Meredith, J.This is an appeal under the Letters Patent by the defendant from a decision of a learned Judge of this Court sitting singly.

2. The suit was brought by the respondent on the basis of an instalment bond which had been executed on 15th November 1939, by the defendant in favour of the plaintiffs brother, who was then joint with him. The bond was executed in respect of past liability upon two handnotes executed on 12th December 1935 and 28th December 1985. According to the plaintiff, a partition took place in his family on 6th December 1941, and this bond was allotted to him.

3. Various defences were taken, which were all rejected by the Courts of fact. But a plea in bar was also taken which succeeded before them. The case relates to Chotanagpur, and the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1939, was extended to Chotanagpur on 20th July 1939, which it will be noticed, was before the execution of the instalment bond. The plaintiff did not get himself registered as a money-lender until 6th December 1941. In these circumstances, it was urged that Section 4, Money-lenders Act, operated as a bar to the suit. That section in effect, provides that a suit shall not be maintainable in respect of a loan advanced after the commencement of the Act except by a registered money-lender, though there is a proviso making a concession in such cases where the loan is advanced within six months of the Act coming into force and the money, lender has got himself registered within the same period. Here, however, the registration was not until more than six months after the Act had come into force.

4. The learned Munsif, holding that Section 4 was a bar, dismissed the suit, and the learned Subordinate Judge, on appeal upheld that decision. The learned Judge of this Court, however, relying upon the decision of this Court in Mt. Surajbansi Kuer and Others Vs. Mt. Larho Kuar, , held that Section 4 was not applicable to the case because this, though a loan, was not a loan advanced after the commencement of the Act. The loan must be regarded as advanced in 1935, when the hand-notes were executed. That was long before the Act came into force. "Loan" is defined, for the purposes of the Money-lenders Act, in Section 2(f) as first, an advance whether of money or in kind on interest made by a money-lender, and including secondly, a transaction on a bond bearing interest executed in respect of past liability, and, thirdly, any transaction which in substance, is a loan. It was held by a Bench of this Court, of which I was a member in the case just cited that Section 4, upon its wording, was intended to apply only to loans as contemplated by the first part of this definition, because the wording used is not "loan" but "loan advanced" and, in the case of a transaction executed in respect of past liability, there is no actual advance.

5. Mr. A.C. Roy for the appellant argues, first, that the observations in the decision were only obiter dicta, because what was really decided was that a casual money-lender need not be registered. In the second place, he urges that, if the decision is not regarded as obiter on this point anyway it is wrong, and the question should be referred to a Pull Bench.

6. I am unable to agree with Mr. Roy that the decision is merely obiter on the point. In that case also the question was whether Section 4 operated as a bar to the suit, and this Court held that it was not a bar for two separate reasons; first because the plaintiff was not a professional money-lender, and second, because, in that particular transaction, there was no actual advance after the Act came into force. Both these grounds were given for the decision, and neither can be regarded as obiter.

7. With regard to the alternative contention that the decision needs re-consideration by a Fall Bench, Mr. Eoy relies mainly on an English case B.S. Lyle Limited v. Chappell (1982) 1 K.B. 691. His argument is that even where the bond is executed in respect of past liability, in the eye of law there is a fresh advance--a notional advance.

8. It must be conceded that in some transactions executed with regard to past liability this will be the position. When general observations are made in any case, they must always be read with regard to the facts of the particular case before the Court. Undoubtedly the observations in Mt. Surajbansi v. Mt. Larho AIR 1946 Pat. 810, must be read with reference to the particular transaction under examination in that case, and if taken as laying down an absolutely general principle, irrespective of the nature of the transaction, they might be regarded as too broad. But as I have said, they should be considered in regard to the facts of that case, and indeed, I think, in regard to Section 4, each case will have to be treated upon its own merits. In some cases, the transaction might be of such a nature as to be regarded in law as a fresh advance, even if in fact no money was actually paid. What B.S. Lyle Limited v. Chappell (1932) 1 K.B. 691, actually lays down, as I read it, is this: that where the transaction between the parties, is in substance a repayment and a fresh advance, it is not necessary to go through the formality of handing over the money and handing it back. The law will regard that as done. In that case a borrower had given to a firm of money-lenders a promissory note to secure payment of a loan with interest. Being in arrear to an amount of 170 in respect of principal and 34 in respect of interest, that is to say 204, he agreed to borrow from the money-lenders a sum of 300, of which 200 should be considered as principal and 100 as interest, and the sum of 300 was to be paid by him by 60 equal consecutive weekly instalments. This was regarded as a fresh loan, even though no money was actually paid over and received by the borrower, Nevertheless, the fact remains that the transaction was expressed as being a fresh loan out of which the original liability was to be discharged. Mr. A.C. Roy argues that every renewal of a contract of loan, or even an extension of time to pay, amounts to a fresh advance. But I do not think the English case cited lays down any such broad proposition. Nor has Mr. Roy been able to cite any case in which it has been laid down. As I have said, I think the matter has to be determined in each case by the nature of the transaction in question. In the present case, there is nothing in the document to suggest any fresh advance, either actual or notional. The transaction was not expressed as a notional repayment, and the substitution of a fresh liability, upon a fresh advance out of which the original liability was to be regarded as discharged. The bond merely recites that out of the loan of Rs. 600 which was taken upon the handnotes after accounting, RS. 535 remained due, and the debtor being unable to pay, the money-lender had agreed to payment by instalments. Accordingly, the prayer for instalments having been allowed, the borrower, by executing this bond, admitted the liability and promised to pay the amount of Es. 535 by certain instalments, which are stated, within a period of three years; and there was a clause that in default of payment of any instalment, the entire amount could be realised at once with interest.

9. Thus, in the present case there was, in my opinion, nothing which could be regarded as a fresh advance. The decision of the learned Single Judge was, therefore, upon the facts of the case, in my judgment, correct, and I would, accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.

Agarwala C. J.

I agree.