VENKATACHALIAH, J.

(1) THIS Appeal involves the question whether a reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer under S. 18 (3) (a) of the Karnataka Land Acquisition (Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961 (act for short) beyond the period of 90 days stipulated therein is, by that reason alone, an invalid reference. In Uppara Basappa v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, ILR 1986 Kant 2102 a learned single Judge has taken the view that a reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer beyond 90 days contemplated in S. 18 (3) (a) is an invalid reference. Another learned single Judge, in Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg) Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmavva, AIR 1982 Kar 347 has held such reference to be valid if the reference was within 3 years and 90 days from the date of filing of a valid application under S. 18 (1) of the Act. There is thus a divergence of judicial opinion on the point, which requires to be resolved here. The appeal is by the Assistant Commissioner, B. S. Division, Belgaum, directed against the judgement and Award dated 7th Aug., 1986 made in L.A.C. No. 73 of 1986 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge, Chikodi, enhancing compensation in respect of certain extents of land in Sy. No. 268/1, 268/3, 262/3, 262/9 and 262/10 of Nidasoshi village. Hukkeri Taluk, Belgaum District, acquired, for the purpose of formation of public road, pursuant to the preliminary Notification published in the Gazette dated 21-5-1981.

(2) THE claim before the Land Acquisition Officer was at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per acre. The Land Acquisition Officer determined the market value of the land at Rs.5300/- per acre uniformly treating the lands at Jirayat lands. Respondent-claimant did not accept the offer contained in the L. A. Os Award. She sought for reference to the Civil Court. In the present case, the L. A. O. passed the award on 28-2-1984. Notice of Award under S. 12 (2) was served on 15-4-85. Respondent-claimant filed the application under S. 18 (1) seeking a reference on 13-5-1985 well within the time prescribed by the proviso to S. 18 (2). But the L. A. O. did not send the reference to the Civil Court within 90 days from 13-5-1985; but made the reference on 10-3-1986. The Civil Court, on an appreciation of the evidence, treated an extent of 0.18 guntas out of the acquired lands in SY. No. 268/3 as Bagayat land, capable of raising irrigated crops and fixed the market value of that extent at Rs.14,000/- per acre. The rest of the acquired lands were treated as Jirayat lands and on that basis of the capitalisation of the net-income a sum of Rs.8500/- per acre was determined as market value.

(3) WE have heard Sri Chandrasekharaiah, learned Government Advocate for the appellant and Sri Kothavale, learned Counsel for the Respondent-claimant. We have been taken through the judgement and Award under appeal and the evidence on record. On the contentions urged at the hearing of this appeal the following points fall for determination : (A) Where, a "person interested" files a valid application under S. 18 (1) within the time prescribed therefor but the Land Acquisition Officer makes the reference beyond the period of 90 days contemplated in S. 18 (3) (a), whether such a reference would be an invalid reference by reason alone of the delay on the part of the L.A.O. in making the reference whether the pronouncement in Uppara Basappas case (ILR 1986 Kant 2102) can be said to lay down the law on the point correctly (B) Whether the re-classification of the lands into bagayat and jirayat portions made by the Court below and the enhancement of compensation in respect of the former to Rs.14,000/- per acre and in respect of the latter to Rs.8500/- per acre is not supportable on the evidence on record (C) If so, what is the proper market value to be determined in respect of the acquired lands (D) Whether the respondent-claimant is entitled to the benefits of higher solatium under S. 23 (2); to the higher rate of interest on the enhanced amount of compensation under S. 28 and to the additional amount under S. 23 (1a) of the Karnataka Act 17 of 1961, read with the Central Amending Act 68 of 1984. "section 18 (1) of the Act, inter alia, provides that "any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Deputy Commissioner require that the matter be referred by the Deputy Commissioner for the determination of the Court whether his objection to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. " Proviso to Sub-S. (2) of S. 18 requires that an application under S. 18 (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date of service of the notice under S. 12 (2 ). This proviso prescribes a period of limitation within which an application under S. 18 (1) shall be filed. It is necessary to set out S. 18 (3). It says :" (3) (A) The Deputy Commissioner shall within ninety days from the date of receipt of an application under Sub-S. (1) make a reference to the Court. (b) If the Deputy Commissioner does not make a reference to the Court within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of application, the applicant may apply to the Court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference, and the Court may direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such time as the Court may fix. "in Lakshmavvas case (AIR 1982 Kar 347) Swami,. , after an examination of the scheme of the Act, was persuaded to the view that the period of 90 days contemplated in S. 18 (3) (a) of the Act, is a mere direction as to the period of time within which the statutory obligation on the part of the L. A. O. would require to be performed; that such statutory obligation does not come to an end as long as the right in the person interested to compel a reference subsists; that since a person interested is entitled to make an application under S. 18 (3) (b) within the period of 3 years after the expiry of the said 90 days from the date of filing of an application under S. 18 (1), the statutory obligation on the part of the L. A. O. to make a reference must be held to subsist co-extensively and that, therefore, a reference made within that time should be held to be a valid reference. Swami,. observed :"5.3. . . . . As long as the jurisdiction to give a direction to the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference exists in the Civil Court, the statutory obligation of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference must be held to continue. In that event, only the two sub-clauses can be read together otherwise it will be defeating the very object of the Act. Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-S. (3) of S. 18 of the Act, are not mutually exclusive as contended by the Learned Government Pleader. In fact, the entire S. 18 of the Act, has to be read as a whole. "in Uppara Basappas case (ILR 1986 Kant 2102) the view that commended itself to Kulkarni,. was this :-"11. . . . . . . . THE prescription of ninety days imposed on the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference, debars the Deputy Commissioner from making a reference after the expiry of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application under Sub-S. (1) of S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. "the question is which of these two views can be said to lay down the law correctly.

(4) WE may now notice briefly the arguments of the learned Counsel on either side. Sr. Kothavale submitted that, consistent with this statutory-right of the person interested to compel a reference and the correlative-duty on the part of the L. A. O. to make such reference, the prescription of the time in S. 18 (3) (a) is not one of limitation but a direction to the L. A. O. to act expeditiously and is a provision built-in for the benefit of the persons interested to avoid inconvenience to them by undue delays in the performance of the statutory obligation on the part of the L.A.O. Sr. Kothavale contended that having regard to the purpose for which this statutory duty is cast on the L.A.O. it would only be reasonable to construe that the duty would subsist till it is discharged by performance and, at any rate, any construction which would lead to the result that the person charged with the duty could, by his own inaction, get rid of his own duty and thereby extinguish the right of the person for whose benefit the duty existed would be unreasonable. Sr. Kothavale submitted that serious inconvenience and great injustice would follow if the nullification of the obligation itself is to be inferred from the disobedience of the statutory-duty by the very person charged with that duty. Sr. Chandrasekharaiah, learned Government Advocate, strongly supporting the view that commended itself to Kulkarni,. in Uppara Basappas case (ILR 1986 Kant 2102) submitted that the expression "shall" in S. 18 (3) (a) would connote the significance of the time-limit for the performance of the duty and that since a remedy for the nonperformance of this duty by the L.A.O. within the time prescribed is also provided in Cl.18 (3) (b), the statutory obligation under S. 18 (3) (a) comes to an end as a consequence of the creation of a new right in the persons interested under S. 18 (3) (b) to move the Civil Court for a reference. The argument is that the right of the persons-interested is not defeated by the non-performance by the L.A.O. of his obligation under S. 18 (3) (a) but is replaced by a new right to work out this remedy under S.18 (3) (b) and that therefore, the assumption basic to the contention of Sr. Kothavale that the construction placed on the relevant provisions in Uppara Basappas case (ILR 1986 Kant 2102) would lead to a total extinguishment of the right of the person interested is an untenable one. Learned Government Advocate, accordingly, contended that if Cls. (a) and (b) of S.18 (3) are, as indeed they must be, construed together, the inference becomes inescapable that the period of 90 days provided in S. 18 (3) (a) is intended to be made the outermost limit, in point of time, of the subsistence of the obligation on the part of the L. A. O. to make a reference and with the extinguishment of that obligation upon the expiry of ninety days, a new remedy under S. 18 (3) (b) is born. The coming into being of the remedy under S. 18 (3) (b), according to the argument, is itself the result of the extinguishment of the obligation of the L. A. O. under S. 18 (3) (a). Learned Government Advocate also submitted that if the statute bids that a certain thing be done in a particular manner it can only be done in that manner and in no other.

(5) WE shall, first, examine whether the contentions of the learned Government Advocate have, really, any substance. S. 18 (1) confers a right on the person-interested, who has not accepted the award, that he may "require" that the matter be referred by the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the Court. In Kothamasu Kanakarathamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 304 [LQ/SC/1964/11] the right of the person-interested to "require" that the matter be referred to the Civil Court and the correlative duty of the L.A.O. to make the reference are referred to thus :" (2 ). . . . . Indeed, whenever applications are made under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference unless there is a valid round for rejecting the applications such as for instance that the applications were barred by time. Where an officer of the State is remiss in the performance of his duties in fairness the State ought not to take advantage of this fact. . . . . " (Emphasis supplied) in Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 [LQ/SC/1965/113] it was observed :" (13 ). . . . . Again under S. 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested. . . . . " (Emphasis supplied)* * (Emphasis not found in original - Ed) in Md. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 404 Supreme Court observed that the expression "require" implies an element of compulsion and observed :-"24. . . . . The word "require" in S. 18 of the Act implies compulsion. It carries with it the idea that the written application makes it incumbent on the Collector to make a reference. The Collector is required to make a reference under S. 18 on the fulfilment of certain conditions. . . . . "the reference to be made pursuant to S. 18 (3) (b) is pursuant to and in effectuation of the same right of the person interested on which an application under S. 18 (1) is based and in enforcement of the same statutory obligation on the part of the L. A. O. to make - reference under S. 18 (3) (a ). There are no two sets of rights and obligations separately under S. 18 (3) (a) and 18 (3) (b ). The purposes for which stipulation of time for the performance of the Duty by the L. A. O. under S. 18 (3) (b) is built-in is set out in the report of the Joint Select Committee in its recommendations :-"in some cases, the Deputy Commissioners do not make a reference even when an application has been made. We therefore, consider it necessary to make it obligatory on the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference within ninety days from the date of receipt of an application under S. 18 (1 ). We are also of the opinion that provision should be made empowering the Court to require the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. We accordingly, inserted a new Sub-S. (3) in S. 18. " (Underlining supplied) the Joint Select Committees report would indicate that jurisdiction of the Court is to require the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. That obligation is not independent of the one arising from the right of the person interested to require a reference under S. 18 (1) of the Act. The statutory obligation on the part of the L. A. O. to make a reference on the application filed under S. 18 (1) does not come to an end with the expiry of ninety days contemplated under S. 18 (3) (a ). The obligation subsists till the Court is moved in the matter under S. 18 (3) (b).

(6) IF the time limit under S. 18 (3) (a) is built-in for the benefit of the person-interested no construction can be placed on it which would defeat its very purpose by the delay on the part of the person charged with the duty to act promptly. The L.A.O. cannot benefit by his own wrong. S.18 (3) (2) is a procedural provision. It is a sound rule of construction that procedural enactments should be construed liberally and in such manner as to render the enforcement of substantive rights effective. The procedure is after all the hand maid and not the mistress of justice. To construe a provision which was intended to give speedy relief to the persons-interested and in aid of their substantive rights should not be construed in a manner which would defeat the very rights of those persons. Any construction which would lead to serious injustice should be avoided.

(7) THERE is a fundamental distinction between the nature and quality of the prescription of time in the second proviso to S. 18 (2) on the one hand and in S. 18 (3) (a) on the other. The first is a case of limitation for the enforcement of a right and seeking a remedy; the other is a case of prescription of time for the performance of a statutory duty. In the very nature of things, these two prescriptions cannot be put on the same footing, for purposes of construction. A provision prescribing limitation is a disabling one. An accessory right - a right to a remedy - gets barred. In M. P. Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) 22 STC 400 Supreme Court observed:"it is a common knowledge that the law generally prescribes limitation for initiating proceedings and not a period within which a pending proceeding should be disposed of. "but the prescription of a time-limit in S.18 (3) (a) relates to the performance of a statutory duty. As we have seen, S. 18 (3) (a) imposes a duty on the L.A.O. to make a reference when there is a valid application under S. 18 (1) in that behalf. The statute then says that that duty shall be discharged by performance within a specified time. Does it lie in the power of the L. A. O. to defeat the provisions which impose the duty by disregarding its performance within the time prescribed The answer must needs rest on whether the prescription of time - where it is one bearing on the performance of a public duty - is mandatory or merely directory. In this Maxwell says (Maxwell on interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, at page 314.) :- "no universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. "the following observation of Sri Arthur Channel in Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin, 1917 AC 170 at 174 is also worth recalling :". . . . . When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in respect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them though punishable, not affecting the validity of acts done. "in the present case, the prescription of time in S. 18 (3) (a) is for the benefit and furtherance of the right of the person-interested and was clearly not intended as a time-limit beyond which the statutory duty itself would get extinguished. We think we should not opt for an interpretation which has this consequence, as serious general inconvenience would result from such an interpretation. It would not also promote the objects of the legislature in building-in this provision in the statute.

(8) SEVERAL judicial pronouncements have considered the effect of the disregard of the provisions in a statute prescribing time limits for the performance of duties. In the Remington Rand of India Limited v. The workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224 [LQ/SC/1967/226] construing S. 17 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, touching the prescription of a time-limit of 30 days for the publication of a report or award, Supreme Court observed :-". . . . . a provision as to time in S. 17 (1) is merely directory and not mandatory. S. 17 (1) makes it obligatory on the Government to publish the award. The limit of time has been fixed as showing that the publication of the award ought not to be held up. But the fixation of the period of 30 days mentioned therein does not mean that publication beyond that time will render the award invalid. "in Prakashchand Maheswari v. Zilla Parishad, Muzzaffarnagar, AIR 1971 SC 1696 [LQ/SC/1971/305] referring to the time schedule under Rules 4 and 5 framed under the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, it was held :-"17. The next argument of counsel that the time schedule mentioned in Rr. 4 and 5 in the notification of Jan. 28 not having been adhered to, the assessment was illegal, must be rejected on the face of it. These rules laying down certain dates by which the work was directed to be taken in hand and completed were merely directory and not mandatory. . . . . "in Manzoor Khan v. State of U. P. , AIR 1973 SC 2548 [LQ/SC/1973/183] the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam (1 of 1966), regarding the scheme being sanctioned within 6 months was considered. It was observed :"5. The fact that the scheme was not sanctioned within six months from the date of inviting objections cannot make the scheme illegal or ultra vires. Even S. 31 merely provides that the Board may, so far as may be, within six months. . . . . sanctioned it. . . . . " So the period of six months within which the scheme has to be sanctioned is not an absolute limit. The provision regarding the scheme being sanctioned within six months is purely directory and not mandatory. The scheme is, therefore, valid. "in Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 653 [LQ/SC/1980/443] the provisions of Sub-Ss. (3) and (S) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 fell for consideration. Sub-Sec. (3) provided :"within sixty days after the receipt of any application under Sub-S. (1) the Standing Committee shall either accord sanction to the lay-out on such conditions as it may think fit or disallow it or ask for further information with respect to it. "sub-Sec. (5) said :-". . . . . PROVIDED that the passing of such orders shall not be in any case delayed for more than sixty days. . . . . . ". The question was whether the time-schedule was mandatory and non-compliance with it resulted in a deemed sanction. Negativing this contention Supreme Court observed :"it seems to us that when Sub-Sec. (3) declares that the Standing Committee shall within sixty days of receipt of the application deal with it, and when the proviso to Sub-S. (5) declares that the Standing Committee shall not in any case delay the passing of orders for more than sixty days the statute merely prescribes a standard of time within which it expects the Standing Committee to dispose of the matter. It is a standard which the statute considers to be reasonable. But non-compliance does not result in a deemed sanction to the lay-out plan. "in R. v. Urbanowski, (1976) 1 All ER 679 it was observed :-"counsel for the Crown. . . . . referred us to the analogous law dealing with the time limit for stating cases to the Divisional Court, and he has referred us to authority which offers guidance as to when the court should hold statutory words to be directory, and when mandatory. We find considerable assistance in the interpretation of this Sub-Section from a consideration of the law relating to the time limit for stating cases and I will indicate very shortly why. Rule 67 of the Magistrates Courts Rules 1968 provides that the time within which justices shall state a case shall be three months after the application for the case to be stated. . . . . "scarman L.. referred to and relied upon the following orders of Cave,. in Hughes v. Wavertree Local Board, (1894) 10 TLR 357 :"the rule in question provides that on an application to the Court to Summary Jurisdiction under that Act at any time within seven clear days a case shall be stated in three months after the date of the application and after the recognizances are entered into. It is contended that the whole of the rule is a condition precedent, and that it is not merely directory. It may be so as far as relates to acts to be done by the appellant, but not so far as it relates to the magistrates; as to their act it is only directory. "

(9) The anology of the provisions of S. 66 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (corresponding to S. 256 of the 1961 Act) and the judicial pronouncement on the effect of non-compliance with the prescription of time therein is even more apposite. The relevant portion of the said S. 66 (1) provided :-". . . . . AND the Appellate Tribunal shall within ninety days of the receipt of such application draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court. "in Benoy Kumar v..-T. Commissioner, AIR 1954 Cal 225 [LQ/CalHC/1953/142] Chief Justice Chakravarti, referring to the validity of a reference under S. 66 (1) made by the Tribunal after the expiry of the period of ninety days observed :"in the present case the reference was not made within ninety days from the receipt of the application. . . . . . . . . The act which the statute enjoins to be done within a particular period is an act to be done by the Tribunal and it is a settled principle of construction that when the effect of construing such provisions as mandatory would be to affect the rights of individuals, they ought not to be so construed :- canadian Pacific Rail. Co. v. Parke, (1899) AC 535 ( A ). The principle was stated by the Privy Council more elaborately in montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin, AIR 1917 PC 142 (B), which is the leading case on the subject. As stated there, the principle is that where the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of that duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, such provisions should be construed as being directory only and not imperative. "(Emphasis supplied) what emerges from these pronouncements is that, the time-limit prescribed for performance of a duty is rarely mandatory. In the present case, as long as the right on the part of the person interested to compel a reference subsists that right must be held to subsist till the right to move the Court under S. 18 (3) (b) is not lost - a reference made by the L. A. O. even if it be after the period of ninety days prescribed in S. 18 (3) (a), would require to be sustained. S. 18 (3) (a) directs the L.A.O. to act promptly and the period of ninety days referred to therein is the legislatures standard of promptitude. It does not mean that if the L. A. O. is not prompt in performing the duty, the right, to aid which the duty exists as correlative, is itself lost. Such a construction would palpably be an unjust construction. In Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated collieries Ltd., 1940 AC 1014 at p. 1022 it was observed :". . . . . IF the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. "then again, Maxwell reiterates that any interpretation of a provision should be agreeable to justice, reason and commonsense. It is observed:

"if the Court is to avoid statutory result that flouts commonsense and justice it must do so not by disregarding the Statute or overriding it, but by interpreting it in accordance with the judicially presumed parliamentary concern for commonsense and justice. "(page 208)

(10) WE may now turn to the reasoning that commended itself in Uppara Basappas case ILR 1986 Kant 2102. Kulkarni,. placed reliance on the two decisions viz. , Gangavva, v. Udachappa, AIR 1964 Mys 107 (FB) and Md. Hasnuddins case (AIR 1979 SC 404 ). Both these cases, we are afraid, were on a different point. The question that fell for consideration was whether the application filed by the person-interested beyond the period of ninety days prescribed in the proviso to S. 18 (2) would be a valid application. What was decided in that context cannot be apposite in construing a provision like S. 18 (3) (a) which pertains to different stage of the proceedings and is different in quality and content. While the prescription of time in the proviso to S. 18 (2) might well be one of limitation, S. 18 (3) (a) is not a provision of limitation. It is a statutory mandate for an expeditious discharge and performance of a statutory duty. Indeed the observations in Md. Hasnuddins case (AIR 1979 SC 404) excerpted by the learned single Judge pertain to the consequences of an application for reference under S. 18 (1) not being filed in time and whether the Court of reference could go into and examine this. That point has nothing to do with the consequences that flow from the L. A. O. not sending up the reference within ninety days. The observation is in Hasnuddins case (AIR 1979 SC 404) is :"9. The short question that falls for determination in the appeal is whether the Court can go into a question that the application for reference was not made to the Collector within the time prescribed in S. 18, Sub-S. (2) of the Land Acquisition Act; and if so, can it refuse to entertain the reference if it finds it to be barred by time. There was at one time a great divergence of judicial opinion on the question. But almost all the High Courts have now veered round to the view that the Court has the power to go into the question of limitation. It not only has the power but also the duty to examine whether the application for reference was in accordance with law,. i.e., whether it was made within time prescribed under the proviso to Sub-S. (2) of S. 18 of the Act or not. . . . ."

(11) WE are, therefore, with great respect to the learned single Judge, unable to bring ourselves to agree with the view taken of the matter in Uppara Basappas case (ILR 1986 Kant 2102 ). Statutory obligation to make a reference would continue and remain subsisting till the corresponding right on the part of the person interested to seek and compel a reference subsists. Swami,. in Gwalior Rayons case (AIR 1982 Kar 347) has held that this obligation continues till the expiry of the period of three years which is held to be the period of limitation for making an application under S. 18 (3) (b ). It appears to us that the view taken by Swami,. should be preferred to the one taken in Uppara Basappas case. If we prefer the view in Uppara Basappas case undeserved injustice and hardship would be occasioned to the parties. We should, we think, avoid such a construction of the provisions. Indeed Supreme Court said AIR 1986 SC 137 [LQ/SC/1985/319] (P. 66). American Home Products v. Mae, Labs :". . . . . IT is a well-known principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not be put upon a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injustice or absurd inconvenience or anomaly. . . . . "sr. Kothavale urged that the right of the person interested to compel a reference should not be held to come to an end even after the expiry of 3 years and 90 days and that a reference made by the L.A.O. even thereafter would be a valid one. It is unnecessary to go into and answer that question here. The reference in the present case is within the period of 3 years from the expiry of 90 days. We hold the reference to be valid. As long as the Gwalior Rayons case (AIR 1982 Kar 347) continues to hold the field Sr. Kothavales proposition will not be of assistance. Contention (a) is held and answered accordingly.

(12) RE : Contention (b) - The Court-below reclassified the acquired land into Bagayat and Zirayat portions treating 18 guntas as Bagayat and the rest of 1 acre and 24 guntas as Zirayat. The correctness of this is assailed by the appellant. The case of the claimant was that 18 guntas were irrigated by a well situate in the land. The existence of a well was not disputed; but it was suggested in the course of the cross-examination that the well was not in the acquired portions. But even if the source of water was not in the acquired-portion, it is borne out by the evidence that 18 guntas were utilised to raise irrigated crops. In the circumstances it is difficult to accept the contention of the L.A.O. that the Court below was in error in treating these 18 guntas as Bagayat. So far as the valuation of Bagayat portions is concerned, we have been taken through the evidence on record and the reasoning of and the conclusion reached by the Court below. It appears to us that the determination of the market-value at Rs.14,000/- per acre in respect of the 18 guntas of Bagayat-land does not appear to be so excessive as to call for interference in appeal.

(13) SO far as the extent of 1 acre 24 guntas of Zirayat land is concerned, the Court-below treated this as medium type of land and estimated the gross yield at 3. 36 quintals of groundnut. The assessment of the land is more than Rs.4/- per acre. Even the original assessment, it is stated was well above Rs.2/- per acre. The price taken is Rs.427/- per quintal and 40% of the gross yield was deducted towards costs and expenses of cultivation. The basis, on which the Court- below treated the land as "medium type" is somewhat unclear. But, on the facts, we find no infirmity in the determination of the market-value made by the Court-below. If assessment is any indication, the acquired land is shown to be a superior quality of land. Having regard to this assessment, we think that the determination of the market-value may not justify interference in appeal. Contention (b) is also held and answered against the appellant.

(14) RE : Contention (c) - On the basis of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Bhag Singhs case AIR 1985 SC 1576 [LQ/SC/1985/255] and of the Full Bench of this Court in Soma Gopala Gowdas case ILR 1986 Kant 848, claimant-respondents should be held entitled to the benefits of higher solatium under S. 23 (2) as amended and to the higher rate of interest on the enhanced amount of compensation under S. 28. However, in the present case, the claimants are not entitled to the benefits under S. 23 (1a), as possession is stated to have been taken anterior to the date of the preliminary Notification itself. However, if, upon a reconsideration of the principles in Bhag Singhs case (AIR 1985 SC 1576 [LQ/SC/1985/255] ), it is held by the Supreme Court that the claimants in similar circumstances are not entitled to all or any of the aforesaid additional benefits, then, in such an event, this award, in relation to these additional benefits, shall stand so modified by and be read subject to the said pronouncement of the Supreme Court, without need for the appellant L. A. O. to take up this matter individually in appeal to the Supreme Court. This award, in so far as these additional benefits are concerned, shall not be executed for a period of three months from to day or until the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, on a reconsideration of Bhag Singhs case, whichever is earlier. Any recoveries made shall be subject to the final decision in Bhag Singhs case and shall be accounted for or restituted, as the case may be, accordingly. Contention (c) is answered accordingly.

(15) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.