M.G. MUKHERJI, J.

(1) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment dated June 3, 1991 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court. The learned Single Judge disposed of an application for contempt for a purported disobedience and violation of an earlier order passed by the self-same Court on 21. 7. 89 in C. O. No. 1939 of 1989. It was alleged that by not allowing the Special Officers to hold and conduct the election of the Executive Committee of the Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress as per the programme drawn by the two Special Grocers in accordance with the direction given by the said Court i. e. , the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Alipur there was contempt of Court. There is a further allegation in the said application that there had been an interference with the course of justice by intimidiating the two Special Grocers and causing even assaults on them, which really amounted to criminal contempt.

(2) THE learned Single Judge curiously enough does not come to any specific finding as to whether or not a case for contempt has really been made out by the petitioner and against the contemners. Ignoring the contention of the contemnor respondents before him that any further direction was unnecessary towards the implementation of the Courts initial judgment dated 21. 7. 89 and overruling the contention that it was inexpedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction as a model of executing the previous order, the learned Single Judge was of the view that he could justifiably give appropriate further directions in the matter of holding the election since his earlier judgment dated 21. 7. 89 got the seal of approval of the apex Court of the country and the said learned Single Judge had jurisdiction to reverse or alter or even modify the earlier judgment in any manner whatsoever. He was therefore competent to pass orders since the further contempt application could not be said to be infructuous because he had ample jurisdiction to close the breach in addition to punishing the contemnor. But then the learned Single Judge in his wisdom thought that justice will not only be done properly by merely going into the violation of the order and finding out who is guilty or not but by passing effective direction to hold the election of the Executive Committee of the Union and for the sake of securing the ends of justice and for upholding the preservation of rule of law, he, was competent to pass apposite orders and/or directions. The learned Single Judge accordingly directed the learned Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipur to make all arrangements for holding the election of the Executive Committee of Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress in the compound on the vacant space of the District Judges Court, Alipur on any Sunday or according to convenience under the direct supervision of a senior Assistant l3istrict Judge to be selected by the learned District Judge. He earlier directed the 5th Additional District Judge to give necessary orders so as to appoint two Special Officers for holding the election and gave to the special Officers the choice of a date in consultation with the Assistant District Judge. He went also to direct the District Judge to implement this order so as to render all possible assistance to the 5th Additional District Judge including the availability of the District Judges compound for holding the election. The learned Single Judge further went on to observe that the election was to take place on the basis of the voters list prepared by the Special Officers. There was a further direction on the Deputy Commissioner of Police and the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station to render all possible assistance in the matter. The learned Assistant District Judge was directed-further to function as the Returning Officer and for rendering assistance the Special Officers were given liberty to take other hands to help them in counting the votes. The counting was to take place immediately at the end of the polling time and the Assistant District Judge was to declare the result forthwith after the counting was over. The newly elected Executive Committee of the Union was directed to assume once with the leave of the Additional 13istrict Judge and in case any one had any objection to the election, he was given the right of representation before the learned Additional District Judge and liberty was further given to the learned Additional District Judge to allow the elected representatives to assume once pending the hearing of the said representation of the objector. The election was to take place by secret ballot and the time limit fixed for completion of the election was fixed as 14th August, 1991.

(3) IT seems obvious that very many changes were incorporated by the learned Single Judge subsequent to his earlier judgment and order dated 31. 7. 89.

(4) IT has been argued by the appellants that it was not within the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge to have passed the impugned judgment and order in the manner he did and the learned Single Judge could not effect changes from the earlier order by passing further order and directions. It would not, however, be out of place to remember the sequence of events which led to the present appeal. On 21. 7. 89 the learned Single Judge gave directions for appointment of two Special Officers to conduct the election of the Executive Committee of the Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress in accordance with the constitution of the said Trade Union within g period of two months from the- date of their appointment. This was in a revisional application when the respondents in the present appeal on being unsuccessful in obtaining an injunction both before the trial Court as well as in the Appellate Court came up to this Court in revision. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the election held on 16. 8. 88 was null and void and directed the learned Additional District Judge to appoint two Special Officers to conduct by secret ballot the election of the Executive-Committee of the Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress in accordance with the constitution of the Trade Union. There was a further direction that till the election took place and the result was declared, there should be status quo as on date with regard to the Union, vis-a-vis the appellants and the nine other members of the Executive Committee and also the company. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 21. 7. 89 the present appellants filed a special leave application before the Supreme Court but the same was rejected. Thereafter one Uttam Basu and one Pijus Kanti Nag were appointed as Joint Special Officers by the learned Additional District Judge. By a notice dated 21. 9. 89 an election schedule was framed by the Joint Special Officers which according to the appellants were so done without paying any attention to and in breach of the provision of the Constitution of the Trade Union. The Joint Special Officers invited voters list from both the groups for preparation of the voters list. The appellants contended that the Joint Special Officers showed a partisan spirit and accepted the list submitted by one faction and totally ignored the list submitted by the appellants group. The voters list was apparently full of serious discrepancies and certain instances of such irregularities were cited in paragraph 11 of the application the appellants apprehended that there could not be any free and fair election. The election was to be held on the open road in front of the opening gee of the Companys factory at Garden Reach Road. Even though the appellants expressed their grievance before Joint Special Officers and expressed their apprehensions about there not being a free and fair election the Joint Special Officers did not take any step in this regard to ameliorate the grievance of the appellants. 271 members who were excluded from the purported voters list moved a Writ application but were not successful to obtain an interior order. On. 26. 8. 89 the appellant No. 1 Ashis Chakraborty who claimed be held as per schedule but the result of the same not being declared till l5. 11. 89 and directed the Special fevers to take adequate police protection with a further direction upon the O. C. South Port Police Station to make arrangements for providing adequate police force for ensuring the election to be held peacefully inside the factory premises. On 20. 10. 89 the Special Officers came to the once of the Personnel Manager alongwith respondents No. 6 and 7 i. e. the Assistant Commissioner of Police Port Division and the O. C. South Port Police Station. Workers had already arrived at the factory and they were getting restless because of the delay in commencement of the voting. A group of workers entered the chamber of the Personnel Manager and demanded immediate start of polling. At about 9-00 a. m. appellant No. 1 Asish Chakraborty gave a letter to the Special Officers requesting them to start the election immediately Uttam Basu, one of the Special Officers, suddenly became ill and he was taken to the medical unit of the Company and thereafter was removed to a Nursing Home for further medical check up and treatment. Around 11-00 a. m. the other Special Officer Pijus Kanti Nag issued a notice to the effect that he was not in a position to conduct the election. Even though there were adequate police arrangements, the Special Officers thus failed to perform their duties in holding the election on 20. 10. 89 as per the schedule. Thereafter the respondents filed a contempt application against the appellants and the respondents 2 to 7, before the learned Single Judge, for an alleged violation of the order dated 21. 7. 89 in C. O. 1939 of 1989. It is specifically alleged that the appellants and the respondent No. 8 were trying to frustrate the election as per order 21. 7. 89 passed by the learned Single Judge and ultimately prevented the holdings of the election by not allowing the Special Officers to conduct the election. The contemnors with the help of their supporters violated the said order dated 21,7. 89 in collusion with the Officers and the Management and even the Police personnel. The learned Single Judge passed an order on 21. 11. 89 issuing a Rule Nisi against the appellants and the respondents Nos. 2 to 7. On 12. 12. 89 the said learned Single Judge made it clear that the pendency of said contempt application will not prevent the implementation of his judgment dated 21. 7. 89 and the contempt petitioners would be at liberty to pray before the learned Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipur adequate directions for implementation of the said order and for fixing a date and place of election and for delineating the procedure and modalities to be followed for conducting the said election. The appellants as well as the respondent No. 8 contested the said contempt application and filed affidavits-in-opposition denying all allegations regarding their culpability and further reiterated that they did not violate and disobey the order of this Court in any manner whatsoever, far less wilfully or deliberately. There was no case of any obstruction to the due administration of justice which might land them into the arena of contempt. They had high regards for the Courts orders and with great humility they did bow down to the orders of Court to carry them out. The Company Officers and the Management also denied their complicity and contended further that they did not put any objection or hindrance to the implementation of order dated 21. 7. 89 in any manner whatsoever. The Police Authorities also denied their complicity and averred that at no point of time they refused to cooperate in implementation of the Courts order.

(5) SINCE the learned Additional District Judge refused to hear the objection of the appellants on substantive issues prior to date of the election like exclusion of purported 300 bona fide members of the said Union and the apparent inclusion of 150 ineligible persons in the purported voters list and failure of learned Special Officers to verify and/or to adjudicate upon such matters, the reluctance of the learned Special Officers to follow the detailed procedure for holding a free and fair election and furthermore the learned Additional District Judge failed to act in accordance with the Courts order dated 12. 12. 89 by not giving any direction as to the procedure and modalities to be followed by the Special Officers as regards the conduct of the election, the appellants moved a Civil Revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which was numbered C. O. No. 422 of 1989 before A. K. Nandi, J. who had then the determination to hear out revision eases. By an order dated 18. 1. 90 A. K. Nandi, J. , discharged the Special Officers and appointed two learned Advocates of this Court as Special Divers and further directed inter alia that although the election might be held, the result of the same should not be published and office bearers would not assume office till completion of adjudication on the points raised before the Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge was directed either to investigate himself into the allegations of the petitioners or delegate his duty to the Special Officers. The Special Officers if so entrusted by the learned Additional District Judge were directed to submit report to the learned Judge who would decide finally as to whether the result of their investigation could vitiate the election and this should be so done after hearing both the parties to the proceeding. A. K. Nandi J. , was further pleased to pass several orders as well dated 24. 1. 90, 27. 2. 9d and 20. 8. 90 regard being had to the exigencies of circumstances. The Special Officers subsequently appointed tried to hold the election in terms of the order dated 18. 1. 90 but they could not do so due to non-availability of a suitable venue. By an order dated 20. 8. 90 A. K. Nandi J. , was pleased to discharge Mr. Dilip Kumar Sett and Mr. Tapan Kumar Dutt, two learned Advocates of this Court Who expressed their unwillingness to continue any more and directed the Additional District Judge to appoint another two Special Officers to conduct the election as expeditiously as possible and by any means before the Puja vacation and further directed that the order passed on 18. 1. 90 would hold ,good excepting such modifications that were necessary on account of the lapse of time and that copies of all the orders passed by him were directed to be sent to the Court below for a consideration in accordance with law. Mr. H. K. Gajra and Mr. P. K. Roy, two retired Judicial Officers of West Bengal Higher Judicial Service were appointed as Special Officers. Due to non-availability of Garden Reach Municipality the election could not be held. It seems obvious that the learned Single Judge who ultimately heard out the matter did not direct his mind at all as to the merits of the fresh contempt application but arguments were only made on the question as to whether the said learned Single Judge retained to himself the jurisdiction to pass necessary and effective orders without deciding as to whether any contempt had been committed or not. The learned Trial Judge also bypassed the main issue as to whether the order dated 21. 7. 89 remained alive regarding the holding of election since some subsequent orders in supercession of the earlier order were passed from time to time by A. K. Nandi, J.

(6) THE learned Single Judge was very much aware of the submission made by the respondents who moved for contempt before him that the very purpose of the contempt application was not to have anybody punished but to have efficacious relief granted by him earlier in his judgment dated 21. 7. 89. The learned Single Judge was conscious of the Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 1982 (2) CHN 213 (Samir Kumar Sarkar v. Maharaj Singh) that it was inexpedient to invoke and exercise the contempt jurisdiction as a mode of executing the original order and that the jurisdiction of contempt was really a matter of concern for the administration of justice, dignity and authority of judicial tribunals and it was not a right of a party for invoking the contempt jurisdiction merely for the redress of his grievances and an application for contempt was also not a mode by which rights of a party could be enforced against another. In Md. Idris and Anr. v. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji and Ors. reported in AIR. 1984 SC 1826, [LQ/SC/1984/224] it was held that the High Court could pass appropriate-direction in addition to punishing the party for contempt of court. But here it was a case of not at all punishing any party for contempt of court but merely altering the previous order dated 21. 7. 89 in trying to set at naught the subsequent orders of A. K. Nandi, J.

(7) MR. Saktinath Mukherjee appearing for the respondents contended that the effect of the order dated 21. 7. 89 was that the Additional District Judge was merely to pass certain orders as were necessary from time to time by way of its supervisory jurisdiction. as a delegated authority but he was not to exercise any judicial powers and as such the different revisional applications which were filed before the revisional Court in which A. K. Nandi, J. passed orders were all without jurisdiction. We have given the contention the necessary appreciation as it deserved but we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree that the Additional District Judge was really a persona non grata and all the orders that A. K. Nandi, J. passed subsequently were so passed in a jurisdiction so exercised in futility. The parties were very much bound to follow the subsequent orders in a jurisdiction to which they have voluntary submitted to and obtained orders from and they could not wriggle out of the same.

(8) MR. Naranarayan Gooptu, the learned Advocate-General, who appeared on behalf of the appellants drew our attention to various changes that the learned Single Judge made from his earlier order and they were as follows:

(i) The Assistant District Judge is to act as the Returning Officer;

(ii) The Special Officers might take other persons to help them in counting of the votes;

(iii) The counting was to take place immediately at the end of the polling time and

(iv) The Assistant District Judge was to declare the results forthwith after the counting is over;

(v) The newly elected Executive Committee of the organisation was to assume office with the leave of the Additional District Judge;

(vi) If anybody has any objection to the election, he would be entitled to make his representations before the Additional District Judge who will consider the same and pass necessary orders and if he thinks proper he should allow elected representatives to assume the office.

(9) MUCH has been said about the appealability of the order. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee appearing for the respondents took a preliminary objection that the Supreme Court clearly enunciated a principle of law in D. N. Taneja v. Bhajanlal reported in (1988) 3 SCC page 26 that unless punishment is imposed by the High Court the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution and further that when the High Court acquits contemners, it does not exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. The Supreme Court further observed that when the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt, there is no provision of appeal against any order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by or under Article 215 of the Constitution.

(10) WE find, however, that the words of the statute are wider in magnitude than what was propounded in the Supreme Court Judgment itself. We find section 19 (1) of the Act providing an appeal against any "order or decision of High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt". It was argued by Mr. Mlukherjee that the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is confined only to the passing of an order of punishment under section 12. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the court does not exercise a jurisdiction to punish for contempt, where no punishment is ultimately imposed and even though the order might be passed in a proceeding for contempt, it is not appealable under section 19 (1). We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that section 19 (1) does not merely speak of an appeal lying only against punishment for contempt but uses the expression that an appeal lies from any order or decision passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. As regards the meaning of the expression "any order or decision" we understand a variety of orders and punish for contempt. Our own High Court in 1981 (2) CHN page 97 Ranjit Chatterjee v. Rambadan Choubey held that if the order or decision prejudicially affects a party, he has indeed a right of appeal. If no other order except punishment would have been appealable, there would have been no necessity of using the words "any order or decision" in the expression "the execution of the punishment or order appeal against" as used in section 19 (2) (a) of the Act. If the scope of appeal under section 19 is restricted only to punishment imposed under section 12 and nothing beyond, then a person who is ex facie found guilty of contempt under section 14 and is detained in custody pending the hearing on the charge of contempt and is refused bail, would have no right of appeal against such refusal of bail pending the decision on the charge of contempt which will amount to deprive the alleged contemner of the right of appeal in such circumstances. If in case of such an, exigency, where he is directed to be released on a particular bond which is found to be much excessive, his right is to be defeated to a large extent and the very purpose of making provision for appeal to give relief in appropriate cases will be lost. We are of the clear view that while the contemner is detained in custody under section 14 pending determination of the charge, there is no punishment imposed on him as yet under section 12. The contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that the detention in such circumstances would also be a form of punishment under section 12 is really untenable. The legislature in its wisdom does not use surplus words but obviously uses such words which would advance its object and would remove the mischief of ambiguity. We have exhaustibly dealt with all the contingencies in this regard over appealability or otherwise of an order or decision in Ashoke Kumar Rai v. Ashoke Arora, F. M. A. T. No. 2146 of 1991 decided by us on 17. 12. 91 to hold that even though it was stated in D. N. Taneja v. Bhajanlal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 [LQ/SC/1988/278] that unless a punishment is imposed, no appeal lies against it, at best relates to a case of criminal contempt and nothing beyond and if any order or decision is arrived at deciding any bone of contention or any issue in the controversy, an appeal lies.

(11) IN Baradakanta v. Chief Justice G. K. Mishra, AIR 1974 SC 2255 [LQ/SC/1974/195] the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Supreme Court held at page 2260 that where the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise a jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and no appeal would lie against it as of right under the provisions of section 19. The Supreme Court held thus that the Orissa High Court in refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt as prayed for by Baradakacta did not do anything in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The Supreme Court thus on an analysis of the relevant provisions came to a clear finding that the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commenced with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt which might be done either suo moto or on a motion by either party or on a reference by a court. The Supreme Court incidentally held while deciding the main question of law involved in the matter that the impugned order refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt would not come within the purview of provisions of section 19. This decision was, however, of a three-Judge Bench. In a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Baradakanta v. Orissa High Court, AIR 1976 SC 1206 [LQ/SC/1975/348] , the Supreme Court held and observed that only those decisions or orders in which some point is decided or a finding is made in exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to punish for contempt, an appeal lay under section 19. However, in the facts of the said case the Supreme Court held that the impugned order did not fall under such a category which would be appealable since it was an interlocutory order pertaining purely to the procedure, wherein it was made clear that the question of the maintainability of the proceeding would be decided later on. This decision also like the earlier one did not propound any broad proposition of law that except punishment, no other order or decision is appealable under section 19 but on the other hand it broadens the proposition that only such orders or decisions in which some paint is decided or a finding is given in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt, an appeal could be preferred. In the latter case, however, the impugned order was an order passed subsequent to the initiation of the contempt proceeding, but in which no point was decided and no finding was given which could be found to be appealable. In Purshatam Das v. B. B. Dhillon reported in AIR 1978 SC 1014 [LQ/SC/1978/110] , it was held that on a mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by issuance of a notice under section 17, no question was decided and hence an order merely initiating a proceeding without any further order, did not decide anything against the alleged contemners and hence could not be appealed against under section 19.

(12) EVEN though we take into consideration these decisions we have to Bold, which we do in the facts and circumstances of the present case as we have held in Ashoke Kumar Rai v. Ashoke Arora and Anr. , (F. M. A. T. No. 2146 of 1991 decided) by us on 17. 12. 91 that the decision in D. N. Taneja v. Bhajanlal (1988) 3 SCC 26 [LQ/SC/1988/278] , is not attracted to the facts of the present case in view of the inconsistency between this decision of the Supreme Court and that of its earlier decisions in Baradakanta v. Chief Justice G. K. Mishra, AIR 1974 SC 2255 [LQ/SC/1974/195] and by the invocation of the principle of law enunciated in the five-Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1933 [LQ/SC/1989/332] , the pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same composition or a smaller number of Judges and in order that such a judgment would be found binding, it is not necessary that the matter should have to be referred to a Full Court or that pronouncement by a Constitution Bench is necessary and for finding an answer to the question as to when the exercise of the High Courts jurisdiction to punish for contempt comes into play, we are bound to follow the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the earlier decision of Baradakanta v. Chief Justice G. K. Mitra, AIR 1974 SC 2255 [LQ/SC/1974/195] in preference to the decision in D. N. Taneja v. Bhajanlal reported in AIR (1988) 3 SCC 26. Further more it being not a case of criminal contempt, we are compelled to hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there was an uncalled for exercise of contempt jurisdiction by this Court in the manner as done by the learned Single Judge while altering his previous decision or directives without going into a finding at all as to whether or not a contempt has really been committed by any of the contemners as mentioned in the application before the said learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge was really using his contempt jurisdiction in a case not of criminal contempt since he was not vested with the power in the said jurisdiction at all, it being the ale prerogative of Criminal Division Bench and the order is clearly of no force of applicability. Assuming for the sake of argument that he was exercising his jurisdiction for civil contempt, which jurisdiction he could lawfully exercise sitting singly and against the violation of his own order, we must hold in the facts and circumstances of the present case relying on our decision in Ranjugopal Mukherjee v. Ramapada Mahalder and Ors. reported in CAL LT 1991 (2) HC 366 that the Courts enquiry was to be directed to the limited question as to whether its order has been wilfully disobeyed or not. While exercising its powers under the Contempt of Courts Act in a proceeding for civil contempt, it is not therefore open to the Court to pass an order, which will materially add to or alter the order for the alleged disobedience of which its contempt jurisdiction was invoked. When judged in the context of this principle, there is no escape from the conclusion that the learned Single Judge went beyond his jurisdiction in passing the order under appeal.

(13) IN the view we ultimately take of the present case since both the sides have agreed that election should be held as expeditiously as possible, we direct the two Special Officers to decide upon an election schedule after scrutiny of the voters list so that the election may be held as early as possible latest by the end of February, 1992. The venue is to be fixed by the Special Officers after hearing the submission of both the appellants as well as the respondents. In case there be any controversy over the voters list and holding of the election, the same may be referred to the learned 5th Additional District Judge, for his final decision if any, but that, however, would not in any manner hold back the election to the office bearers. We do not approve the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the election should be held in Alipore District Judges compound or that the learned Assistant District Judge is to supervise the election or that he should be functioning as the Returning Officer. Judicial Officers who are to deal with the list from time to time should in our view, not be personally involved as functionaries in the holding of the election, over which they may have to adjudicate since that will put them to great embarrassment or might cause an embarrassment to a colleague of theirs in the judicial fraternity. The Special Officers themselves would be serving as the Returning Officers but then the Special Officers are at liberty to take the help of outsiders in counting of the votes, if they do feel such a necessity. The direction as given by the learned Single Judge regarding the declaration of results immediately after the counting at the end of the polling time may be maintained by the Special Officers but then as already indicated by us, the Assistant District Judge should not be held in-charge of the declaration of the results after the counting and it should be entrusted to the Special Officers. The newly elected Executive Committee of the Union shall assume office with leave of the Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipore as already indicated by us. If anyone has any objection to the election he would be entitled to make adequate representation before the Additional District Judge, 5th Court, Alipore who will consider the representation and pass necessary orders. For all other purposes not specifically indicated in our order, the parties should be at liberty to take proper directions and/or orders from the learned 5th Additional District Judge. The election should be held by secret ballot as indicated by the learned Single Judge. All necessary police protection including posting of public personnel at the time of election should be provided by Deputy Commissioner, Port in consultation with O. C. South Port Police Station.

(14) THE appeal accordingly, stands disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.

(15) LET a xerox copy of the operative portion of this order be made available to all the parties concerned through their respective learned Advocates, countersigned by Assistant Registrar (Court). G. R. Bhattacharjee, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.