C. Kondaiah, J.

1. The appeal by the defendant is directed against the judgment of the Court of the Additional District Judge, Dewas, decreeing the civil suit No. 13A of 1974 instituted by the respondents for partition and possession, of their half share in the plaint schedule movable and immovable properties and for mesne profits.

2. In order to understand the scope of the appeal and the respective contentions of the parties, it is necessary to state the material facts that led to this appeal. One Harlal, a Hindu Brahmin, resident of Malgaon village, tahsil Khategaon in the district of Dewas died in the year 1920 leaving behind him his widow Bhagirathibai, son Balmukund and daughter Gajribai and considerable movable and immovable properties. The daughter Gajribai, who was married died in 1931 leaving behind her sons Jagdishprasad, Gangaprasad and Jamna-prasad, the respondents herein. Balmukund, the son of Harlal died on 19-2-1966 leaving behind him the plaint schedule properties and Anusayabai, the daughter of Ganpatibai, the predeceased daughter of Balmukund and his mother Bhagirathibai. Bhagirathibai also died on 2-3-1966.

3. On 6-10-1971, the present suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties left by Balmukund and for possession of their half share and mesne profits from three years from the date of suit was instituted by the respondents on the ground that they being the sons of Gajribai, the pre-deceased daughter of Bhagirathibai and consequently they are heirs of Bhagirathibai, who by the date of her death, acquired a right to the half share to the estate of Balmukund, who died on 19-2-1966. The appellant-defendant filed a written statement contending inter alia that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any share and in any event they can get one-fourth share as she being the representative of her grand father Balmukund branch would be entitled to the one fourth along with the Plaintiffs in the estate of Bhagirathibai; and that the suit is barred by limitation in respect of the recovery of moveables.

4. The trial Court on a consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence held that on the death of Balmukund, his mother, Bhagirathibai and the grand daughter, the appellant Anusayabai would each inherit half of the plaint schedule property the estate of Balmukund and that undivided half share inherited by Bhagirathibai would devolve on her death on 2-3-1966 on her predeceased daughters sons, the respondent-plaintiffs and consequently decreed the suit for partition and for possession of the half share of the plaint-schedule properties and the remaining half would go to the appellant Anusayabai. The trial Court determined the mesne profits at Rs. 100 per acre in respect of 48 acres of cultivable land which amounts to Rs. 4800 and refused to fix any mesne profits for the remaining 10 acres of pasture land, and directed the defendant-appellant to pay mesne profits of Rs. 2400 per year since three years from the date of this suit till the date of delivery of possession. The trial Court also granted a decree for the recovery of half of the moveables worth Rs. 1625-03, rejecting the plea of limitation raised by the defence in that regard. The trial Court did not award interest on the mesne profits granted to the Plaintiffs. Hence the appeal by the defendant and the memo of cross-objections by the respondents in respect of their claim for interest on mesne profits awarded to them and also for mesne profits in respect of pasture land of 10 acres.

5. The contention of Shri Waghmare, learned counsel for the appellant is three-fold--

(1) The expression "children" used in section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is of wide concept so as to take in the grand children of any pre-deceased son or daughter and, therefore, the appellant must be entitled to a half share along with the respondents in the estate of Bhagirathibai.

(2) That the present suit filed on 6-10-1971 is barred by limitation in respect of movable properties.

(3) That the quantum of mesne profits determined by the trial Court is excessive and not warranted by the evidence on record.

6. This claim of the appellant is resisted by Shri Gokhale, learned counsel for the respondent contending inter alia that there is no merit in this appeal and the Court below erred in not awarding interest on the mesne profits; that the trial Court should have granted mesne profits in respect of 10 acres of pasture land in addition to Rs. 100 per acre awarded for 48 acres of cultivable lands and the suit is in time for the recovery of the movable also under Article 110 of the Limitation Act and that the appeal must be dismissed and the cross-objections be allowed.

7. Upon the respective contentions of the parties, the following questions arise for decision --

(1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances, the appellant would be an heir, who is entitled to a share in the estate of her great-grand-mother Bhagirathibai along with the respondents, who are the grand-sons of Bhagirathibai through her deceased daughter

(2) Whether the suit is or is not barred by limitation in respect of movables

(3) What is the quantum of mesne profits for plaint schedule of 58 acres of land

(4) Whether the respondents Plaintiffs are entitled for interest on the mesne profits awarded to them and if so what is the rate

8. We shall take up the first question first. The answer to this question depends upon the provisions of section 15(1)(a) when read with the Rules specified in section 16 and scheme of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, No. XXX of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Before adverting to section 15(1)(a), it is profitable to refer briefly the scheme of the Act pertaining to the law of succession applicable to property of a Hindu dying intestate. This Act, which came into force on 17-6-1956, was enacted by the Parliament with the sole object of amending and codifying the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. The intendment of the Act is indicated in the preamble is not merely to amend but to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession. The Act consisting of 31 sections is divided into four chapters. Chapter II which consists of sections 5 to 23 deals with intestate succession. Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 referred to the law of succession applicable to properties of males who died intestate, whereas sections 14, 15 and 16 apply to property of a female Hindu. Section 17 provides special provisions respecting persons governed by narumkattam and aliyasantana laws, whereas sections 18 to 28 relate to general provisions relating to succession. This in brief is the intendment of the Act relating to the law of succession of intestate succession among Hindus.

9. Section 14 entitles a female Hindu possessed of any property whether acquired before or after the commencement as a limited owner. Section 15(1), which is material for our purpose reads thus:--

15(1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16,--

(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband;

(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;

(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;

(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and

(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.

A definite and uniform scheme of succession to the property of a female Hindu dying intestate after the commencement of the Act has been enunciated by this section. The very section 15(1) specifically indicates that the rules set out in section 16 would govern the order of succession among the heirs specified in section 15(1) and the mode of distribution of the property among them. Therefore, the rules laid down in section 16 are pivotal to determine the order of succession among the heirs referred to in section 15. Rules 1 and 2 specified in section 16 may be noticed:--

(1) Among the heirs specified in sub-section (1) of section 15, those in one entry shall be preferred to those in any succeeding entry, and those included in the same entry shall take simultaneously.

(2) If any son or daughter of the intestate had predeceased the intestate leaving his or her own children alive at the time of the intestates death, the children of such son or daughter shall take between them the share which such son or daughter would have taken if living at the intestates death.

Rule 1 of section 16 entities the heirs in one entry specified in sub-section (1) to succeed to the estate of the famale propositus to the exclusion of those heirs in any succeeding entry. All the heirs that would fall in one entry shall take simultaneously.

10. Under Rule 2, the children of any predeceased son or daughter of the intestate shall take between them the share which their father or mother as the case may be would have taken if they were alive at the time of the propositus death. The sons, daughters and the husband, who fall under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act would inherit in equal moieties the property of a female Hindu dying intestate to the exclusion of classes of heirs specified in Clauses (c), (d) and (e) the law makers made it specific that it is the sons and daughters of the female Hindu that would be the heirs. Where any son 6r daughter of the intestate had pre-deceased intestate leaving behind his or her own children alive the children of such pre-deceased son or daughter would take between them the share which their father or mother would have taken, if they were alive at the material time. It is also pertinent to notice that the grand children of a female Hindu would not become heirs, if their father or mother, as the case may be, were living at the time when the succession open. The grand children would only succeed between them to the shares, which their parents, if alive would have taken or inherited. As the Parliament intended to give the share of a pre-deceased son or daughter to his or her children, this provision has been made. The grand children cannot be equated to the children of the female Hindu. The use of the expression "his or her own children alive" in rule (2) set out in section 16 indicates the use of the expression "children" in section 15(1)(a) to be of limited import so as to take in only children born to the pre-deceased son or daughter. The Sovereign Parliament, if intended to give the wider import to the word "children" so as to take in grand children also, it would have certainly employed appropriate and suitable expressions and language to convey such intention. Wherever the Parliament intended to make the son or daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son as an heir, it has specifically indicated so. We may in this contest usefully notice the provisions of section 8 which prescribed the rules of succession in the case of male Hindu dying intestate. section 8(a) and the heirs in Class I of the Schedule read thus:--

The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this chapter:--

(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule;

Schedule--Heirs in class I--Son; daughter; widow; son of a rife-deceased son; daughter of a predeceased son; son of a predeceased daughter; daughter of a predeceased daughter, widow of a predeceased son; son of a predeceased son; daughter of a predeceased son of a predeceased sen; widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son.

The Parliament has unlike in the case of female Hindus made a deviation in the order of succession in respect of sons, daughters and widows of a pre-deceased son of a pre deceased son of a male Hindu dying intestate; The aforesaid three categories of heirs would inherit to the property of a male Hindu dyine intestate simultaneously with a daughter, son, widow and other heirs specified in class I of the Schedule. There is no use of the expression "children" in class I of the Schedule attached to section 8. Without any ambiguity the son and daughters of the pre-deceased sons and daughters are shown to be the heirs who simultaneously take with the other heirs in class I of the Schedule. If the Parliament had intended to make the grand children of the pre-deceased son and daughter of a female propositus nothing prevented the Legislature to employ suitable words to convey such object and intendment in section 15(1)(a) of the Act.

11. True, as submitted by Shri Waghmare, the expression children" is not defined under the Act. Where an expression in a statute is not defined, it must He construed in the context and the attending circumstances under which the expression "children" has been implied in section 15(1)(a) of the Act. The Courts can only interpret and construe the expression taking into account the context and setting in which it has been used, but it is not open to the Courts to read something into the section, which is not enacted by the Sovereign Parliament.

12. We may usefully notice the dictionary meaning of the word "child" whose plural is "children". The word "child" is meant by the Shorter Offord English Dictionary (Third Edition) Volume I at page 324 as correlative to parent thus:--

The offspring, male or female, of human parents, in Biblical and derived uses; Descendants; members of the tribe or clan.

Venkatramaiya Law Lexicon, Volume I at page 203 says child or children primarily mean issue in the first generation only sons and daughters to the exclusion of grand-children or other remoter descendents. The dictionary meaning of the word "child" relates to the offspring of a human being. The word "child" must, therefore, be construed in the context of the parents only to a offspring born to a human being, while construing the same word in Biblical sense, it may be of wide import so as to mean descendants and clan.

13. We are now construing this expression "children" the plural of "child" in the context of inheriting to the estate to the parents or grand parents. The proper and appropriate meaning in the context is the "child" or "children" born to the female Hindu dying intestate. The extended meaning of wider import to this expression cannot be applied to the case in hand. The child may be a male or female. They must be alive on the relevant date when the Succession opens. They would also take as a Class one share representing their parents. They cannot take simultaneously with the other sons and daughters of the female Hindu. Their right to inherit as a group to one share in the estate of a female Hindu is their birth to their parents, who if alive, on that date would have been one of the heirs along with the other sons and daughters, who are entitled to a share in the property. We are, therefore, of the firm view that the expression "children" used in section 15(1)(a) of the Act roust be construed only as issue of the first generation which alone is consistent with the intendment and scheme of the Act. This word "children" cannot be given wider import so as to include grand-children as contended by Shri Waghmare. If the interpretation sought to be placed by the appellants counsel is acceded to, it will lead to, anomalies resulting in great hardship in the working out the shares of the heirs. Why such construction should confine to grand children only Why not the same principle be extended to great grand children and great grand children of the female Hindu and where can we draw a line in this regard Such construction would also lead to absurdities apart from being unworkable. This view of course gains support from the decision of the House of Lords in Riward Rowen and John Keys Thomas v. Thomas Lawis IX Law Reporter 890 therein the question relating to the scope and the meaning of the expressions "child" or "children" used in a will made by the testatrix Marry Thomas on 2nd March 1880 in respect of the disposition of her property fall for consideration. The pertinent question was whether the expression "child" or "children" would also take in grand children. Earl of Selborne L.C. observed at page 897 thus:

The primary sense of the word "children" is issue of the first generation, and that primary sense ought to be adhered to, when there is nothing or not enough to disclose it.

Lord Blackburn said at page 915 thus:--

....the words "child or children" primarily mean issue in the first generation only, sons and daughters, to the exclusion of grand children or other remoter descendents. Here also if there is enough to justify the construction, the words may be read as equivalent to issue or heirs of the body; but it requires something to justify the reading the words in what is not their primary sense.

14. In Munnalal v. Rajkumar : A I R 1962 S C 1493 one of the questions that fall for decision was whether Munnalal and Ramchandra, the sons of Khilonabai, the female Hindu dying intestate would become the heirs of her estate to the exclusion of her grand son Rajkumar. The learned Judge, Shah J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court ruled at page 1500 thus:--

......by virtue of sections 15 and 16 of the Act the interest declared in favour of Khilonabai devolved upon her sons Munnalal and Ramchandra to the exclusion of her grand son Rajkumar.

15. The son, who is declared to be as heir of a female Hindu under section 15(1)(a) or that of a male Hindu specified in Class I of the Schedule attached to section 8 would include both the natural son and a son adopted in accordance with law relating to adoption among Hindus the children may be legitimate or illegitimate. The child may be in the womb of the mother at the time when the succession opens. All such children must be held to be persons entitled to inherit under the Act There is no bar for illegitimate children or adopted children or children in the womb at the material time from inheriting to the estate of a male or female Hindu dying intestate. Such liberal interpretation is consistent with the modern times and trend of the law and reformation intended by the codification and modification of the law applicable to the succession of the property left by male or female, who died intestate. We, therefore, hold that the appellant cannot be declared to be an heir along with the respondents to the estate of her great grand-mother Bhagirathibai. For all the reasons stated, we answer question No. 1 in the negative and against the appellant.

16. This brings us to examine question No. 2. The respondents counsel seeks the aid of Article 110 of the Limitation Act to support his contention that the suit for the recovery of the share of the Plaintiffs in the plaint moveable is within the period provided herein. No doubt Article 110 provides a period of 12 years from the date on which exclusion from the property becomes known to the Plaintiff and the present suit is within 12 years from the date of death of Bhagirathibai; but Article 110 is applicable only to a case of a joint family property. The suit to enforce a right to a share in the joint family property which is enjoyed by the defendants to the exclusion of the Plaintiff could no doubt be filed within 12 years from the date of the exclusion. The suit property in respect of which the respondents claimed a half share therein cannot be held to be a joint family property. The entire plaint property moveable and immoveable was the estate of late Balmukund. On his death on 19-2-1966, his mother Bhagirathibai and the appellant Anusayabai were entitled as heirs of Balmukund to equal moieties therein. The appellant as well as late Bhagirathibai inherited the estate of Balmukund. By no stretch of reasoning, they can be considered to be the members of the Hindu joint family. They inherited the estate of Balmukund as joint heirs. They must, therefore, become co-heirs. Each one of them was entitled to half share in the property. The suit for moveables must have been filed within 3 years from the date on which the Plaintiffs right to sue accrues. The appellant-defendant was in possession of the entire estate of Balmukund. As there is no specific provision prescribed for instituting a suit for moveables in the present case, the Plaintiffs should have filed a suit within three years as provided under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The present suit has been filed beyond the period of 3 years from the date of death of Bhagirathibai and, therefore, the suit for recovery of the Plaintiffs share in the plaint moveables must fail.

17. We shall now advert to the question pertaining to quantum of mesne profits. The trial Court has fixed a sum of Rs. 100 per acre in respect of 48 acres of cultivable rain fed dry land. We have perused the material evidence and the judgment of the trial Court. The Court below has not taken into account the cultivation expenses incurred by the agriculturist in raising the crops in the suit lands. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, we feel it just and proper to fix a sum of Rs. 50 per acre for the period in question in respect of 48 acres. With regard to the 10 acres of pasture land, there is no justification to award any mesne profits. The person in possession of this pasture land is not proved to have derived any income from the pasture land. We agree with the trial Court that no separate mesne profits need be awarded to the Plaintiffs in respect of this pasture land. We, therefore, determine the mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 2,400 for the entire 58 acres of land for a period commencing from three years prior to the suit till the date of delivery of possession of the half share of the immoveable properties decreed by the trial Court in favour of the respondents.

18. There remains the question whether the respondents are entitled for interest on the mesne profits awarded to them. The answer to this point is found in the very definition of mesne profit under section 2(12) of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 2(12) defines mesne profits thus:--

mesne profits of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession.

Interest is an integral part of mesne profits defined under section 2(12) of the Civil Procedure Code. It must, therefore, be allowed in the computation of mesne profits itself. The very basis for such assumption and theory is that the person is wrongful possession appropriating income from the property himself gets the benefit of the interest on such income vide M N. Dasjee v. Tirupathi Devasthana : A I R 1965 S C 1231 and Hermans Dosajea v. Board of Trustees : A I R 1959 A P 64. On consideration of the facts and circumstances, we award simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the mesne profits awarded to the Plaintiffs.

19. In the result, the appeal in respect of the moveable property is allowed and dismissed in other respects. The cross-objections in so far as the interest on the mesne profits awarded is concerned, is allowed and dismissed in other respects. In the circumstances, we direct each party to bear its own costs.