Courtney Terrell, C.J.These are two applications in civil revision against a decision of the District Judge of Monghyr summarily dismissing appeals out of suits in which the facts in so far as the point which I have to determine were precisely similar.

2. The suits were instituted to recover arrears of bhaoli rent in respect of the years 1340 and 1341 Fasli and the suits were instituted in the month of September 193%. No question arises as to the correctness of the decision of the Munsif as affirmed by the dismissal of the appeal by the District Judge that the decree of the bhaoli rent claimed in respect of the year 1311 is entirely correct. In respect, however of the year 1343, the Munsif had decided that by reason of the period of limitation instituted by Schedule III, Bihar Tenancy Act as amended by the Amending Act of 1934, Para. 2(b)(ii), the claim in respect of the year 1340 was barred, the suit having been begun more than one year from the last day of the agricultural year in which the arrear fell due. The last day of the agricultural year 1340 was in September 1933. Therefore if the Munsif were right, the last day for bringing the suit fell in September 1934.

3. The Bihar Tenancy Act was published on November 14, 1934, and on June 4, 1935, a Notification appeared in the Bihar and Orissa Gazette, stating that the Act would be enforced as and from June 10, 1935. By the time the Act was published and certainly by the time it came into force--the last day of limitation as prescribed by the Amended Act had already expired and therefore if the view correct that the limitation set forth in the Act was to be applied in this particular suit, the effect of the Act would have been to destroy the vested right of action in respect of the year 1340 which was possessed by the plaintiff up to the time of the Act.

4. It is undoubtedly in the power of the Legislature to take away a vested right of any subject, but it is a recognized rule of construction that in order to bold that the Act has had this effect, it must be necessary to find the indication of such an intention in the plain words of the Act. Where the Legislature has, however, not expressly stated such an intention, the criterion of construction is that the new period of limitation is to be dealt with as a matter of procedure only. It is perfectly true as stated by the learned Munsif that the decision of the Privy Council in Soni Ram v. Kanhaya Lal 35 A. 227 : 19 Ind. Cas. 291 : 40 I.A. 74 : 11 A.L.J. 389 : 13 M.L.T. 437 : 17 C.W.N. 605 : (1913) M.W.N. 470 : 17 C.L.J. 488 : 15 Bom. L.R. 489 : 25 M.L.J. 131 enunciates a broad proposition that the period of limitation applicable to a suit is to be judged by the law in force at the time of the institution of the suit and it is true that the suit in this particular case was instituted at a time when the law was that suits in respect of bhaoli rent must not be instituted more than one year after the last day of the agricultural year in respect of which the rent is recoverable. But that by no means disposes of the matter. As a broad proposition it is true, but this does not affect the canon of construction to be applied to any Act for the purpose of finding out whether it was the intention of the Legislature to take away a vested right. The principle applicable to such circumstances is as I have stated above.

5. The destruction of a vested right, if such, has been enacted must be discoverable as the intention of the Legislature from the express words of the Legislature, otherwise the period of limitation is to be taken as a matter of procedure. This I gather to have been the principle laid down in the elaborate judgment in Manjlioori Bibi v. Akkel Mahmud 17 C.W.N. 889 : 19 Ind. Cas. 793 : 17 C.L.J. 316 . The decision of the Privy Council has effected no alteration of the law as therein stated and that the proper way only in which to view the Privy Council decision was laid down by a Pull Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gopeshwar Pal Vs. Jiban Chandra Chandra, .

6. The principle involved is also to be illustrated by the decisions of this Court firstly in Chote Lal Nand Kishore Nath Shah Deo Vs. Tula Singh and Others, where the learned Judges dealt with the two cases reported in Manjhoori Bibi v. Akkel Mahmud 17 C.W.N. 889 : 19 Ind. Cas. 793 : 17 C.L.J. 316 and Gopeshwar Pal Vs. Jiban Chandra Chandra, referred to above and more recently in Shiya Janki Thakurain Vs. Kirtanand Singh Bahadur and Others, Fazl Ali, J. delivering the judgment of a Bench of this Court pointed out that a new law ought to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with vested rights and a statute is, therefore, not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation thin its language renders necessary, so that when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. Applying these principles of construction of the Bihar Tenancy Act to the facts of this case, it becomes manifest that the period of limitation prescribed has not affected the vested right of the plaintiff who formally proceeded to sue in respect of the year 1340 and indeed upon general principles of justice; this view has the further justification that by the time the Act was published, that is to say on November 14, 1934, the period of limitation which the Judge has held to be applicable would have already expired, with the result that the plaintiffs right of action would have been destroyed without notice to him.

7. In my opinion the decision of the learned Judge was erroneous. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree not only for the year 1341 Fasli but also for the arrears of bhaoli rent due in respect of the year 1340. No one has appeared on behalf of the tenant. The revision applications succeed but there will be no order for costs.