A.M. Bhattacharjee, J.

(1) On a reference being made by a Division Bench of this Court, the present rule has been referred to this larger Bench for disposal as according to the referring Bench, the "same involves "a very important question" decision whereon "may lead to far-reaching consequences".

(2) Under section 86 (1) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 "any dispute relating to the affairs of a Co-operative Society" was required to be referred to the Registrar if the parties thereto were as specified in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) to that sub-section and under section 1312 (2) (d) of the said Act, no Civil Court would have any jurisdiction in respect of "any dispute required under section 86 to be referred to the Registrar". The important question, according to the order of reference, is what were the disputes that were required to be so referred to the Registrar under section 86 (1) (d) and were accordingly not justiciable in a Civil Court and, the Rule in its entirety having been referred to this Bench for disposal, the further consequential question is whether the dispute involved in the Civil Suit, giving rise to this revisional application, is such a dispute.

(3) When the order of reference was made in 1985, the Act of 1973 was still in operation and the present Act of 1983, which has replaced the Act of 1973, was yet to come into force which has thereafter come into force with effect from 1st August, 1987. Section 3 of the Act of 1983, while repealing the earlier Act of 1973, has provided in sub-section (2) that "anything done or suffered or action taken (including any suit or proceeding commenced, any dispute decided, any right or title accrued, or any liability or obligation or penalty incurred)" while the preceding Act was in operation, "shall be deemed to have been done or suffered or taken under this Act, as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all material times when such thing was done or suffered or such action was taken". As a result, since the repeal and replacement of the Act of 1973 by the Act of 1983 in 1987, the law to be considered for the present proceeding, including the suit that has given rise to it, is that contained in the new Act of 1983 and we propose to dispose of this Revision with reference to the provisions of the present Act. Be it, however, noted that the relevant provisions material for our present purpose of the Act of 1973 and the Act of 1983 are almost in pari materia. The relevant provisions are sections 86 (1) and 132 (2) of the Act of 1973, now repealed, and sections 95 (1) and 134 (2) of the present Act of 1983 and the material portions thereof are reproduced herein below :-Act XXXVIII of 1973:-

"86 (1) Any dispute relating to the affairs of a Co-operative Society or of the liquidator of a society shall be referred to the Registrar if the parties, thereto are among the following, namely :- (a)the society, its managing committee, any past or present officer, agent or employee or the liquidator of the society; or (b)a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member of the society; or (c)a surety of a member, past member or deceased member the society, whether such surety is or is not a member of the society; or (d)any other co-operative society or any person (including financing bank) having transactions with the concerned cooperative Society or the liquidator of such society".

"132 (2) Save as provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of - (d) any dispute required under section 86 be referred to the Registrar. "

(4) Act XIV of 1983 :-

"95 (1) Any dispute concerning the business of a co-operative society capable of being the subject of civil litigation or any dispute relating to the affairs of a co-operative society (other than a dispute relating to the disciplinary action taken by a co-operative society against the paid employees of the co-operative society of the terms and conditions of the service of the paid employees of the co-operative society) shall be referred in the prescribed manner to the Registrar, if the parties thereto are among the following : (a)a co-operative society or its board or an officer (past or present), agent, employee or liquidator of a co-operative society; (b)a member or a past member or a person claiming through member or a past member or on behalf of a deceased member a co-operative society or a financing bank of a co-operative society ; or (c)a surety of a member or past member or deceased member of a co-operative society, whether such surety is or is not a member of the co-operative society; or (d)any other co-operative society or any person including a financing bank having transaction with a co-operative society or any liquidator of a co-operative society. "

"134 (2) Save as provided in this Act, no Civil Court or Revenue Court shall have jurisdiction in regard to- (d) any dispute required under section 95 to be referred to the Registrar. "

(5) The question that has arisen for our consideration is what are the disputes which were and are required to be referred to the Registrar under section 86 (1) of the Old and section 95 (1) of the New Act and, are, therefore, not cognizable by the Civil Courts under section 132 (2) of the Old and section 134 (2) of the New Act. We would have to construe the expression "dispute" and ascertain the denotation and connotation of the term "dispute" in the context of these sections.

(6) Mr. Motilal, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, accordingly started placing before us the latest Editions of Craies on Statute Law and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes and regretted very much that he could not get handy Crawfords Statutory Construction.

(7) Learned Members of the Bar and the Bench very often forget that gone are the days when Maxwell came out with his First Edition in 1875 and the Second Edition in 1883 and Craies with his First Edition in 1907, when those leading treatises on interpretation or construction of Statues could be, and in fact were, immensely useful. But as Chandrachud, C. J. , pointed in the First Judges Transfer Case (Sankalchand Seth - AIR 1977 SC 2328 [LQ/SC/1977/267] at 2336), the principles of interpretation, with rules pulling in different directions, have become a murky area and just as a case-law digest can supply an authority on almost any thinkable proposition, so also these principles have collected over the years divergent formulae which can fit in with any interpretation which one may choose to place. To quote from Denning (Discipline of Law - 1979 - page 9), "if you find a maxim or rule on your side, your opponent will find one on his side to counteract it". Let us, therefore, put aside these treatise for the time being until we feel that our endeavour to understand the plain meaning of the relevant provisions, apparently written in plain English, will not succeed without the aid of these treatises. Now that we have said "plain meaning of plain English", we have reminded ourselves of the classical observations of Vivian Bose, J. in the Supreme Court decision in Seksaria Cotton Mills (AIR 1953 SC 278 [LQ/SC/1953/40] at 281-282) that the more learned a person is in law, the more puzzled he would be

"for it is not till one is learned in the law that subtleties of thought and bewilderment arise at the meaning of plain English words, which any man of average intelligence, not versed in the law, would have no difficulty in understanding". We dare say that we, my Lords Ganguli and Nandi, JJ. , and myself, have not felt much difficulty in understanding the relevant provisions on a plain, though careful, reading thereof. May be, we are not that learned or versed in law to suffer from any sort of amblyopia, which, according to the dictum of Vivian Bose, J. , may result from learning in law.

(8) As we have already noted, any "dispute" required to be referred to the Registrar under section 86 (1) of the Old or section 95 (1) of the New Act, would go out of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts because of section 132 (2) of the Old and section 134 (2) of the New Act. The expression "dispute" has been defined in section 2 (20) of the New Act as "any matter capable of being the subject of civil litigation, and includes a claim in response of any sum payable to or by a Co-operative Society". The definition as section 2 (q) of the Old Act was also the same, but for the addition of words "whether such claim be admitted or not" at the end, which probably makes no difference and surely no difference for our present purpose.

(9) Having defined the term "dispute" as "any matter capable of be the subject of civil litigation", user of those very words purporting to qualify the expression "dispute" in section 95 (1) of the New Act is obviously sheer tautology. But enactment of good law is good enough, even if the language may lack precision. Be that as it may, what must. go to the Registrar under section 95 (1), and would go out of bounds of the Civil Courts, is a dispute" which is "concerning" the business of "or" is relating to the affairs of "a Co-operative Society. The expressions "concerning" and "relating and the expressions "business" and "affairs" may sound synonymous and reference to the Lexicon may also go to support such an impression. Tautology again We do not think so.

(10) Any thing concerning the business of a Co-operative Society is a matter relating to the affairs of the Society. But everything relating to the affairs of the Society may not be concerning the business of that Society. Lending money to its members is obviously the business as well as the affairs of a "co-operative Credit Society" as defined in section 2 (p) of the Act of 1973 and section 2 (17) of the Act of 1983. Providing its members with residential accommodation is obviously the business as well as the affairs of a "co-operative Housing Society" as defined in section 2 (18) of the Act of 1983. But any dispute relating to the appointment or termination service of any of the officers or employees of the Society or any dispute relating to the holding or not holding the statutory meetings would be one relating to the affairs of the Society, but not necessarily concerning its business. From that point of view, even though the two expressions business and affairs may very often be used synonymously, the expression affairs has a wider connotation or import than the expression business. As we have already indicated, disputes relating to the constitution of the Society, or the election of its office-bearers, or the conduct of its general meetings and the like are obviously disputes relating to the affairs of the Society, but may not be disputes concerning the business of the Society, where the business the Society, as per its Rules and By-laws, consists of, say, lending money to its members as in the case of Co-operative Credit Society, or providing accommodations to its members, as in the case of a Co-operative Housing Society.

(11) Reference in this connection may be made to three decisions the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (AIR 1969 SC 1320 [LQ/SC/1968/253] ), in Sabharwal Brothers (AIR 1972 SC 18931) and in O. P. Bhatnagar (AIR 1982 SC 1097 [LQ/SC/1982/84 ;] ">AIR 1982 SC 1097 [LQ/SC/1982/84 ;] [LQ/SC/1982/84 ;] ), in all of which the analogous provisions of section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, fell for consideration and the expression "touching the business" in section 91 (1) of the Act had to be construed. But the context in which the expression business was used in section 91 (1) of the Maharashtra Act would have to be noted in order to appreciate as to why the expression "business" was given a somewhat narrow connotation and not equated with all "affairs" of the Society. The relevant provisions of section 91 (1) of the Maharashtra Act material for our purpose, read as hereunder:-

"any dispute touching the constitution, election of the office-bearer conduct of general meeting, management or business of a Society".

Now as in common life, a man is very often known by the company he keeps, a word also very often suffers alteration or variations in its colour, contents and connotation in the context of the collocation in which it is used and this rule is epitomised in the maxim Nescitur a Soccis. And in the context of the preceding words "constitution", "election of office-bearers", "conduct of general meetings" and "management", the succeeding word "business" in section 91 (1) was held in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (supra, at 1325) to have used in the narrower sense and to mean "the actual trading or commercial or other activity of the Society which the Society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its by-laws". And this was followed in the later two decisions in Sabharwal Brothers (supra) and in O. P. Bhatnagar (supra).

(12) In Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (supra), the Supreme Court has pointed out (at 1326, paragraphs 18,23) that if a Society, e. g. , a Co-operative Credit Society, "own buildings and lets out parts of buildings which it does not require for its own purpose, it cannot be said that letting out of those parts is a part of the business of the Society". But the Supreme Court has pointed out further (supra0 that if "it is the business of a Society to construct and buy houses and let them out to its members", "in that case letting out of a property may be part of its business". In that case, the Society was a Co-operative Bank and the dispute was relating to tenancy "between a tenant and a member of the Bank in a building which has subsequently been acquired by the Bank" and was accordingly held not to be dispute "touching the business of the Bank". The Supreme Court however, added (supra, paragraph 23) that it was "doubtful that the word dispute would include a dispute between a landlord Society and a tenant, when the landlord Society has not been set up for the purpose of constructing or buying and letting out houses", clearly implying thereby that where the business of the Society has been set up for the purpose of constructing or buying and letting out houses", clearly implying thereby that where the business of the Society is to construct or acquire and to let out premises to its members, as in the case of a Co-operative Housing Society, a dispute relating to such tenancy between the Society and the member may come within section 91 (1) and may thus go out of the reach of the Civil Courts notwithstanding all that may be contained in the "various Rent Acts which give special privilege to tenants".

(13) In Sabharwal Brothers (supra), the respondent acquired the disputed flat as a member from a Co-operative Housing Society whose business was to let out premises to its members. The respondent, in her turn let out the same to the appellant for certain term and the dispute was, therefore, between a member-tenant of a Co-operative Housing Society and a tenant under such member-tenant. The Supreme Court has ruled (at 1895, paragraph 9) that apart from the fact that such letting out by a member- tenant was in breach of the relevant by-laws which could affect the members right to membership, it was also difficult to see as to how "letting by a member to another would touch the business of the Society", which was to provide its own members with accommodation. But it was nevertheless pointed out that "the position might have been different if the latter (i. e. the appellant) had himself been a tenant of the Flat under the Society", implying thereby that a dispute relating to tenancy between a member-tenant of a Society and the Society, whose business is to let out premises to its members, would have come within section 91 (1) to be governed by the Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the Rent Acts dealing with landlords and tenants of premises.

(14) The observations in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (supra) and in Sabharwal Brothers (supra), therefore, appear to be authority for the view that if the Society is one whose object is to provide accommodation to its members and in furtherance of such object, it lets out a premises to one of its member, disputes relating to such letting out would be disputes "touching the business" of the Society within the meaning of section 91 (1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies, Act, 1961 to go out of the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts and to be decided by the authorities under the Act.

(15) In O. P. Bhatnagar (supra), Deccan Merchants Co--operative Bank (supra) was explained on the footing that the Society in that case "was a Co-operative Bank and ordinarily a Co-operative Bank cannot be said to be engaged in business when it lets out property owned by it" and therefore the dispute relating to tenancy of a portion of the building belonging to the Co-operative Society could not be a dispute under section 91 (1) to become non-justiciable in a Civil Court. In respect of Sabharwal Brothers (supra) , it was held (at 1105) that the same "decided only one point, albeit a point of great importance, namely, that the Society having sold the Flat,. . . the letting out of the flat by the flat-owner was no concern of the Society" as "there was nothing to show that such letting would affect the business of the Society once it has sold the flat". But it has been pointed out further that the observations in Sabharwal Brothers (supra) to the effect that "the position might have been different if the latter had himself been a tenant under the society" would "logically" and "as a necessary corollary" lead to the conclusion that if the Society had let out the flat to the appellant, "the decision of this Court would have been otherwise" implying thereby that the dispute in that case could not have been taken cognizance of by the Civil Courts.

(16) Even though this is not the precise question which has been referred to this Bench, we have adverted to this aspect in some details as a rather recent Division Bench decision of this Court in Re-Sipra Mitra (91, Calcutta Weekly Notes 698) has, after referring to and purporting to be governed by the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions, laid down certain propositions with which we have not been able to agree and we are inclined to think, and this we say with due respect, that the said Division Bench decision goes counter to the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court above referred to. The Division Bench has observed (at 705) that "we also hold that it was not the intention of the legislature to deprive a tenant in a building owned by a Co-operative Society of the benefits given by the various pro-visions of the Rent Act" and for this the Division Bench has relied strongly on Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (Supra). As we have already pointed out, the main ground on which the dispute in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (supra at 1326) was held to be not a dispute under section 91 (1) was that the Society being a Co-operative Bank, whose business was not and could not be inducting tenants, "the dispute between a tenant and a member of the Bank in a building which has subsequently been acquired by the Bank cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the Bank" to come within section 91 (1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. The Supreme Court also adverted to the question of competing jurisdiction of the Civil Courts under the Rent Acts and of the authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act relating to eviction of tenants in respect of buildings owned by the Co-operative Societies and observed that it could hardly be "the intention of the legislature to deprive tenants in buildings owned by Co-operative Societies of the benefits given by the Rent Act" and that "for achieving that social objective it is necessary that a dispute between the landlord and the tenant should be dealt with by the Courts under the Rent Act and in accordance with the special provisions of the Rent Act" and that "the two Acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the (Co-operative Societies), Act should apply".

(17) In appreciating these observations, however, it must be borne in mind that the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, the concerned Society being a Co-operative Bank, letting out portion of its houses even to its members could not be a matter touching the business of the Society. And all that the Supreme Court intended to convey was that even though disputes touching the business of a Cooperative Society are to be decided by the authorities under the Act and by the Civil Courts, a dispute between the Society, which is Co-operative Bank, and its member to whom a tenancy has been granted by the society is not to be treated as "disputes" within the meaning of section 91 (1) of the Act and it could not be expected that the legislature intended to deprive the tenants in buildings owned by Co-operative Societies of the benefits given by the Rent Act and the Rent Act would apply proprio vigore to disputes relating to ejectment of tenant, even though a Co-operative Society is the landlord and its member is the tenant. But even in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (supra, paragraphs 18, 23) and also in Sabharwal Brothers (supra, paragraph 9) the Supreme Court took care to make it clear that where, as in the case of Co-operative Housing Society, the very business or affair of the Society is to provide accommodation to its members and the Society lets out premises, acquired or constructed by it, to its members, a dispute relating to ejectment between such a Society and its member-tenant would obviously be a dispute touching the business of the Society to be governed by and under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act.

(18) In Sipra Mitra (supra), the claim for recovery of possession made by a member of the Co-operative Housing Society to whom a flat was allotted by the Society, against the tenant inducted by such member. It appears that the tenant was so inducted as a result of a tripartite agreement between the Society, the allottee-member and the tenant and under the By-laws of the Society such letting out by a member-allottee could only be done with the permission of the Society. If the business of a Housing operative Society is to allot premises to its members and also to permit such member to let out such premises to other outsider, then it may be difficult to understand as to why a dispute relating to eviction of such tenant would not be one relating to the affairs of the Society, the Rules and By-laws of which provide and authorise such letting out. We have no doubt that the observations of the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (supra), to the effect that "it was not the intention of the Legislature to deprive a tenant in a building owned by a Co-operative Society of the benefits given by the various provisions of Rent Act" must be read subject to this rider that if the business or affairs of the Co-operative Society is to let out premises to its members, as in the case of a Co-operative Housing Society, any dispute relating to such tenancy including recovery of session of the tenanted premises, shall squarely come within section 95 (1) of the Act of 1983 and would have to be adjudicated under and in accordance with the provisions of that Act, if the parties to the dispute are Society and the member-tenant or such others are specified in clauses (b) , (c) and (d) of that section. This has been indicated by the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank (supra) while in 0. P. Bhatnagar (supra) the Supreme Court has gone much further and has ruled (at 1104, paragraph 19) that if the Society is a tenant-co-partnership-type housing society formed with the object of providing residential accommodation to its co-partner tenant members", "it is as much the concern of the Society to ensure that the flats are in occupation of its members in accordance with the by-laws framed by it, rather than a person in unauthorised occupation, as it is the concern of the member, who lets it out to another under an agreement of leave and licence and wants to secure possession for his own use after the termination of licence" and "it must, therefore, follow that a claim by the Society together with such member for ejectment of a person who was permitted to occupy having become a nominal member thereof, upon revocation of licence, is a dispute falling within the purview of section 91 (1) of the Act".

(19) We are grateful to our learned brother Ganguli, J. , for letting us know in his interesting judgement in J. L. Bose v. Brigadier Atindra Mohan Bhattacharjee (1989-2 Calcutta High Court Notes 109) about the hoary past of the Rent Restriction Laws from the 15th Century and the development of the status of the tenants almost to the position semi-irremovability and it may be that days have come or are well-nigh coming o the birth of a new legal maxim, namely, once a tenant, always a tenant and of a new juristic approach to regard non-ejectibility of tenants to be the rule and ejectability to be the exception. Gone is that stage of civilisation when, as pointed out by Sir Henry Maine, the progress of the human society was gradually from status to contract and the present move is rather on the reverse gear, i. e. from contract to status. Gone are the days when one could hire and fire a servant or a tenant as he pleased and the modern Jurisprudence is going all the way to invest the servants, the tenants and others with secured and endurable status founded on the terra firma of laws, both statutory and non-statutory. As pointed out by Ganguli, J. , the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956, is one such measure and almost every time the Legislature has thought it fit to amend the same, the amendments have, by and large, demonstrated their bias in favour of the tenants and against the landlords. Our Judicial exposition of such laws must, therefore, be in tune with such legislative intendment and should not aim at, wherever possible, depriving tenants of its beneficial protections.

(20) But we cannot but note that the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Acts, the preceding one of 1973 and the succeeding one of 1983, are also enacted by the same Legislature and having assented to by the President, its provisions would, to the extent they go, out-weigh the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956, wherever the latter is inconsistent with the former. And, therefore, if the business or the affairs of a Co-operative Society, which is a Housing Society as defined in section 2 (18) of the Act of 1983, is to grant tenancies to its members, a dispute between such tenant-member and the Society would obviously be a dispute "concerning the business" and "relating to the affairs" of the Co-operative Society within the meaning of section 95 and no Civil Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the same in view of section 134 and the same would have to be referred to the Registrar alone under section 95.

(21) From the Order of Reference it appears that there are two decisions rendered by two learned Judges of this Court holding that section 86 of the Act of 1973, corresponding to section 95 of the Act of 1983, "are wide enough to cover all disputes concerning the co-operative society", The Division Bench in the order of reference has expressed its apprehension that such a view would "lead to the result that all kinds of suits in which the Co-operative Society may be involved, irrespective of whether they involve complicated questions of law or not, would be out of bounds for the Civil Court and must be adjudicated by the Registrar". The Division Bench wondered as to whether the Legislature really intended to confer upon the Registrar-not being properly equipped as a Civil Court-the entire jurisdiction of the Civil Courts for the purpose of adjudicating complicated civil suits irrespective of their nature and character, in the event a Co-operative Society is a party to the said dispute".

(22) We are afraid that if, as noted in the order of reference, the learned single Judge have stated that "the provisions of section 86" (of the Act of 1973, now replaced by section 95 of the Act of 1983) were "wide enough to cover all disputes concerning the Co-operative Society", they have stated the proposition too broadly. As we have already indicated, the "dispute", in order to come within the provisions of section 86 of the Old Act and section 95 of the New Act and thus to go out of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts under the provisions of section 132 of the Old and section 134 of the New Act, must be disputes, not just concerning or involving a Co-operative Society, but concerning the business or relating to the affairs of the Society, such business or affairs to which the Society is authorised to be concerned with or be involved in or in order to carry out its objectives under the Act and as chartered by and in its Rules and By-laws, A loan granted by a Society which is only a Co-operative Housing Society and not a Co-operative Credit Society, or a tenancy granted in respect of a portion of its property by a Society which is a Co-operative Credit Society and not a Co-operative Housing Society, can not thus give rise to a dispute concerning the business or relating to the affairs of the Society, But, as already stated, if the dispute concerns or relates to something which the Society is legally authorised to and required by its Rules and By-laws to undertake, it would squarely come within the provisions of section 95 of the new Act, corresponding to section 86 of the old Act and cannot be entertained by the Civil Court if the parties to the dispute are as specified in those sections. And once these conditions are satisfied, the dispute must be referred to the Registrar and cannot be taken cognizance of by the Civil Courts, however complicated the questions of law the dispute may involve. If that be, and we think that to be, the law made by our Legislature and that law does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity, then it is simply useless to express any anxiety, as manifested in the Order of Reference as to whether the Registrar, not being expected to be "properly well-equipped as a Civil Court", would beable to decide the dispute effectively. Even if a legislative measure appears to be unwise, we must leave it at that, for neither we can review legislative wisdom nor should we be presumptuous to think that. wisdom is our sole monopoly. Justice Holmes once said to Justice Stones that if the Legislature enacts a measure and "i cant find anything in the Constitution expressly forbidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or not, goddamit, let them do it".

(23) This brings us to the case in hand where the promoters of a Co-operative Housing Society, before its formation and registration as such, entered into a written agreement to purchase some land and having failed to obtain conveyance from the seller, instituted this suit in the Civil Court in the name of the Society after the same was duly formed and registered. As would appear from the plaint and the Deed or Agreement, the land was sought to be purchased for the Co-operative Housing Society and for the avowed purpose (vide, clause 2 (c) of the Deed of Agreement) of constructing houses thereon for allotment of apartments to the members. The dispute in this case therefore directly concerns the business and relates to the affairs of the Society which is patently a Co-operative Housing Society and is therefore clearly a dispute within the meaning of section 86 (1) of the Old and section 95 (1) of the New Act. The dispute also is one between a Co-operative Society and "any person having transactions" with the Co-operative Society within the meaning of clause (d) of section 86 (1) and of clause (d) of section 95 (1) as aforesaid. The fact that the Co-operative Society was not formally formed and registered when the Agreement was entered into is immaterial for the Society has already come into jural existence when the suit was filed and the question of maintainability would obviously have to be decided on the state of affairs prevalent at the time when the suit was instituted. The suit, therefore, could not be entertained by the Civil Court under the provisions of section 132 (2) (d) of the then prevailing Act of 1973, now replaced by section 134 (2) (d) of the present Act, 1983. The Court below was accordingly wrong in entertaining the suit and in holding that it had jurisdiction and that the plaint was not liable to be rejected under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the Court had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit.

(24) One word more before we conclude. We have held that the dispute involved in the suit, giving rise to this revision, is a dispute of which cognizance cannot be taken by a Civil Court because of the provisions of section 134 (2) (d) of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 and the same is required to be referred to the Registrar under section 95 (1) thereof. We are accordingly quashing the impugned order passed by the Court below holding the same to be maintainable in Civil Court and we are directing rejection of the plaint. But we note that such a dispute, required to be referred to the Registrar, is to be so referred within two months from the date of the accural of cause of action as provided in section 95 (2) of the Act and it is obvious that such period has expired long before and it would not be possible for the Registrar to entertain the dispute, unless the time taken prosecuting the suit, giving rise to the revision is excluded. Whether the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act can apply ex proprio vigore to the reference of the dispute to the Registrar is a different matter. But as pointed by a Division Bench of this Court in Somenath Banerjee v. Vivek Salvi (92, Calcutta Weekly Notes 558), it is now settled law that the principles enacted in section 14 of the Limitation Act, being embodiment of principles justice and equity, are made applicable even to proceedings not expressly covered by the section, like appeals, even though the section specifically refers to suits and applications only. Since the Court below held the suit to be maintainable and rejected the application for the rejection of the plaint and it has now required a Special Bench to hold the same to be non-justiciable in Civil Court, we entertainno doubt that the plaintiff-opposite party should be held to have prosecuted the suit bona fide and with due diligence within the meaning of the provisions of section 14. We have determined the question of law referred to us; but since we must also see that justice is done to the unsuccessful plaintiff, we would like to make it clear that if the plaintiff-opposite party now proceeds to have the dispute referred to the Registrar, the period from the date when the suit was filed to the date of this judgment of ours, should be excluded by the Registrar in computing the period prescribed under section 95 (2) of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1983.

(25) We accordingly make the Rule absolute, set aside the impugned order of the Court below holding the suit to be maintainable and dismissing the application for rejection of the plaint and direct that the plaint shall stand rejected. In the circumstances, however, we propose to make no order as to costs. K. M. Ganguli, J. I agree. A. K. Nandi, J. I agree. Rule made absolute.