Manohar Lall, J.This is an application in revision on behalf of the first party in a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal P.C., against whom an order has been passed on 7th August 1937, declaring that the second party are entitled to possession of the disputed lands.

2. The first party petitioner is the landlord who, having obtain, ed rent decrees in 1929 to 1931 against the tenants opposite party, proceeded to put the decrees in execution and after purchasing their holdings duly obtained delivery of possession in or about or up to 1931. The area covered by these execution proceedings was about 85 bighas of land. The present proceedings were started on 5th July 1937, because the tenants, who had been dispossessed, as stated above, claimed to be in possession of these very holdings on the ground that notwithstanding the delivery of possession, the landlord allowed the tenants to remain in possession of the entire lands as before and thereafter they used to make over half the crops on the batai system to the landlord petitioner.

3. The learned Magistrate has believed the case of the second party and declared them to be in possession as I have stated above. This is a finding of fact with which this Court ordinarily refuses to interfere; but there are certain circumstances which to my mind completely vitiate the findings of the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate ought to have kept in view the off-repeated observation of this Court that it is the bounden duty of a Criminal Court to obey the orders of the Civil Court and to respect the dakhaldehani given by the Civil Courts. It is open no doubt to the Magistrates to take notice of events subsequent to the dakhaldehani and it is also true, as pointed out by my brother Rowland in Rajnandan Missir v. Cheddi Thakur A.I.R.1932. Pat. 185, that a Magistrate does not exceed his jurisdiction if he draws up proceedings u/s 145, Criminal P.C., even though a recent writ of delivery of possession in execution of the Civil Court decree is produced by the opposite party but in such cases "it may be a decision so grossly erroneous that this Court would have no option but to interfere in revision".

4. In the present case the second party examined three witnesses on their behalf. The first witness was a man named Narayan who in the whole of his examination-in-chief did not venture to say one word how he came to be in possession of these very lands by virtue of the alleged settlement. No details of the settlement were given; neither the time nor the place are mentioned. Witness No. 3 for the second party is equally silent on this point. The only solitary evidence that I find on this point is that of Dhandhi who is a carpenter and not a party to these proceedings. He states towards the end of his examination that the second party had been allowed to cultivate even after the dakhaldehani. This statement itself is a very vague one; it does not mention the terms of the so called settlement nor the time when they were said to have been so allowed.

5. The statement is hearsay and ought not to have been allowed to be admitted in evidence. The facts of the present case somewhat resemble the facts of a decision by my brother Madan in Bishwanath Sao and Others Vs. Official Receiver and Others, where in somewhat similar circumstances the learned Judge thought it proper to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the Criminal Court. I am satisfied that in the present case the learned Magistrate, although he committed no error of jurisdiction, has arrived at a finding which is vitiated by his not keeping in view the facts which I have stated above. The learned Magistrate ought to have considered the whole history of the case and then to ask himself whether it was possible under such circumstances that the landlord who had obtained a decree for rent for a large area of land and had sold all the lands that were in possession of the tenants, and obtained possession by going through the regular form of dakhaldehani proceedings in the Civil Court, would at all be likely to settle the whole of those very lands without any distinction or variation with these very tenants, exactly as if nothing had happened in the meantime. It was the obvious duty of the tenants to have obtained sufficient documentary evidence of their settlement, so that they may not be put to any further troubles if they are accused of trespass and the question of re-settlement falls to be investigated afresh in any Court of justice.

6. I therefore have no hesitation whatsoever in setting aside the order of the Magistrate dated 7th August 1937. I do not believe for a moment the flimsy evidence produced by the tenants.

7. In my opinion the first party is in possession since the date of their dakhaldehani. I accordingly declare the first party to be entitled to possession of the disputed lands until evicted therefrom in due course of law and forbid all disturbance of possession until such eviction.