(1.) The Jharkhand State Electricity Board (JSEB) entered into an agree- j ment with M/s. Railway India Technical Ser- j vices Limited (M/s. RITES), a Central Government Undertaking for laying electrification in rural areas consisting of 4923 villages for a sum of Rs. 300 crore. Pursuant to that, different work orders were issued in the year 2003 to M/s. RITES. As per the terms of the agreement, 10% of the project cost equivalent to Rs. 29.19 crores was to be released to M/s. RITES as mobilization advance against the Bank guarantee of equivalent amount. However, M/s. RITES assigned the job for execution of the same to M/s. Ramjee Power Construction Limited (M/s. RPCL) for Rs. 277.5 crore and as per their agreement, M/s. RPCL was required to deposit 5% of the contractual amount, i.e. Rs. 13.875 crores towards security by way of Bank guarantee and further a sum of Rs. 13.875 crores on account of mobilization advance also by way of Bank guarantee. On entering such agreement, M/s. RITES made request to the Board to allow M/s. RPCL to submit Bank guarantee through it (M/s. RITES) for the amount equal to 92.5% of mobilization advance and further allow it (M/s.RITES) directly to furnish Bank guarantee equivalent to the amount of 7.5% of the mobilization advance which request was acceded to by the Board. Thereafter mobilization advance to the tune of Rs.29.19 crores were released to M/s. RITES through cheque of Rs. 10,97,15,020/- in the name of M/s. RPCL and Rs. 18,10,24,076/- in the name of M/s. RITES. However, before that M/s. RITES after obtaining 18 Bank guarantees from M/s. RPCL worth Rs. 25,43,79,465/-deposited it with JSEB. However, on 27-7-2005 Additional General Manager of M/s. RITES informed to the Board that Bank guarantee, received from M/s. RPCL which were deposited with the Board, are forged. When enquiry was made by the Board from the Bank of India, Club side Branch, Main Road, Ranchi, the Chief Manager of the Bank informed that out of 18 Bank guarantees, 14 Bank guarantees worth Rs.19,64,85,959/- had been cancelled on the basis of letter issued by M/s. RITES and also by J.S.E.B and on production of original Bank guarantee by M/s. RPCL, though J.S.E.B had never written either to M/s. RITES or the Bank Manager for discharge of the Bank guarantee and moreover, Bank guarantees as per the clause stipulated therein were never supposed to be cancelled without the consent of J.S.E.B. Under this situation, first information report was lodged on 11-8-2005 against the petitioner, Chairman cum Managing Director of M/s. RPCL as well as Chief Manager, Bank of India, Ranchi alleging therein that the accused persons in conspiracy with each other got the amount of mobilization advance released on the basis of forged Bank guarantees which were cancelled by M/s. RPCL in connivance with Bank officials. Upon it, a case was registered as Dhurwa P. S. case No. 153 of 2005 under Sections 467, 471, 409, 420 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, after one and half month, the Joint General Manager Vigilance of M/s. RITES lodged a case with the CBI putting allegation that pursuant to an agreement arrived at in between M/s. RPCL and M/s. RITES, 15 Bank guarantees worth Rs. 15,91,02,019/- towards security deposit and 12 Bank guarantees worth Rs. 16,80,48,772/- towards mobilization advance were submitted by A. K. Singh, Chairman cum Managing Director of M/s. RPCL. Upon confirmation of the issuance of the Bank Guarantees by the Bank, a sum of Rs.16.8 crore was paid to M/s. RPCL but when some suspicion arose, enquiries were made with respect to genuineity of 27 Bank guarantees, 22 Bank guarantees are forged and not only that even those Bank guarantees have been cancelled by M/s. RPCL without seeking advice from M/s. RITES and thus, Chairman cum Managing Director of M/s. RITES and other employees in connivance with officials of the Bank of India, Ranchi caused loss to M/s. RITES to the tune of Rs.32.7 crores. On the basis of a written complaint, CBI registered a case against the accused persons under Section 120(B) read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

(2.) Upon registration of the second FIR, this writ application was filed for quashing the second first information report on the ground that on the same set of allegation, 1st first information report had been lodged as Dhurwa P. C. case No. 153 of 2005 and as such any statement/allegation subsequently made should have been treated statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as such, registration of second first information report by the CBI is wholly unwarranted and is fit to be set aside.

(3.) However, during the pendency of this application, police submitted charge-sheet on 30-6-2007 under Sections 467,471,409,420 and also under Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner Ashok Kumar Singh, Chairman cum Managing Director, M/s. RPCL, Sudhir Zade, Chief Manager of the concerned Bank, Vijay Burman,Kundan Khanna and Priti Sinha, all Stamp Vendors and even cognizance of the aforesaid offences was taken against all the five accused persons. Subsequently, even in second case registered by the CBI as R. C. 1 of 2005 charge-sheet was submitted under Sections 120(B), 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner, Ashok Kumar Singh, Chairman cum Managing Director of M/s. RPCL, Rajeev Kumar Singh, Director of M/s. RPCL and even the cognizance of the aforesaid offences has been taken against them.

(4.) In these eventualities submission was advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has been alleged to have furnished forged Bank guarantees to the JSEB as well as to M/s. RITES in order to secure mobilization advance from the Board as also from M/s. RITES but, in fact, it is M/s. RITES who can be said to have been allegedly cheated in both the cases as liability fastened as per the agreement arrived at in between JSEB and M/s. RITES is upon M/s. RITES for securing mobilization advance on deposit of Bank guarantees and, therefore, petitioner needs not to be put on trial in both the cases as the alleged act of furnishing forged Bank guarantees form part of the same transaction and, therefore, necessary order be passed for amalgamating both the cases so that accused persons be put to one trial.

(5.) In support of his submission learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance rendered in a case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (AIR 1963 SC 1850 ) and in the case of Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh (AIR 1965 SC 87 ).

(6.) However, learned counsel appearing for the CBI submits that allegations levelled in both the cases never suggests that both the offences have been committed in one transaction, rather the petitioner and other accused persons by playing fraud have been alleged to have cheated JSEB of Rs. 10.97 crore whereas M/s. RITES has been cheated of Rs. 32.7 crore, though mode of cheating is the same whereby forged bank guarantees were deposited and then getting got it cancelled and, therefore, submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner is fit to be rejected.

(7.) It be stated that there is no provision in the Code for amalgamating the cases. Criminal cases cannot like civil suit be consolidated and tried together on the same evidence except within the limits as to the joinder of charges laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code. In terms of Section 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the normal rule for trial is that there should be separate trial in respect of each offence and each accused. It is only because of enabling provisions as contained in Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223 in the Code that a joinder of charge for each offence becomes possible if it falls within the provisions of any one of these four sections which are exceptions to the normal rule as enshrined under Section 218. It is not incumbent on a Court to hold a joint trial, if the offences are distinct offences. However, learned counsel perhaps taking aid of the provision as contained in Section 223(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has come with the plea that both the cases need to be tried together as offence alleged against the petitioner does appear to have been committed in the same transaction.

(8.) Obviously the question does arise as to what is the meaning of same transaction. It has been held in some of the cases that if a series of acts are so connected together by proximity of time community of criminal intent continuity of action and purpose. The opinion of one transaction can be formed. But at the same time, one may not lose sight that merely doing the same thing or similar things continuously or repeatedly does not amount to a same transaction as there is a clear distinction between a same transaction and a similar transaction. It has been held in a case of C. N. Krishna Murthy v. Abdul Subban (AIR 1965 Mys 128) that the main test is the continuity of action meaning thereby the following-up of some initial act through all its consequences and incidents until the series of acts or group of connected acts come to an end either by attainment of the object or by being put to an end to or by abandoned. If any of these things happens and the whole process is begun over again, it is not the same transaction but a new one in spite of the fact that the same general purpose may continue.

(9.) Under this situation, in order to evaluate as to whether the offences as alleged have been committed in same transaction or similar offence has been committed in another transaction, materials collected in course of investigation of the cases need to be examined and for that appropriate stage would be at the time of framing of charge. I am told in course of hearing of the case that both the cases, in which cognizance have already been taken, are pending before the same Court and, therefore, the petitioner would be at liberty to raise the issue before the learned trial Court, so that the Court after going through the materials brought on record, may come to the finding that the offences as alleged have been committed in same transaction or in different transaction and if it is found on the basis of materials collected that the alleged offences have been committed in different transactions then the question of holding one trial for both the offences does not arise.

(10.) With the aforesaid observation/direction, this application is disposed of. Order accordingly.