Meredith, J.This case has been referred to a Full Bench, as it raises two questions of considerable difficulty and importance. The first is whether the High Court u/s 115, Civil P.C., has jurisdiction to revise a decision of the Collector in a case under the Orissa Tenancy Act (B.&O. Act 2 of 1918) wherein the Collector has wrongly usurped to himself the appellate powers conferred upon the District Judge u/s 204(3) of the Act, or, in the alternative, has acted in the exercise of his own revisional powers u/s 204(5) of the Act. The second is whether a suit u/s 31B, Orissa Tenancy Act, as amended by Act 8 of 1938, is cognizable by the revenue Courts, or by the ordinary civil Courts. The facts are these: Section 81, Orissa Tenancy Act, as it stood before the Amendment Act of 1988 provided inter alia:

When any occupancy-holding or portion of a holding is transferred by private sale, the transferee or his successors-in-interest shall within two years from the date of the commencement of this Act or within one year from the date of the transfer, whichever is later, apply to the landlord to whom the rent of the holding or portion is payable j for registration of the transfer. The maximum fee payable on such registration shall be a sum equal to 25 per centum of the consideration money or to six times the annual rent of the holding or portion thereof, whichever is greater.

Section 193 of the Act provides inter alia: The following suits and applications shall be cognizable by the Collector and shall be instituted and tried or heard under the provisions of this Act, and shall not be cognizable in any other Court except as provided in this Act, namely (a) all suits and applications under any portion of this Act other than Chap. 11.

2. The rest of the section is not material to our present purpose. Section 250 of the Act, as it stood after the Orissa Tenancy Amendment Act (B.& O. Act 2 of 1929) was in the following terms:

The provisions of this Act applicable to arrears of rent and suits and proceedings for the recovery thereof, shall, as far as may be, apply to anything payable or deliverable in respect of (a) any sub-proprietary interest, (b) any nij-jote, khamar, khudakast or nij-ehas land held by cosharers, (c) any land held by cosharers, under the provisions of Sub-sections. (2) and (3) of Section 26, (d) any rights of pasturage, forest rights, rights over fisheries and the like, and (e) any registration fees prescribed in Sections 14, 15, 16, 31 and 31A.

3. Under these provisions suits by the landlord to recover his mutation fees were always entertained in the revenue Courts. For example, in Mritunjpy Praharaj v. Sree Jagannath Jeu A.I.R 1918 Pat. 255, it was held that the transferee of an occupancy holding is bound to deposit the registration fee prescribed by Section 31, Orissa Tenancy Act, 1918, and if he fails to do so the landlord may sue for it. That case dealt with a suit in the revenue Court. A similar case was Balmakund Kanungoe v. Mritunjoy Paharaj AIR 1920 Pat. 377 and also so was Raja Ramchandra Deb v. Fakir Paikara (38) 17 Pat. 325 Act 8 of 1988 abolished the transfer fee. Section 6 of that Act inserted a new Section 30A, which provided, inter alia, that:

The occupancy holding of a raiyat, or a portion or share thereof, shall be transferable by sale, exchange, gift or bequest without the landlords consent and without payment of any fee to him. Such transfer shall carry with it the occupancy right in the holding and all the rights appurtenant thereto.

4. Section 7 substituted a new section for Section 31, containing provisions relating to such transfers, and Section 8 substituted two new Sections 31A and 31B for the old Section 81A. The first clause of this new Section 31B runs:

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any transferee who obtained a transfer of an occupancy holding or a portion or a share thereof, before the commencement of the Orissa Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1938, shall be liable to pay the fees lawfully payable by him at the time of the transfer, within three years from the coming into force of that Act or the date of the landlords knowledge of the transfer whichever is later, but he shall not be liable to ejectment on the ground that the landlord has not given his consent to the transfer.

5. Also by Act 8 of 1938, the words and figures "31 and 31A" were deleted from Section 250. The landlord filed a suit in the Court of the Rent Suit Deputy Collector for recovery of Rs. 106-8-9 as arrear mutation fee and interest due upon a sale deed for Rs. 400 dated 20th June 1938. Act 8 of 1938 came into force on 1st November 1938. The Rent Suit Deputy Collector dismissed the suit, holding that since the amendments of 1938 and the deletion of the provisions from Section 250 under which, he said, such fees were formerly being claimed, he had no jurisdiction to entertain it. He should not, of course, in any case have dismissed the suit. Upon the view which he took his right course was to return the plaint for presentation in the proper Court. However that may be, the landlord preferred an appeal before the Collector, who entertained the appeal as such, and held, that though the amendment of Section 250 might appear to have taken away the power of the rent Courts to entertain such suits, it was not really so, because the provisions of Section 5(c) and (e), Orissa General Clauses Act 1 of 1937 were applicable, and preserved the right of suit in the revenue Courts. He, therefore, allowed the appeal, and directed the Deputy Collector to hear the suit on the merits. Then there was an application in revision to the High Court by the transferee, and the Division Bench, before whom the case came, referred it for decision to a Full Bench.

6. It is conceded that the appeal from the decision of the Deputy Collector lay not to the Collector, but to the District Judge under the provisions of Section 204 of the Act, but it is argued that his order can be taken to be with jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Section 204(5), which give the Collector an unrestricted power of revision, by treating his appellate decision as one in revision. It is unnecessary, in my view, for the purposes of the present case to decide finally the extent of the Collectors power of revision u/s 204(5). I would like to say however that I much doubt whether the provisions of that Sub-section admit of the narrow construction placed upon them by my brother, Manohar Lall, in his separate judgment, which I have had the advantage of seeing. The provisions of Section 204 are peculiar in this respect that they provide in some cases for a course of appeal runningDeputy Collector, Collector, Commissioner, and in others Deputy Collector or Collector, District Judge, High Court. In certain cases moreover, there is a provision that the judgment of the Collector shall be final; and, lastly, in Clause (5) there is a provision that:

Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the Collector may call for the record of any case in which any Deputy Collector has passed a decree or order to which this section applies if it appears that such officer has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, or has failed to exercise a, jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity; and the Collector may pass such order as he thinks fit.

5. The provisions with regard to appeal amount (with a saving as regards certain express provisions elsewhere in the Act) to this, that orders of the Collector, which are not judgments, in suits, or orders in the course of suits relating to their trial, or orders relating to execution, shall be appealable to the Commissioner, and in the case of similar orders of a Deputy Collector appeal will lie to the Collector. In the case however of suits and orders other than the residuary orders already provided for, where the subject-matter does not exceed Rs. 100 in value, and no question as to whether rent is payable for land or not, or question of title is involved, the judgment of the Collector is made final, and an appeal from the Deputy Collector lies to the Collector. In all other suits an appeal lies from the Deputy Collector or Collector to the District Judge, unless the amount in dispute exceeds Rs. 5000, in which case the appeal lies direct to the High Court. In the former case there is a provision for a second appeal to the High Court from the appellate decree of the District Judge. Under these provisions the course of appeal in the present case was plainly Deputy Collector, District Judge, High Court.

6. We are now in a position to appreciate the exact nature of the first question which I have formulated. The objection with regard to the right of the High Court to enter, tain the application was given up during the course of the argument; but if the High Court has no jurisdiction to sit in revision over the decision of the Collector, then no consent can confer jurisdiction, and the question has therefore to be decided. Whether a power of revision exists must depend upon the interpretation of Section 115, Civil P.C. That section empowers the High Court to interfere in revision in a fit case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court, and in which no appeal lies thereto. No appeal has been provided from the decision of the Collector sitting in appeal or in revision. The only question therefore is whether, in circumstances such as those before us, the Collectors Court is subordinate to the High Court. The question of the meaning of the word "subordinate" as used in Section 115 in relation to the power of revision is one which has been frequently considered by the various High Courts. The number of reported decisions is legion. It would be profitless to examine them all. Many of them are Single Judge cases. Lshall deal with those of special interest or importance, and then state my own opinion.

7. Taking first Calcutta cases, the first that need be noticed is a case of Kartik Chandra Ojha v. Gora Chand Mahto 40 Cal. 518 . This was a case under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, but, being before the formation of the Patna High Court, came before the Calcutta High Court. It was held by a Division Bench that the Deputy Commissioners, in the performance of their judicial duties under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, are Courts subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which can therefore interfere with their orders in revision. It was held that proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner for enhancement of rent are judicial proceedings, and in view of the express provisions of Section 224(2) of the Act, which allow in certain cases a second appeal to the High Court, it could not be contended that the Deputy Commissioners in such circumstances were not Courts subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.

8. The important point here is that it was held that the Deputy Commissioners Court was generally subject to the appellate juris diction of the High Court, because there was provision for a second appeal to the High Court in certain cases. It was noticed that under the Act powers of revision, direction and control were vested in the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue; but it was held nevertheless that that did not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere in revision. In the same year, 1913, there was a Full Bench decision of five Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Har Prasad Das 40 Cal 477 in which it was held that in the case of an order passed by a civil Court or revenue Court u/s 476, Criminal P.C., Section 439, Criminal P.C., has no application, but the High Court can exercise J the powers vested in it by Section 115, Civil P.C., or Section 15, High Courts Act. Their Lordships said (at page 50l):

When action is taken by a revenue Court u/s 476, the proceeding before it is, for the reasons already assigned, not a proceeding before an inferior criminal Court within the meaning of Section 435. The order made therein is accordingly not open to revision u/s 439 read with Section 435. But the order is open to revision u/s 115,Civil P.C., on any of the grounds mentioned therein, or u/s 15, High Courts Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 104; the order is made by a revenue authority as a Court in the course of a judicial proceeding before it; with reference to such judicial proceeding the revenue Court is a Court subordinate to this Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C., and is a Court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court within the meaning of Section 15 of 24 and 25 Vict. c. 104.

9. The revenue Court in question was that of the Assistant Settlement Officer. In 1914 in the case of Darbari Panjara Vs. Bhoti Roy, , a Division Bench held, in regard to the Santal Parganas Act (37 of 1855) and the Santal Parganas Justice Regulation (5 of 1893), that the High Court could not interfere u/s 15, High Courts Act, 1861, with orders of Courts where the course of appeal provided was to the Commissioner as High Court, and it made no difference that the same person might have been appointed to act as Sub-divisional Officer and Subordinate Judge, and the same individual appointed to discharge the duties of the Deputy Commissioner and District Judge. The same year another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held, in Uma Charan Mondol v. Midnapur Zeraindary Co. Ltd. AIR 1914 Cal. 890, in a case relating to the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, that although for the purposes of the application of the power of superintendence of the High Court u/s 15, High Courts Act, it was not necessary that an appeal should lie to the High Court in the very proceeding in which the power of superintendence was involved, where, by statute, superintendence over a revenue officer in a particular matter is vested in the Board of Revenue, it would be anomalous to hold that the revenue officer should be deemed, even for the purposes of that particular proceeding, a Court subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court and so subject to its powers of superintendence. Their Lordships pointed out that for the purpose of the application of the power of superintendence it was not necessary that an appeal should lie to the High Court in the very proceeding in which the power of superintendence was invoked. In fact, if the party aggrieved was entitled to relief by way of appeal, it would not be necessary for him to invoke the exercise of the power of superintendence. "But", they said.

where a Court is made subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of a tribunal, different from and in no way subordinate to this Court, it cannot reasonably be held that the Court is subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of this High Court.

10. I come now to a case of 1937 Sachindra Nath Das Vs. Surya Kanta Misra, . There it was held that the High Court could not interfere in revision with the decision of the authority appointed u/s 138(a), Bengal Local Self Government Act (3 of 1885) to determine election disputes, though such authority did act judicially as a Court. The learned Judges considered the question whether, assuming that the authority in question (the District Magistrate) was to function as a Court, that Court was subordinate to the High Court within the contemplation of section 115, Civil P.C. They observed that a District Magistrate when normally functioning as a Court exercises jurisdiction in criminal matters, and not in civil matters. It might, therefore, well be the case that when some new function is imposed upon him by some special Act, although he acts as a Court and not as an individual, that Court is not subject to the civil jurisdiction of the High Court. However, apart from that, they held that the provisions of Section 148, Bengal Local. Self-Government Act, which said that the decision of the authority u/s 138(a) should be final and should not be questioned in any Court, were enough to oust the jurisdiction of the. High Court to act in revision.

11. I turn next to cases of our own High Court. Gopi Biswal v. Ram Chandra Sahu AIR 1916 Pat. 257 was a case (of 1916) under the Orissa Tenancy Act, and presented features similar to the present case. In a suit for arrears of rent the Deputy Collector decided that no rent was payable for a sarbarakari tenure. The plaintiff appealed to the Collector, who gave him a decree. Thereupon the defendant applied to the High Court in revision. A Division Bench held that u/s 204(8) the plaintiff should have appealed not to the Collector, but to the District Judge, and it set aside in revision the judgment and decree passed by the Collector. Unfortunately the question of the jurisdiction of the High Court to act in revision was not raised, or considered. In Raktu Singh v. Emperor A.I.R 1921 Pat. 94 a case of 1921, a Division Bench, purporting to follow Emperor v. Har Prasad Das 40 Cal 477 , held that an order passed by a revenue Court u/s 476, Criminal P.C., is not revisable by the High Court under Sections 435 and 439, Criminal P.C., but is open to revision u/s 115, Civil P.C., or u/s 107, Government of India Act. It may be noticed that the order, which the learned Judges were considering, was that of the Commissioner in the course of hearing an appeal in a mutation case in the Land Registration Department. In 1926, Mulliek, J. sitting singly, in Faujdar Rai Vs. Emperor, followed the above case, applied the same principles, and set aside in revision u/s 115, Civil P.C., an order of the Collector u/s 476, Criminal P.C., passed in proceedings for the commutation of rent u/s 40, Ben. Ten. Act, in appeal from an order of the Sub-Deputy Collector of Champaran.

12. Recently the question has arisen in several cases before the Cuttack Circuit Court in connexion with the Orissa Tenancy Act. In Puni Sethi and Others Vs. Gangadhar Patro and Others, Fazl Ali and Manohar Lall, JJ. considered the question whether the High Court has any power to revise the order of the Collector passed in appeal in a case in which the subject-matter is valued at less than Rs. 100 and to which the provisions of Sub-clause (2) of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act, apply. They were of opinion that in those circumstances the Collector could not be held to be subordinate to the High Court. "He is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court," they said, "if he decides any question mentioned in Sub-clause (3) when his decision becomes appealable to the District Judge or High Court." It was argued before them that the High Court always has the power to revise orders of the subordinate Courts and that as the Collector is sometimes subordinate when deciding cases of the character before them but beyond RS. 100 in value, he must be taken to be subordinate to the High Court for all purposes. They did not accept that argument. The same question was considered again by the same two learned Judges in 5 Cut Parmananda Parida v. Shyarn Sahu Cut L.T. 64. They held that unless a particular case falls under Sub-section (3) of Section 204 the High Court cannot exercise any power of revision in regard to an order passed by the Collector, and they observed:

The majority of oases which are tried under the Orissa Tenancy Act are cognizable by Revenue Courts only. In a limited number of suits however and proceedings arising out of those suits an appeal lies from the decision of the Deputy Collector or Collector to the District Judge or the High Court and only in such cases the Courts of the Deputy Collector and the Collector can be held to be subordinate to the High Court. The scheme of the Act indicates that in simple and petty suits which do not involve any question of title or other complicated question and also in proceedings arising out of such suits the order of the Collector should be final, whether passed as a Court of first instance or as an appellate Court.

13. It will be observed that these two cases go beyond holding that there is no power of revision where the appeal from the Collectors decision lies to the Commissioner. They hold that there can be no revision in those cases where it is merely provided that his order shall be final. In my view, at least in so far as they lay down that wider proposition, these decisions cannot be regarded as correct. It is, to my mind, clear that the power of revision cannot depend on the right of appeal in the particular case, since it is only where there is no right of appeal that the power of revision exists at all under the provisions of Section 115, Civil P.C. If these decisions are correct, it would mean that there is no power to revise an order of the Collector passed in the exercise of his own power of revision. In my view, however, the use of the word "final," as held in Shah Chaturbhuj Vs. Shah Mauji Ram, merely indicates that there is no right of appeal. I shall notice one other Patna case, the Pull Bench decision in Jagarnath Lall Vs. Land Acquisition Deputy Collector, . In that case the Pull Bench held that the High Court had no power to revise an order of the Collector making or refusing to make a reference to the civil Court u/s 18(1), Land Acquisition Act. They held that it is doubtful whether the Collector in such a case acts judicially or as a Court, but in any case he is certainly not a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C. The principle reason for the decision seems to have been that the Land Acquisition Collector is not subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, and the High Court has no power what so ever over him. In the course of the judgment, however, occur the following remarks:

14. It is clear that all Courts are not subordinate to the High Court. For example, Revenue Courts are subordinate to the Board of Revenue, and this Court has no power whatsoever to revise any orders passed by them yet they act judicially.

15. I t is clear that neither this general observation nor the decision in this case can have any bearing on the particular question of the subordination of the Court of the Collector when hearing rent suits under the Orissa Tenancy Act. Two Allahabad cases call for notice. British India Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shanti Narain, was a case (of 1935) under the Companies Act. In g that case it was held by Iqbal Ahmad and Harries, JJ., that a District Judge, upon whom the Local Government had conferred the exclusive original jurisdiction to decide questions arising under the Companies Act, when deciding such matters was nonetheless subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, for the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred on the District Court could in no way oust the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Section 115, that jurisdiction being neither expressly nor impliedly ousted by the Companies Act. Reference was made to other decisions of the Allahabad High Court in which it had been held that no revision lay to the High Court against an appellate decree of the District Judge in suits filed in the revenue Court under the Agra Tenancy Act (Act 2 of 1901). But it was noticed that those decisions turned to some extent on the express provisions of Section 167 of that Act, which debarred all Courts other than a revenue Court from taking cognizance of any dispute or matter of the nature in question except in the way of appeal. In 1938 in Shah Chaturbhuj Vs. Shah Mauji Ram, , it was held by a Pull Bench that the Court exercising jurisdiction u/s 5, U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act (27 of 1934), is a civil Court and as such subordinate to the High Court. The High Court was, therefore, in accordance with Section 115, Civil P.C., competent to revise the order passed by such a Court u/s 5. It was held that there was nothing in that Act that could be interpreted to divest the High Court, either expressly or by necessary implication, of the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 115. The mere denial to the decree-holder of the right of appeal could not warrant the inference that the Legislature intended to bar the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The provision in Clause (2) of Section 5 that the decision of the appellate Court should be "final" meant no more than this, that the order passed by the appellate Court could not be made the subject of a second appeal.

16. I turn now to cases of the Oudh Chief Court. In 1910 a Division Bench held in Indar Parshad v. Fateh Chand (10) 9 I.C. 747, that the High Court has power to interfere in revision with the orders of Courts of revenue exercising jurisdiction under the Rent Act, but only in those cases in which an appeal lies to the Court of the District Judge and to the High Court. Again in 1923 in Chauharja Bakhsh v. Kalka Pande AIR 1923 Oudh. 18 a Division Bench held that the revisional jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioners Court, Oudh, u/s 115, Civil P.C., read with Section 135, Rent Act, was restricted to those cases in which the course of appeal lay to it under Sections 119 and 119B, Rent Act, and did not extend to cases in which the course of appeal lay to the Board of Revenue. In the course of the judgment occur the following observations:

It is admitted that the case out of which this application arises falls within the class of cases in which the course of appeal lies to the Court of the District Judge and to this Court u/s 119, Oudh Rent Act. The chief function of a Court of appeal is to redress the errors of the Court from whose decision it has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal; prima facie therefore the Court of the Assistant Collector, when exercising jurisdiction over the class of cases in which the course of appeal lies to this Court, is a Court subordinate to this Court.

17. In 1929 there was an interesting Pull Bench decision of five Judges in Gaya Prasad v. Kalap Nath AIR 1929 Oudh 389. A suit for recovery of rent under the provisions of Section 108, Clause (2), Oudh Rent Act, 1886, was instituted by the applicant in the Court of an Assistant Collector. The suit was dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff the Deputy Commissioner reversed the decision. Prom the decree of the Deputy Commissioner the defendant preferred a second appeal to the District Judge. The District Judge accepted the appeal, set aside the decree of the Deputy Commissioner, and restored the decree of the Court of first instance. The application in revision was filed against the decision of the District Judge, and the question raised was whether the Court of the District Judge in those circumstances was subordinate to the Chief Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C. It was held that it was not so subordinate, because the Court, of the District Judge in those circumstances must be considered to be a Court of revenue, and as such was not a Court subordinate to the Chief Court. Under the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act the Court of the District Judge was the final Court of appeal, and under the provisions of Section 3 "Court" was defined as "any judicial officer presiding in a Court of Revenue for disposal of matters under this Act." Hence, it was held that the District Judge when so presiding was a Court of Revenue. It seems to have been assumed 3 that that settled the question, and that as a Court of Revenue he could not be subordinate to the highest civil Court. It is to be noticed, however, that there was a dissenting judgment by Hasan, J. Two Bombay cases may be noticed. Kashiram v. Rajaram (11) 35 Bom 487 was a case under the Mamlatdars Courts Act (Bombay Act 2 of 1906). Section 23 of that Act is as follows:

23. (1) There shall be no appeal from any order passed by a mamlatdar under this Act. (2) But the Collector may call for and examine the record of any suit under this Act, and if he considers that any proceeding, finding or order in such suit is illegal or improper, may, after due notice to the parties, pass such order thereon, not inconsistent with this Act, as he thinks fit.

18. The plaintiff brought a possessory suit in the Court of the Mamlatdar. The Mamlatdar upon the pleadings referred the parties to a civil Court. The plaintiff then applied in revision to the Collector, who reversed the decree, and gave a decree for possession. The defendant then applied to the High Court in revision u/s 115, Civil P.C. A Division Bench held that the Collector had assumed the powers of a Court of appeal, and not a Court of revision; that he was not authorized by Section 23 to interfere with the finding of fact of the Mamlatdar; and for those reasons it set aside the order of the Collector, thus revising the Collectors revisional order. In the following year, there occurred another case under the Mamlatdars Courts Act Purshottam Janardan v. Mahadu Pandu (12) 37 Bom. 114 . It was also an application u/s 115, Civil P.C., to set aside an order of the Collector in which he had reversed the decree of the Mamlatdar. It was objected that the High Court had no power to interfere with the order of the Collector so made. It was held that the Collector acting under the Mamlatdars. Courts Act was a Court under the superintendence and control of the High Court and subordinate to it. Reference was made to Section 3, Civil P.C., in which certain Courts are stated to be subordinate to the High Court, "but," observed the Court, "that does not exclude all other Courts from the category of Courts subordinate to the High Court." In the result the Collectors order was set aside.

19. I shall notice three decisions of the Madras High Court. The first is a case of 1919 Kamaswami Goundan v. Kali Goundan AIR 1919 Mad. 672. This was a case under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The application in revision was against an order of the Deputy Collector u/s 131 of that Act, setting aside a sale for arrears of rent. There was a preliminary objection that the Court had no power to revise such an order. The Court noticed that Section 205 of the Act gave a power of revision to the Board of Revenue or the District Collector in the case of such an order, and in the case in question the petitioner had invoked the interference of both those authorities without success. Nevertheless, it was held that Section 192 of the Act rendered Section 115, Civil P.C., applicable to all suits, appeals and all other proceedings under the Madras Estates Land Act and so the High Court was entitled to interfere in revision. The learned Judges said:

It may seem undesirable that the power of revising the same order should vest in two authorities so different in their constitution and ordinary procedure as this Court and the Board of Revenue, and one may wonder whether such a result was deliberately intended by the Legislature or arrived at by inadvertence. Nevertheless, we have to interpret the Act as it stands. It is impossible to say that the grant of the power of revision to this Court is inconsistent with the grant of similar power to the Collector and Board of Revenue; and I think it must be held that Section 192 vests this Court with the power of revision which petitioner invokes.

20. It may be mentioned that the Madras Estates Land Act, like the Orissa Tenancy Act, contains provisions providing for different courses of appeal in different types of cases; in some cases to the Revenue Courts, in some cases to the District Courts and High Court. As for Section 192, it simply makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, subject to certain reservations, generally applicable, giving the Local Government power to make rules debarring the application of any provisions thereof. Rajah of Mandasa v. Jagannayakalu AIR 1932 Mad. 612 is a case of great importance, The question was referred to a Pull Bench of five Judges, I whether the High Court had power to interfere in revision with a decision of the Board of Revenue settling fair rents under chap. 11, Madras Estates Land Act. The majority decision was that the High Court had no such power, but the reason for that conclusion was the finding of the learned Judges that the Board of Revenue in such circumstances acts not judicially as a Court, but administratively. The wider question, whether the Board of Revenue was in all cases free from the revisional superintendence of the High Court, was not decided; but it is noteworthy that in the course of their judgments several of the learned Judges expressed the opinion that the Board of Revenue while sitting as a Court was subordinate to the High Court, and its decisions could be revised. Anantakrishna Ayyar, J., for example, said:

The extreme view that the High Court has no power of revision, either u/s 115, Civil P.C., or u/s 107, Government of India Act, over any orders passed by the Board of Revenue under the Madras Estates Land Act is, in my opinion, unsustainable. I very respectfully differ from the opinions of the learned Phillips and Odgers, JJ. in Raghunadha Patro v. Govinda Patro AIR 1928 Mad 1032 .

21. It is clear also from the terms of the orders of reference that Wallace and Tiru venkatachariar, JJ., the referring Judges, also disagreed with the view taken upon the general question in Raghunadha Patro v. Govinda Patro AIR 1928 Mad 1032 Moreover, one of the learned Judges of the Pull Bench, Sundaram Chetty, J., delivered a dissenting judgment holding that even in settling fair rents under chap. 11 the Board: of Revenue was a Court and subordinate to "the High Court and open to superintendence u/s 107, Government of India Act, though he was of opinion that there was no power of revision u/s 115, Civil P.C., having regard to the special terms of that section and Section 3. Some of the observations of Wallace J. in his order of reference are worth quoting. He said:

The High Court by virtue of Clause 16, Letters Patent, (corresponding to Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court) is a Court of appeal (using that word in a wide sense including revision, reference, and so on) from civil Courts in the Presidency and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence. This power is one which is derived from Parliament and cannot be added to or subtracted from by any enactment of the Local Government, but it is subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council under Clause 44, Letters Patent. The powers of the High Court cannot, therefore, be affected by any statute passed by the Local Government. Even if such a statute professes to lay down, for example, that a particular tribunal is not a civil Court or is not a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court it would be of no effect if the High Court itself decided on a consideration of the case that such tribunal was a civil Court or was a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court...the final arbiter as to whether or not it is a Court under the superintendence of the High Court is the High Court and not the Local Government. Hence, any contention or conclusion that the Madras Estates Land Act itself does not confer the power of revision on the High Court or even that the Local Government did not intend to confer such powers on the High Court or that under rules framed by the Local Government the Board of Revenue is appointed as the final appellate authority or as the final revisional authority is neither here nor there. It is for the High Court to decide whether the Board of Revenue in exercising this appellate or revisional power is or is not a civil Court or a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court.

22. Later on he makes this very pertinent quotation from Rex v. Shoredich Assessment Committee Morgan Ex parte 1910 2 K.B. 859

Subjection to the High Court is a necessary and inseparable incident to all tribunals of limited jurisdiction; for, the existence of the limit necessitates an authority to determine and enforce it.

23. Later he says:

The contention of the respondents that in order to decide whether the High Court has appellate jurisdiction over a Court we must embark on a minute search of the statute constituting that Court in order to find some indication however small, that the Legislature intended to put the Court under superintendence of the High Court is far fetched. One would rather deduce that, where the Legislature intended to subordinate a Court to the High Court but does not make it very clear by the statute which creates the Court, the reason is because the provisions of the Letters Patent make it unnecessary to do so.

24. Later again he says:

the learned Judges seem to regard the existence of a concurrent power of revision both in the High Court and in the Board of Revenue as an anomaly. But a concurrent power of revision is already present in certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. In any case the anomaly is resolved if the High Court is held to be the superior Court of revision.

25. I shall refer to one more Madras decision Sri Perla Annapurnammagaru and Another Vs. The Rajah, , because, though it is a decision of a single Judge, it is a case where it has been definitely held that the High Courts power extends to revising the order of the Collector, made by him in the exercise of his own revisional powers. Venkatasubba Rao J., in his judgment says:

The question is, whether the High Courts power extends to revising the order of the Collector, made t by him in the exercise of his own revisional powers. This question must be answered in the affirmative on the authority of Paramaswami Ayyangar v. Alamu Natehiar Ammal AIR 1919 Mad. 510 and Kamaswami Goundan v. Kali Goundan AIR 1919 Mad. 672. Mr. Venkatesa Ayyangar relies upon the decision of the majority of the Judges in Raghunadha Patro v. Govinda Patro AIR 1928 Mad 1032 but that case dealt with the orders of the Board of Revenue and not of the Collector and having regard to the dissent expressed from it by several Judges in the later Pull Bench case Rajah of Mandasa v. Jagannayakalu AIR 1932 Mad. 612 , as also by the referring Judges there, I am not prepared to extend its application beyond what has been actually decided by it. The preliminary objection therefore fails.

26. One Rangoon decision calls for notice, namely Mohideen v. Bukshi Ram AIR 1926 Rang 33. The question referred to the Full Bench was, whether the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere in j revision with orders passed by the Rent Controller of Rangoon refusing to grant a certificate certifying the standard of rent u/s 15, Rangoon Rent Act. The three learned Judges could not agree. Heald and Rutledge, JJ. were of opinion that the Controller of Rents is not a Court nor a civil Court. The High Court is not a Court of appeal from him as a Court nor has appellate jurisdiction over him, nor is he a Court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court within the meaning of Section 107, Government of India Act, nor subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C., so as to make his decisions subject to revision by the High Court, Rutledge, J., observed that the Controller is not a Court but an executive and administrative officer appointed by the Local Government under the provisions of the Act. Robinson C. J., however, was of a different opinion. He held that the Rent Controller acted as a civil Court, and must be held to be a civil Court. If, therefore, there was a reference from his decision to the Chief Judge of a Small Cause Court (under the provisions of the Act) who supported his decision, an application for revision of the order of the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court would lie to the High Court; and if the Court were to reverse the order it would equally reverse the order of the rent controller. Under those circumstances he observed that it could not possibly be said that the rent controller was not a Court subordinate to the High Court. He held that it was no straining of language or argument to hold that the rent controller was to be regarded as a civil Court, subordinate, through the channel of the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, to the High Court. He held moreover that the expression "appellate jurisdiction" in Section 107, Government of India Act, does not necessarily imply that there must be some right of appeal. The expression, he said, is used merely to indicate the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court so as to cover the largest area over which its jurisdiction extends.

27. Having examined the views of the various High Courts in so far as they have been expressed in reported decisions, let us now turn to an examination of the question itself. It is unnecessary in the present case finally to decide whether the Court of the Collector is subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C., in a case where an appeal lies under the statute to the Commissioner. I will only say, first, that, in my view, it would be an anomaly for subordination to depend upon a mere question of valuation; for the Collectors Court to be subordinate when dealing with a case valued at over Rs. 100, but to escape that subordination merely because the case was of a, lower valuation. The pettiness of a case may be a good reason for providing that there shall be no appeal; it can surely be no reason for providing that the Court shall escape subordination and be free from all supervision in regard to questions of jurisdiction, so as to be able to act without jurisdiction or to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature could ever have intended that. Secondly, in merely providing that the judgment of the Collector shall be final it has not indicated in any way subordination to the Commissioner rather than to the High Court. Thirdly, it is to be noticed that the course of appeal provided is in the main to the District Judge and High Court. It is only in a very limited class of orders, indeed a class of orders which must be mainly, if not wholly, administrative that the course of appeal is provided to the Commissioner. Such a limited provision for an appeal to the Commissioner could hardly support a contention that the District Court and the High Court are not the Courts to the appellate jurisdiction of which the Collectors Court is made, in general, subject. Fourthly, it seems to me that the principles upon which I am going to decide the actual question before me are principles of general application irrespective of any provisions for appeal or finality in particular cases. The most obvious course in seeking to ascertain the connotation of the word "subordinate", as used in Section 115, Civil P.C., is to look to the CPC itself. Section 3 of this Code says that:

For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court.

28. In my view it plainly follows from this that if the revenue Courts hearing suits under the Orissa Tenancy Act are civil Courts of a grade inferior to that of a District Court, then they are subordinate within the provisions of Section 3 and so of Section 115. It seems to me that in many of the cases, which I have examined, it has been assumed that a Court cannot be a revenue Court and a civil Court at the same time; that the two are mutually exclusive. In short, that the revenue Courts deciding disputes between landlord and tenant, because they are distinct from the ordinary civil Courts and are separately referred to in Section 5, Civil P.C., cannot, therefore, be civil Courts within the meaning of Section 3, Civil P.C. In my judgment, that assumption is quite wrong. The revenue officers under the Orissa Tenancy Act, perform many functions. Some of their statutory duties are obviously administrative; others are judicial. In some cases, however, and the present is one of them, they are clearly constituted as Courts exercising judicial functions and deciding ordinary civil disputes, which have been specially assigned to them because they are between landlord and tenant. Because they are between landlord and tenant, they are nonetheless civil suits, and the Courts that decide them are, therefore, civil Courts. These revenue Courts in such cases are merely one species of the genus civil Court. They are a sub-division of civil Courts in the general sense. The fact that there are special provisions regarding these revenue Courts, and a special definition in Section 5, Civil P.C., and that they are specially defined in the Orissa Tenancy Act, can, in no way, affect this, argument. To define the species does not exclude it from the genus.

29. If it is once agreed that these revenue Courts are civil Courts within the meaning of Section 3 then the question of subordination will depend not on their label, but on whether they are of a grade inferior to that of a District Court. It might thus well be the case that some revenue Courts, such as those of the Deputy Collector and Collector, are subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, and others, such as the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, are not. However that may be, there can be no doubt that the Court of the Collector sitting under the provisions of the Orissa Tenancy Act is of a grade inferior to that of a District Court, since there are definite provisions providing for an appeal from the judgment of the Collector to the District Judge. Where one Court is made subject to the appellate jurisdiction of another, the former is obviously thereby made inferior to the latter; and plainly that inferiority must still subsist where by reason of the pettiness of the cause no appeal is provided for. Otherwise, the absurd result would follow that the Court rises in grade in inverse ratio to the importance of the case. If I am right in these views, there can be no escape from the position that the Courts of Deputy Collector and Collector under the Orissa Tenancy Act are subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, and their decisions are therefore open to revision irrespective of any other consideration (unless of course there are express provisions to the contrary within the meaning of Section Civil P.C., which is not the case here).

30. In support of the views t have expressed I rely upon a decision of the Privy Council. In order that the full significance of this decision may be appreciated, it is necessary to consider the provisions of the Bengal Rent Act (Act 10 of 1859) in some detail. The general scheme under that Act with regard to appeals is somewhat similar to that of the Orissa Tenancy Act. Indeed, there can be little doubt that the provisions of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act, have been largely copied from the corresponding provisions in Act 10 of 1859. In Act 10 of 1859 there is the same dual provision for appeal: in one case to the ordinary civil Courts and High Court, in another case to the revenue authorities. Section 23(7) of the Act provides that several classes of suits, specified in the section, shall be cognizable by the Collectors of land revenue and shall be instituted and tried under the provisions of this Act, and, except in the way of appeal as provided in this Act, shall not be cognizable in any other Court or by any other officer or in any other manner. (Notice that this would prima facie appear to debar the High Court from acting in revision). Section 151 makes the Collectors and Deputy Collectors under the Act subject to the general direction and control of the Commissioners and the Board of Revenue. It makes all orders of the Collector, not being judgments in suits or orders passed in the course of suits, and relating to the trial thereof or orders passed after decree, and relating to the execution thereof, appealable to the Commissioner, and says that no judgment of a Collector or Deputy Collector in any suit shall be open to revision or appeal otherwise than as expressly provided in this Act. Section 152 provides that orders passed in appeal by the Commissioner or Collector shall not be open to any further appeal, but the Board of Revenue or the Commissioner may call for any case and pass such orders thereon as they may think proper. In other words, it gives the Board of Revenue and the Commissioners power of revision. Section 153 makes the judgment of the Collector in certain cases below Rs. 100 in value final and not open to revision or appeal, except as afterwards provided in the Act. Section 160 contains provisions for appeal in cases other than those previously referred to, and provides an appeal from the decision of the Collector to the Zillah Judge, except in cases of over Rs. 5000 where it is said that the appeal shall lie to the Sudder Court.

31. Before I come to the Privy Council decision, I must refer to one other Act, the first general CPC (Act 8 of 1859). Section 3 of this Act contains the provisions with regard to revision, and provides that the judgments of "civil Courts" shall not be subject to revision, except by those Courts themselves by way of review under the provisions for review, and by the constituted Courts of appellate jurisdiction. Bearing all these provisions in mind, let us examine the decision of the Privy Council in Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadoor v. Taranath Mookerjee 9 Cal. 295. In that case it was held by the Privy Council that the rent Courts established by Act 10 of 1859 are civil Courts within the meaning of Act 8 of 1859. In other words, in the case of revenue Courts in regard to which the provisions were even more special and exclusive than in the case of revenue Courts under the Orissa Tenancy Act, the Privy Council held them to be civil Courts within the meaning of that expression as used in the Code of Civil Procedure, so as to make Section 284 of that Code, relating to transfer of decrees for execution into another district, applicable to those Courts. If Section 284, then why not Section 115 and Section 3 of the present corresponding Act Not only that, but where the High Court, acting u/s 15 of 24, 25 Vict. c 104, revised the orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Manbhum transferring his own decrees to other districts for execution, the Privy Council held that the High Court had jurisdiction so to interfere. The High Court observed:

If the orders complained of are passed without jurisdiction, we think we have the power to interfere u/s 15 of the Act of Parliament constituting this Court. We are also of opinion that a revenue Court under Act 10 of 1859 has no power to transfer a decree of its own to be executed by another Court within the jurisdiction of the latter. Such power cannot exist without an express provision of the law granting it.

32. The Privy Council said:

A question was raised with respect to the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain this question in revision at all. Their Lordships do not think it necessary to say anything upon that point, except that they entirely agree with the view taken by the High Court of their own jurisdiction.

33. Dealing with the contention that the Collector sitting as Judge of a rent Court established by the Act was not a civil Court within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure, their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to certain sections in the Rent Act distinguishing the revenue Courts from the civil Courts, and said:

It must be allowed that in those sections there is a certain distinction between the civil Courts there spoken of and the rent Courts established by the Act, and that the civil Courts referred to in Section 77, and the kindred sections mean civil Courts exercising all the powers of civil Courts, as distinguished from the rent Courts which only exercise powers over suits of a limited class. In that sense there is a distinction between the terms; but it is entirely another question whether the rent Court does not remain a civil Court in the sense that it is deciding on purely civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights, and whether being a civil Court in that sense, it does not fall within the provisions of Act 8 of 1859. (italics mine.) It is hardly necessary to refer to those provisions in detail, because there is no dispute but that, if the rent Court is a civil Court within Act 8 of 1859, the Collector has u/s 284, the power of transferring his decrees for execution into another district.

34. After examining the question in some detail, their Lordships say:

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the rent Courts established by Act 10 of 1859 must be held to fall within Section 284 of Act 8 of the same year.

35. It is true that this decision related to the words "civil Court" as used in the CPC of 1859, and the Code of 1908 contains provisions, such as those of Sections 3, 4 and 5, not in the earlier Code. I am aware too that Rankin, J. (as he then was) in Allen Bros. & Co. v. Bando & Co. AIR 1923 Cal. 169, has stated that, in his opinion, the expression "civil Court" as used in the CPC is used not in the general sense to connote the genus, but only in re ference to that particular species of civil Court, which has full powers of original jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 9. That is an arguable view, and, in my opinion, much could be said for it but for the fact that the Privy Council has pronounced otherwise. To my mind it is a construction impossible to square with the decision of the Privy Council with which I have just dealt. There is no getting over the fact that, where in the corresponding Code of 1859 the same expression is used in, generally speaking, the same contexts, the Privy Council has said that the rent Courts established by the Rent Act of 1859 must be held to fall within Section 284 of Act 8 of 1859, the expression used in Section 284 being simply "civil Court." So far as I can see by comparing the two Codes the expression "civil Court" is used in exactly the same sense in both the Code of 1859 and that of 1908, and it is to be noted that in both cases the Preamble describes the Act as relating to the "Courts of civil judicature."

36. In the Act of 1908 as in that of 1859 the expression "civil Court" is nowhere defined. The expression "revenue Court" is defined in the later Act in Section 5. That definition, however, merely says in effect that all civil Courts are not revenue Courts within the h meaning of Section 5. It does not say even by implication that revenue Courts are not civil Courts within the meaning of the Act. I shall refer to one more Privy Council decision Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar AIR 1917 P.C. 71. That was a case under the Religious Endowments Act (20 of 1863). That Act gave the civil Court special powers to determine certain matters in connexion with religious endowments. In short, the District Judge under that Act sits as a special tribunal. There is no provision anywhere in the Act with regard to appeal to the High Court, yet the Privy Council held that where the civil Court acts under that Act without jurisdiction, the order is open to revision by the High Court u/s 115, Civil P.C., 1908. It was argued that on the construction of the statute a petition for revision of the adjudication of the District Court did not lie in such a matter as that dealt with in Section 10 of the Act. In regard to this preliminary objection, their Lordships observed:

Section 115, Civil P.C., enables the High Court, in a case in which no appeal lies, to call for the record of any case if the Court by which the case was decided appears to have acted in the exercise of a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it, or to have exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, and further enables it to pass such an order in the case as the Court may think fit.

It will be observed that the section applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it. The section is not directed against conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. And if the appellants contention be correct, then if the civil Court should absolutely and whimsically decline to exercise its jurisdiction and refuse to make any orders as to the filling up of vacancies...there would not, in a case such as the present, be any remedy available under this section and no appeal would lie.

37. These observations would be equally applicable to the decision of the Collector under the Orissa Tenancy Act where no appeal is provided for. It would mean that he could, by usurping a jurisdiction he had not got, pass whimsical orders against which there could be no remedy either by the High Court or by the revenue authorities, since in the Orissa Tenancy Act there is equally no provision for any revision by the latter in such a case. Could the Legislature ever have contemplated that the Collector should be able to usurp the jurisdiction and functions of the District Judge without incurring also the liability to superintendence to which the District Judge is subject, and by usurpation of jurisdiction to free himself from the control under which the office usurped must function So much for the Collectors order regarded as an appellate order without jurisdiction. Regarded as an order in revision, it has been pointed out in several decisions to which I have referred that the existence of the power of revision cannot, in itself, bar a further power of revision by a superior Court. Indeed there is nothing in the provisions of Section 115 upon which any such contention could be founded.

38. So far I have dealt with the question purely in relation to Section 115, Civil P.C. A number of the decisions I have considered proceed also upon the basis of the supposed power of judicial interference in revision conferred u/s 107, Government of India Act. There is no longer any such question of any power of judicial interference in revision outside the limitations of Section 115, since Section 224, Government of India Act, 1935, in reproducing Section 107 of the former Act, adds a clause, making it clear that the superintendence contemplated therein is administrative merely. Nevertheless the provisions of Section 224, Government of India Act, have some beaming on the question of subordination. Under, Section 224 every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts in India for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction, and this superintendence involves the powers, inter alia, to call for returns, make and issue general rules regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts, and so on. Can it be said that this wide power of superintendence over these Courts does not render them subordinate to the High Court, using the word "subordinate" in the ordinary sense The fact that Section 224 does not provide any special power of judicial interference with the decisions of subordinate Courts does not mean that it does not involve subordination. Once, however, subordination is involved, then the powers u/s 115 must come into operation, and so provide means of judicial revision. A certain amount of light is also thrown on the question by the provisions of Clause 11, Letters Patent, which run:

And we do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall be a Court of appeal from the civil Courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence, and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as were, immediately before the date of the publication of these presents, subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal by virtue of any law then in force, or as may after that date be declared subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna by any law made by competent legislative authority for India.

39. From this also it appears that it was in the contemplation of Parliament that liability to superintendence involves judicial subordination. Where a Court is subject to the superintendence of a High Court--whatever Court it may be--the High Court becomes the residuary Court of appeal, from that Court; that is to say, wherever there is a right of appeal, without any specification of the forum where such appeal will lie, the appeal will automatically come to the High Court. It is universally recognized that a Court is subordinate to its Court of appeal, and the power to entertain appeals carries with it, in non-appealable cases, the power of revision. In my view, therefore, it follows, at least in the absence of any legislative provisions to the contrary, that the power of administrative superintendence carries with it judicial subordination. Section 192, Orissa Tenancy Act, provides that, subject to any special notifications by the Local Government, declaring the contrary, and subject to certain (immaterial) exceptions specified elsewhere in the Act, the CPC of 1908 applies to all suits arid other proceedings in the Revenue Courts under the Act. The general application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regulating as they do the entire proceedings in the Courts to which they apply, appears to me in itself to involve the general superintendence of the High Court, since those rules themselves, as contained in Schedule 1, Civil P.C., are all subject to being annulled, altered, or added to by the High Court u/s 122 of the Code. The whole scheme of that Code indicates that its provisions are intended to regulate the procedure of Courts under the superintendence of the High Court. Surely therefore when once the local Legislature in constituting special Courts makes the provisions of the CPC generally applicable in the absence of any special provisions to the contrary, it thereby by implication indicates that it contemplates these Courts as being among those under the High Courts general superintendence. Once that is so, Clause 11, Letters Patent, comes into operation, and constitutes the High Court the general Court of appeal for such Courts, and when that is the case, subordination cannot be denied.

40. Subordination depends ultimately upon subjection to appellate jurisdiction. That is no doubt true, but it is here very necessary to avoid a possible source of confusion. It is the Court, and not the case, that is subordinate. Subordination therefore cannot depend upon the nature of the particular case before the Court. It is in this respect that my view differs from that of my learned brother Manohar Lall. It is not the fact that the present case is in value more than Rs. 100 that justifies a finding that the order is open to revision by us, but the fact that the High Court has residuary appellate jurisdiction over the Court of the Collector constituted under the Orissa Tenancy Act. The question whether a particular case is of a category where appeal is or is not provided for is, in my view, quite irrelevant, unless of course there is some provision of a competent Legislature expressly excluding the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. To quote from Rankin, J. in Allen Bros. & Co. v. Bando & Co.A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 169 "a right of appeal, however limited, will let in the full general power of superintendence," and I would add, will involve subordination. To quote again from the same case.

the rule-making power or even greater powers vested elsewhere do not avail to take away those powers of the Court which follow from its position as a Court of appeal.

41. As I have already indicated, I express No. final opinion on the effect of a provision for appeal elsewhere, as it is unnecessary to decide that point in the present case. In my view, upon both the lines of thought, which I have adopted, the conclusion inevitably follows that an order of the Collector made in the circumstances of the present case can be scrutinized by the, High Court in the exercise of its revisional powers, u/s 115, Civil P.C. I may add that any other view would lead to the possibility of hopeless conflict and deadlock. The present case is not an isolated one. It is stated that a large number of cases are awaiting the result of the present application. Suppose now that in the present case the Collector had taken the opposite view; that he had held that suits like this are not cognizable in the revenue Courts. The Court of the Bent Suit Deputy Collector would be bound by his decision. Suppose in another similar case the plaintiff instead of going to the Collector went in appeal, and went rightly, to the District Judge; and suppose the District Judge held that such suits are not cognizable in the ordinary civil Courts but only in the revenue Courts; and suppose the High Court upheld this view in second appeal; the decision of the High Court and the District Judge would have to be followed by Munsifs, and consequently no Munsifs Court would be able to entertain these suits. If, however, it be held that the order of the Collector in such a case is final and not open to revision by the High Court, then the Deputy Collectors Courts being bound by his decision, also could not entertain such suits. The position would be that a plaintiff would find himself thrown out from both Courts, and with no possible remedy. A construction of the law which could lead to such a possibility is surely to be avoided, unless there is no other alternative.

42. I come now to the second question, whether the Collectors order is right on the merits. It has been conceded that Section 5, Orissa General Clauses Act, has no application, because this is not a case of simple repeal, but of the enactment of new provisions replacing the provisions of the former Act. The provisions of Section 5 are similar to those contained in the other General Clauses Acts that have been enacted in this country. The position in regard to the corresponding section, Section 6 of Act 1 of 1868, has been considered in Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendra Krishna16 Cal. 267 The present appears to be amongst the first class of cases noticed by Wilson, J., in regard to which he says:

The first class of cases-consists of those in which the Courts have had to construe enactments which have altered the law, not by the mere repeal of earliar enactments so as to bring the case u/s 6, General Clauses Act, but by new affirmative provisions, and in which the new enactments contain in themselves no special rule for their own interpretation. In such cases the Courts have applied the settled rule of construction ordinarily acted upon in the absence of any statutory rule inconsistent with it; and that rule is, that retrospective effect is not ordinarily given to an enactment so as to affect substantive rights but that provisions affecting mere procedure are applied to pending proceedings.

43. In the present case, of course, we are concerned merely with a matter of procedure. There is no question of the right to realize these arrears being affected. In fact, the new Act expressly preserves the right, the only question being as regards the procedure for enforcing those rights u/s 31B, whether by suit in the revenue Courts, or in the ordinary civil Courts. It is well settled that no litigant has a vested right in any particular form of procedure. It is unnecessary to refer to further rulings with regard to the application of the General Clauses Act; but reference may just be made to two other Full Bench cases Jogodanund Singh v. Amrita Lal Siroar 22 Cal. 767 and Pateh Chmd v. Muhammad Bakhsh 16 All. 259. If the view of the Collector is correct, it is not for the reasons he has given. It is contended, however, with much force, that Section 250, Orissa Tenancy Act, does not determine the forum of litigation and was never intended to do so, but merely to apply the special incidents of rent suit trials provided in the Act. The exclusion of the reference to Sections 31 and 31A and the omission to substitute any reference to Section 31B could not, therefore, affect the forum in which a suit u/s 31B must lie. That forum is determined by the pro-visions of Section 193, which are directly applicable. Section 193 provides, inter alia, that all suits and applications under any portion of the Act other than chap. 11 (the chapter relating to records of rights and settlement of rents) shall be cognizable by the Collector, and shall not be cognizable in any other Court except as provided in the Act. It is sought to meet this argument by contending that by "suits and applications under this Act" is meant only suits and applications for which there is a special provision in the Act, and not suits which are brought merely in enforcement of a liability or right created by the Act. Section 31B undoubtedly creates an unconditional liability where there was none formerly u/s 81. Indeed it is arguable whether the old Section 31 ever created any liability on the part of the transferee to pay mutation fees. There are cases in which it has been held that such liability, if it existed, existed by custom. Section 31 merely limited it. Section 81B, however, does in express terms provide for the liability of the transferee for the transfer fee within three years of the coming into force of the amending Act, or the date of the landlords knowledge, whichever is later, and in doing so it takes away the former liability to ejectment on the ground that the landlord had not given his consent to the transfer. Section 31B, however, undoubtedly, does not contain any express provision for a suit. It is a case, therefore, of a suit arising out of the liability created by the Act, but a suit not expressly provided for by the Act.

44. It is necessary, therefore, to consider carefully what the Legislature means when it speaks of "suits under the Act." Prima facie the creation of a right imports the creation of a remedy. Let us turn to the provisions of the Act itself in other cases to seek light on the Legislatures meaning. It is argued that the Act does not expressly provide for ejectment suits, and so ejectment suits have always been held to lie in the civil Courts. That, however, seems to be a mistaken contention. The suits which lie in the civil Courts are suits to eject not a tenant, but a trespasser, and are expressly referred to in Section 209. Suits for the ejectment of a tenant are entertained in the revenue Courts, as seems to be implied by the way they are distinguished in Section 207 and Section 209. Moreover, an ejectment suit u/s 75 is specially provided for in the Act, and is, therefore, undoubtedly cognizable only by the revenue Courts, having regard to the provisions of Section 193. There are other provisions in the Act, which seem to indicate clearly that Section 193 is intended to apply directly to all suits in enforcement of rights and liabilities created by the Act. The provisions of Section 60 are strikingly illustrative of this. Section 60(1)(a) simply creates a liability of the tenant to pay additional rent for excess land. It does not say the landlord may bring a suit under this Act for additional rent; yet when we come to Sub-section (5) there is a reference to "a suit under this section" as if the Legislature contemplates that the suit is under the section even though the section merely creates the liability, and contains no express provision for a suit. It is noteworthy that even in regard to suits for rent there seems to be no express provision anywhere that a suit to recover rent may be filed under the Act; yet Section 193 has always been held applicable, and all such suits are filed in the revenue Courts. Here again there are provisions creating the liability for rent as in Section 62, but no express provisions for a suit. The same inference with regard to what was meant by the Legislature is to be derived from the provisions of Section 92. Section 92(1) provides that every raiyat who is ejected from his holding shall be entitled to compensation i for improvements. There is no express provision for a suit to recover such compensation; yet it is surely intended that such a suit should be brought in the revenue Courts, for Section 92(5) contains a provision that the Local Government may make rules requiring the Court to associate with itself, for the purpose of estimating the compensation to be awarded, a number of assessors. Such a peculiar procedure could only have been intended for suits in the special revenue Courts.

45. In short, the Act seems throughout to assume that wherever the rights of landlord and tenant have been settled inter se under Act, they are enforceable under the Act, and those cases come u/s 193. The terms of the side note to Section 192 indeed clearly suggest that the Act regards landlord and tenant suits and suits in the Revenue Courts as synonymous. In my opinion, the contention that Section 250 in no way determines the forum of litigation, and that Section 193 applies directly, is correct. Section 193 applies therefore, to suits u/s 31B, and such suits are cognizable only in the revenue Courts. I would answer the second question accordingly. The Collectorss view is, therefore, right on the merits. This being so, whether or not it may be treated as being with jurisdiction in virtue of the Collectors reyisional powers, it is not one with which the High Court will interfere in the exercise of its discretionary revisional powers, which are only invoked for the purpose of doing justice. To sum up, in my view, the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application and to scrutinise the order of the Collector in revision, but having done so no sufficient ground can be found for interference. I would, therefore, dismiss the application.

Dhavle, J.

46. I also agree with Meredith, J. that the suit was cognizable in the revenue Court and not (as the Deputy Collector held) in the civil Court. When the Deputy Collector came to the contrary conclusion, he should have returned the plaint under Order 7, Rule 10, Civil P.C.; and as the claim exceeded Rs. 100, an order made by him to return the plaint would have been appealable to the District Judge under Sub-section (4) of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act, read with Order 43, Rule 1(a), Civil P.C. The Deputy Collector dismissed the suit instead, and from this dismissal an appeal lay to the District Judge under Sub-section (3) of Section 204. It is not pretended that the Collector had any jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and the question thus arises whether this Court has power to revise the Col-lectors order as beyond his jurisdiction. The Advocate General who appears for the opposite party has endeavoured to support the order of the Collector as one that could have been passed in revision under Sub-section (5) of Section 204; and this makes it necessary to consider the general question whether the Collector is subordinate to this Court in all suits under the Orissa Tenancy Act, irrespective of whether they fall within Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) of Section 204. For, though my learned brothers are agreed that in the matter of this particular appeal entertained by the Collector of Puri, this Court has power to interfere u/s 115, Civil P.C., Manohar Lair J. takes the view that the Collectors power of revision under Sub-section (5) does not extend to suits within Sub-section (3), nor our power of revision under s.115, Civil P.C., to suits within Sub-section (2).

47. Now, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector over the suits referred to in Section 193, Orissa Tenancy Act, is clearly exercised by him as a "revenue Court," an expression defined in Section 3(17) as meaning "any Court (other than a civil Court) having jurisdiction under this Act to entertain suits or other proceedings." Section 192(2) provides that subject to notifications which may be issued by the Local Government under Sub-section (1) (modifying the CPC "in its application to landlord and tenant suits"), and subject also to the other provisions of the Act, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all suits and other proceedings in revenue Courts. It does not appear that any notification has been issued affecting the applicability of Section 115, Civil P.C., to revenue Courts dealing with suits u/s 193, Orissa Tenancy Act, nor have we been referred to anything in the latter. Act on this point. Section 115, Civil P.C., will therefore apply if the conditions required by it are satisfied. The section only applies in cases in which no appeal lies to this Court, and this condition is satisfied in the present case because the Orissa Tenancy Act (as will be presently seen) provides no appeal to this Court against the appellate order of the Collector in any suit u/s 193. The only other condition to be satisfied is that the Court, whose order we are asked to revise, should be a Court "subordinate" to this Court. For this we must look in the first place to the Orissa Tenancy Act, since the CPC was primarily enacted for ordinary civil Courts and not for revenue Courts created by special or local Acts (like the Orissa Tenancy Act) for deciding civil suits of a limited class. Now, where appeals lie from one Court to another, the former must be subordinate to the latter, at least in respect of such appeals. We thus come to the general provisions for appeals found in the first four Sub-sections of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act. According to the first Sub-section every order passed by a Collector is appealable to the Commissioner, provided it is not (a) a judgment in a suit, (b) an order passed in the course of a suit and relating to the trial thereof, or (c) an order passed after decree and relating to the execution thereof. We are not concerned in the present case with any order of the Collector appealable to the Commissioner, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to pursue this Sub-section any further beyond noting the express exclusion of all judgments and orders in suits and execution proceedings from the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner. Sub-section (2) makes the judgment of the Collector final in suits which do not exceed Rs. 100 in value and in which the judgment does not decide a question whether rent is payable for land or not or a question relating to title to land or to some interest in land as between parties to the suit. There is a proviso to this Sub-section, on lines similar to what we find in Sub-section (1), regarding orders passed by a Deputy Collector exercising the powers of a Collector and laying down that if the suit is tried and decided by such a Deputy Collector, an appeal shall lie from his judgment to the Collector. Sub-section (3) provides for an appeal from the judgment of the Collector or Deputy Collector in suits other than those referred to in Sub-section (2) to the District Judge unless the amount or value in dispute exceeds Rs. 5000, in which case the appeal shall lie to the High Court; and under the proviso there is a second appeal to the High Court under Order 42, Civil P.C., from any appellate decree passed by the District Judge. The next Sub-section provides for appeals against orders passed in the course of a suit and relating to the trial thereof, or orders passed after decree and relating to the execution thereof, except such as are not appealable under the Civil Procedure Code, to the Court to which an appeal from the judgment in the suit lies.

48. It will be seen from these provisions for appeal that Sub-section (2) makes the original judgment of the Collector himself, in the suits there dealt with, final, while the preceding and the following Sub-sections make his judgments or orders appealable. The proviso to the same Sub-section also, unlike that to Sub-section (3), is silent about a second appeal, from the appellate decree of the Collector. Does it follow that in suits and appeals within Sub-section (2) the Collector is not a Court subordinate to the High Court for revision u/s 115, Civil P.C. In the first place, finality in the matter of appeals in certain cases can, it seems clear, hardly determine the question of subordination in such case for the purpose of Section 116, Civil P.C., as this section confers the power of revision precisely in those cases decided by a subordinate Court in which no appeal lies to the High Court. Secondly, a right of appeal in rent suits, however limited, should prima facie make the Court of first instance subordinate to this Court in all rent suits tried by it, in default especially of any indication to the contrary, such as was found in Ram Dayal v. Ramadhin 12 All. 198 in the specific provision for revision by the paramount revenue authority. For, the Collector in Orissa is as much a revenue Court (deciding civil questions between landlord and tenant) when he deals with cases coming within Sub-section (2) as when he tries suits within Sub-section (8), a range of suits in which he is unquestionably subordinate to this Court by reason of the provision for appeals, and as I have already pointed out, the section starts by excluding all suits from the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner. Why then should it be taken that revision is excluded merely because this subordinate revenue Court is empowered to pass an original order which is declared final, or an appellate order from which no second appeal lies The orders referred to in Rules 63 and 103 of Order 21 as "conclusive" (a word at least as strong as the word final), subject to the result of a suit there indicated and the non-appealable first appeals of Section 102, Civil P.C., are alike liable to interference in revision. A parallel is also furnished by the Bihar Tenancy Act, 8 of 1885, which makes it clear that the Legislature conferred final jurisdiction in order to bar appeals but not revision; according to Section 153 of this Act, an appeal shall not lie from any decree or order passed, whether in the first instance or on appeal (a) by a District Judge, Additional Judge or Subordinate Judge, if the amount claimed does exceed Rs. 100, or (b) by any other judicial officer specially empowered by the Local Government to exercise "final jurisdiction" under the section, "if the amount does not exceed Rs. 50, unless in either case the decree or order had decided a question relating to title to land, etc.

49. It is interesting to note, in passing (for I am not just at present considering Sub-section (5) of our section on the Collectors power of revision), that the proviso to this section gives a revisional jurisdiction to the District Judge in the case of decrees or orders passed by officers specially empowered to exercise final jurisdiction; and that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is in no way affected by any of the provisions of the section. The Courts that try rent suits under the Bihar Tenancy Act are, no doubt, civil Courts and as such subordinate to the High Court u/s 3, Civil P.C.; but the point is that subordination for the purpose of revision is not negatived merely by final jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of first instance, or non-appealable jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of first appeal.

50. The scheme of the Orissa Tenancy Act is that after beginning with the exclusion of all rent suits from the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner, it restricts appeals to the High Court to cases within Sub-section (3); and we can only regard our. revision as excluded from cases within Sub-section (2) if revision must be confined to the field in which appeals lie (which seems an impossible position to take) or if the Collector was intended to be left free from all control in such cases (an intention which is not established by making his orders final and of which there is no other indication). Turning to yet another Tenancy Act in force in these parts, we have Section 218, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, Bengal Act 6 of 1908, making the judgment of the Deputy Commissioner in suits for arrears of rent (and for rents received by agents) not exceeding Rs. 100 in value "final and not open to revision or appeal except as provided, etc...." words which (see Thakahari Dutt v. Kashinattt Dutt AIR 1935 Pat. 417 expressly exclude revision by the High Court u/s 115, Civil P.C., quite apart from the fact that the section is not among those specified in Section 265(2) as applicable to cases under the Act. Notwithstanding provisions of this kind and also provisions expressly vesting revision and general direction and control in the superior revenue authorities, the High Court of Calcutta exercised its power of superintendence, in a matter u/s 27 of the Act in Kartik Chandra Ojha v. Gora Chand Mahto 40 Cal. 518 a little before the passing of the Orissa Tenancy Act, basing this power upon the appellate jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Section 224(2) in other suits under the Act tried by the Deputy Commissioner.

51. Section 224(2), Government of India Act, 1935, now leaves the High Court without any jurisdiction, under its power of superintendence over Courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction, to question any judgment of any (such) inferior Court which is not subject to appeal or revision. But this cannot affect its power of revision u/s 115, Civil P.C., in cases decided by subordinate Courts in which no appeal lies thereto, provided of course that there is nothing in the Act which creates the subordinate Court, as there is in the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, to bar revision or make the section itself applicable. I propose later on to deal with the law as settled by the High Courts under Act 10 of 1859, the Act under which rent suits continued to be tried in Orissa down to the enactment of the Orissa Tenancy Act. Construing the provisions of the Orissa Tenancy Act and Section 115, Civil P.C. (as I have been doing so far) by themselves and also in the light of the corresponding provisions found in the two other major Tenancy Acts in force in Bihar and Orissa in 1913, it seems significant that the Orissa Act contains nothing which could in any way bar the application of Section 115, Civil P.C., to any suits tried u/s 193 of the Act. Nor is it uncommon to bar appeals in petty cases, while leaving the revisional power of the High Court (with or without other remedies) unaffected (see, for example, Section 9, Specific Relief Act, and suits under the Small Cause Courts Act, besides Section 153, Ben. Ten. Act, etc., already cited and in criminal matters, Sections 412 and 413, Criminal P.C., especially before the amendments of 1923). The reasons for which appeals are restricted have usually little or no application to interference in revision. As I have already said, it is necessary even in this case to construe Sub-section (2) with reference to our powers of revision, not because the suit before us falls within it, but because the question of the Collectors subordination to the High Court has a bearing on Sub-section (5), and Manohar Lall, J. would limit the operation of this Sub-section to cases falling within Sub-section (2) in order to avoid a conflict of decisions by the Collector and the District Judge or the High Court. Sub-section (5) runs:

Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the Collector may call for the record of any case in which any Deputy Collector has passed a decree or order to which this section applies, if it appears that such officer has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity; and the Collector may pass such order as he thinks fit.

52. The opening words of this Sub-section are indeed comprehensive enough to get over the appeals to superior authorities provided by the earlier Sub-sections. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Collector is, however, confined to decrees and orders passed by a Deputy Collector. Such decrees or orders, if appealed against to the District Judge or the High Court, will either merge in or be replaced by the decrees or orders of these superior authorities, and will thus be put beyond the Collectors revisional jurisdiction. The Legislature may also well have presumed that the Collector has no time to waste in revising appealable decrees or orders, at least before the expiry of the period of limitation for the appeals; and even if he should somehow happen to interfere in such cases, his order in revision will not be binding on the superior authority when hearing the appeal. These considerations support the argument of the Advocate General that the Sub-section in effect empowers the Collector to interfere only when the matter rests with the decree or order of the Deputy Collector (i.e., after the expiry of the period of limitation for the appeal). On this foot-ins a conflict of the kind that occurred in the case referred to by Manohar Lall, J. Rookneey Roy v. Amrith Lall 14 W.R. 254, will only arise if the Collector should fall into the mistake of correcting in revision a decree or order which has already been dealt with in appeal. Such a mistake need not perhaps be regarded as impossible. But this will not suffice to warrant the rejection of the plain meaning of the opening words, which the Legislature presumably used as a deliberate departure from such provisions as were to be found in Section 153, Ben. Ten. Act, and Section 115, Civil P.C. The Collectors mistaken interference in revision will not be without a remedy if, as I have already indicated, his Court be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court jn all suits and orders excepted by Sub-section (1) 1 from the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner: and there is as little in Sub-section (5) as in Sub-section (2) to exclude revision by this Court u/s 115, Civil P.C., a power attracted by the definite subordination indicated by Sub-section (3) but not confined either expressly or by any necessary implication to cases within this Sub-section.

53. In my opinion, our power of revision extends to all matters dealt with by the Collector as a revenue Court handling landlord and tenant suits whether as a Court of first instance, or as a Court of appeal, or as a Court of revision. To limit our power of revision to cases within Sub-section (3), viz., cases in which a first or a second appeal lies to the High Court and further to limit the Collectors power of revision to cases within Sub-section (2) in spite of the comprehensive opening words of Sub-section (5), as Manohar Lall, J. has done, would be to leave the even more serious conflict referred to by Meredith J. without any remedy whatever, viz., the conflict between an appellate (or revisional) decision of the Collector that a claim not exceeding Rs. 100 is not cognizable by the revenue Court and a decision by the High Court in a civil suit that the same, claim is not cognizable by the civil Court. No construction that would lead to such a deadlock ought to be accepted, unless we are driven to it by any unmistakable provision or indication in the Act. As it is, we have the analogy of Section 158, Ben. Ten. Act, to which I have already referred showing how the Collectors power of revision (even though it is exercisable in cases in which appeals lie to higher authorities) need not exclude our power of revision u/s 115, Civil P.C. I would therefore accept the contention of the Advocate General that the order of the Collector, though bad as an appellate order, could have been validly made by him in revision under Sub-section (5), especially as it is obvious that neither party appealed to the District Judge.

54. Meredith, J. considers that the Collector, though functioning as a revenue Court, constitutes a civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court within the meaning of Section 3, Civil P.C., and that on this ground also he is subordinate to us within the meaning of Section 115. Section 3, however, is based on Section 2, the "interpretation clause" of the CPC of 1877, which was repeated in the CPC of 1882 and in which, after defining "district" as meaning the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction (called a District Court) etc., it was added that

every Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes shall, for the purposes of this Code, be deemed to be subordinate to the High Court and the District Court

and in the Codes of 1877 and 1882 (as in the present Code) the earliest occasion for the use of this interpretation clause arose in connexion with the provisions regarding "the place of suing," every suit being required to be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it, and where a suit might be instituted in more Courts than one and such Courts were subordinate to the same appellate Court, the defendant being authorized to apply to such Court to transfer the suit to another Court whereupon the appellate Court was to determine in which of the Courts having jurisdiction the suit was to proceed. The CPC (Act 8) of 1859 contained a similar provision in Section 6 regarding the transfer of suits by the District Court from any Court subordinate to it, but did not define which Courts were to be regarded as subordinate to it for this purpose. This makes it unlikely that Section 3 of our Code was intended to make out revenue Court, as a Court deciding civil questions between landlord and tenant, a civil Court of a grade inferior to that of the District Court and thus subordinate to this latter Court. The definition of revenue Court in Section 8(17), Orissa Tenancy Act, which I have already quoted, also militates against its treatment as a civil Court within the meaning of Section 8, Civil P. C. The distinction between revenue Courts and civil Courts is also really kept up in Section 5, Civil P.C., even though it is recognized in this section that the former do deal with civil matters of a limited class-"suits or other proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes": if the civil Court have original jurisdiction under the Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature, it is not to such Court that u/s 5(1) the Local Government will have power by notification to declare that any portions of the provisions of the Code in matters of procedure upon which the special enactment is silent and which are not expressly made applicable by the Code to revenue Courts shall not apply or shall only apply with such modifications as the Local Government may prescribe. This distinction between civil and revenue Courts in Section 5 of the Code is not without a bearing on Section 3, and in my opinion, the civil Courts contemplated in Section 3 are, to use the words of Rankin, J. in Allen Bros. & Co. v. Bando & Co. AIR 1923 Cal. 169,

civil Courts exercising all the powers of civil Courts as distinct from Courts which only exercise powers over civil matters of a special class or classes, e.g., the rent Courts under Act 10 of 1859 and the Land Acquisition Judge.

55. This however does not affect the subordination of our revenue Court to the High Court for the purposes of Section 115, Civil P.C., because, as the same learned Judge also observed in the same case.

the word subordinate is not defined by the Code 9 because Section 3 is not a definition. This section does not claim to be, and is not intended to be, exhaustive: Purshottam Janardan v. Mahadu Pandu 37 Bom. 114 .

56. Section 115, Civil P.C., does not require the subordinate Court to be a civil Court within Section 3, and the Orissa Tenancy Act definitely involves the subordination of the revenue Court to the High Court (by way of appeal under Sub-section (3) of Section 204), and thus, through the general provision contained in Section 192(2), attracts the operation of Section 115, Civil P.C., giving the High Court a power of revision free (so far as I can gather) from the limitations to which its appellate powers are subject. The Orissa Tenancy Act does not contain any provision with a direct bearing on the subordination of the revenue Court to this Court in respect of matters coming within Sub-sections (2) and (5) of Section 204, except that Sub-section (1), as I have already pointed out, makes it clear that the revenue Court is not subordinate in such matters to the Commissioner. My learned brothers have disagreed on the question of this subordination for the purposes of Section 115, Civil P.C. Let me, therefore, turn to the history or external circumstances which led to the enactment of the Orissa Tenancy Act, in order to find out, if possible, how far the Legislature could have intended by restricting (or continuing to restrict) appeals to this Court to cases within Sub-section (3) of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act, to limit the revisional power of this Court in a similar manner: see Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Bdn. 8, page 21.

57. The trial of rent suits by the Collector was introduced, into Orissa (as well as Bengal, Bihar and Benares) by Act 10 of 1859, replacing the regulations under which summary suits for arrears of rent used to be tried by Collectors "whose decisions in such cases shall be final, subject to a regular suit, unless the ground of appeal be the irrelevancy of the regulation to the case appealed, on which ground only the Commissioner" was authorized to entertain an appeal: see Section 4 of Regn. 8 of 1831. Section 23 of Act 10 of 1859 provided that landlord and tenant suits of several classes, including suits for arrears of rent, shall be cognizable by Collectors and "except in the way of appeal as provided in the Act, shall not be cognizable in other Court or by any other officer or in any other manner. "Section 151 of the Act began by making Collectors, in the performance of their duties under the Act, "subject to the general direction and control of the Commissioners and Boards of Revenue," and Section 152 gave Commissioners and Board of Revenue powers of revision except in suits and execution of decrees, etc. Section 151 proceeded to make all orders passed by a Collector under the Act, not being judgments, in suits or orders passed in the course of suits and relating to the trial thereof or orders passed after decree and relating to the execution thereof, appealable to the Commissioner, and all such orders passed by Deputy Collectors appealable to the Collector--provisions which are reproduced in Sub-section (1) of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act.

58. The section further provided that no judgment of the Collector or Deputy Collector in any suit, and no order of a Collector or a Deputy Collector passed in any suit and relating to the trial thereof, or after decree and relating to the execution thereof, shall be open to revision or appeal otherwise than as expressly provided in the Act. The word "revision" in this provision was interpreted in 1864 by a Pull Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Ruttun Monee Dassee v. Kaleekissen Chuckerbutty (1864) W.R.F.B 147 (F.B.) to refer not to the powers conferred on Commissioners and the Board of Revenue by the latter part of Section 152, but to any revision by any other judicial Court, whether such revision be sought in the shape of a suit in a civil Court or in any other way. In 1871 a Full Bench of the High Court of the North Western Provinces considered this part of Section 151 and came to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 35 of Act 23 of 1861 extend to the Courts of revenue officers acting without jurisdiction under Act 10 Of 1859: See Hurpershad v. Lalu (71) 3 N.W.P.H.C.R. 60 (F.B.). This was on the ground among others that the provision made for the finality of the judgments of the Collector and Deputy Collector by Section 151 of Act 10 of 1859 corresponded with that which was made in Section 3, Civil P.C., Act 8 of 1859, for the judgment of the ordinary civil Courts, and that when the Legislature by an enactment passed subsequently to these two laws, conferred on the highest appeal tribunal powers of revising under certain circumstances the decision of "any subordinate Courts," it could not have intended that this general provision should be read in a restricted sense so as to authorize only a revision of the civil Courts judgments. Turning for a moment to the power of revision referred to in this decision, it is to be noted that the CPC of 1859 contained no provision on the point, and that Section 85 of Act 23 of 1861, which was enacted to amend the Code of 1859, first conferred this power in the following terms:

The Sadder Court may call for the record of any case decided on appeal by any subordinate Court in which no further appeal shall lie to the Sudder Court, if such subordinate Court shall appear in hearing the appeal to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, and the Sudder Court may set aside the decision passed on appeal in such case by the subordinate Court, or may pass such other order in the case as to such Sudder Court may seem right.

59. This power of revision given by Section 35 is much more limited than our power u/s 115 of the present C. P. Code, and was gradually extended. Section 622, Civil P.C., of 1877, empowered the High Courts to call for the record of any case.

in which no appeal lies to the High Court if the Court by which the case was decided appears to have exercised a. jurisdiction not vested in it by law or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, and to pass such order in the case as the High Court thinks fit.

60. Section 92, Civil P.C., Amendment Act, Act 12 of 1879, added after the words "so vested" in Section 622 of the Code of 1877 the words "or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." The Code of 1882 repeated the amended provision, and Section 115 of the present Code only added words to make it clear that the case must have been decided by a Court subordinate to the High Court. Before the Code of 1877, the High Court (which replaced the Sudder Court under the Charter Act) had thus no power of revision in cases which had not been decided on appeal by a subordinate Court, nor in cases in which such Court had declined jurisdiction or exercised it with material irregularity. Going back to Act 10 of 1859, Section 153 made the judgment of the Collector "final, and not open to revision or appeal except as hereinafter provided" in rent suits and two other class of suits u/s 23 and Section 24, if the amount or value in suit did not exceed Rs. 100.

unless in any such suit a question of right to enhance or otherwise vary the rent of a ryot or tenant or any question relating to a title to land, or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto has been determined by the judgment, in which case the judgment shall be open to appeal in the manner provided in Sections 160 and 161

of the Act; and Section 155 provided that if any such suit, as aforesaid, in which if tried and decided by a Collector the judgment of the Collector would be final, is tried and decided by a Deputy Collector, an appeal from the judgment of the Deputy Collector shall lie to the Collector. These provisions roughly correspond to Sub-section (2) of Section 204 of our Act. Section 160 provided for an appeal in other suits from the judgment of the Collector and Deputy Collector to the Zillah Judge unless the amount or value in dispute exceeded Rs. 5000, in which case the appeal was to lie to the Sudder Court (shortly afterwards replaced by the High Court). This is very much the same provision as we find in Sub-section (3) of Section 204 of our Act. Section 161 laid down "rules relating to presentation and hearing of appeals." The petition of appeal was to be written on the stamp paper prescribed for appeals from the subordinate civil Courts, and the manner in which appeals from the subordinate civil Courts were heard and determined and all proceedings which may be had in respect of such appeals were made applicable to the appeals to the Zillah Judge or the Sudder Court. In 1861 a Full Bench of the Sudder Dewany Adawlut decided that Section 161 operated to make Section 372, Civil P.C., of 1859, applicable to the decisions of the Zillah Judges u/s 160 and that therefore special appeals lay from such decisions.

to hold otherwise would presume that Act 10 of 1859 was intended to invest the subordinate civil Courts with some new finalities as to their appellate jurisdiction, and to restrict the ordinary power of this Court, which we see no reason whatever to think was contemplated by the Legislature in framing the Act in question: Hullodhur Biswas v. Moheshchunder Holder 1861 S.D.A. 144.

61. It appears, however, that doubts were entertained in the N.W. Provinces whether the decisions passed by the Zillah Judge in regular appeal under Act 10 of 1859 were open to special appeal, and the Legislature, therefore, by Section 17 of Act 14 of 1863 declared that it was the intention of Act 10 of 1859 that such decisions should be open to special appeal to the Sudder Court in the same manner, and subject to the same rules, as decisions of Zillah Judges passed in regular appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Orissa Tenancy Act has made the matter even clearer by the proviso to sub-s. (3) of Section 204. By Sub-section (4) it has also provided for appeals against orders which are appealable under the Civil Procedure Code, and Sub-section (5) is a deliberate addition recalling Section 153, Ben. Ten. Act and Section 115, Civil P.C., but departing from both of them in giving the Collector a power of revision notwithstanding anything contained in the previous Sub-sections (in particular the appeal to the District Judge and the High Court) and not confining the power to cases in which no appeal lies either to the Collector himself or even to the District Judge or the High Court. The question how far the provisions of the CPC of the time were g applicable to proceedings in rent suits under Act 10 of 1859 was the subject of many decisions, but it is necessary to refer to a few of them as bearing on the High Courts power of revision u/s 35 of Act 23 of 1861 or under the later Codes of Civil Procedure or of superintendence u/s 15 of the Charter Act. In Toyluckonath Sirdar v. Baluk Ram Doss(1864) W.R. Gap No. Act 10 Rul 26, the High Court acting u/s 35 of Act 23 of 1861 set aside the order of a Collector where in an appeal from a rent suit for Rs. 3-1-8 the Collector had exceeded his authority by deciding upon the genuineness of a deed of sale propounded by the plaintiff. In Docowree Cazee v. Hurrosoonderee Debea (66) 6 W.R. Act 10 Rul 53 the Collector had at first entertained an appeal from an order of a Deputy Collector selling an under-tenure in execution of a decree, and affirmed the decision of the Deputy Collector, but upon review of judgment had set aside his former order on the ground that he had no jurisdiction: orders in execution were not appealable under Act 10 of 1859. The question was referred to a Pull Bench whether Section 35 of Act 23 of 1861 applied to the orders of the Collector in the case. The Full Bench considered it unnecessary to answer the question, holding that the Collector had just as much jurisdiction to reverse his own order upon review as he had to make it. This is probably the decision referred to by Norman, J. in Bhyrub Chunder Chunder v. Shama Soonderee Debea (66) 6 W.R. Act 10 Rul 68 where the learned Judge exercised the High Courts power of superintendence u/s 15 of the Charter Act, and set aside the order of the Collector in an interveners appeal on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to entertain it. Jackson J, agreed, while still retaining his doubts about the applicability of Section 35 to the Courts of Collectors.

62. In Gobind Coomar Chowdhry v. Kristo Coomar Chowdhry 7 W.R. 520 a Deputy Collector acting under Act 10 of 1859 had declined to make an order for restitution of an amount levied in excess of what was due under a decree (as it stood before reduction in appeal and special appeal), directing the judgment-debtor to institute a separate civil suit to enforce his claim. The District Judge declined to interfere, holding that no appeal lay from his order, passed as it was after decree and relating to the execution thereof: see Section 151 of Act 10 of 1859. On appeal to the High Court, the matter was referred to a Full Bench, and Peacock C.J., held that the Court had power "under the general powers of superintendence vested in it" to enforce restitution. Loch, J. specified the power as one u/s 15 of the Charter Act. This power was invoked doubtless because the power of revision u/s 35 of Act 23 of 1861 would not have met the case for at least two reasons: (1) no appeal lay from the order of the Deputy Collector to the District Judge, (2) the Deputy Collector had not exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law but had refused to exercise a jurisdiction so vested. In Drobo Moyee Dabee v. Bipin Mundul 10 W.R. 6 a lowazima special appeal was preferred to the High Court u/s 35 of Act 23 of 1861 and Section 15 of the Charter Act, from the appellate order of a Collector in a case in which no appeal lay to him. The High Court declined to interfere at all because the conduct of the applicant in allowing the Collector without objection to hear the appeal and thus taking his chance of a decision in his favour was held to disentitle him to any extraordinary relief from the High Court. My reason for referring to this case is that the learned Judges expressed no doubt about the applicability of Section 35 to appellate orders of the Collector in a proper case, as had been done in Bhyrub Chunder Chunder v. Shama Soonderee Debea 6 W.R. Act 10 Rul 68 and other cases. In Maharanee Adheeranee Narain Coomaree v. Purkhit Raootra 15 W.R. 426 it was found in special appeal that the District Judge who had heard the appeals had no jurisdiction to do so as they arose out of suits for arrears of rent amounting to less than hundred rupees and no question of title was involved. The High Court was asked u/s 35 of Act 23 of 1861 to send the first appeals to the proper Court, namely, the Court of (the Collector, for hearing, but declined to do so and allowed the plaintiffs 30 days to prefer the appeals in the Court of the Collector, if so advised. The District Judge was, of course, subordinate to the High Court, but the point to notice is that the High Court also treated the Collector as a subordinate Court in extending the time for filing the appeals before him, as indeed seems to have been implied in the decision of the Full Bench in Subjaun Ostagar v. Promothonath Ghose 6 W.R. 77, where Peacock C.J. ruled, on an interpretation of Section 35 of Act 23 of 1861, that:

If an appeal be heard by a subordinate Court which has no jurisdiction to hear it, when it ought to be heard by another subordinate Court (the italics are mine) which has jurisdiction to hear it, the I (High) Court may set aside the decision of the Court which had no jurisdiction, and may, if they think it right, refer the case to the Court which had jurisdiction, even if it be too late to prefer a fresh appeal to that Court.

63. The decision of the N.W.F. Provinces High Court in Hurpershad v. Lalu 3 N.W.P.H.C.R. 60to which I have already referred, and in which it was held that notwithstanding the concluding portion of Section 151 of Act 10 of 1859 under which no judgment of a Collector in a suit was to be open to revision otherwise than as expressly provided in the Act, the High Court had power u/s 35 of Act 23 of 1861 to set aside an appellate order of the Collector in a suit in which the appeal lay to the District Judge, had been pronounced about a month before Maharanee Adheeranee Narain Coomaree v. Purkhit Raootra 15 W.R. 426 and about a month after came Taraohand Mundul v. Bhyrub Chunder Chukerbutty 15 W.R. 551 in which the Calcutta High Court only declined to interfere in revision u/s 35 of Act 23 of 1861 with an appellate order of a Collector, who had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, because the order of the Deputy Collector was wrong on the merits. The Deputy Collectors order had been made in execution of a decree, and the Collector had no jurisdiction to interfere. The learned Judges do not seem to have felt any doubt about their own power to interfere with the order of the Collector u/s 35, but they proceeded on the footing that a large discretion was left to the Court by the section and that by setting aside the order of the Collector on the ground of want of jurisdiction, they would be giving an appearance of validity to the order of the Deputy Collector which had been made in violation of the provisions of Section 92 of Act 10 of 1859. I have already pointed out that the power of revision u/s 35 of Act 23 of 1861 was very limited and that this was apparently the reason why in Gobind Coomar Chowdhry v. Kristo Coomar Chowdhry 7 W.R. 520 the Full Bench interfered u/s 15 of the Charter Act, a power which was affirmed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadoor v. Taranath Mookerjee 9 Cal. 295 in respect of the orders of a Collector transferring certain execution cases to Courts outside his district. The power of the High Court to interfere in revision under the CPC was (as already shown) gradually increased, and the interference of the High Court in revision would seem to have grown in frequency with the gradual increase in extent of the power to interfere. In Mohant Gobind Ramanuja Das v. Lakhun Parida 11 C.W.N. 112 which was decided in 1906, the High Court set aside in revision the orders of the Collector dismissing seven appeals in seven rent suits, on the ground that the defendants had not had a proper opportunity of producing a certain document in the trial Court. The learned Judges referred to the fact that no further appeal lay from the orders of the Collector, but they considered that Section 153 of Act 10 of 1859 was no bar to revision, observing:

It has been frequently held in this Court that it has powers either u/s 622, Civil P.C., or if not, u/s 15, Charter Act, to interfere in cases where the lower Courts have not acted correctly according to law.

64. In Chaitan Patgoshi v. Kunja Behari (11) 38 Cal. 832 the Calcutta High Court in 1911 again affirmed its jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of a Collector and a Deputy Collector under Act 10 of 1859, in a case in which an execution sale was impeached as ultra vires and illegal and was also sought to be set aside u/s 310A, (now Order 21 Rule 89), Civil P.C. It was ruled that Section 31A did apply to the case by reason of the provisions of Sections 109 and 110 of the Act and that the Collector had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the order of the Deputy Collector refusing the application u/s 310A. The learned Judges overruled the objection that they had no jurisdiction to interfere u/s 15, Charter Act, an objection that had been advanced on the authority of Huro Mohun Mookerjee v. Kedar Nath Doss 5 W.R. Act 10 Rul 25 and they interfered in revision after referring to the view taken in Mohant Gobind Ramanuja Das v. Lakhun Parida 11 C.W.N. 112 and apparently endorsing it. It would thus seem that the power of the High Court to interfere in revision under the CPC with the order of the Collector in all suits and executions under Act 10 of 1859 was gradually but more or less firmly established before the Orissa Tenancy Act was passed in 1913 to replace it. The trial of rent suits by Collectors under Act 10 of 1859 had continued in Orissa much longer than in other territories to which the Act had been applied, because it was found to be more suited to the conditions of Orissa as to other portions of the Rent Law, various provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act had been extended to Orissa from time to time. It is in these circumstances that the Orissa Tenancy Act was passed, deliberately maintaining the trial of rent suits by Collectors as under Act 10 of 1859 (presumably, as it had been interpreted by the High Courts) without any change to speak of in the first three Sub-sections of Section 204. The proviso to Sub-section (3) and the whole of Sub-section (4) complete a process of judicial interpretation with reference to the CPC (see for example Hare Krishna Mabanti v. Bishun Chandra Mahanti 35 Cal. 799 and Chaitan Patgoshi v. Kunja Behari 38 Cal. 832 referred to above) and contain nothing to affect the power of interference in revision which had been asserted by the High Courts notwithstanding such provisions as those contained in the concluding portion of Section 151 and Section 158 of Act 10 of 1859. Sub-section (5) is new, but again contains nothing to affect the revisional power of the High Court. I can thus find no indication in the Orissa Tenancy Act of 1913 that the Legislature did not intend the Court of the Collector to remain subordinate to the High Court, in the matter of all suits and executions, for purposes of revision u/s 115, Civil P.C.

65. My conclusion, therefore, is that the Collector is subordinate to the High Court when he acts under any of the last four Sub-sections of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act. I may perhaps conclude by referring to a small point that was not noticed during the arguments. The term "revenue Court" is defined in Section 3(17), Orissa Tenancy Act, as meaning any Court (other than civil Court) having jurisdiction under the Act to entertain suits or other proceedings. In the present case, the Collector clearly had no jurisdiction under the Act to entertain the appeal as he did, but the definition of revenue Court is only meant to distinguish that Court from a civil Court and cannot be read to mean that the Collector ceases to be a revenue Court as soon as he exceeds his jurisdiction under the Act. His appellate order was clearly passed in his capacity as a revenue Court, and cannot be beyond our jurisdiction to revise merely because acting as a revenue Court (and in no other capacity) he has exercised a jurisdiction which was not vested in him by law. The appeal in fact lay to the District Judge, and if he had heard it, a second appeal would have lain to us. There is also a series of cases in which it has been held that if a District Judge entertains an appeal which does not lie to his Court, a second appeal lies against his decision: see for example Ram Ratan Prasad and Others Vs. Banarsi Lal and Others, . But the reason for this is that the principle that a decree made without jurisdiction is reversible on appeal is involved by implication in Section 99, Civil P.C: see Ranjit Misser v. Ramudar Singh 16 C.L.J. 77 and Gangadhar Karmakar v. Shekbar Basini Dasya AIR 1917 Cal. 320 . This principle however cannot be applied to the Collector because no appellate order of his in any suit under the Act is appealable to the High Court. If the District Judge had passed an appellate order without jurisdiction and the order were of a kind which did not admit of a further appeal to the High Court, this Court would have interfered with it in revision, as was done in Gour Routh Vs. Digamber Giri and Others, . The appellate order of the Collector can stand on no higher footing--it is certainly not assailable by way of appeal but cannot be put beyond our power of revision merely because it happens to be passed in the exercise of a jurisdiction which did not belong to the Collector. I would therefore hold that we have power to deal with it in revision.

Manohar Lall, J.

66. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my brother Meredith and in view of the importance and difficulty of the questions about to be discussed I have taken time to consider a large number of cases including the cases which have been exhaustively reviewed by my learned brother. But I regret that I am unable to agree with him in the reasonings which he has employed for holding that this Court can always revise orders passed by the Collector while trying suits or hearing appeals under the Orissa Tenancy Act although I agree that in the circumstances of this case this Court has power to revise the order passed by the Collector. It is, therefore, but right and proper that I should give my own somewhat lengthy reasons why I take a different view.

67. The respondent instituted a Miscellaneous Case No. 16 on 20th February 1939 for recovery of mutation fee due to him under the Orissa Tenancy Act. The amount of fee admittedly due on calculation at 25 per cent, of the purchase price of the sthitiban holding was Rs. 100. The claim in this proceeding was laid at Rs. 106-8-9, that is to say Rs. 100 as mutation fee and the balance as interest thereon. The proceedings were started under the provisions of the recent amendment of the Orissa Tenancy Act which abolishes mutation fees and deletes the corresponding provisions from Section 250, Orissa Tenancy Act. The Deputy Collector took the view that the remedy of the respondent was by instituting a regular suit in civil Courts and that recourse to revenue Courts was forbidden after the amendment of the Orissa Tenancy Act. The respondent preferred an appeal to the Collector of Puri, who, apparently by an oversight, entertained the appeal although the amount claimed by the respondent was over Rs. 100. The Collector took the contrary view and held that the recent amendment of the Orissa Tenancy Act did not affect the jurisdiction of the revenue Courts to entertain the present suit. He accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the trial Court and remanded the suit for trial on the merits. Owing to the great importance of the question as to whether such suits should be entertained by the civil Courts or should continue to be entertained by the revenue Courts, the case has been directed to be disposed of by a Full Bench.

68. Upon hearing the parties the following questions emerge for decision: (1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the order passed by the Collector on 10th June 1939; (2) if this Court has jurisdiction whether the Collector was competent to hear the appeal which was preferred before him, or whether his order can be supported as having been passed in the exercise of his revisional powers u/s 204(5), Orissa Tenancy Act; and (3) whether the proceedings for recovery of the mutation fee were maintainable in the revenue Courts or whether such a suit is now solely within the jurisdiction of the civil Courts after the amendment of the Orissa Tenancy Act.

69. I must state at the outset that I agree with the view taken by my brother Meredith that proceedings for recovery of mutation fee were maintainable in the revenue Courts and I have nothing to add to his reasoning on this point. I would accordingly answer the third point framed by me above in the manner suggested by my learned brother. The critical question is, has this Court jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the order passed by the Collector in the circumstances stated above It should be borne in mind that the subject-matter of the claim in dispute in the present case exceeded Rs. 100 in value. It is necessary to examine first the scope of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act, which has been somewhat obscurely worded and the construction whereof has given rise to great difficulty. The scheme of that section appears to be this, that unless expressly provided in the Orissa Tenancy Act, all judgments given by a Collector in a suit or an order passed in the course of a suit and relating to the trial thereof, or orders passed after decree and relating to its execution, if the value is over Rs. 100, are appealable to the District Judge; but if the value exceeds Rs. 5000 appeal lies to the High Court. A second appeal is also provided to the High Court from an appellate order passed by the District Judge; all other orders passed by the Collector are appealable to the Commissioner. Provision is also made for appeals from orders passed by a Deputy Collector while exercising powers of a Collector. In case of suits below Rs. 100 and where the judgment does not decide any question whether rent is payable for the land or not or any question relating to the title of land or some interest in land as between the parties to the suit, appeals lie from the Deputy Collector to the Collector. But if the value is over Rs. 100 and the judgment decides the questions just enumerated appeals from the order of the Deputy Collector lie to the District Judge unless the value is over Rs. 5000 in which case the appeal lies to the High Court. Second appeal to the High Court is also provided in the former case. It is also provided that if the subject-matter of the dispute is below Rupees 100 and none of the above-stated questions is involved, the judgment of the Collector is final either as an original Court or as an appellate Court from the order of the Deputy Collector. But the Collector is given extensive jurisdiction by Sub-clause (5) which runs thus:

Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the Collector may call for the record of any case in which any Deputy Collector has passed a decree or order to which this section applies, if it appears that such officer has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity; and the Collector may pass such order as he thinks fit.

70. It will be observed that Sub-clause (5) is couched in a most comprehensive language and if it is literally construed it would enable the Collector to call for the record of any case in which the Deputy Collector has passed a decree or order concerning disputes of over Rs. 100 in value and even in cases below Rs. 100 in value involving a decision of question as to the liability to pay rent for land or title to land or some interest in the land as between parties to the suit. If this construction is adopted, it would permit conflict of decisions, for instance where an appeal lies to a District Judge or the High Court in a certain case the District Judge or the High Court may pass one order while the Collector under Sub-clause (5) may call for the records of that very case from the Deputy Collector and pass a contradictory order. Such a situation actually arose in Rookneey Roy v. Amrith Lall 14 W.R. 254. In that case a suit to recover Rs. 254 as arrears of rent was decreed by the Deputy Collector for Rs. 49. The defendant appealed to the Judge and the plaintiff appealed to the Collector. The Judge dismissed the defendants appeal but the Collector gave the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 155-6-6. The High Court of Calcutta issued a rule at the in, stance of the defendant upon the plaintiff to show cause that the Collector in receiving and disposing of the appeal has acted without jurisdiction as the suit was for a sum of over Rs. 100. The pleader of the plaintiff admitted that the Collector had no jurisdiction. The High Court exercised its power u/s 15 of the Charter and observed:

There are two judgments, one passed by the Judge who had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the other passed by the Collector who had no jurisdiction at all. In such circumstances we think the rule must be made absolute and the decree of the Collector set aside.

71. In Gopi Biswal v. Ram Chandra Sahu AIR 1916 Pat. 257 the situation might have been similar. The Deputy Collector in a suit for arrears of rent had decided that no rent was payable by the defendant for a sarbarakari tenure. The appeal therefore lay to the District Judge but the plaintiff appealed to the Collector. It was held by this Court that the Collector had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and accordingly his judgment and decree were set aside and it was directed that the memorandum of appeal should be returned by the Collector for presentation to the District Judge. The report does not show whether the High Court interfered in its revisional powers or under its power of superintendence which it undoubtedly possessed in 1916 under the Government of India Act of the preceding year. Chaitan Patgoshi v. Kunja Behari 38 Cal. 832 was a similar case. In order to escape this conflict, the wide words in Sub-clause (5) must be construed so as to give the Collector jurisdiction to call for the record of a case only in those matters from which an appeal would lie to him, that is where the value of the subject-matter is below Rs. 100 and which does not involve the decision of any question as to whether rent is payable or not or any question relating to title to the land or some interest in the land as between the parties to the suit. Krishnan, J. adopted a similar construction in a case arising under the Madras Estates Land Act (1 of 1908) in Paramaswami Ayyangar v. Alamu Natehiar Ammal AIR 1919 Mad. 510. In that case the High Court was moved to revise the order of a Special Deputy Collector in the matter of bringing on record the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff in certain suits u/s 77, Madras Estates Land Act. It was argued that under S.205 the powers of revision lay in the Collector or the Board of Revenue and not in the High Court. Ayling J. observed at p. 77:

It is not, and cannot be, intended to affect the revisional powers of this Court, in suits which are made appealable, to the District Court and this Court under part A of the schedule. No appeal lies against the Deputy Collectors order sought to be revised ; and if, as is urged on plaintiffs behalf, the Deputy Collector has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law, this would seem to be a fit case for interference in revision.

72. Krishnan, J. dealt with the argument that the aggrieved party ought to have moved u/s 205 and that therefore the revisional powers of the High Court should be held to be excluded as being inconsistent with it. In considering this argument the learned Judge proceeded to decide whether Section 205 could be applied at all. He observes at p. 80:

That section speaks of "any proceeding before a revenue officer from whose decision no appeal lies." The question whether Section 205 applies to orders in a rest suit depends upon the meaning we attach to the word proceeding in it. To avoid the serious anomaly of a conflict of decision in the same matter that may otherwise result from the revenue authorities revising orders passed in rent suits in which the appeal lies from the final decree to the civil Courts, I think we may well hold that the word proceeding refers to the whole proceeding and not to a part of it, or in other words, in a rent suit to the whole suit itself and not to any interlocutory orders in it. If this is correct, as an appeal lies from the revenue officers decision in the suit, Section 205 will not apply to proceedings in rent suits.

73. The case in Maeleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales 1891 A.C. 455, is an illustration of the same view where their Lordships put a narrow construction upon the section of a statute which was on its plain reading capable of a very wide construction. That section was in these words:

Whosoever being married marries another person during the life of the former husband or wife, wheresoever such second marriage takes place, shall be liable to penal servitude for seven years.

74. The appellant, Macleod, was married in the Colony of New South Wales and in the lifetime of his spouse married again another lady in the State of Missouri in the United States of America and was convicted in the Colony of New South Wales, for the offence of bigamy. In construing the effect of the words in the section quoted above Lord Halsbury L.C. observed at p. 456:

In the first place, it is necessary to construe the word whosoever and in its proper meaning it comprehends all persons all over the world, natives of whatever country. The next word which has to 9 be construed is wheresoever. There is no limit of person, according to one construction of whosoever; and the word wheresoever is equally universal in its application. Therefore, if their Lordships construe the statute as it stands, and upon the bare words, any person, married to any other person, who marries a second time anywhere in the habitable globe, is amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of the New South Wales, if he can be caught in that Colony. That seems to their Lordships to be an impossible construction of the statute. It therefore becomes necessary to search for limitations, to see what would be the reasonable limitation to apply to words so general ; and their Lordships take it that the words "whosoever being married" mean "whosoever being married, and who is amenable, at the time of the offence committed, to the jurisdiction of the Colony of New I South Wales,"

75. and then proceeded to give reasons why similarly "wheresoever" should be read as "wheresoever in this Colony the offence is committed." It is a well-known principle of construction of statutes that each part of a statute should be construed so as to result in a harmonious working of all the parts, or as put by Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 8,1937 at page 202:

Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words by altering their collocation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the Legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. But where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsmans unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractibility of the language used. The rules of grammar yield readily in such cases to those of common sense.

76. For these reasons I would construe Sub-clause (5) of Section 204, to mean that the Collector can only call for the record of any case in which any Deputy Collector has passed a decree or order where the subject-matter of the dispute or claim is not above Rs. 100 and no question as to the liability to pay rent for the land or title to land or some interest therein as between the parties to the suit has been or can be decided. It was conceded, and indeed it is obvious, that the Collector had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal; in the present case. He appears to have done so per incuriam because a number of connected appeals were filed before him some of which arose out of suits which were admittedly below Rs. 100 in value. Upon the construction which I have placed upon Section 204(5) the same result would follow. The Collector had no jurisdiction whatsoever to revise the order in question passed by the Deputy Collector as the subject-matter of dispute was over Rs. 100 in value.

77. I now proceed to consider the extent of the jurisdiction of this Court to revise orders passed by the Collector in rent suits. It should be premised that a large number of cases which are found on the subject were cases decided by the Calcutta High Court when they interfered with similar orders passed under the Rent Act (10 of 1859) when the Codes of Civil Procedure of 1859 and 1861 were in force and when the High Court of Calcutta had extensive powers of interference as a Court of superintendence under the Charter of Parliament. This power of superintendence of the High Courts was expressly preserved by Sections 106 and 107, Government of India Act, 1915, which was in force when this High Court was created. But that power has now been expressly taken away under the new Government of India Act, 1935, which by Section 224 restricts the power of superintendence over all Courts in India for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction to matters enumerated in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d). It is expressly provided in Sub-clause (2) that:

Nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision.

78. In other words the powers of revision which the High Court possesses must be sought for either in the particular Act in question--in this case the Orissa Tenancy Act--or u/s 115, Civil P.C. It may be observed that Section 115, Civil P.C., authorizes the High Court to interfere in revision with orders passed by any Court subordinate to such High Court. Can Clause 11 of our Letters Patent give us now any jurisdiction The superintendence referred to there had reference to the then existing state of affairs. As stated above, the later Government of India Act has taken away that power. Is then the Court of the Collector subordinate to the High Court in all matters which it decides as a Court exercising powers under the Orissa Tenancy Act In my opinion, the scheme of Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act, and the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5, Civil P.C., 1908, help to remove the difficulty which existed when the case in Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadoor v. Taranath Mookerjee (82) 9 Cal. 295 was resolved by the Judicial Committee but in my opinion no longer exists now. Act 8 of 1859 (the earlier Civil Procedure Code) did not contain any section corresponding to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the present C. P. Code. Section 1 of the earlier Act was in these terms: "The civil Courts shall take cognizance of all suits of a civil nature with the exception of suits" enumerated therein. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadoor v. Taranath Mookerjee 9 Cal. 295 pointed out at page 178:

It must be allowed that in those sections (that is to say, sections of which 77 of Act 10 was a type) there is a certain distinction between the civil Courts there spoken of and the rent Courts established by the Act, and that the civil Courts referred to in Section 77, and the kindred sections mean civil Courts exercising all the powers of civil Courts, as distinguished from the rent Courts which only exercise powers over suits of a limited class. In that sense there is a distinction between the terms; but it is entirely another question whether the rent Court does not remain a civil Court in the sense that it is deciding on purely civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights, and whether being a civil Court in that sense, it does not fall within the provisions of Act 8 Of 1859. It is hardly necessary to refer to those provisions in detail, because there is no dispute but that, if the rent Court is a civil Court within Act 8 of 1859, the Collector has u/s 284, the power of transferring his decrees for execution into another district.

79. But these considerations, in my opinion, do not apply in the face of the definition in the present Civil Procedure Code. Section 3 defines that for the purposes of the Civil Procedure Code.

the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court.

80. The words to be noticed are "every civil Court." Section 4(2) merely preserves the remedy of a landholder or landlord to recover rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land by resorting to any special law for that purpose. But Section 5 is important, which by" Sub-clause (2) defines that revenue Court means a Court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or other proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes. The concluding words are more important:

but does not include a civil Court having original jurisdiction under this Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature.

81. These words suggest that the draftsman had in view the observations of Lord Hobhouse quoted above at p. 179. It is also to be observed that by Act 12 of 1887, Bengal, Agra and Assam civil Courts Act, Section 3 gives now an exhaustive enunciation of classes of civil Courts--this classification omits a revenue Court. I conclude from these considerations that the Courts of the Deputy Collector and the Collector while trying cases or hearing appeals under the Orissa Tenancy Act are revenue Courts and not civil Courts even though they may be trying suits or proceedings of a civil nature. Does then the High Court have any jurisdiction over orders passed by a Deputy Collector and Collector while trying such suits In, my opinion the answer is furnished by Section 204, Orissa Tenancy Act itself. The moment the Deputy Collector and the Collector tries suits over Rupees 100 in value they become subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court because appeals lie in the first instance to the District Judge and second appeals are provided to the High Court where the value is between Rs. 100 and Rs. 5000 and appeals are provided to the High Court where the value is above Rs. 5000. This being so, any order passed by these revenue Courts in such cases become revisable by the High Court not u/s 107, Government of India Act or under Clause 11, Letters Patent but u/s 115, Civil P.C.

82. Various Courts in India have taken the same view. I shall only refer to the instructive cases from the High Courts. In Uma Charan Mondol v. Midnapur Zeraindary Co. Ltd. AIR 1914 Cal. 890 almost all the authorities of the Calcutta High Court which are relevant on the point were examined. That was a case under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and arose out of a proceeding for settlement of fair rent before the revenue officer u/s 85 of the Act. The defendants in a certain suit applied to the High Court for an order upon the Settlement Officer to stay the trial of the proceeding instituted before him pending the determination of the appeal and the cross-appeal which were preferred to the High Court emanating from a suit for recovery of possession of lands. In considering the argument that the High Court has powers of superintendence in all cases because u/s 224 an appeal lies in certain circumstances, from the judgment of a Deputy Commissioner to the Judicial Commissioner and in certain other circumstances to the High Court, the learned Judges observed:

It would, in our opinion be anomalous to hold that where, by statute, superintendence over a revenue officer is vested, in a particular matter, in the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, the revenue officer should be deemed even for the purposes of that particular proceeding a Court subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of this High Court.

83. The words "in a particular matter" are the key to the solution of the problem. The Oudh Chief Court takes the same view. The case in Indar Parshad v. Fateh Chand 9 I.C. 747 decides that the High Court has power to interfere in revision with the orders of Courts of revenue exercising jurisdiction under the Rent Act, but only in those cases in which an appeal lies to the Court of the District Judge and then to the High Court: see also Chauharja Bakhsh v. Kalka Pande AIR 1923 Oudh. 18 and Gaya Prasad v. Kalap Nath AIR 1929 Oudh 389. In Paramaswami Ayyangar v. Alamu Natehiar Ammal AIR 1919 Mad. 510, already referred to, Ayling, J. observed that the provision of Section 205 in the Madras Estates Land Act.

is not, and cannot be, intended to affect the revisional powers of this Court, in suits which are made appealable to the District Court and this Court under part A of the schedule.

84. In Raghunadha Patro v. Govinda Patro AIR 1928 Mad 1032 Phillips, J. followed the reasonings in Uma Charan Mondol v. Midnapur Zeraindary Co. Ltd. AIR 1914 Cal. 890 already referred to. (See also the remarks of Odgers J. at p. 1040. Venkatasubba Eao J. took a different view.) Some other instructive Calcutta cases may also be noticed. In Ram Loohan Singh v. Beni Prasad Kurmi (09) 36 Cal. 252 it was held that the revenue Courts are Courts of civil jurisdiction within the meaning of the CPC in that their decrees, when transferred in the regular course, are to be treated in all respects as if they were passed by a Court of civil judicature. The decree-holder having obtained his decree from the Court of the Collector of Balia failed to get full execution thereof and got a transfer to the district of Chapra and then to the district of Bhagalpur for the execution of the balance. The property of the judgment-debtors having been advertised for sale, they applied under the provisions of the CPC for an injunction to stay the sale of the properties attached in execution of that decree. The application was refused because the Court held that the CPC did not apply inasmuch as the decree was passed by a revenue Court. In allowing the appeal from this decision the learned Judges observed at p. 254:

Though the decree of the revenue Court at Balia was a decree in the execution of which relief was sought to be obtained from a Court of civil judicature, to which it has been transferred, that decree did not lose its original character. It is only in the course of execution that the civil Court should treat such a decree in all respects as if it had been passed by itself.

85. In Chaitan Patgoshi v. Kunja Behari (11) 38 Cal. 832 it was held that the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the Collector and the Deputy Collector passed under Act 10 of 1859, but it is to be observed that the case arose out of an execution of a decree which was for more than Rs. 175. This was also a case where the High Court interfered with the order of the Collector who had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal which ought to have been filed before the District Judge. The following passages from the judgment of that learned Judge, Rankin, J., (as he then was) in Allen Bros. & Co. v. Bando & Co. AIR 1923 Cal. 169 are instructive. I am quoting from page 939:

The word subordinate is not defined by the Code because Section 3 is not a definition. This section does not claim to be, and is not intended to be, exhaustive: Purshottam Janardan v. Mahadu Pandu 37 Bom. 114 . Though not defined the word subordinate plays an important part in the Code as may be seen from Sections 23, 24, 100,115, 133, 136 and 137. There are also in the Code several phrases that may be contrasted and compared thus: Court of a grade inferior (Section 3); Court of highest grade (Section 63); any Court (Section 113); civil Courts subject to their superintendence (Section 122); any Court of civil jurisdiction (Section 141). The words civil Court in the Code appear to have a special meaning though this again is nowhere defined. I take them to mean civil Courts exercising all the powers of civil Courts as distinguished from Courts which only exercise powers over civil matters of a special class or classes, e.g., the rent Courts under Act 10 of 1859 and the Land Acquisition Judge. The two broadest phrases in the Code are to be found in Sections 113 and 141. The latter in no way touches upon the question of subordination; the former does, because reference is a form of appellate jurisdiction, Maharaja Birendra Kishore Manikya Bahadur Vs. Secretary of State for India in Council, but Order 46 cuts down its application and it does not apply to the Rent Controller or the President. It may be argued that High Court has superintendence over any Court because it has power to alter the order and so to give a power of reference to any Court. Beyond this argument, which in reference to special statutory Courts unknown to the Code seems very precarious, I can see nothing in the Code which even promises to be of any assistance on the present question unless it be that a comparison between sections 23 and 24 appears to show that a Court may be subordinate within the meaning of the Code in a purely administrative sense.

86. At p. 943 the learned Judge considered cases under the Rent Act (Act 10 of 1859) and observed:

In 1861 therefore the Sadar Court possessed appellate jurisdiction over the Collectors Court by the terms of the Act of 1859 itself and the High Court inherited therewith a power of superintendence. The cases were fully discussed in Chaitan Patgoshi v. Kunja Behari 38 Cal. 832 . They show that a right of appeal however limited will let in the full general power of superintendence, but the right of appeal in those cases is clearly given by the special Code itself and applies to cases within the special jurisdiction conferred thereby.

87. In my opinion, these remarks are very important and apposite and confirm me in the view which I have taken. Maflho Prakash Singh v. Murli Manohar 5 All. 406 was a case decided by a Full Bench consisting of five Judges. Straight, Old field, Brodhurst and Tyrrell, JJ. drew very largely upon the observation of the Judicial Committee in Rajah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadoor v. Taranath Mookerjee 9 Cal. 295, and were of opinion that the view that the revenue Courts are not the less oivil Courts, because only of the fact that their jurisdiction is limited to suits connected with the revenue and rent of the land, is fortified by the consideration that in a large number of these suits, appellate jurisdiction being exercised in reference to them by the regular civil Courts, the decrees to be drawn up and executed are necessarily the decrees of civil Courts of judicature and concluded at page 412 thus:

If then, as the Privy Council seems to have ruled in the case already referred to, by the analogy between Act 10 of 1859 with 8 of the same year, and of 12 of 1881 with 14 of 1882, that revenue Courts are civil Courts, and that for the purpose of enforcing their decrees, where their own special procedure does not empower them, they may resort to the provisions of the Civil Code relating to execution, it would appear we should hold in regard to the present reference, that the revenue Courts, being within the general description of civil Courts, and in this sense, unless in terms exempted, subject to the procedure of the Civil Code, save in so far as special procedure is to be found in the Bent Act itself, are in their general procedure in other respects to be governed by the rules of the Civil Code.

88. They therefore decided that the revenue Courts of the North Western Provinces in those matters of procedure upon which the Bent Act is silent are governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Stuart C.J. gave a strong dissenting judgment. His remarks from the beginning of the last paragraph at page 417 are instructive reading. In Ram Dayal v. Ramadhin (90) 12 All. 198 Straight and Brodhurst, JJ. who were two of the learned Judges who decided the Full Bench case just referred to, held that the High Court had no power to revise under the CPC an order passed by a Collector u/s 183, North Western Provinces Bent Act on appeal from an Assistant Collector of the second class in a suit valued at less than Rs. 100. Straight, J. who delivered the judgment of the Bench pointed out that grave inconvenience and confusion of judicial authority would ensue if both the Board of Revenue and the High Court be held to have co-ordinate jurisdiction to revise orders by the rent Court and observed at p. 199:

I think I am bound in dealing with a question of this kind to guard against so grave a dilemma arising, which I feel sure could never have been intended, and to leave to the Board of Revenue, to whom the power in specific terms is given by the statute, the exclusive jurisdiction thereby in my opinion, contemplated and provided. This will certainly procure uniformity of procedure, because while looking to the terms of Section 199, Rent Act, the Board of Revenues jurisdiction to deal with those cases in which an appeal lies u/s 189, Rent Act, is in terms excluded, and naturally, because they go to the civil Court Judge and to this Court, on the other hand it leaves their jurisdiction untouched to deal with those cases to which Section 189, Rent Act, is not applicable.

89. The case in British India Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shanti Narain, decided that the High Court had jurisdiction to revise an order passed by the District Judge in a matter under the Companies Act u/s 54(2) of Act 7. of 1913. The case was decided upon the ambit of Section 115, Civil P.C. It will be observed that the Companies Act does not provide for dual control in that some orders passed by the Company Judge are appealable to the High Court and other orders are appealable to some other authority. The same remarks apply to the later Full Bench decision in Shah Chaturbhuj Vs. Shah Mauji Ram, It may be pointed out that this was a case under the U.P. Agriculturists Belief Act and by Section 5(2) the Court was defined to mean a civil Court so that there was no difficulty in holding that the Court exercising jurisdiction u/s 5 of that Act was a civil Court and as such subordinate to the High Court. The only case of the Rangoon High Court which requires notice is the Full Bench case in Mohideen v. Bukshi Ram AIR 1926 Rang 33 The case was decided upon the construction of Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915. The learned Chief Justice observes at p. 87:

It is, however, urged that this superintendence is only over Courts subordinate to this Courts appellate jurisdiction. I am not prepared to agree that the expression "appellate jurisdiction" in Section 107, Government of India Act, necessarily implies that there must be some right of appeal. The expression is used merely to indicate the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court so as to cover the largest area over which its jurisdiction extends.

90. He, therefore, held that the refusal of the Bent Controller of Rangoon amounted to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction conferred upon him and was a case within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C. But that was a decision of a Court subordinate to the High Court and therefore it was open to the High Court of Rangoon in a suitable case to consider that decision in exercise of its powers of revision. The learned Chief Justice added: but that, in any case, it is open to it to do so in exercise of the general powers of superintendence conferred on it by Section 107, Government of India Act.

91. Heald, J. on the other hand took a contrary view. He pointed out that the Letters Patent of the Rangoon High Court were different from the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court in that the corresponing clauses of the Rangoon Letters Patent omit any reference to Courts subject to the superintendence of the High Court and refer to this Court merely as a Court of appeal and to its jurisdiction merely as appellate jurisdiction.

92. The learned Judge observes at p. 41:

If the words "subject to its appellate jurisdiction" in Section 107, Government of India Act are read in conjunction with the description pf the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in Clause 14, Letters Patent, it seems to me impossible to hold that Section 107 confers on this Court any powers of revision in respect of any Courts for which this Court is not a Court of appeal or over which it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction.

93. For these reasons he held that the Controller of Bents in Rangoon was not a Court or a civil Court nor that the High Court was a Court of appeal from such a Court or had appellate jurisdiction over him or that he was a Court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court within the meaning of Section 107, Government of India Act or subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C. Rutledge, J. took the view that the Controller is not a Court at all but an executive and administrative officer appointed by the Local Government under the provisions of the Rangoon Bent Act. It need not be repeated that Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915, has now undergone a radical change. To come to the Patna cases. In 3 Patna Law Journal there are two Pull Bench cases Parmeshwar Ahir Vs. Emperor, decided by five Judges and Sheonandan Prasad Singh v. Emperor AIR 1918 Pat. 103 decided by three Judges of this Court. The judgments contain an exhaustive review of the history of the jurisdiction of the High Courts and. of the Patna High Court. The learned Chief Justice at p. 602 refers to two cases decided by the Calcutta High Court under Act 10 of 1859 where the High Court set aside the order of the Collector in a case in which he had usurped the jurisdiction by reversing the order of the Deputy Collector when the appeal lay to the Zilla Judge. It will be observed that the High Court interfered under the Charter Act on the ground that the Collectors Court was one over which at the time of the passing of the Charter Act the Sadar Court possessed appellate jurisdiction which the High Court inherited. The learned Chief Justice makes these important observations at p. 603:

It may perhaps be possible here and there amongst the voluminous reports of cases decided by the various High Courts to find some instance of the exercise of superintendence which migh be difficult to justify on the ground of appellate jurisdiction, but I am satisfied that the result of considered opinion is that the power of superintendence granted by the 15th section of 24 and 25 Yict. c. 104 depends upon appellate jurisdiction in one or other of the forms already indicated.

95. Puni Sethi and Others Vs. Gangadhar Patro and Others, was a case in which I delivered the judgment in agreement with my brother Fazl Ali. That was a case under the Orissa Tenancy Act but the subject of the claim was below Rs. 100. Similarly at p. 64 (of 5 Cut 1 T) there is a decision given by my brother Fazl Ali with whom I agreed, but that also was a case in which the value of the claim did not exceed Rs. 100. In Bidyadhar Misra and Others Vs. Radhashyam Panda and Others, Chatterji, J. took the same view. Lastly reference may be made to some Privy Council cases: 3 Municipal Officer, Aden v. Hajee Ismail Hajee Allana (06) 30 Bom. 246. In that case acting under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent of 1865 the High Court of Judicature for the Presidency of Bombay made an order for transfer of a suit which was validly brought in the Court of the Political Resident at Aden and directed its trial by the High Court itself. One of the contentions raised was that the Court of the Political Resident, Aden, was not subject to the superintendence of the High Court. Lord Macnaughten who delivered the judgment of their Lordships pointed out that the very preamble of the Act which regulated the administration and civil justice at Aden shows that it was thought expedient to provide for the superintendence or revision of such judgments and proceedings by the High Court at Bombay to whom no appeal lay from any decision or order of the Resident although provision was made for a reference to the High Court at Bombay in a great number of cases, and in every case the Resident was bound to dispose of the matter before him conformably to the decision of the High Court. Their Lordships were asked to consider the language of Clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court with the language of Section 15 of 24 and 25 Vict. c. 104, usually called "the Charter Act" and to notice that in Section 15 stress was laid on the existence of appellate jurisdiction, but their Lordships overruled this argument by observing at p. 42:

The power of transfer contained in the Charter Act has nothing to do with the power of removal conferred by the Letters Patent, and the Letters Patent make superintendence, not appellate jurisdiction, the condition of the exercise of the power of removal which the High Court at Bombay has put in force.

96. It is only necessary to repeat once more that the extent of the power of superintend dence which the High Court possessed under its Letters Patent is now completely cut down by the Parliamentary enactment of 1935, namely by Section 224(2), Government of India Act. In Veeraraghavulu v. Vertata Narsimha (14) 1 AIR 1914 P.C. 87 a number of suits were brought u/s 9, Madras Rent Recovery Act, 1865, against the raiyats to enforce the acceptance by them of the pattas tendered in respect of their holdings. The Assistant Collector found that the pattas were not in accordance with the terms agreed and dismissed the suits. Appeals were preferred to the District Court which affirmed his decision. The High Court reversed the decision of the District Court and the matter was taken up in appeal before the Privy Council. It was argued before their Lordships that the defendants had no right of appeal to the High Court, inasmuch as the proceedings were of a summary nature under the Madras Act, and various provisions of the CPC were relied upon. Mr. Ameer Ali in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee made these observations, at page 264 of the report:

It is contended in the first place that no appeal lay to the High Court u/s 69, Madras Rent Recovery Act, which provides for one appeal only from the order of the Collector to the Zillah Judge. This contention, however, ignores the provisions of Section 372 of Act 8 of 1859, which at the time the Madras Rent Recovery Act of 1865 was enacted, was the law regulating the procedure of the civil Courts in India outside the presidency towns. Under that section, a special appeal lay to the Sudder Court from all decisions passed in regular appeal by the Courts subordinate to Sudder Court. It is not disputed that the Zillah Judges Court was subordinate to the Sudder Court, nor that the appeal to the Zillah Judge from the Collectors Court was a "regular appeal"--an appeal on law and facts. Later legislation substituted the High Court for the Sudder Court, and the District Judge for the Zillah Judge, but the subordination of the one to the other was maintained. The provisions of Act 14 of 1882, the law in force at the time when these suits were instituted, are clear on the point that an appeal lies from the order of the District Judge to the High Court, unless that right is taken away by express legislation or by some express provision of law.

97. In Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao (16) 3 AIR 1916 P.C. 21 the case arose out of certain proceedings started by the zamindars under the Madras Forest Act, 1882, claiming certain parcels of land. Having failed before the Forest Settlement Officer they went up in appeal before the District Judge, who affirmed the decision. The High Court, however, reversed the decision and hence an appeal before the Privy Council by the Secretary of State for India in Council. In considering the validity of the proceedings before the different forums, Lord Shaw, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, observed (at page 197):

What happened in the present case was that the claim was rejected (i.e., the claim by the zamindars). An appeal by the respondents was thereupon made to the District Court, and a decision was pronounced. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In I their Lordships opinion this objection is not well founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the CPC apply. This is in full accord with the decision of the Full Bench in Kamaraju v. Secretary of State (88) 11 Mad. 309 (P.B.) a decision which was given in 1888 and has been acted on in Madras ever since.

99. The critical words to notice, in these observations are "when proceedings of this character reach the District Court." In my opinion, under the Orissa Tenancy Act, proceedings for recovery of rent can only reach the District Court if they are above Rs. 100 in value, and it is only when proceedings reach the District Court then that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary civil Courts. It follows, therefore, that proceedings which are of a value below Rs. 100 are not proceedings in Courts which may be called the ordinary civil Courts of the country; and, indeed, as I have shown above, those Courts are the revenue Courts as defined in Section 5, Civil P.C. For these reasons I would hold that this Court has jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the order passed by the Collector on 10th June 1939 because the order was passed in a proceeding of which the value was over Rs. 100 and from which appeal lay to the District Judge and then to this Court if the requirements of Order 42, Civil P.C., were satisfied.