title of original owner Manorama Devi Falke but had only asserted that there were legal heirs of Manorama Devi, Falke other than Ramchandra Rao, Man Singh Rao and Uday Singh Rao, and, therefore, since all of them were not party to the sale deed, he had only challenged the derivative title of the respondents and such denial does not constitute denial of title which could be considered as an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlords in the tenanted premises and thus were not covered under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. The respondent No. 1 on the other hand supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Court of First Appeal.

(8.) THEREFORE, this second appeal preferred by appellant was admitted by the then Single Bench on the following substantial questions of law:-" whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, on the ground that defendants have denied derivative title of the landlord "

(9.) THE learned, Counsel of both the sides were heard at length and the record is perused.

(10.) IN this respect, a perusal of the pleadings Shows that the appellant had admitted his status as a tenant. He has also admitted that he was inducted as a tenant by Smt. Manorama Devi and after the death of Manorama Devi her legal heirs had become his landlords. He has also not disputed that Ramchandra Rao and Mansingh Rao were among those heirs of deceased Manorama Devi.

(11.) WHAT has been disputed by the appellant was that besides Mansingh Rao and Ramchandra Rao her original landlord Manorama Devi had other legal heirs also and because the said purchase by Gyasobai and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 was not from all of them, the. said Gyasobai and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 were not her only landlords. Besides this, he has also disputed that the respondent No. 1 was adopted son of said Gyasobai.

(12.) THUS, it is clear from the said pleadings that the appellant has not claimed title in himself. He has also not claimed title in any third person but he has simply claimed that besides sellers Ramchandra Rao and Mansingh Rao there were other also who were his co-landlords and all of them not being the landlords, the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and Gyasobai did not derive his title as the only landlords (Para 2 of written statement). His other contention was that respondent No. 1 is riot the adopted son of his co-landlord Gyaso Bai. This, in the opinion of this Court was nothing else but a derivative title of the respondents. The appellant in the present case has not renounced his character as a tenant nor has he set up a title either in himself or in any third person. It has been interpreted by the learned First Appellate Judge as a denial of title of the landlord which adversely and substantially affects the interest of the owner. This finding of the learned First Appellate Court-can not be upheld. It is not a case similar to the case in Chandulal v. Naresh Chand and Ors. reported in 2002 (1) MPACJ 6 wherein the tenant had denied the title of auction, purchasers in a sale by Income Tax Department in favour of the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff of that case. In the Present case there was no denial of the title of the said Ramchandra Rao, Mansingh Rao and Udaisingh Rao but, there was a pleading that besides that, the title to suit premises is vested in some other persons also who were also the co-landlords.

(13.) IN the case of C. Chandramonah v. Sengottalyan and Ors. , reported in (2000) 1 SCC 451 , [LQ/SC/2000/18] it was held by the Apex Court that unless there is a notice of transfer of title in favour of successor landlord or an attornment of tenancy, tenants assertion that such landlord is merely a co-owner does not amount to denial of title. It has been observed by the Apex Court in that case that to constitute denial of title of the landlord, a tenant should renounce his character as tenant and set up title or right inconsistent with the relationship of landlord and tenant either in himself or in a third person. In that case the defendant had even paid rent to a successor of his previous landlord and in a suit instituted by the plaintiff the defendant had asserted that though he had been paying rent, but plaintiff alone was not the absolute owner of the property because the original landlord from whom the plaintiff also claims, had left behind him a widow and three daughter also who were also his landlords. In the present case also the appellant has neither claimed title in himself nor has claimed title in any third person but has simply said that besides the sellers of the suit premises to the respondents, his original landlord i. e. , Manorama Devi had left some other heirs also.

(14.) AGAIN in the case of Sheela and Ors. v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, reported in 2002 (2) M. P. H. T. 232 (SC) = (2002) 3 SCC 375 , [LQ/SC/2002/308] the Apex Court has observed as follows :-

"in our opinion, denial of landlords title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. "

(15.) THUS, in the present case, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above referred cases, it can not be said that there was such denial of title by the appellant which has made him liable for eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. It is accordingly held that the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act on the ground that appellant has denied derivative of title of the landlord. Thus, the finding of the learned Judge of First Appellate Court in this respect is hereby set aside and in result the impugned decree is also set aside. The appeal stands allowed and the suit of the respondent No. 1 dismissed. The respondent No. 1 shall bear his own costs as well as the costs of appellant in this Court as well as in both the Courts-below. Decree be drawn up accordingly.