S. V. MARUTHI, J.

( 1 ) THIS revision arises out of an order of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada in C. M. A. No. 42 of 1991 filed against the order of the Rent Controller, Vijayawada in R. C. C. No. 269 of 85.

( 2 ) TENANT is the petitioner in this revision.

( 3 ) RESPONDENT filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner from the petition schedule premises under Section 10 (2) (i) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. Respondent is the owner of the petition schedule property. Petitioner took on lease of the petition schedule premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000. 00 payable by the first of every month. By 31-1-1984, the petitioner was liable to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 8,300. 00. On 2-2-1984, the petitioner paid to the respondent a sum of Rs. 300. 00 and committed default in payment of rent of Rs. 8,000. 00. The petitioner obtained a receipt No. 16 for the payment of rent from the respondent and the petitioner also signed on the counterfoil receipt acknowledging her liability to pay the arrears of rent. By 31-5-1985, the petitioner had to pay a sum of Rs. 24,000. 00. The respondent demanded several times to pay the rents due. The petitioner while promising to pay the arrears of rent, evading to pay the rents. In spite of notice issued to the petitioner on 8-6-1985, she did not pay the rents due. Hence the respondent filed the eviction petition, out of which, the present revision arose.

( 4 ) PETITIONER filed a counter before the Rent Controller denying that she was a tenant of the respondent and with the following allegations; that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and the Rent Control Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition; that she became indebted to the respondent in a sum of Rs. 25,000. 00; that the respondent wanted the petitioner to pay Rs. 500. 00 every month so that Rs. 250. 00would be taken towards the discharge of interest and the remaining Rs. 250. 00 towards the discharge of the principal. As the time went on, the interest was reduced to Rs. 200. 00and Rs. 300. 00 was paid every month towards the principal amount. Separate receipts were prepared and she was asked to sign counterfoils of the said receipts. Accordingly, petitioner continued to pay the amounts and ultimately she was informed that the debt was completely cleared. However, behind her back, a suit was filed and it was decreed, pursuant to which, the suit building was brought to sale and the respondent became the highest bidder. When the respondent issued the notice to the petitioner, the petitioner having received the same questioned the attitude of the respondent. The respondent took back the notice received by the petitioner and demanded payment of Rs. 80,000. 00 in case the petitioner wanted re-conveyance of the schedule property. The petitioner represented that she had already cleared the debt of Rs. 25,000. 00. Then the respondent declared that he became the owner of the building by participating in the Court auction and petitioner may not know about it and that even though the delivery was only paper delivery by the amin, still the respondent was the owner of the schedule property and the valuation of the estate had increased and therefore the petitioner had to pay Rs. 80,000. 00.

( 5 ) ON the basis of the above pleadings, the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition on the ground that the Rent Control Court had no jurisdiction as there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the respondent purchased the property in Court auction under sale certificate Ex. A 36 and he took delivery of the premises as per the proceedings in R. C. C. No. 17 of 1976 and Exs. A. 37 and A. 40 are the delivery receipts by the petitioner and a sub-tenant of the premises. Ex. A. 37 was proved by PW 3 and Ex. A. 40 was proved by PW 5. Exs. A. 7 to A. 10 and A. 12 to A. 26 receipts show that the petitioner paid rents to the respondent as a tenant. Payment of rent under Exs. A. 7 to A. 10 and A. 12 to A. 26 establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner had not paid any rent after Ex. A. 26. Therefore, there was willful default in payment of rent of Rs. 28,000. 00. Holding as above, the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and directed eviction of the petitioner, against which, the present revision is filed.

( 6 ) THE main contention of the petitioner in the revision is that against the order of the Rent Controller in R. C. C. No. 269 of 1985 dated 4-10-1990, the respondent filed an appeal before the Subordinate Judge on 9-11-1990 and there was a delay of five days in filing the appeal. The respondent filed an Interlocutory Application to condone the said delay which was allowed on 25-2-1991 by the Subordinate Judge on payment of costs. The provisions of the Limitation Act are not made applicable to the Rent Control Court as iris not as Court within the meaning of subsection (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In support of this contention, counsel for the petitioner relied on a recent Full Bench decision of this Court in The Nalgonda Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Hyderabad, 1993 (2) APLJ 336 (FB ). According to the learned counsel, in view of the judgment of the Full Bench holding that the Rent Control Court is not a Court but only a Tribunal, the Limitation Act is not applicable. Counsel further submits that if the Limitation Act is not applicable, the order of the Subordinate Judge is a nullity as the Court has inherent lack of jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Counsel, therefore, submits that the order condoning the delay is non est in the eye of law and consequently the order in the appeal is without jurisdiction and, as such, the order of the Subordinate Judge is liable to be set aside.

( 7 ) AS regards the merits of the case, counsel submits that the respondent purchased the property in a Court auction pursuant to a decree obtained against the petitioner under Ex. A. 36 sale certificate; that the petitioner filed C. M. P. No. 946 of 1974 and obtained stay of confirmation of sale. However, there is no evidence when the respondent took delivery of possession of the petition schedule property. Exs. A. 37 dated 22-4-1977 and Ex. A. 40 dated 25-2-1977 do not indicate when the respondent took delivery of possession of the premises. Against the order under Section 11 of the Act, petitioner filed an appeal which was allowed, against which, a revision was filed by the respondent in the High Court which was dismissed. The petitioner constructed first floor pending disposal of R. C. C. When the Municipal Corporation filed a case against the petitioner for constructing the house without obtaining their permission, respondent did not raise any objection. Originally, the property belonged to the" husband of the petitioner. After the death of her husband in 1966, petitioner was entitled to one third share and her children were entitled to 2/3rd share. Till the notice was issued by the respondent on 5-6-1985 under Ex. A. 27, she was not aware of any of the earlier proceedings. All the records, namely, electricity, water receipts were in the name of the petitioner. Respondent also filed a suit O. S. No. 1220 of 1984 which was dismissed directing him to approach the Civil Court. The judgment in O. S. No. 1220/84 operates as res judicata. The above circumstances indicate and establish that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and hence the eviction petition is liable to be dismissed.

( 8 ) SRI P. V. R. Sarma, appearing for the respondent submitted that originally the property belonged to the petitioner. She had taken Rs. 5,000. 00 as loan from the respondent. Since the amount was not paid, a suit O. S. No. 166 of 1971 was filed which was decreed. In execution of the decree he filed Execution Petition No. 718 of 1976 and brought the petition schedule property to sale. He became the highest bidder and thus purchased the property. He took delivery of possession under Ex. A. 37 and Ex. A. 40 being delivery receipts signed by the petitioner and sub-tenant of the premises respectively. Ex. A. 36 was the sale certificate issued to him, the effect of which is that the title of the respondent to the petition schedule premises became perfect and unimpeachable. P. Ws. 3 and 5 who are the attestors of Ex. A. 37 and A. 40 proved the documents. Ex. A. 1 dated 4-2-1976 shows that mutation was. effected in favour of the respondent in the municipal records. Exs. A. 2 to A. 5 are the house tax receipts issued by the Municipal Corporation white Ex. A. 6 is the demand notice for house tax. Exs. A. 12 to 26 are the rent receipts, evidencing payment of rent by the petitioner to the respondent. She did not deny her signatures on A. 12 to A. 26. Ex. A. 7 is a receipt for Rs. 600. 00. Ex. A. 27 is the notice issued by the respondent to the petitioner. Exs. A. 31 to A. 35 are the tax receipts. Petitioner filed a C. M. A. and obtained stay of confirmation of sale in Execution Petition No. 718 of 1976. The suit in O. S. No. 1220 of 1984 was dismissed on the ground that the respondent filed the petition under Section 11 (4) of the Act, The fact that the petitioner did not take any steps to set aside the decree in O. S. No. 166 of 1971 indicates that she has no bona fides. The children of the petitioner filed a suit only after the present Rent Control Case was filed. Guardian was appointed on behalf of the minor children in O. S. No. 166 of 1971. Payment of rents establishes the relationship of landlord and tenant. Exs. A. 12 to A. 26, read with Exs. A. 37, A. 40 establish that there was relationship of landlord and tenant and there was evidence that the petitioner committed willful default in payment of rent and, therefore, the Subordinate Judge had rightly allowed the appeal setting aside the order of the Rent Controller.

( 9 ) AS regards the applicability of the Limitation Act, to the proceedings before the Subordinate Judge under the Rent Control Act, counsel submits that this objection was not raised before the appellate authority and the delay was condoned and the order condoning the delay had become final as no revision was filed against that order. Therefore, the petitioner is precluded from raising this objection at this distance of time. There objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court should be raised at the earliest point of time. Having not raised, she cannot be permitted to raise the same in the revision petition. The Rent Control Court is a Court and Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act is applicable. It is not a case of total or inherent lack of jurisdiction. There is a difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction and irregular exercise of jurisdiction. This Court in a number of cases has taken the view that the Rent Control Court is a Court and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable. The Full Bench decision of this Court (supra) has no application to the present case as it was dealing with a case under the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Court. Therefore, Counsel submitted that the revision is liable to be dismissed.

( 10 ) THE first question for consideration is whether the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings before the Subordinate Judge under the Rent Control Act.

( 11 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner placed reliance on the following observations of this Court in Nalgonda Co-op. Marketing Society Ltd. v. Labour Court, (supra) which reads thus:"37. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court dealt with the same question in a matter arising under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 and expressed the view that the Limitation Act dealt only with the applications to Courts (vide Jokkith Fernandex v. Amina Kunhi Umma, AIR 1974 Kerala 162 (FB ). "this being the position, even if the power under Section 5 were to be read into a special local law by reason of the provisions of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, that power is exercisable only by Courts and not by tribunals or other authorities such as the appellate authority in this case. " Subsequently, a Division Bench of the same Court had held in U. Chacko v. P. Marakar, AIR 1978 Kerala ,161 that the Limitation Act was applicable only to the proceedings before a Court and that the appellate authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 was not a Court. We consider that these decisions lay down the correct principle. "

( 12 ) HOWEVER, the objection as to the applicability of the Limitation Act was not taken before the Subordinate Judge who condoned the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the order has become final as no revision was filed against the: said order. In P. Shanker v. P. Nagamalleswara Rao, 1987 (2) ALT 665 it was held that--"a party should not be allowed, who seeks permission to raise an additional ground including the one touching upon the jurisdiction of the Court, at a time when having lost in two Courts below, seeks for the first time to raise in the third Court just at the time of final hearing, though the said plea was available long before when the case came up for final disposal, in the Court of the first instance.

( 13 ) THE petitioner has not raised the objection even in the grounds of revision but filed a petition raising it as an additional ground on 21-6-1993, while the C. R. P. was admitted" on 26-10-1992. In view of the judgments referred to above, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the objection at this stage.

( 14 ) THE next question to be considered is whether the Rent Controller acting under the Rent Control Act is a Court.

( 15 ) THE earliest decision on this aspect is the decision of this Court in G. D. M. Rao v. " Ranga Panaiah and Bors. , AIR 1975 AP 13 [LQ/TelHC/1974/53] . The issue directly arose under the Rent Control Act and the question for consideration was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller, exercising the powers under the Rent Control Act. The facts of the case are that there was an ex parte order of eviction against the tenant, and possession was taken over by evicting the tenant. The tenant filed. A. No. 4518 of 1972 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on 15-9-1972 for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction. The landlord raised an objection to the petition on the ground that the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller. The matter came up before the High Court in a revision. Ramachandra Rao,. (as he then was) after considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank, : AIR 1967 SC 1494 [LQ/SC/1967/70 ;] ">AIR 1967 SC 1494 [LQ/SC/1967/70 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/70 ;] and the judgment of this Court in K. Chalapathi Rao v. B. N. Reddy, 1965 (2) an. W. R. 557 D. B. (sic) held that the Rent Controller acting under the Rent Control Act is a Court and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings before the Rent Controller under the said Act. The learned Judge distinguished the decision in Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1970 SC 209 [LQ/SC/1969/190] : (1970 Lab IC 269) observing that it was a case dealing with the Labour Court exercising the powers under the Indus-trial Disputes Act.

( 16 ) IN P. Baskar Rao v. V. Subba Raju, 1967 (2) An. W. R. 58, Gopala Rao Ekbote. (as he then was) that Section 5. of the Limitation Act is made applicable by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act to the Special Law, the Rent Control Act. under which the appeal is preferred, and consequently the Court has power to condone the delay in filing the appeal.

( 17 ) IN Chalapathirao v. B. N. Reddy, it was also held that the Rent Controller is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

( 18 ) IN Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907 [LQ/SC/1963/4] the Supreme Court held that at page 910 -"if the suit was barred by time and the Court decreed it, the Court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. . . . . It is true that Section 3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory and that it is the duty of the Court to take notice of this provisioned give effect to it even though the point of limitation is not referred to in the pleadings. Even so, it cannot be said that where the Court fails to perform its duty, it acts without jurisdiction. If it fails to do its duty it merely makes an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. . . . . "

( 19 ) THE next decision to be considered is the judgment of this Court in Munilal v. K. Narayana, 1988 (2) ALJ 755 wherein it was held that -"it was repeatedly pointed out in several decisions that a Court has got the power to decide rightly as well as wrongly. If it decides wrongly, the person who is affected can only take the course prescribed by taw for setting it right and if that course is not taken, the wrong cannot be disturbed. Where the Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, the judgment unless reversed or annulled in a proper proceeding is not open to attack in any collateral action or at the time of execution. In the present case, the cause is eviction and the parties are the landlord and tenant. Undoubtedly, the Court constituted under the Rent Control Act has jurisdiction. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, if the Court had commuted a mistake, it would only amount to an irregularity or even an illegality, but it does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. In this context, we may refer to Section 20 (4) which says that the decision of the appellate authority shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in Section 22. Section 22 provides a revision to the High Court by any aggrieved party against the order passed under Section 20 and the High Court is vested with the jurisdiction to go into the legality and regularity and propriety of such orders. We are, therefore, of the view that the order of the appellate authority remanding the case is not a void order, but is only an order passed in irregular exercise of its power. "

( 20 ) WHILE holding as above, the learned Judges relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey supra. It was also held that jurisdiction does not depend upon the correctness of the decision and the power to decide carries with it the power to decide rightly or wrongly and even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties.

( 21 ) THE Supreme Court in Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh, 1988 (2) APLJ (SC) 34 held that -"the Rent Control Officer shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of Sections 345 and 346 of Cr. P. C. 1973 and in view of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the U. P. Ubran Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 shall be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 193,. P. C. Section 195 (3), Cr. P. C. provides that the expression court in Section 195 (1) (b) (i) will include a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of the Section. Section 195 (1) (b) (i) provides a pre- condition for taking congizance of an offence under Section 193,. P. C. viz. , a complaint in writing of the Court. In view of the specific provision made in sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Rent Act that for the purposes of Sections 345 and 346, Cr. P. C. Rent Control Officer assuring it to be a Tribunal as held by the High Court and not a Court, would be deemed to be a Civil Court, and therefore, for purposes of Sections. . . "

( 22 ) IN G. Bulliswamy v. Smt. C. Anna-purnamma, AIR 1976 AP 270 [LQ/APHC/1975/40] : 1976 (1) An WR 169 this Court held that the rent Controller conies within the meaning of a Court as contemplated by Sections 3 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. "

( 23 ) IN M. Jagannabham v. Rangaiah, 1983 (1) ALT 106 (S. N.) this Court dealt with the question, whether the Rent Controller under the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, is a Court or a persona designata. It was held that - The Controller is indicated not by name but by official designation. The Principal District Munsif is"ascertained as a member of a class and as filling a particular capacity". The intention gathered from the provisions of Act 15 of 1960 and Act 19 of 1972 and the nature of functions to be performed by the Controller, unequivocally makes it clear that the Controller is not to act as "persona designata" but has to act as a Court. . . . In such circumstances, I do not have hesitation to hold that the Controller under A. P. Buildings (lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is a Court and not a persona designata. "

( 24 ) FROM the above, it follows that this Court had taken the consistent view that the rent Controller is a Court not only under the Contempt of Courts Act but also under the Rent Control Act and that under Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, the Rent Control Act is being treated as a special law and by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable to the provisions under the Rent Control Act.

( 25 ) HOWEVER, the consistent view expressed by this Court that the Rent Controller is a Civil Court and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable was not brought to the notice of the Full Bench which decided Nalgonda Co-op. Marketing Society Ltd. case (supra ). However, in the light of the view which I have expressed, it is not necessary to decide, whether the decisions referred to above are impliedly overruled by the judgment of Full Bench in Nalgonda Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. case. I am of the view that the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the objection at the stage of revision.

( 26 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Sakuru v. Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279 [LQ/SC/1985/222] wherein it was held that at page 1281 -"the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in courts and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. . . . . "

( 27 ) I may point out that the judgment in Sakurus case was a case which arose under the A. P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, under which, the Collector was empowered to decide the rights of the parties declaring them as owners of land under Section 38e of the said Act. Therefore, it has no relevancy to the facts of the present case.

( 28 ) I have already pointed out that a distinction was brought between irregular or , illegal exercise of jurisdiction and inherent lack of jurisdiction. It is not disputed that the Rent Controller has jurisdiction over the parties. Assuming that the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act is not a Court and the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable, he might have exercised the jurisdiction irregularly and it is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, the petitioner is precluded from raising objection to the order passed by the Subordinate Judge, in the revision as she had not raised the objection at the earliest point of time and she had acquiesced the order passed by the Subordinate Judge and the order had become final. Therefore, at this stage, she cannot be permitted to challenge the order condoning the delay in filing the appeal.

( 29 ) COMING to the merits of the case, the following facts are not in dispute. Petitioner was the original owner of the property. She took a loan of Rs. 5,000. 00 from the respondent and respondent filed a suit O. S. No. 166 of 1971 and that the minor children of the petitioner were represented by a Court guardian and the suit was decreed. In execution of the decree, the property was brought to sale and the respondent became the highest bidder and purchased the. property and a sale certificate was issued to him. The effect of a sale certificate is that the title of the respondent becomes perfect and unimpeachable Vide, AIR 1954 Madras 760. Thereafter he took delivery of possession in E. P. 718/76 on 7-1-1976. Petitioner gave delivery receipt for taking her own articles under Ex. A. 40. Ex. A. 37 was another receipt issued by the tenant delivering possession of the property. Thereafter, the petitioner was allowed to continue as a tenant. Since there was default in payment of rent, respondent filed R. C. C. 17 of 1976. In the said proceedings the petitioner was directed to deposit the rents. However, she did not comply with the same. Therefore, as order on eviction was passed. The order of eviction was, however, set aside in appeal and the revision filed by the respondent was dismissed. The suit filed by the respondent in O. S. No. 1220 of 1984 was dismissed on the ground that the landlord had already filed a petition under the Rent Control Act viz. , R. C. C. 17 of 1976. In R. C. C. No. 17 of 1976 the relationship of landlord and tenant was found and that operates as res judicata in the present proceedings. To the notice Ex. A. 27 issued by the respondent, there was no reply from the respondent. She filed C. M. A. against the order granting sale certificate to the respondent and sought for stay of confirmation of sale in C. M. P. No. 946 of 1974. The fact that the petitioner filed a C. M. A. 1974 and that she was a party to the eviction proceedings in R. C. C. No. 17 of 1976 indicates that she was aware of the proceedings taken by the respondent against her. Therefore, I am of the view that the learned Subordinate Judge is right in directing eviction of the petitioner on the ground that there was relationship of landlord and tenant and that the petitioner has not denied the non-payment of the rent in an amount of Rs. 28,000. 00.

( 30 ) IN view of the above, 1 see no reason to interfere with the order of the Subordinate Judge and the revision is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

( 31 ) IT is represented by the learned counsel for the petitioner that under Special circumstances time may be granted for vacation of the premises. Taking into account the special circumstances of the case (9) nine months time is granted to the petitioner for vacating the premises. However, the continuation of the petitioner in possession of the premises for a period of nine months will be subject to the payment of rent regularly and subject to the payment of arrears of rent, within two months. In default this order stands vacated.

( 32 ) REVISION dismissed.