Chapman, J.The plaintiff in these suits claims to be the proprietor of what is known as the Kanti Indigo Concern, or as it is called in the plaints the Kanti factory. The principal defendants in the suits were persons who had attached certain properties in execution of decrees obtained by them. These properties had been attached as the properties of Mr. George Toomey to the extent of twelve-annas and the property left by Mrs. Flora Toomey in respect of four-annas. Mr. George Toomey and Mrs. Flora Toomey had previously been proprietors of the Kanti Indigo Concern. The plaintiffs case was that by reason of the transactions, which I propose presently to describe, the title of Mr. George Toomey and Mrs. Flora Toomey to the properties attached had passed to the plaintiff, and that, therefore, the defendants were not entitled to put the properties to sale as the proper ies of the Toomeys. The defendants case was that under the transactions relied upon by the plaintiff the properties attached had not passed to the plaintiff and that they were entitled to proceed against them as being the properties of the Toomeys. The learned District Judge gave judgment in favour of the defendants. The plaintiff now appeals to this Court.
2. I proceed to detail the transactions upon which the plaintiff relies.
3. It will be convenient to deal first with the case in respect of the four-annas share as the questions relating to that share are quite distinct from the questions which arise as to the twelve-annas.
4. In February 1891 Mr. Gibbon the proprietor of the four-annas share executed a mortgage of his share in the Kanti Indigo Concern in favour of the Eastern Mortgage Company. In February 1895 Mrs. Flora Toomey purchased from Mr. Gibbon his equity of redemption in that four-annas share. At the same time Mrs.Flora Toomey took a further advance from the Company and executed a second mortgage, again mortgaging the four-annas share in favour of the Company. These mortgages were in the form of an English mortgage.
5. In 1907 the Company sued for foreclosure and obtained a decree which was made absolute in 1911. The plaintiff in these suits acquired the interest of the Eastern Mortgage Company in these four-annas.
6. The defendants case is that what was mortgaged by Mr. Gibbon and subsequently by Mrs. Toomey was a four-annas share of the properties of the Kanti Indigo Concern as they stood at the time of the mortgages: that the properties in suit were acquired subsequent to the mortgages and were, therefore, never mortgaged to the Eastern Mortgage Company and did not pass to that Company under the foreclosure decree of 1911 and, therefore, did not pass to the plaintiff who derives his title through the Eastern Mortgage Company.
7. The question I have to determine, therefore, is, what was mortgaged by Mr. Gibbon in 1891 and subsequently by Mrs. Flora Toomey in 1895. The property mortgaged in Mr. Gibbons mortgage is thus described:
Four equal and undivided sixteen parts or shares of and in all those Indigo factories or sets of works for the cultivation and manufacture of Indigo which collectively comprised or are called or known by the name of Contai or Kanti formerly forming part of certain concerns known as A. Nowel and Co.s Concerns and also the like parts or shares of and in the factories or outworks and buildings thereto belonging or appertaining and called or known respectively by the names or descriptions of Ragai Lowton and Nuriar and also the like parts or shares of and in the mouzas, villages and lands held on mokarari lease or other analogous tenure of which the particulars are given in the first schedule hereunder written and which Said factories, outworks, mouzas, villages and lands are collectively known as the Contai or Kanti Concern together with the like parts or shares of and in all and every other lands and landed property attached to or held with or considered to be part or parcel of the said factories or concerns and of and in all bungalows, buildings, vats, reservoirs, godowns and other erections and all engines and other machinery, boilers, screws, plant, implements, live and dead stock, boats, carts, carriages and other chattels and effects in or upon or belonging to the said factories or concerns lands and hereditaments and also of and in all balances and sum and sums of money due and owning by raiyats and other persons to the said factories or concerns or to the owners or proprietors thereof.
8. In Mrs. Toomeys mortgage of the year 1895 her liability under Mr. Gibbons mortgage is admitted and it is recited that M. Gibbon had mortgaged "four-sixteenth parts or shares of and in the Contai or Kanti Indigo Concern and its outworks of Ragai Lowton and Nuriar and mouz s and hereditaments more particularly described in the body and in the first schedule of Mr. Gibbons mortgage-bond." And she recites that the same property is again mortgaged by her as security for a further loan.
9. It would be as well to at once dispose of the learned District Judges view that in these documents the particular description given in the schedule was the dominant description. In my opinion it is perfectly clear that the dominant description is contained in the words "four-sixteenths parts or shares of and in the Contai or Kanti Indigo Concern and its outworks" and that the schedule that followed was merely for the purpose of enumerating the particulars and if that schedule was imperfect or inaccurate it is not to be inferred that Mrs. Toomey did not intend to include in her mortgage any property which would come within the antecedent generic denomination of the words "Kanti Indigo Concern." For this view it is sufficient to refer to the judgment of Lord Westbury in the case of West v. Lawday (1865) 11 H.L. Cas. 375 ; 13 L.T. 171 ; 11 E.R. 1378 ; 145 R.R. 238, "where the subject matter is demised as a whole under a denomination which is applicable to the entirety and then the words of description that include and denote the entire subject-matter are followed by words which are added on the principle of enumeration but do not completely enumerate and exhaust all the particulars which are comprehended and included within the antecedent universal or generic denomination. Then the ordinary principle and rule of law is this that the entirety which has been expressly and definitely given shall not be prejudiced by an imperfect and inaccurate enumeration of the particulars." I am entirely unable to agree with the learned District Judge when he says that a share in an Indigo Concern does not constitute a definite property. Shares in Indigo Concerns are constantly transferred and dealt with all over Bihar and there is no difficulty in holding that such a share is a perfectly definite and specific kind of property.
10. In this particular instance, however, the contents of the schedule to the bonds are not really very relevant. The properties which formed the subject of the suits had not, at the time of these bonds, been acquired, and would in any event have not been included in the schedule.
11. The question I have to consider is this. Did the parties intend that the property subsequently acquired and incorporated in the concern should, in the event of foreclosure, pass to the mortgagees It must be remembered in this case that in form the mortgage purported to convey the title in the share in the Indigo Concern to the mortgagees absolutely, the mortgagor having a right only to a re-conveyance in the event of her discharging the loan. Can it be for a moment doubted that the parties intended that the properties acquired during the period in which the absolute title to share in the concern lay with the mortgagees should go to the mortgagees if the properties were acquired for the purposes of the concern and were incorporated therewith It is not, however, necessary to rely merely upon the form of the mortgage. If the parties meant anything they meant this, that the mortgagees by instituting a suit in proper form at some future date should be able to obtain a complete title to a share in that Kanti Indigo Concern. Can the parties have possibly meant that that title to be acquired at some future date by the mortgagees should be to a share in the concern as it stood at the time of the mortgage. It is obvious that this cannot have been the intention, for it would not be possible for a person to acquire say in the year 1911 a title to a share in the Kanti Indigo Concern as it stood in the year 1895, the good-will, the debts, the liabilities the rights under contract everything would have changed beyond recall. I have no doubt that what the parties meant was that if the mortgagees brought a suit for foreclosure at some future date they should acquire a title to a share in the Kanti Indigo Concern as it stood upon the date upon which they obtained foreclosure. No other interpretation appears to me to be possible and this was the interpretation which Mrs. Toomey obviously herself put upon the transaction, for when the suit for foreclosure was brought Mrs. Toomey filed a petition giving a list of the properties which had been acquired for the purposes of the concern since the date of her mortgage.
12. That the particular properties which formed the subject of these suits were acquired for the purposes of the Kanti Indigo Concern and were incorporated in that concern at the time of the foreclosure decree is clear from this petition of Mrs. Toomey to which I have referred for the properties are all included in the conveyance a list of Which is given in that petition. Bacharam Mukerji a clerk in the employ of the concern also gives evidence to the effect that the incomes and outgoings of the properties the subject of these suits were all put into the general account of the Kanti Concern. I would, therefore, hold that the Eastern Mortgage Company, when they brought their suit for foreclosure, were entitled to obtain a foreclosure decree of a four-annas share in the Kanti Indigo Concern and that that four-annas share included the properties which were the subject of these suits.
13. Some arguments have been addressed to us that the decree that was obtained did not, in fact, include these properties. The decree Exhibit 2 grants the plaintiff foreclosure in respect of the mortgaged properties which are described as as undivided one-fourth part or share of "an Indigo Concern known as the Contai or Kanti Indigo Concern full particulars of which are set forth in the schedule annexed to the plaint marked A." It is true that these properties are not included in the schedule but I repeat my opinion that the dominant description is in the first part of the description and that I cannot hold that the decree-holder should be prejudiced by the fact that the schedule was incomplete. When possession was delivered (Exhibit 21) the Eastern Mortgage Company was given possession of an undivided one-fourth part or share of an Indigo Concern known as the Contai or Kanti Indigo Concern simply; no reference is made to any schedule and to this delivery of possession, Mrs. Flora Toomey made no objection.
14. The learned District Judge has referred to Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act and suggests that a share in an Indigo Concern is not specific Immovable property within the meaning of that section and that the properties acquired subsequent to the mortgage are not accessions within the meaning of Section 70 or 71 of that Act. The Transfer of Property Act, however, was not intended to be exhaustive: There are many mortgages known to English Law which it would be difficult or impossible to bring within the terms of the Transfer of Property Act, yet there can be no doubt that such mortgages would be enforceable in India: for instance there is a well known kind of mortgage in England which would resemble the present mortgage in many particulars. I mean a mortgage of a share or shares in a partnership [Cavander v. Bulteel (1873) 9 Ch. 79 ; 43 L.J. Ch. 370 ; 29 L.T. 710 ; 22 W.R. 177.] It is not, therefore, necessary to decide, whether the present mortgages were or were not strictly within the terms of Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. I have no doubt that there is no principle of law which could have prevented the Court from giving effect to the intention of the parties in this particular case and from granting the Eastern Mortgage Company foreclosure in respect of the four-annas share of the Kanti Indigo Concern as it stood at the time of the decree for foreclosure.
15. In regard to what the learned District Judge says on the subject of accessions it is sufficient to refer to the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Raja Kishendatt Ram v. Raja Mumtaz Ali Khan 5 C. 198 ; 5 C.L.R. 213 ; 6 I.A. 145 ; 4 S P.C.J. 17 ; 3 P.C.J. 637 ; (sic) & Jacksons P.C. No. 58 ; 3 Ind. Jur. 426 ; 3 S L.R. 1 ; 2 Ind. Dec. 737 (P.C.).
16. There would be little difficulty in holding upon the principle therein laid down that these properties were accessions. But I have preferred to deal with the question upon somewhat different lines. The view I take is that if a share in an Indigo Concern is mortgaged what the parties must intend is that when foreclosure or sale takes place at some subsequent date the share shall pass to the mortgagee as it stands at the date of sale or foreclosure. This would include not only what strictly could be held to be accessions but also changes in good-will, rights under contract and so forth.
17. The properties that were attached appear to have been attached subsequent to the foreclosure. They were attached as being the properties of the Toomey and the defendants have strenuously contested the plaintiffs claim to these properties. It is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiffs have succeeded to the liabilites of the Toomeys. This being so, I would hold that so far as the four-annas share is concerned the plaintiff is entitled to a decree, that the attachment of the properties is invalid as against him and that the properties cannot be put to sale as the properties of the Toomeys.
18. I proceed now to consider the question of the twelve-annas share.
19. In 1907 Mr. Toomey deposited as security with Messrs. Shaw Wallace & Co., in Calcutta five conveyances of the years 1866 to 1883 under which his father had acquired twelve annas share of the Kanti Indigo Concern. Upon this equitable mortgage Messrs. Shaw Wallace and Co. sued in 1909 and obtained a decree which was made absolute and under which there was a sale in 1911. In this part of the case two questions arise. First what did Mr. Toomey intend to mortgage, and next what passed at the sale.
20. In regard to the first question what Mr. Toomey intended to mortgage, the learned District Judge appears to have thought that all the title-deeds were not deposited. There is no technical rule that in an equitable mortgage all the title-deeds should be deposited. It is all merely a matter of intention. The authorities for this are given in Cootes law of Mortgages, 8th Edition, Volume I, page 74. It appears to me to be clear that the intention was to mortgage the twelve-annas share in the Kanti Indigo Concern, and for the purpose of creating an equitable mortgage of that share it was quite sufficient for Mr. Toomey to deposit the conveyances under which his father had purchased that share. The only question is whether Mr. Toomey intended to mortgage the twelve-annas share as it stood at the time of the conveyances to his father in the years 1866 to 1883. These conveyances were of two-annas share in 1866, two-annas in 1876, two-annas in 1881, and six annas in 1883. It is quite inconceivable that in 1907 Mr. Toomey intended to mortgage a two-annas share as it stood in 1866, another two-annas as it stood in 1876, another two-annas as it stood in 1881 and another six-annas as it stood in 1883. That appears to me an absolutely inconceivable proposition. It is perfectly clear that when Mr. Toomey executed this mortgage in 1907 he meant that in the event of a suit for sale the twelve annas share of the Kanti Indigo Concern as it stood at the time of the sale should be sold. The properties which formed the subject of these suits were all acquired for the purpose of the concern as I have held above and before the mortgage in 1907 and there is no difficulty in holding that the mortgage covered these properties.
21. The next question is whether these properties passed at the sale. It appears that when Messrs. Shaw Wallace and Co. obtained a decree and the properties were put up to sale a wrong procedure was adopted. The sale proclamation under the heading "Schedule of Property" commences with a general description of the twelve-annas of the Kanti Indigo Concern. There then follow two lots, lot No. 1 and lot No. 2 and in each lot there is a list of specific items of property. These two lots were separately sold. It was common ground in the Court below that the properties the subject of these suits were not expressly included in these lots. The appellant suggests that the property which formed the subject of these suits may have been sold under lot No. 1 but no substantial ground for so holding has been put before us. The principle laid down by Lord Westbury to which I have referred in the earlier part of this judgment does not help me out of the difficulty. Here there were two sales under two Schedules and on a perusal of the sale proclamation it is not possible to say that the dominant description twelve-annas of the Kanti Indigo Concern applies to one Schedule rather than the other. There can be little doubt that it was intended to be the dominant description but the lots were separately sold, and I find it impossible to say that the properties the subject of these suits which were not mentioned in either lot were sold in either. That being so I must hold that the plaintiff has not satisfied the Court that Messrs. Shaw Wallace & Co. purchased the twelve-annas share in the properties in suit in execution of their mortgage-decree and as the plaintiff derives his title so far as the twelve-annas is concerned from Messrs. Shaw Wallace & Co. his suits so far as the twelve annas is concerned must be dismissed.
22. Nothing that is said by the learned District Judge in his judgment or by me in the present judgment will be res judicata in any further proceeding the plaintiff may take for the sale of these properties in execution of his mortgage-decree. I do not know what objection, whether upon the merits or upon the ground of limitation, there may be to such a proceeding. I would accordingly decree the appeal in p Article The plaintiff is entitled to a decree that so far as the four-annas is concerned the attachment of these properties is not valid against him and that so far as that share is concerned they cannot be put up to sale as the properties of the Toomeys. In respect of the remaining twelve-annas the suits are dismissed; the defendants are entitled to half costs in all Courts.
23 Hearing fee two gold mohurs in Nos. 139 and 143, three gold mohurs in 142, one gold mohur in each of the rest. Half of this to be allowed.
Rof, J.
24. I entirely agree with all that my learned brother has said. In view of the importance of the principles enunciated by him as applicable to Concerns formed for the cultivation and manufacture of Indigo I would add a few words upon the nature of such concerns as I understand it,
25. The earlier mortgage in these eases is dated 1891. My experience of Indigo Concerns dates back to 1890. At that time the indigo industry was flourishing; enormous profits were made by good concerns. The major part of these profits was invariably ascribed to the good-will of the concern. Factories with equal or better machinery, with equal or better lands were incapable of making such profits without the goodwill attached to a good name. The area over which this good-will extended locally was known as the dehat. It was a recognised law that neighbouring concerns should confine their operations strictly to their own dehats, and one of the most important duties of the Indigo Planters Association was to decide disputes relating to dehat boundaries. The most dreaded bugbear to the manager of a good concern was what was known as an interloping factory. The goodwill of the concern was maintained in the dehat through the concerns position as a landlord, and its ability as a landlord to exercise a peaceful domination over the smaller cultivators and labourers domiciled upon the land of which the concern was landlord. Without such peaceful domination, there could be no certainty that sufficient indigo would be cultivated to fill the vats. In another direction its good-will was maintained by careful manufacture. Indigo bearing a good mark fetched a far higher price in the market than indigo from an unknown source. Without a good name in the dehat and a good name in the indigo market, the factory buildings themselves and the factory leases and milkiat were of little value; indeed many of the leases were taken at unremunerative rates merely for the purpose of extending the good-will of the concern. An instance of this is to be seen in Mr. Kennedys evidence upon the reason for which the lands held by the concern were put up for sale in two lots; the leases specified in lot II were unremunerative leases.
26. I have embarked upon this explanation of the position twenty-five and twenty-years ago of an Indigo Concern, in regard to lands acquired by the concern, in order that it may be clear that such acquisitions were in those days made strictly for the purposes of the concern as an Indigo Concern and not for any other purpose at all. A concern was a concern for the cultivation and manufacture of indigo. The realisation of rents was a minor consideration. Things now-a-days are different. The good-will of concern is of little value. The profitable property of a concern is now the milkiat, the zerait and mokararis held at favourable rates. Now-a-days money would only be advanced on the security of such lands, not on the security of the concerns good name. But I have no doubt at all that in 1891 and 1895 the chief security upon which money was advanced to a concern was the good-will of the concern. The right to collect rents was acquired to extend the good-will of the concern within the dehat. Such acquisitions were an accession to the concern as an Indigo Concern. Raiyati holdings were acquired for the purpose of cultivating indigo thereon or of exchanging lands within the holding for lands upon which indigo might be profitably cultivated, Such acquisitions were also made for the purpose of the concern.
27. It is a common rule of equity, codified in Section 70 of the Transfer of Property Act, that accessions to the property mortgaged belong for the purpose of the security to the mortgagee. I have no hesitation at all in saying that in the case before us the acquisitions claimed were acquisitions made strictly for the purposes of the concern and are in fact accessions to the property mortgaged. I concur in the order proposed as to the four-annas. I also for the reasons given concur in the order proposed as to the twelve-annas. The property of concern was deliberately sold piecemeal. The property now claimed was not included in either piece. I also concur in the proposed order as to costs.