Gopal Rao Ekbote, J. 1. These two petitions are filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, questioning the validity and propriety of the order passed by the Estates Abolition Tribunal (District Judge), Rajahmundry. 2. The facts may briefly be stated. The petitioners herein filed an application under Section 11 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, hereinafter called the Act, for the grant of a patta in regard to some Lanka Lands. The respondent also filed a similar application. These applications came up for enquiry before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kakinada. He was of the opinion that as there are more than one rival claimants for the grant of patta, the dispute as to who is lawful ryot will have to be decided under Section 56 of the Act. He, therefore, dropped the further enquiry under Section 11 of the Act and advised the applicants to file separate applications under Section 56 (1) (c) of the Act. That order was passed on 11-11-1959. The petitioners in pursuance of that order, filed an application under Section 56 (1) (c) before the same Assistant Settlement Officer. The respondent was impleaded as a party in that petition. The respondent, however, was not satisfied with the above said order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 11-11-1959. He preferred an appeal before the Estates Abolition Tribunal. The appeal was allowed. The order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was set aside and he was directed to restore the case to its original number and proceed with the enquiry and dispose of the matter according to the Act. It is this view of the Tribunal which is challenged in these petitions. 3. The principal contention of the learned Advocates for the petitioners is that no appeal lies against an order passed under Section 11 of the Act. It is true that any order passed on petitions filed under Sections 12, 13 or 14 would be under Section 15 and that Section provides for an appeal against such orders. There is, however, no provision in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, under which an appeal can be preferred against an order passed under Section 11. It follows, therefore, that the order of the Tribunal is bad in law. This objection was raised before the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that Section 11 and Section 56 (1) (c) must be read together and they are not redundant and contrary to each other and as appeal is provided against an order passed under Section 56 (1) on a parity of reasoning, appeal can be entertained against an order passed under Section 11. I am unable to accept this approach to this question. 4. It must be remembered that a right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right attaching to litigation. It does not exist and cannot be assumed unless expressly given by statute or by rules having the force of law. It follows that appellate Court cannot exercise wider powers of correcting the lower Court than are strictly conferred upon it by the statute which creates the appellate Court. If the appellate Court, therefore, is entitled to correct any order passed under Section 36, it does not necessarily mean that it can overstep its limits and correct any order which expressly falls under Section 11 of the Act. By any device right of appeal cannot be enlarged beyond the letter of the statutory provision. Appeal is a creature of the statute and can be exercised by the suitor only in case there is express provision of law or a rule or by unavoidable implication. No such thing exists here. When the Legislature has provided an appeal against an order passed under Section 56 and has not provided any appeal against an order passed under Section 11, the appellate Court cannot by inference assume jurisdiction to decide an appeal filed against an order, admittedly passed under Section 11 of the Act. I am, therefore, of the clear opinion that no appeal lies against an order passed under Section 11 of the Act. 5. It is not in doubt that orders passed under Section 11 are in relation to the grant of patta and orders which can be passed under Section 56 (1) (c) are in regard to the question as to who is the lawful ryot. These two Sections, therefore, connote different ideas and contemplate distinct orders. It is true that in some cases a situation may arise, where during the course of enquiry under Section 11 it is revealed that unless the real dispute between the parties in regard to the question as to who is the lawful ryot is decided under Section 56 (1) (c) the final decision in regard to the grant of patta cannot be given. In such a case, what procedure should be adopted, is not indicated either in the Act or in the Rules. In my opinion, when such a situation arises,the proper course would be to withhold the proceedings under Section 11 and decide the dispute under Section 56(1) (c) in the light of which decision proceedings under Section 11 may be resumed and final orders passed therein. Instead of insisting that the proceedings under Section 11 should be dropped and then separate proceedings under Section 56 (1) (c) be initiated and after they are concluded, the parties be directed to further file applications under Section 11, would in my view, be a cumbersome procedure not contemplated by the Act or the Rules made thereunder. There can be, in my opinion, only two courses open: either to direct the parties to get the dispute decided under Section 56 (1) (c) and resume the proceedings under section 11 in the light of the decision under Section 56 (1) (c) or stay the proceedings under Section 11 and take up the proceedings under Section 56 (1)(c) and after the conclusion is reached proceedings under Section 11 can again be proceeded with. In either case, when it is the same Assistant Settlement Officer, who is competent to dispose of the disputes contemplated under Section 11 and Section 56 (1) (c) no exaggerated importance need be attached as to what procedure should be followed. It is true that in some cases Section 11 and Section 56 (1) (c) would both be attracted and in such a case the best course would be to stay the proceedings under Section 11 and without insisting upon a formal application under Section 56 (1) (c) treat the application filed under Section 11 as written application filed for the purpose of deciding dispute under Section 56 (1) (c) and decide that dispute first. In the light of the conclusion arrived at, the main petitions under Section 11 can be effectively disposed of. In this case also, the same procedure could, with profit, be followed. As both the parties are before the Assistant Settlement Officer, he can stay the proceedings under section 11 and proceed with the enquiry under Section 56 (1) (c) and after reaching the conclusion, resume the enquiry under section 11 and pass a proper order under the Act. 6. I would, therefore, allow these revision petitions and set aside the orders both of the Tribunal as well as the Assistant Settlement Officer and give directions to the Assistant Settlement Officer, after recording evidence of the parties as they intend to adduce, to dispose of the petitions as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Revision allowed.