Das, J.These analogous appeals arise out of a suit in ejectment brought by the appellants against defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The appellants are the proprietors of Tauzi No. 3142. Defendant No. 3 is the proprietor of Tauzi No. 3143. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have a house on plot No. 342 which admittedly lies in Tauzi No. 3143. They have erected a wall and a chabutra on 7 dhurs of land in plot No. 341 which adjoins plot No. 342, and it is in respect of this trespass on plot No. 341 that the plaintiffs complain.

2. The lower Appellate Court has found that plot No. 341 is joint between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 and that there has undoubtedly been an encroachment by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on 7 dhurs of land in plot No. 341, but that such encroachment has taken place by the leave and license of defendant No. 3. It has also found that the land encroached upon falls far short of the area which defendant No. 3 would be entitled to on partition and that the plaintiffs have not suffered any substantial injury by reason of such encroachment. On these findings the Courts below have given the plaintiffs a decree for joint possession with the defendants but have refused to eject defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from the land.

3. I am of opinion that the Courts below have taken an entirely correct view of the law on the subject. The authorities, I think, establish the proposition that, before a Court will, in the case of co-sharers, make an order directing that a portion of the joint property alleged to have been dealt with by one of the co-owners without the consent of the other should be restored to its former condition, a plaintiff must show that he has sustained, by the act he complains of, some injury which materially affects his position. See Nocury Lall Chuckerbutty v. Bindabun Chendur Chuckerbutiy 8 C. 708 : 4 Ind. Dec. 456, Shamnugger Jute Factory Co., Ltd. v. Ram Narain Chatterjee 14 C. 189 : 7 Ind. Dec. 125, Joy Chendar Rukhit v. Bippro Churn Rukhit 14 C. 236 : 7 Ind. Dec.156, Brahmamoyee Chaudhurani v. Gopi Mohan Rai Chowdhury 7 Ind. Cas. 124 : 15 C.W.N. 188 and Paras Ram v. Sherjit 9 A. 661 : A.W.N. (1887) 253 : 5 Ind. Dec.878. It was con. tended by Mr. Kulwant Sahay on behalf of the appellants that the last mentioned case was virtually overruled by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shadi v. Anup Singh 12 A. 436 (F.B.) : A.W.N. (1890) 95 : 6 Ind. Dec. 1023. In that case it was found by the final Court of facts that the defendant was building upon land which was in excess of the share that would come to him on partition, and that on partition the plaintiff could not be adequately compensated. Therefore the plaintiff succeeded in establishing that, by the act complained of, he did sustain an injury which materially affected his position. The actual decision, therefore, is consistent with the rule which I have deduced from the cases, and falls within the ambit of that rule, but there are certain observations in the leading judgment of Edge, C.J., which support the arguments put forward on behalf of the appellants. So far as these observations are concerned, all that I say is that they were not necessary for the decision of the case and that, with great respect, I am unable to adopt them for the purposes of this decision. The next case relied upon by Mr. Kulwant Sahay is that of Shibba Mal v. Naurang Mal 39 Ind. Cas. 739 : 15 A.L.J. 293. That was a suit by the plaintiff for the removal of a balcony which the defendant had built projecting over a consider-able width of a passage which was the joint property of the plaintiff and the defendant. Walsh, J., thought that as the plaintiff had failed to show that he had sustained any injury by the act of the defendant, there could not be a mandatory injunction compelling the defendant to remove the balcony. Richards, C.J., and Bannerji, J., took a different view on appeal. In view of the long series of decisions both of the Calcutta High Court and Allahabad High Court, not one of which was considered or even referred to in the judgment delivered by Richards, C.J., I am unable to follow that decision. I am of opinion, therefore, that if the case had arisen between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 3, the plaintiffs could not have asked for a mandatory injunction compelling defendant No. 3 to pull down the erections on 7 dhurs of land. In my judgment, it makes no difference that the wall and the chabutra have been erected, not by defendant No. 3, but by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by leave and license of defendant No. 3; for it is well settled that one joint owner "might license the doing of whatever he might do himself--" See Wilkinson v. Haygarth (1847) 12 Q.B. 837 : 116 E.R. 1035 : 16 L.J.B. 103 : 11 Jur. 104, Job v. Potton (1875) 20 Eq. 84 : 44 L.J. Ch. 252 : 32 L.T. 110, Jacobs v. Sewards (1872) 5 H.L. 464 : 41 L.J.C.P. 221 : 27 L.T. 185, and Sat Narayan Singh v. Anant Prosad 51 Ind. Cas. 31 .

4. It is suggested, however, by Mr. Kulwant Sahay that, as there is a denial of the plaintiff title to plot No. 341, not only by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, but also by defendant No. 3, there is some sort of equity in favour of the plaintiffs which would entitle them to the mandatory injunction asked for. There is, in my judgment, neither principle nor authority in support of this proposition. Alt that the cases lay down is that where there is a denial of the title of one co-owner by the other co owners there is in law an ouster and where there is an ouster, the co-owner ousted is entitled to a decree for joint possession. In this case the plaintiffs have got a decree for joint possession. Bat they go further and the point that has been argued on their behalf is that where a co-owner A in denial of the title of co owner B allows a stranger C to erect a building on the land jointly held by A and B, B is entitled, by reason of the denial of his title, to a mandatory injunction, compelling C to demolish the building so erected. In my judgment, the solution of the problem must still depend on whether any substantial injury has been sustained by B and the Court will proceed to solve the problem unhampered by any consideration of the denial of the plaintiffs title. In this case, the Courts have concurrently come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have sustained no injury whatever by the erection of a wall and chabutra on 7 dhurs of land. On this finding, the plaintiffs suit for demolition of the wall and dhabutra must fail.

5. The only other question that has been argued before me is that the lower Appellate Court erred in setting aside the finding of the Court of first instance on the question of the shares held by the plaintiffs and defend ant No. 3 respectively in plot No. 341. For the reasons which have been given by the learned Judge on appeal, I am of opinion that it was not necessary for the Court; of first instance to record any finding on that point.

6. The result is that these analogous appeals fail and must be dismissed with costs.