Sheel Nagu, J. - Inherent powers of this court u/S. 482 CrPC are invoked seeking quashment of FIR dated 13/2/19 bearing crime No. 171/19 registered at Police Station Kotwali District Morena alleging offences punishable u/S. 406 of IPC.

2. The sole ground raised in support of the aforesaid challenge is that or the incident giving rise to the impugned FIR, the same prosecutrix Smt. Nirma Devi/respondent No.2 herein has already lodged FIR dated 8/11/16 bearing crime No. 331/16 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana District Agra alleging offences punishable u/Ss. 498A, 323, 406, 506 of IPC and 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act inter alia against the same petitioner.

3. Admittedly the only difference between the two FIRs is that in the earlier one vide P/2 dated 8/11/16 offences punishable u/Ss. 498A, 323, 506 of IPC and 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act apart from Section 406 IPC are alleged whereas in the impugned subsequent FIR vide P/1 dated 13/2/19 the sole offence alleged is punishable u/S. 406 of IPC. More so, in the earlier FIR vide P/2 besides the petitioner (bother-in-law Jeth of prosecutrix) allegation is also against three other co-accused (Sumit (husband of prosecutrix), Jagdish Singh (father-in-law of prosecutrix) and Smt. Sangeeta (mother-in-law of prosecutrix)) who are also main accused.

4. Thus the challenge to Annexure P/1 FIR dated 13/2/19 by the sole petitioner/accused is on the ground of double jeopardy by invoking provision of Article 21 (2) of the Constitution of India.

4.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision of Apex Court in T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala, (2001) AIR SC 2637 Para 20 to contend that there can be no second FIR and consequently no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.

4.2 On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision of Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin, (2018) 5 SCC 718 to remind this court about limitation of inherent powers u/S. 482 CrPC.

5. Admittedly chargesheet pursuant to the impugned FIR has not yet been filed although it is informed by learned counsel for the rival parties that statements u/S. 161 CrPC pursuant to the impugned FIR have since been recorded. It is further informed by learned counsel for rival parties that earlier FIR vide P/2 dated 8/11/16 registered at Agra has been stayed by the Allahabad High Court (no document in that regard is on record). It is also not disputed at the Bar that Sumit Singh (husband of prosecutrix) has filed divorce petition u/S. 13 (1) of Hindu Marriage Act against the prosecutrix which is pending adjudication before the Family Court Morena.

6. The sole ground raised while attacking the impugned FIR vide P/1 dated 13/2/19 is that of double jeopardy which is manifested in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India and in Section 300 of CrPC. Both these provisions are reproduced below for ready reference and convenience:-

Article 20 (2) of the Constitution

20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences :- (1) xxxx

(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.

(3) xxxxx

Section 300 CrPC

300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.

(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub- section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub- section (2) thereof.

(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub- section (1) of section 220.

(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such lastmentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted.

(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.

(5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first- mentioned Court is subordinate.

(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 , (10 of 1897 ) or of section 188 of this Code.

Explanation.- The dismissal of a complaint, or the discharge of the accused, is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section.

7. The constitutional protection provided to a person under Article 20(2) of the Constitution is against repeat prosecution and punishment for the same offence. Similarly, the statutory protection u/S. 300 CrPC also prescribes immunity from trial of offence for which conviction or acquittal has already taken place and continues to subsist.

8. The conditions precedent for application of clause 2 of Article 20 have given in the Shorter Constitution of India by Durga Das Basu are as follows:-

(a) There must have been previous proceeding before a Court of law or a judicial tribunal, (Maqbool Hussain Vs. State of Bombay, (1953) AIR SC 325 and Thomas Dana Vs. State of Punjab, (1959) AIR SC 375) of competent jurisdiction. (Asstt. Collector of Customs, Bombay Vs. Malwani, (1970) AIR SC 962)

(b) The person must have been prosecuted in the previous proceeding. (Maqbool Hussain Vs. State of Bombay, (1953) AIR SC 325 and Thomas Dana Vs. State of Punjab, (1959) AIR SC 375)

(c) The conviction (or acquittal) (Asstt. Collector of Customs, Bombay Vs. Malwani, (1970) AIR SC 962) in the previous proceeding must be in force at the time of the second trial. (Asstt. Collector of Customs, Bombay Vs. Malwani, (1970) AIR SC 962)

(d) The offence which is the subject-matter of the second proceeding must be the same (State of Bombay Vs. Apte, (1961) AIR SC 578 and Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1965) AIR SC 682) as that of the first proceeding, for which he was prosecuted and punished.

(e) The offence must be an offence as defined in section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, (Collector of Customs Vs. Calcutta Motor & Cycle Co, (1958) AIR Calcutta 682) that is to say, an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.(Maqbool Hussain Vs. State of Bombay, (1953) AIR SC 325 and Thomas Dana Vs. State of Punjab, (1959) AIR SC 375). It follows that the prosecution must be valid and not null and void (Baijnath Prasad Tripathi Vs. State of Bhopal, (1957) AIR SC 494) or abortive. (Safi Mohammad Vs. State of W.B, (1966) AIR SC 69)

(f) The subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding where he is, for the second time, sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence. Hence, the clause has no application where the subsequent proceeding is a mere continuation of the previous proceeding, e.g., in the case of an appeal against acquittal, (Kalawati (Smt.) Vs. State of H.P, (1953) AIR SC 131), or against conviction. (State of Maharashtra Vs. Shriram, (1980) CriLJ 13 ( para 10) Bom.) Nor does it bar a retrial, on appeal, with a direction to reframe the charges, provided the retrial is confined to the same offence or offences for which he had been tried at the original trial. (State of Maharashtra Vs. Shriram, (1980) CriLJ 13 ( para 10) Bom.)

9. Thus the protective umbrella extended by the Constitution and as well as the Code is against repeat prosecution/trial and punishment but not against investigation.

10. The expression "prosecuted" found in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and the expression "tried" found in section 300(1) of CrPC pertain to prosecution by the court of competent criminal jurisdiction which relates to proceedings arising on and from filing of chargesheet u/S. 173(2) of CrPC. This necessarily implies that protection by the Constitution and as well as the Code against double jeopardy is not available during the process of investigation which commences from the lodging of FIR till before filing of chargesheet u/S. 173(2) of CrPC. This aspect has been succinctly explained by the Apex Court in one of its earliest decision rendered while interpreting Article 20 (2) of the Constitution in Para 12 of Maqbool Hussain Vs. State of Bombay, (1953) AIR SC 325, which is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience:-

"12. The words" before a court of law or judicial tribunal" are not to be found in article 20(2). But if regard be had to the whole background indicated above it is clear that in order that the protection of article 20(2) be invoked by a citizen there must have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence before a court of law or a tribunal,required by law to decide the matters in con- troversy judicially on evidence on oath which it must be authorised by law to administer and not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or ail administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute but not required to proceed on legal evidence given on oath. The very wording of article 20 and the words used therein:" convicted commission of the act charged as an offence", "be subjected to a penalty ", " commission of the offence ", " prosecuted and punished ", " accused of any offence ", would indicate, that the proceedings therein contemplated are of the nature of criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure."

11. The expression "prosecution" found in Article 20(2) of Constitution is neither defined in the Constitution, nor in the Code. Thus taking assistance of dictionary meaning of the expression would be appropriate. Some of the leading dictionaries define the expression "prosecution" thus:-

"In Oxford English Dictionary

Prosecution. The prosecuting of someone in respect of a criminal charge. (the prosecution) [treated as sing. or pl.] the party prosecuting someone in a lawsuit. 2 the continuation of a course of action with a view of its completion.

In Chambers 21st Century Dictionary

Prosecution 1. the act of prosecuting or process of being prosecuted. 2. the bringing of a criminal action against someone. 3 a the prosecuting party in a criminal case; b the lawyers involved in this. 4. formal the process of carrying something out.

In Collins English Language Dictionary

Prosecution 1. Prosecution is the action of charging someone with a crime and putting them on trial. 2. The lawyers who try to prove that a person on trial is guilty are called the prosecution.

In Legal Glossary, 2015 published by the Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice

Prosecution 1. the institution and carrying on of the legal proceedings against a person. 2. the party by whom criminal proceedings are instituted or conducted. 3. the act of prosecuting in any sense. 4. in relation to a course of study."

12. Testing the factual matrix attending the instant case on the anvil of aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions and discussion (supra), it is evident that petitioner seeks protection against impugned investigation. Moreso the alleged previous prosecution in shape of FIR lodged in Agra District has not matured into a prosecution in its real sense as explained above and further that there is no earlier conviction or acquittal or punishment and therefore the question of invoking the principle of double jeopardy does not arise.

13. Accordingly, since no protection against investigation is available either under Article 20(2) of the Constitution or u/S. 300 CrPC, this court can be of no assistance to the petitioner in the present case which is accordingly dismissed sans cost.