Kulwant Sahay, J.This is an appeal on behalf of the defendant in an action in ejectment. The only important question for decision for decision in the appeal is the question of limitation.

2. The Plaintiff-Respondent is the Mahanth of Noornagar, otherwise called Jalpura, and he brought a suit for a declaration that a deed of sale executed by Ram Kishun Gir, a former Mahanth of the math, to Tilak Singh, an ancestor of the defendant, in the year 1894, was not binding upon him; and that it did not convey any title inasmuch as the vendor Mahanth had no right to sell the property which was a property endowed to the math, without any justifying necessity of the math. The present suit was instituted on 29th July 1921. The defendant in his written statement alleged inter alia that he and his ancestors had been in adverse possession for more than twelve years and that the suit wan accordingly barred by limitation.

3. The learned Munsif held that the defendant had been in possession of the land at least from the year 1395 and that the plaintiff and the math represented by him had been out of possession for about 27 years before the suit. He held that the article applicable was Article 144, Schedule 1, Lim. Act, and that the defendant was in adverse possession since after the death of Ram Kishun Gir, he being of opinion that during the lifetime of Ram Kishun Gir the possession of the defendant was permissive possession. He accordingly dismissed the suit.

4. On appeal the learned. Subordinate Judge held that time began to run as against the plaintiff when he became the Mahanth of the math. It appears that since Ram Kishun Gir, there have been three Mahanths of the math, namely, Sheodhyan Gir, Ganesh Gir and the plaintiff Kailash Gir. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the Mahanth for the time being was a tenant for life and any alienation of the math property made by him which was not for the benefit of the math was valid during his lifetime and that it the successor of the vendor did not sue the purchaser for more than 12 years he would be barred only for the period that he remained the Mahanth of the math, and that after him his successor would have a fresh start of limitation from the time of the death of his predecessor. He accordingly held that as the suit was brought within 12 years of the death of the plaintiffs immediate predecessor, Mahanth Ganesh Gir, the suit was not barred by limitation. He accordingly decreed the suit with costs.

5. The defendant has now come up in second appeal against this decision, and as I have said above the only question is as to whether the suit is barred by limitation.

6. The determination of this question depends on the determination of the status of the Mahanth of a math. The property admittedly was endowed property and belonged to the math. The question as regards the true position of a Mahanth of a math in relation to the properties belonging to the math or to any idol in the math has been considered in a number of eases. His position has been expressed variously in various decisions. Sometimes his position is described as that of a life-tenant, sometimes as that of a trustee; in some cases he is described to hold the position of a guardian of a minor, and in some cases he is described as corporation sole. The question, however, was considered by the Privy Council in a vary recent case in Sri Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Balusami Ayyar AIR 1922 PC 123 and it was held that the Mahanths of maths, called by what ever names, are only the managers or custodians of the institution and that in no case is any property conveyed to or vested in them; nor are they "trustees" in the English Sense of the word, although they are answerable as trustees in the general sense for mal administration. The learned Subordinate Judge was or opinion that the position of a Mahanth of a math was that of a life-tenant. This view was taken by the Madras High Court in Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami (1904) 27 Mad 435 where the learned Judges observed that the Mahanth is, as he would be described in England, a "corporation sole" having an estate for life in the permanent endowment of the math and an absolute property in the income derived from offerings, subject only to the burden of maintaining the institution; but in a later Full Bench decision of the same Court in Kailasam Pillai v. Nataraja Thambiran (1910) 33 Mad 265 it was held that it could not be predicated of the head of a math that as such he holds the math properties as a life tenant or trustee. The view taken in Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Viydanidhi Tirtha Swami (1904) 27 Mad 435 was disapproved by the Privy Council in the case of Sri Vidya Varuthi Tirtha Swamigal v. Balusami Ayyar AIR 1922 PC 123 referred to above. The learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in his view that the position of each succeeding Mahant was that of a life-tenant.

7. The question as to whether each succeeding Mahant gets a fresh start of limitation from the date of his succession as mahanth was directly raised and considered in several cases. In Nilmeny Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy (1896) 23 Cal 536, Banerji, J., after considering the position of a Mahant of a math, held that although it is true that an idol holds a property in an ideal sense, and its acts relating to any property must be done by or through its manager or shebait, yet that does not show that each succeeding manager gets a fresh start as far as the question of limitation is concerned on the ground of his not deriving title from any previous manager. The succeeding shebaits were considered as forming a continuing representation of the idols property. In Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das (1910) 37 Cal 885 it was held by the Privy Council affirming the decision of the High Court at Calcutta, that the property vested not in the Mahant but in the legal entity, the idol, the Mahant being only its representative and manager and that the title of transferee from the Mahanth became adverse to the right of the idol and of the senior chela as representing that idol and that the suit brought by the successor of that chela was barred by limitation. In Madhusudan Mandal v. Radhika Prasanna Das (1912) 17 CWN 873, it was held by Mookerjee and Beachcroft, JJ., that the effect of a lease granted by a shebait in excess of his authority is not to give each succeeding shebait a new cause of action for setting aside the alienation and adverse possession from the date of the original disposition of the property and is not interrupted by the death of the original shebait and the succession of the new shebait, and that each succeeding shebait does not get a new start for the purpose of limitation.

8. It is clear from these authorities that the plaintiff in the present case could not get a fresh start for the purpose of limitation from the date of his succession as Mahant. The possession of the transferee became adverse to the institution from the date of the transfer upon the finding that the transfer was without any legal and justifying necessity; but even assuming that his possession was permissive during the lifetime of the vendor Ram Kishun Gir, the cause of action in any event accrued on the death of Ram Kishun Gir, and it is admitted that Ram Kishun Gir died more than 12 years before the suit. The succeeding Mahanth represented the institution completely and the defendant did acquire a title by adverse possession for more than 12 years, not only from the date of his purchase but also from the death of the vendor.

9. I am, therefore, of opinion that the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot stand. The result is that the appeal is decreed. The decree of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and that of the Munsif restored. The appellant is entitled to his costs in all Courts.

Mullick, J.

10. I agree.