1. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record.

2. By means of two connected Writ petitions, being Special Civil Application No. 14679 of 2018 and Special Civil Application No. 15877 of 2018, the petitioners herein are raising a common issue with regard to the illegal action of the competent authority, National Highway Authority of India (NHAI), in passing a revised award dated 15.05.2015, modifying the compensation determined under the original awards dated 18.06.2013 / 30.10.2013 passed under Section 3G (1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (in short as 'the Act, 1956').

3. The categorical stand of the petitioners in the Writ petition is that there was no justification for modifying the award, inasmuch as, it is nobodies case that the original award dated 18.06.2013/30.10.2013 was a result of fraud, collusion or connivance with the land owners or any other person. Attention of the Court is invited to the judgment and order dated 24-31.01.2018 delivered in the bunch of Writ petitions, leading being Special Civil Application No. 6034 of 2015 wherein the legal issue arisen herein has been addressed by the Division Bench. The challenge therein was to the order dated 17.12.2014 passed by the competent authority, National Highways Act, 1956 in reviewing the earlier awards passed by the competent authority determining compensation payable to the land owners for the land acquired for expansion of National highway.

4. It was noted by the Division Bench that Section 3G of the Act' 1956 provides a detailed procedure for determination of the amount of the compensation to be paid for the land acquired. It also provides for the mechanism for raising dispute about any such determination. Sub-section (7) of Section 3G requires the competent authority as well as the arbitrator before whom any dispute may have been raised to take into consideration various factors while determining the market value of the land and other issues related to the determination of compensation to be paid for acquisition.

5. However, none of these provisions substantially or even by necessary implications clothe the competent authority with the power of substantive review. The power of review flowing from Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, applicable by virtue of Section 3-I of the Act' 1956 in the proceedings drawn by the competent authority under the Act' 1956 is conspicuously absent. It was opined that the competent authority does not have power of substantive review, inasmuch as, the statute does not invest him with any such power. No such power can be inferred by way of necessary implication. While saying so, it was held that the revised awards dated 17.12.2014 are liable to be set aside and the original awards dated 30.03.2013 are to be restored. Liberty was left with the respondent NHAI by saying that for any errors committed by the competent authority, the remedy lies in seeking reference before the arbitrator in terms sub- section (5) of Section 3G of the Act' 1956 and not by seeking review before the same authority.

6. Taking note of the above, we may record the stand of NHAI from the affidavit of respondent no.2 of the Project Director, Project Implementation Unit - Ahmedabad wherein it is sought to be stated that the challenge to the revised award dated 15.05.2015 (in the present case) is barred by law of limitation. The Writ petition is liable to be dismissed, accordingly.

7. On the issue of modification/review of the original awards, it is stated that subsequent to the publication of the notification dated 23.10.2012, the competent authority determined the compensation payable to the land holder of the acquired lands and published award under Section 3G of the Act on 18.06.2013. Thereafter, the NHAI, respondent no.2 wrote to the competent authority on 08.02.2014 pointing out a glaring error in the manner of computing the amount of compensation payable for the acquired land. It was informed that in some cases, the market value fixed for constructed land has been offered for open land and, therefore, the competent authority was called upon to suitably correct the award. The further submission is that the competent authority while amending the award and before passing the revised award dated 15.05.2015, had followed the principles of natural justice by issuing notice dated 15.10.2014 to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause as to why the award be not suitably corrected. Personal hearing was granted to the petitioner on 10.11.2014. After hearing the petitioner and the respondent NHAI, on consideration of the material on record, the competent authority corrected the award dated 18.06.2013 and passed a fresh award on 15.05.2015.

8. It is stated that the present petitioner ought to have initiated arbitration proceedings as envisaged under section 3G(5), if they are aggrieved by the amount of compensation awarded to them under the revised award dated 15.05.2015. In another affidavit 07.08.2019, filed by the Project Director, Project Implementation Unit- Ahmedabad on behalf of the NHAI - respondent no.2, it is sought to be submitted that the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 6034 of 2015 and connected matters is not a judgment in rem. In various paragraphs of the said affidavit, the deponent made an effort to defend the revised award dated 17.12.2014 which had already been set aside vide judgment and order dated 24-31.01.2018.

9. It is further sought to be stated therein that the competent authority did not pass a common award, awarding corrected amount of compensation, but individual orders have been passed in respect of each land owner, correcting the amount of compensation awarded to them on the basis of facts of each case. Some of the land owners filed separate writ petitions challenging the individual orders correcting the compensation payable to them by the competent authority and the decision for quashing of the award dated 17.12.2014 is not pertaining to a common corrected award.

10. The Division Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 6034 of 2015 and allied matters did not declare any provision of law to be unconstitutional or bad in law. By quoting various observations of the Division Bench judgment in the aforesaid Writ petitions, it is sought to be submitted that the decision setting aside the impugned order was specific and individual to the petitioner of each Writ petition.

11. Be that as it may, on a query made by the Court, Mr.Maulik Nanavati, learned advocate for the NHAI and Mr.Dhawan Jayswal, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State respondents could not place any statutory provision under the National Highways Act, 1956, which would empower the competent authority declaring the award under Section 3G(1) to make any changes, amend or revise the award once declared by it. In our considered opinion, with the declaration of the award, the competent authority become functus officio and left with no power or authority to make any changes in the award on the premise that the computation of the market value with respect to the land covered under the award was wrong. For any dispute pertaining to the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) of Section 3G, if the same was not acceptable to the NHAI, the remedy was to move an application invoking the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 3H for re-determination of compensation by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government.

12. The statutory remedy available to the National Highway Authority in the shape of raising a dispute before the arbitrator has not been availed. It is trite in law that review is a creature of statute. The administrative or the judicial authority while exercising quasi-judicial or judicial powers do not vest with the power of review of their own orders, unless and until such power is provided under the statute itself. The competent authority making award under Section 3G(1) is a statutory authority, which is conferred with the power of making award by virtue of the National Highways Act, 1956. In the entire Act, there is no provision vesting with the power of review to the competent authority. Insofar as the provision of Section 3-I where limited powers of a civil court has been conferred with the competent authority while making an award, power of review of its own award has not been included.

13. For the aforesaid, we do not find any good ground to take a different view from that what has been taken by the Division Bench in the judgment and order dated 24- 31.01.2018 in Special Civil Application No.6034 of 2015, while quashing the revised award dated 17.12.2014 and restoring the original award dated 30.03.2013 stating that the power of review cannot be inferred from any of the provisions within the statute, i.e. National Highways Act, 1956.

14. Before parting, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Naresh Kumar v. State [(2019) 9 SCC 416],

"13. It is settled law that the power of review can be exercised only when the statute provides for the same. In the absence of any such provision in the statute concerned, such power of review cannot be exercised by the authority concerned. This Court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania [Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 808] , has held as under: (SCC pp. 445- 46, paras 12-14)

“… 12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/ quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457] and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh [Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641] .)

13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji [Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844] , Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan [Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 321] , Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, (1987) 4 SCC 525 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 491] , State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records & Settlement [State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records & Settlement, (1998) 7 SCC 162] and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain [Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain, (2008) 2 SCC 705 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 537] this Court held that the power to [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.] review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.] and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction.

14. Therefore, in view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that in the absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible.”

15. In view of the above discussion, while setting aside the revised awards dated 15.05.2015 and 17.12.2014, both the Writ petitions are hereby allowed. The original awards dated 30.10.2013 and 30.03.2013 are restored. The acquiring body, i.e. National Highways Authority is further directed to deposit the entire amount of compensation determined under the original award as early as possible. The respondent authorities are directed to disburse compensation to the land holders under the original awards on the applications made by them, after due verification.

Civil Application for amendment is accordingly, disposed of.