Aniruddha Roy, J.

Facts:

1. The petitioner had appeared in the Higher Secondary Examination, 2018 conducted by the West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education and the petitioner had secured total 479 out of 600 with an elective subject statistics. In course of the argument learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, the petitioner had secured 7th Rank in West Bengal. The petitioner had scored 93 out of 100 in the mathematics which is the subject matter of challenge through the instant writ petition, as confirmed by the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court.

2. The petitioner then applied before the appropriate authority for Post Publication Scrutiny in terms of Regulation 21 of the West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education Admission and Examination regulation, 2006 (for short, the said 2006 Regulation). There was no change of marks under the said Post Publication Scrutiny.

3. The petitioner then applied before the appropriate authority under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The respondent no.3 had supplied the certified copy of the answer script for mathematics. After receiving the said answer script the petitioner discovered that the answer given by the petitioner in respect of Question No. 2(C)(ii) and Question No. 2(F)(ii) of the mathematics paper were not correctly evaluated, the photo copy of the answer scripts are available being Annexure P-4 at page 22 to the writ petition. The relevant answers for the said two questions are available at pages 44 and 84 to the writ petition.

4. The father of the petitioner then made a representation dated February 04, 2019 before the President of the respondent no.2 for considering the re-evaluation of the answers to the said two questions, Annexure P-6 at page 82 to the writ petition.

5. The petitioner then got the said answers checked by an expert on mathematics being a professor of mathematics at Jadavpur University, when the relevant expert had observed that both the answers of the petitioner appearing in the answer scripts were found to be correct.

6. The petitioner, thus, being agreed by the said alleged in action of the respondent council by not allowing petitioner's answer scripts to be re-examined had filed the instant writ petition.

7. The reliefs claimed in the said writ petition are quoted below:

"a) A Writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents concerned and/or their men, agents, servants and/or assigns and/or appointees to evaluate of the answer of the petitioner of the Question No. 2(c)(ii) and Question No. 2(f)(ii) of the Mathematics Paper of the Higher Secondary Examination, 2018;

b) A Writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents concerned and/or their men, agents, servants and/or assigns and/or appointees to award full marks of the answer of the petitioner of the Question No. 2(c)(ii) and Question No. 2(f)(ii) of the Mathematics Paper of the Higher Secondary Examination, 2018;

c) A Writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents concerned and/or their men, agents, servants and/or assigns and/or appointees to evaluate the of the answer of the petitioner of the Question No. 2(c)(ii) and Question No. 2(f)(ii) of the Mathematics Paper of the Higher Secondary Examination, 2018 by the other examiner or any other Professor of other University;

d) A Writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents concerned and/or their men, agents, servants and/or assigns and/or appointees to issue fresh Mark Sheet of the Higher Secondary Examination, 2018 of the petitioner after awarding full marks of the answer of the petitioner of the Question No. 2(c)(ii) and Question No. 2(f)(ii) of the Mathematics Paper of the Higher Secondary Examination, 2018;

e) A Writ of and/or in the nature of certiorari directing the respondents concerned and/or their men, agents, servants and/or assigns and/or appointees to immediately certify and produce before this Hon'ble Court all documents and records pertaining to the instant case, so that the same may be perused and scrutinized for proper administration of justice;

f) RULE NISI in terms of prayers (a) above;

g) Costs of and incidentals thereto;

h) And such other or further order or orders, direction or directions as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper".

Submissions:-

8. Mr. Kallol Basu learned counsel for the petitioner at the threshold referred to Regulation 21 of the said 2006 Regulation and submitted that, the scope of Post Publication Scrutiny was confined in a very restrictive manner as provided under Sub Regulation 4 to Regulation 21 of the said 2006 Regulation. The restrictive scopes to which the attention of this Court was drawn under Sub Regulation 4 to regulation 21 of 2006 Regulation are quoted below:

"(4) The scope of post publication scrutiny shall be confined to the following matters only:

(a) to checking whether all the pages of the answer script, including the loose sheet or additional sheet attached thereto, are intact;

(b) whether all the answers in the answer script have been assigned marks (being one denoted as zero or otherwise); and

(c) whether there has been any mistake in striking sub-total, total and grant total of the marks, including in transferring or quoting such sub-total and grant total".

9. He submitted that, the restrictive scope of Post Publication scrutiny of an answer script was basically limited to the adding up of the grant total and whether numbers were granted in respect of every answer etc. but there was no scope for re-evaluation of the answer. He submitted that save and except the said Regulation 21 of 2006 Regulation, no other provision was laid down under the said 2006 Regulation for re-evaluation of an answer script.

10. He submitted that, the expert opinion obtained by the petitioner clearly showed that, the evaluation of the petitioners answers in respect of the said two questions were wrong on the part of the examination authority and when such mistake is glaring on the face of the answer script, even if, there was no provision for re-evaluation of the answer script, this Court in exercise of its high prerogative writ jurisdiction with plenary power shall direct for re-evaluation of the answers of the petitioner to the said two questions either by directing the council by appointing an expert or this Court on its own can appoint an expert and get it re-evaluated. In the event, after such evaluation it would be found that the answers given by the petitioner to the said two questions were wrongly evaluated by the council, then the council should be directed to a ward full marks to the petitioner and in that event the marks obtained by the petitioner would be enhanced. Learned counsel submitted that, the petitioner had already secured the rank 7th in the West Bengal and in the event, his marks would be enhanced then consequently his board ranking would also be enhanced.

11. Mr. Basu, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that, even if, no further provision of re-evaluation is engrafted under the 2006 Regulation and since, the same was also not prohibited under the Regulation, the Writ Court after noticing a glaring injustice can direct such re-evaluation of the answer script of the petitioner even though the statute does not expressly provide for the same. In support, the learned counsel for the petitioner had relied upon two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

(i) In the matter of: Bihar Staff Commission & Ors. Vs. Arun Kumar & Ors, reported at (2020) 6 SCC 362.

(ii) In the matter of: Mangilal vs. State of M.P., reported at (2004) 2 SCC 447

12. On the basis of the above, Mr. Basu submitted that, the writ petition should be allowed directing reassessment of the answer script of the petitioner to the extent it had been asked for by the petitioner.

13. Mr. Santanu Kumar MItra, appeared for the State respondents referring to the said 2006 Regulation submitted that, since there being no provision except Regulation 21 was engrafted for post publication scrutiny, to which the petitioner had already availed of, no provision could be presumed under the regulation for re-evaluation of the answer script of the petitioner. This implied a clear prohibition on the part of the examining authority to reassess the answer script of an examinee. A Writ Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under judicial review cannot introduce a new provision in the prevailing statutory Regulation which was not engrafted in the regulation. A Writ Court cannot amend the statute or supplant any provision therein.

14. Mr. Mitra further submitted that, if this practice of re-evaluation is allowed by the Writ Court then every examinee who is dissatisfied with his evaluation in the answer scripts would, as an inherent power of his right to fair play be entitled to demand a disclosure and personal inspection of his answer scripts and thereupon would have a further right to ask for re-evaluation of his answer papers. The inevitable consequence would be that there would be no certainty at all regarding the results of the examination for an indefinite period of time until all such requests are complied with and the results of the verification and re-evaluation are brought into account. It would be wholly wrong for the Court to make a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root problems involved in the working of the system and unmindful of the consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view as opposed to a pragmatic one were to be pronounced. He then submitted that, there must be finality to the results of public examination. Litigation cannot go on for years. In support, of the above contentions, Mr. Mitra had relied upon the following decisions:

i. In the matter of: Maharastra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education vs. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth, reported at (1984) 4 SCC 27.

ii. In the matter of: Pramod Kr. Srivastava vs. Chariman, Bihar Public Service Commission & Ors., reported at (2004) 6 SCC 714.

iii. In the matter of: Board of Secondary Education vs. Prawan Ranjan Panda & Ors., reported at (2004) 13 SCC 383.

iv. In the matter of: West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education vs. Ayan Das, reported at (2007) 8 SCC 242.

v. In the matter of: Central Board of Secondary Education vs. Khustoo Srivastava, reported at (2014) 14 SCC 523.

vi. In the matter of: Ran Vijay Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors., reported at (2018) 2 SCC 357.

vii. An order of a coordinate bench, In the matter of: Central School Service Commission & Ors. vs. Tanuj Paul, F.M.A. 407 of 2015.

viii. An order of a coordinate bench, In the matter of: Subham Shaw vs. West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education & Ors., W.P. No. 14576 (W) of 2018.

ix. An order of a coordinate bench, In the matter of: Souhardya Dolui vs. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 14576 (W) of 2018.

x. An order of a coordinate bench, In the matter of: Barnashis Roy vs. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 564 (W) of 2018.

xi. An order of a coordinate bench, In the matter of: Indramonli Nandi vs. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 25286 (W) of 2018.

15. To oppose the submissions made by Mr. Mitra learned State Counsel, Mr. Kallol Basu in reply submitted that, the law is very clear on the exercise of its plenary jurisdiction by a Writ Court in the facts and circumstances of the case under which the writ petitioner claimed relief. When the injustice is apparent and glaring on the face of the answer scripts which may include not awarding any marks for a correct answer or treating a correct answer to be an incorrect answer, the Court may permit re-evaluation, inter alia, only if it is demonstrated very clearly without any inferential process of reasoning to by a process of rationalization and only in rather and exceptional cases on the commission of material error. In support, Mr. Kallo Basu learned counsel had relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: High Court of Tripura through the Registrar General vs. Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee & Ors., reported at (2019) 6 SCC 663.

16. In reply to the said submission of Mr. Basu learned counsel, Mr. Mitra learned state counsel submitted that, the facts in the instant case is neither a rare nor an exceptional circumstance. In the event, in absence of the statutory provisions, if this Court intervenes and allows reassessment of the answer script of the petitioner, the same might alter the entire result matrix of an examination which had happened in 2018. He also submitted that, from the fact of this judgment In the matter of: Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee (supra) the same can be easily distinguished on the ground that, in the instant case the petitioner had already exhausted the statutory right for post publication scrutiny and then depending upon an inferential process of reasoning by obtaining an experts opinion applied before this Court. Hence the ratio of the said judgment has no application in the fact of this case.

17. The State respondents had filed its written notes with the compilation of judgments they relied upon. The writ petitioner had not filed any written notes.

Decision:

18. After considering the rival contentions of the parties and on perusal of the materials on record it appeared to this Court that, on a meaningful reading of 2006 Regulation save and except Regulation 21 there was no provision engrafted under the said 2006 Regulation, which is the guiding statute, for any post publication re-evaluation. In terms of Regulation 21 admittedly the petitioner had gone through the post publication scrutiny and there was no modification or change in the answer scripts of the petitioner in respect of the answers for the said two questions. Thus, the petitioner had already availed of his right for post publication scrutiny under the statute.

19. Regulation 2006 does not provide for any further re-evaluation of the answer script other than under Regulation 21, neither it expressly prohibited the same. The framers of the regulation being the expert body while framing the regulation after considering all the pros and cons framed the same and then thought it fit not to indulge an endless process of evaluation of the answer script of an examinee. Any right of examinee if specifically not provided for under the statute, the same should be understood as deemed to have been excluded by the regulation framers while framing the regulations. The Regulation 2006, therefore, did not contemplate and recognize the said right of an examinee for re-evaluation. The regulation is not under challenge as would be evident from the reliefs claimed in the writ petition. A regulation having a statutory force cannot be amended or altered by this court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A Writ Court cannot supplant or rewrite a provision in the statute which is not provided for thereunder. The Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day to day working of educational process including the examinations. The petitioner had already scored 93 out of 100 in mathematics. The petitioner secured 7th position in the Higher Secondary Examination, 2018. This is not such a rare or an exceptional case where the mistake in assessment of the answer script of the petitioner is so glaring, without any inferential process that the petitioner would suffer an irretrievable and irreversible prejudice. Neither this would amount to taking away a substantive right of an examinee for reassessment of his answer script after exercising his right for post publication scrutiny in terms of Regulation 21 of the 2006 Regulation. In the matter of: Bihar Staff Selection Commission (supra) the judgment was delivered in a fact where the recruitment of public services was in issue. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment are quoted below:

"26. Given the clear declaration of law in the judgments of this Court, we are of the opinion that the unilateral exercise of re-valuation undertaken by the High Court (both by the Single Judge [Dhananjay Kumar Mishra v. Bihar Staff Selection Commission, (2013) 4 PLJR 169] and the Division Bench [Kumod Kumar v. Bihar Staff Selection Commission, (2015) 3 PLJR 693] ) has not solved, but rather contributed to the chaos. No rule or regulation was shown by any party during the hearing, which justified the approach that was adopted. BSSC, in our opinion, acted correctly in the first instance, in referring the answer to a panel of experts. If there were justifiable doubts about the recommendations of that panel, the least that should have been done, was to require BSSC to refer the disputed or doubtful questions to another expert panel. That was not done; the "corrections" indicated by the Single Judge [Dhananjay Kumar Mishra v. Bihar Staff Selection Commission, (2013) 4 PLJR 169] were accepted by BSSC; several candidates who made it to the select list freshly drawn up pursuant to his directions, were appointed. The Division Bench, thereafter undertook the entire exercise afresh, compounding the matter further by not referring the disputed questions to any panel of experts. We are left reiterating the lament, (made in Ran Vijay [Ran Vijay Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 2 SCC 357 : (2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] ) that the High Court's interference has not resulted in finality "to the result of the examinations" despite a long lapse of time. There is an air of uncertainty about the entire selection - nay, the entire cadre, because the inter se seniority of selected (and appointed) candidates is in a state of flux.

27. As noticed earlier, the Committee of Experts appointed by this Court has made its recommendations. Since the exercise indicates that the previous re-evaluations (by the Single Judge and the Division Bench-both made in the absence of expert recommendations) are not correct or accurate, as an exceptional case, we propose to accept them. This approach of ours is in tune with a recent judgment of this Court in Pranav Verma v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana [Pranav Verma v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana,(2020) 15 SCC 377] , where the Court accepted the recommendations of a single member committee and directed revision of results in a public examination, relating to recruitment of candidates to judicial service.

28. As a result of the above discussion, BSSC is directed to evaluate and publish the results afresh, in the light of the recommendations and report of the experts (constituted by this Court) subject to care being taken by BSSC and the Government of Bihar, not to disturb appointments made previously pursuant to the directions of the Single Judge. In case the number of selected candidates (on the basis of the revised result) exceeds the vacancies available as on the last date indicated for consideration (in the recruitment or recruitments concerned), the State of Bihar would accommodate the excess numbers in the relevant cadres as against future vacancies arising till 31-12-2019. This Court is hereby making these directions to put a quietus on the dispute, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

29. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment [Kumod Kumar v. Bihar Staff Selection Commission, (2015) 3 PLJR 693] of the Patna High Court, as well as the judgment [Dhananjay Kumar Mishra v. Bihar Staff Selection Commission, (2013) 4 PLJR 169] of the Single Judge are hereby set aside; the appeals are disposed of in the above terms without order on costs".

20. From the above observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear to the mind of this Court that, the fact situation In the matter of: Bihar Staff Selection Commission (supra) was considered as an exceptional case before the Hon'ble Apex Court and as such in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the judgment was delivered.

21. In the matter of: Mangilal (supra), the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was grant of compensation to victims of offence under Section 357(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that to receive a compensation under the said provision of law was a substantive right of the recipient victim with a civil consequence. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that in such a case the principle of natural justice by granting an opportunity of hearing, though not provided specifically under the statute became presumptive, unless found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. In the fact of the instant case, the petitioner had already exercised its right under Regulation 21 of the 2006 Regulation for post publication scrutiny. The said regulation having a statutory force does not further recognize any right of the petitioner for reassessment of its answer scripts in any manner. Whereas in exercise of power under Section 357(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 the specific statutory provision is there for receiving compensation by a victim. In this fact situation the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held the right to receive compensation must be followed by an opportunity of hearing even though not specifically provided for under the statute. Hence the ratio decided In the matter of: Mangilal (supra) has no application in the fact situation in the instant case.

22. It is trite that an order or a judgment of a Court of law should not be read like a statute. A judgment is delivered by a court of law on the interpretation of the statutory provisions by applying such provisions in the appropriate fact situation. The court shall only interpret the statute by rendering its judgment and cannot promulgate, modify, amend or alter the statute. This is the job of the legislature. A judgment has to be understood and read in the light of the facts of that particular case and on the basis of the issue raised before the court for adjudication.

23. Applying the above settled principles of law while reading the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee (supra), it appeared to this Court that, it was a special leave petition filed from an order under which the review petition filed by the respondent no.1 against his dismissal of writ petition was allowed.

24. Mr. Kallol Basu learned counsel had relied upon heavily on paragraph 23 of the said judgment In the matter of: Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee (supra), according to him, this was the legal principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below:

“23. In this case we have already noted that the writ petition was filed challenging the results and seeking re-valuation. The writ petition came to be dismissed [Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee v. High Court of Gauhati, 2012 SCC OnLine Gau 899 : (2014) 1 Gau LR 811] in the year 2012 by the High Court. The special leave petition was dismissed [Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee v. High Court of Gauhati, 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1396] in the year 2013. The review petition is filed after nearly 5 years. In the interregnum, there were supervening development in the form of fresh selection. While it may be true that the delay in filing the review petition may have been condoned, it does not mean that the Court where it exercises its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is to become oblivious to the subsequent development and the impact of passage of time. Even in the judgment of this Court in Ran Vijay Singh v. Rahul Singh [Ran Vijay Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 2 SCC 357 : (2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] which according to the first respondent forms the basis of the High Court's interference though does not expressly stated so, what the Court has laid down is that the Court may permit re-valuation inter alia only if it is demonstrated very clearly without any inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation and only in rare or exceptional cases on the commission of material error. It may not be correct to characterise the case as a rare or exceptional case when the first respondent approaches the Court with a delay of nearly 5 years allowing subsequent events to overtake him and the Court. We feel that this aspect was not fully appreciated by the High Court”

25. From the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee (supra) and in view of the settled principles of law on the subject that how a judgment of a court has to be read, as discussed above, this Court is of the firm view that, the ratio of the judgment is available at paragraph 24 and not at paragraph 23 thereof as quoted above.

26. Paragraph 24 of the said judgment is quoted below:

“24. The review, it must be noted is not a re-hearing of the main matter. A review would lie only on detection without much debate of an error apparent. Was this such a case It is here that we must notice the argument of the appellant relating to question in Paper III of the examination alone, engaging the attention of the Court for the reason that the first respondent pressed this aspect alone before the High Court. The judgment [Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee v. High Court of Gauhati, 2012 SCC OnLine Gau 899 : (2014) 1 Gau LR 811] of the High Court in the writ petition appears to bear out this submission of the appellant. The issue relating to the anomaly in the evaluation of Paper III has been discussed threadbare in the judgment. The view of the High Court has not been disturbed by this Court. Despite this the High Court in the impugned judgment [Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee v. High Court of Gauhati, 2018 SCC OnLine Gau 2060] has proceeded to take up the plea relating to questions in Part I and Part II and proceeded to consider the review petition and granted relief that too after the passage of nearly 5 years. This suffices to allow the present appeal”

27. Thus, the ratio decided In the matter of: Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee (supra) has no application in the fact situation of the instant case.

28. The learned State Counsel Mr. Mitra had relied upon all the decisions as referred to above were on the same proposition of law as mentioned above. To avoid prolixity and reiteration this Court thinks it fit not to discuss each and every judgments relied upon on behalf of the State respondents, rather it thinks fit to discuss those which are the most discussed while laying down the proposition of law on the issue in this writ petition.

29. In the matter of: Ran Vijay Singh (supra) the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were as under:

27.The principle laid down by this Court in Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] was affirmed in W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das [W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das, (2007) 8 SCC 242 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 871 : 5 SCEC 792] and it was reiterated that there must be finality attached to the result of a public examination and in the absence of a statutory provision re-evaluation of answer scripts cannot be permitted and that it could be done only in exceptional cases and as a rarity. Reference was also made to Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission [Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883] , Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda [Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda, (2004) 13 SCC 383 : 5 SCEC 457] and Board of Secondary Education v. D. Suvankar [Board of Secondary Education v. D. Suvankar, (2007) 1 SCC 603 : 5 SCEC 719] .

28.The facts in CBSE v. Khushboo Shrivastava [CBSE v. Khushboo Shrivastava, (2014) 14 SCC 523 : 6 SCEC 109] are rather interesting. The respondent was a candidate in the All India Pre-Medical/Pre-Dental Entrance Examination, 2007 conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education (for short “CBSE”). Soon after the results of the examination were declared, she applied for re-evaluation of her answer sheets. CBSE declined her request since there was no provision for this. She then filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court and the learned Single Judge [Khushboo Srivastava v. Union of India, 2008 SCC OnLine Pat 1553] called for her answer sheets and on a perusal thereof and on comparing her answers with the model or key answers concluded that she deserved an additional two marks. The view of the learned Single Judge was upheld [Khushboo Shrivastava v. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Pat 1054 : (2009) 1 PLJR 867] by the Division Bench of the High Court.

29. In appeal, this Court in Khushboo Shrivastava case [CBSE v. Khushboo Shrivastava, (2014) 14 SCC 523 : 6 SCEC 109] set aside the decision of the High Court and reiterating the view already expressed by this Court from time to time and allowing the appeal of CBSE it was held: (SCC p. 526, paras 9-11)

“9. We find that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission [Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883] has clearly held relying on Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] that in the absence of any provision for the re-evaluation of answer books in the relevant rules, no candidate in an examination has any right to claim or ask for re-evaluation of his marks. The decision in Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission [Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883] was followed by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda [Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda, (2004) 13 SCC 383 : 5 SCEC 457] in which the direction of the High Court for re-evaluation of answer books of all the examinees securing 90% or above marks was held to be unsustainable in law because the regulations of the Board of Secondary Education, Orissa, which conducted the examination, did not make any provision for re-evaluation of answer books in the rules.

10. In the present case, the bye-laws of the All India Pre-Medical/Pre-Dental Entrance Examination, 2007 conducted by CBSE did not provide for re-examination or re-evaluation of answer sheets. Hence, the appellants could not have allowed such re-examination or re-evaluation on the representation of Respondent 1 and accordingly rejected the representation of Respondent 1 for re-examination/re-evaluation of her answer sheets....

11. In our considered opinion, neither the learned Single Judge [Khushboo Srivastava v. Union of India, 2008 SCC OnLine Pat 1553] nor the Division Bench [Khushboo Shrivastava v. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Pat 1054 : (2009) 1 PLJR 867] of the High Court could have substituted his/its own views for that of the examiners and awarded two additional marks to Respondent 1 for the two answers in exercise of powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution as these are purely academic matters. …”

30. The law on the subject is therefore, quite clear and we only propose to highlight a few significant conclusions. They are:

30.1. If a statute, Rule or Regulation governing an examination permits the re-evaluation of an answer sheet or scrutiny of an answer sheet as a matter of right, then the authority conducting the examination may permit it;

30.2. If a statute, Rule or Regulation governing an examination does not permit re-evaluation or scrutiny of an answer sheet (as distinct from prohibiting it) then the court may permit re-evaluation or scrutiny only if it is demonstrated very clearly, without any "inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation" and only in rare or exceptional cases that a material error has been committed;

30.3. The court should not at all re-evaluate or scrutinise the answer sheets of a candidate-it has no expertise in the matter and academic matters are best left to academics;

30.4. The court should presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that assumption; and 30.5. In the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the examination authority rather than to the candidate.

31. On our part we may add that sympathy or compassion does not play any role in the matter of directing or not directing re-evaluation of an answer sheet. If an error is committed by the examination authority, the complete body of candidates suffers. The entire examination process does not deserve to be derailed only because some candidates are disappointed or dissatisfied or perceive some injustice having been caused to them by an erroneous question or an erroneous answer. All candidates suffer equally, though some might suffer more but that cannot be helped since mathematical precision is not always possible. This Court has shown one way out of an impasse - exclude the suspect or offending question.

32. It is rather unfortunate that despite several decisions of this Court, some of which have been discussed above, there is interference by the courts in the result of examinations. This places the examination authorities in an unenviable position where they are under scrutiny and not the candidates". Additionally, a massive and sometimes prolonged examination exercise concludes with an air of uncertainty. While there is no doubt that candidates put in a tremendous effort in preparing for an examination, it must not be forgotten that even the examination authorities put in equally great efforts to successfully conduct an examination. The enormity of the task might reveal some lapse at a later stage, but the court must consider the internal checks and balances put in place by the examination authorities before interfering with the efforts put in by the candidates who have successfully participated in the examination and the examination authorities. The present appeals are a classic example of the consequence of such interference where there is no finality to the result of the examinations even after a lapse of eight years. Apart from the examination authorities even the candidates are left wondering about the certainty or otherwise of the result of the examination - whether they have passed or not; whether their result will be approved or disapproved by the court; whether they will get admission in a college or university or not; and whether they will get recruited or not. This unsatisfactory situation does not work to anybody's advantage and such a state of uncertainty results in confusion being worse confounded. The overall and larger impact of all this is that public interest suffers.

30. In the matter of: Dr. NTR University of Health Sciences (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observed as under:

"7. The short question which is posed for consideration before this Court is, "whether in the absence of any provision for re-evaluation, the High Court was justified in ordering re-evaluation after calling for the record of the answer scripts

11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the common judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge ordering re-evaluation of the answer scripts, confirmed by the Division Bench by the impugned common judgment and order, is unsustainable. However, as observed hereinabove, as the results of the original writ petitioners after re-evaluation or appearing in the supplementary examination have been declared, while quashing and setting aside the impugned common judgments and orders passed by the learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench of the High Court, the same shall not be affected and/or disturbed. The impugned common judgments and orders passed by the learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench ordering re-evaluation of the answer scripts in absence of any such provision in the relevant rules are hereby quashed and set aside. However, as observed hereinabove, the same shall not affect the declaration of the results of the original writ petitioners on re-evaluation or appearing in the supplementary examination".

31. In view of the foregoing discussions and reasons and in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed above, this Court is of the firm view that, in absence of a specific provision for re-evaluation of his answer scripts, save and except Regulation 21 of the 2006 Regulation which had already been exercised by the petitioner, the petitioner is not eligible to have his answer scripts re-evaluated as the statute does not permit the same. The case of the petitioner is neither exceptional nor a rare one.

32. Resultantly, this writ petition WPA 4541 of 2019 being devoid of any merit, stands dismissed, without any order as to costs.