Fazl Ali C.J.

1. This is an appeal from an order passed by the Additional Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarpur dated 18-2-1944 in a suit instituted by the appellant Company to recover damages for breach, of a contract from the defendant. The suit was against the Chairman of the District Board of Gaya but in paragraph 2 of the plaint it was stated that "the defendant in the suit is the District Board of Gaya represented by its Chairman". The learned Subordinate Judge has held that he has no jurisdiction to try the suit and has directed the plaint to be returned to the appellant for being filed in proper Court. The appellant being dissatisfied with this order has preferred the present appeal.

2. The plaintiffs case is fully set out in the plaint but the allegations which are material for the purpose of deciding the point before us may be reproduced as follows:

The appellant is a limited liability Company which has its business office in the town of Muzaffarpur and, among other things, carries on the business of constructing buildings, bridges and other works involving skill in engineering. On 18-7-1989 an agreement was signed by the plaintiff at its Muzaffarpur office whereby the plaintiff company undertook to construct for the District Board of Gaya a bridge over the river Panchaney for a sum of Rs. 98,635 and according to the terms of the agreement deposited a certain sum at Gaya as security money. A few months later, the defendant decided to abandon the project of constructing the bridge and after some discussion between representatives of the parties, the plaintiff Company informed the defendant by their letter dated 12.10.1939 that if the contract was cancelled, the plaintiff Company would charge Rs. 41,000 for the prices of materials already ordered for, fabricated and collected and if by 15-10-1939 the final instruction of cancellation reach them, then the plaintiff Company would stop fabrication and collection of further materials by informing the suppliers. On 15-10-1939, the defendant through the District Engineer of the District Board sent the following telegram to the plaintiff Company. "Your... cancel order for balance materials Panchaney bridge work stopped". This telegram was confirmed by a letter and then followed some correspondence between the parties which shows that the defendant desired that the plaintiff Company should have the balance of the materials which were to be used in constructing the bridge fabricated and collected and the plaintiff Company informed the defendant that owing to war conditions the prices of steel materials had risen and the balance of materials could not be had unless an extra cost was agreed to be borne by the District Board. In March or April 1941, the defendant made an attempt to have the bridge constructed by another party with the materials supplied by the plaintiff Company according to the plan and design made by the plaintiff Company to which the plaintiff Company protested strongly. A proposal was then made on behalf of the District Board asking the plaintiff Company to construct the bridge if the District Board agreed to pay Rs. 4480 as extra cost due to increased prices of materials. To this the plaintiff Company made a counter-proposal suggesting the necessity of obtaining a priority certificate to enable them to buy the required materials from dealers of iron goods and also for ascertaining quotations of prices of iron goods then prevailing in Calcutta. Ultimately the attempt to revive the contract completely failed and as the bills submitted by the plaintiff Company were not paid, the plaintiff Company was compelled to bring a suit in which the plaintiff Company claimed Rs. 48,858-4-0, with pendente lite and future interest, as damages for breach of contract.

3. The defendant filed a long written statement in reply to the plaint the contents of which need not be reproduced here and the Subordinate Judge after framing eight issues proceeded to try the suit. The trial was concluded on 18-11944 and on 18-2-1944 the learned Subordinate Judge delivered a judgment in which he decided all the material issues in favour of the plaintiff Company excepting issue No. 3 which raised the question as to whether the suit was triable at Muzaffarpur. He answered issue No. 3 against the plaintiff Company and directed the plaint to be returned for being filed in a Court at Gaya.

4. The only question to be decided in this appeal is whether the view of the Subordinate Judge is correct in law. The answer to this question depends upon the construction of Section 20, Clause (c), Civil P.C. with reference to the facts of the present case. Under this clause a suit may be instituted where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. A cause of action should ordinarily mean the fact or facts which compel plaintiff to bring an action in Court but it is now generally accepted that the expression means, in the words of Lord Justice Fry:

Everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment--every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed and every fact which the defendant could have a right to traverse.

See Read v. Brown (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 128 and Cooke v. Gill (1893) 8 C.P. 107 and also, the observations of Rankin C.J. in Engineering Supplies Ltd. Vs. Dhandhania and Co., . It is obvious that in a suit to recover damages for a breach of contract the cause of action consists of, (1) the making of a contract and (2) its breach; and therefore the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and where the breach occurred. In the present CPC there are only two Explanations to Section 20 The previous Code had a third Explanation, which was to the following effect:

In suits arising out of contract the cause of action arises within the meaning of this section at any of the following places.

(1) the place where the contract was made;

(2) the place where the contract was to be performed or performed or performance thereof completed;

(3) the place where in performance of the contract any money to which the suit relates was expressly or impliedly payable.

This third Explanation has been omitted, but there can be no doubt that the tests mentioned in it are still good tests. The first point which has therefore to be determined is the place where the contract was made. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that since a contract involves an offer and an acceptance, the place where the offer originated may determine the forum because the offer is part of the cause of action. It is further urged on behalf of the appellant that inasmuch as in the present case on 18-7-1939 the plaintiff signed the agreement at Muzaffarpur before submitting it to the defendant at Gaya, part of the cause of action arose at Muzaffarpur and the suit was therefore triable by the Additional Subordinate Judge. In support of this contention, reliance was placed by Mr. Das, the learned Counsel for the appellant, on the decision of Fulton, J. in Dobson Burlow v. Bengal Spinning and Weaving Co. 21 Bom. 126 and of Rankin, C.J. in Engineering Supplies Ltd. Vs. Dhandhania and Co., . These cases seem at first sight to support Mr. Dass contention but as at present advised I am not prepared to subscribe to the view that the mere making of an offer is a part of the cause of action and a suit is triable at a place where the offer originated even though the offer was accepted within the jurisdiction of another Court. If every step taken in the completion of a contract is sufficient to determine the jurisdiction of a Court, then the case may be triable by any number of Courts and the object of the section which among other things aims at giving some protection to the defendant and also at introducing some measure of certainty as to the place of trial may be defeated. As I shall, however, show presently it is not necessary in this case to decide whether the mere fact that the agreement was signed by the plaintiff at Muzaffarpur is sufficient to determine the jurisdiction of the Court at Muzaffarpur to try the present suit.

5. One of the important points in the present case is that the contract which was undoubtedly completed at Gaya is stated to have been cancelled or revoked at Muzaffarpur. There can be no doubt that revocation is part of the cause of action in a suit for breach of a contract and therefore the place where the contract was revoked may determine the forum for the trial of the present suit. Section 6, Contract Act, provides that a proposal is revoked by the communication of notice of revocation by the proposer to the other party. Section 4 of the Act provides that the communication of a revocation is complete as against the person to whom it is made, when it comes to his knowledge. The plaintiffs case is that the revocation was made by a telegram, 15-10-1939 which was duly confirmed by the defendant by his letter dated 16-101939. Under the law, the revocation was not complete until the telegram and the letter in question reached the plaintiff Company.

The same conclusion can be arrived at by a perusal of the correspondence between the parties. It appears that on 12-10-1939 the plaintiffs manager wrote a letter to the District Engineer of Gaya as representative of the District Board which runs as follows:

With reference to your No. 4417 of 3-10-1939 and two proposals we beg to reply as follows:

1. Total cancellation of works:

If the order is to be cancelled we shall have to ask you to take over materials to the value approximately Rs. 41,000. This material has already been received and partly fabricated and is of no use to us. It consists of through plates, cross girders, etc. The balance of the materials have not yet been supplied and can be cancelled provided the decision reaches us at Muzaffarpur by 15-10 1939, to enable us to inform the suppliers.

Upon this a telegram was despatched by the District Engineer to the plaintiff Company on 15th October in these terms: "Your...cancel order for balance materials Panchaney bridge work stopped". The telegram was confirmed afterwards by a letter dated 16-10-1939. As has already been stated the plaintiffs case is that the contract which has been broken was regarding the construction by the plaintiff Company of a bridge over the river Panchaney and this contract was revoked by the defendant when he decided to stop the Panchaney bridge work. The parties had agreed that this revocation to be effective must be communicated to the plaintiff Company at Muzaffarpur on 15-10-1939 and this was done. There can be no doubt therefore that part of the cause of action arose at Muzaffarpur and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge had full jurisdiction to try the suit.

6. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the present appeal is incompetent because whereas the suit in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge was against the Chairman of the District Board, the present appeal has been filed against the District Board of Gaya. It appears that a similar point was raised on behalf of the respondent before the learned Subordinate Judge and it was contended that the suit was not maintainable as the District Board was not the defendant; but he negatived this contention in these words:

In this connection para. 2 of the plaint may be looked to. Though the defendant has been described as the Chairman of the District Board of Gaya, para. 2 clearly mentions that the defendant in this suit is the District Board of Gaya represented by its Chairman. In view of this specific allegation there cannot be any manner of doubt that the defendant is the District Board, and not the Chairman in person or anybody else. The suit therefore as framed is maintainable.

A reference to the plaint shows that the cause title has been amended and the District Board of Gaya has now been substituted as defendant in place of the Chairman of the District Board of Gaya. The present appeal has been filed against the District Board in conformity with the amended plaint. The learned advocate for the respondent contended that the amendment was without jurisdiction, but with that question we are not concerned in this appeal.

7. I would, therefore, allow this appeal with costs, and set aside the order of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit and directing the plaint to be returned for being filed in proper Court. In my opinion the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was quite competent to try the suit and to pass a proper decree therein.

8. We are informed that Mr. Damodar Prasad, the Subordinate Judge, against whose decision this appeal is directed, has been transferred to Gaya. As it will not be desirable that the final judgment in this case should be pronounced by a Judge who did not record the evidence, I would direct u/s 24, Civil P.C., that the suit may be transferred to the Court of Mr. Damodar Prasad at Gaya to enable him to pronounce the final judgment in the suit.

Ray, J.

9. I agree.