1. By way of filing the instant criminal revision petition, petitioner haS challenged the order dated 13.12.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Hanumangarh in Sessions Case No. 37/2017 whereby the leaned Judge has ordered to frame charges for the offences under Sections 304, 279 & 337 of the IPC against the petitioner.

2. Bereft of elaborate details, the necessary facts for the disposal of the case are that on 16.05.2017 at about 4:55 p.m. Surendra Kumar filed a written report to SHO, P.S. Hanumangarh Town alleging inter alia that at about 7:00-8:00 p.m. when he, Jenaram and Rajkumar were going from National Highway to Ramdev Temple then a Swift Desire Car bearing registration No. PB60A-6713, which was driven by Aman rashly and negligently hit Rajkumar and Jenaram and he was on the other side resulting which Jenaram fell down on road and Rajkumar stuck down on the bonnet of the car was dragged by the driver for almost one and half kilometers away whereafter near the Uttam Palace, his body was taken out under the car resulting which his leg was cut and he succumbed to the injuries. Jena Ram complained that he was having pain on his right shoulder and some bruises were found on his left thigh. Upon the said complaint, the said FIR has been registered for the offences under Section 304, 279 & 337 of the IPC. After investigation, offence was found proved against the petitioner and charge sheet was filed in the Court concerned. Hence this revision petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Court below has erred in passing the order impugned and the charge under Section 304 IPC has wrongly been framed against the petitioner as before the incident they were unknown to each other and there was no previous animosity between the petitioner and the deceased Rajkumar. He further states that as per medical report, petitioner was not found drunk at the time of alleged incident and the accident took place due to error of judgment; he did not have any knowledge that Rajkumar was stuck under the car and thus, his case would fall under Section 304-A of the IPC instead of under Section 304 IPC. Lastly, it is prayed that order framing charges against the petitioner to the extent of the offence under Section 304 IPC may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and supported the order impugned.

5. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor for the State. Perused the order impugned and the relevant material available on record.

6. A perusal of the record revealing that at the relevant point of time, the vehicle was being driven by the petitioner at high speed in a rash and negligent manner. The fact that the victim was a pedestrian and hit by the car whereafter his body stuck to the vehicle but the vehicle was not stopped then and there, on the contrary, the petitioner continued to drive the vehicle by dragging the victim under his car and he was dragged around one kilometer. Any person of common prudence should have knowledge that driving a person under a running car for one kilometer and more, may likely cause his death. Knowledge is a thing which is to be inferred from the circumstances. It cannot be denied at this stage that had the vehicle been stopped at once after hitting the victim, he could have survived. At the same time, it can also be inferred that dragging his body alongwith the car for one kilometer would be more prone to cause a death.

7. Learned trial Judge has aptly appreciated the legal and factual aspects of the matter and due opportunity was afforded to the parties; their submissions were noted and discussed thoroughly and then he passed a reasoned and speaking order regarding framing of charges. Prima facie, an opinion can be formed that there are reasonable grounds for presuming that the accused-petitioner has committed the offences. It is nigh well settled that at the time of hearing on the point of charge, the Court is not required to go deep into the merits of the case. Neither meticulous examination of the evidence is required to be done nor threadbare discussion of the matter is warranted. At the stage of framing of the charges, whether or not a prima facie case is made out has to be seen and at the same time, the defence of the accused is not required to be considered.

8. In a recent judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap (Criminal Appeal No. 407/2021 arising out of the SLP No. 3194/2021 decided on 13.04.2021), the law relating to scope of interference in an order framing charge has been discussed and this Court is aptly guided by the enunciation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant paragraph of the afore-mentioned judgment is reproduced as under:

"11. Having considered the reasoning given by the High Court and the grounds which are weighed with the High Court while discharging the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and has acted beyond the scope of Section 227/239 Cr.P.C. While discharging the accused, the High Court has gone into the merits of the case and has considered whether on the basis of the material on record, the accused is likely to be convicted or not. For the aforesaid, the High Court has considered in detail the transcript of the conversation between the complainant and the accused which exercise at this stage to consider the discharge application and/or framing of the charge is not permissible at all. As rightly observed and held by the learned Special Judge at the stage of framing of the charge, it has to be seen whether or not a prima facie case is made out and the defence of the accused is not to be considered."

9. This Court is further aptly guided by the enunciation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Alister Anthony Pareira (Supra). The relevant paragraph of the afore-mentioned judgment is reproduced as under:

"24. On the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the appellant and the counsel for the respondent, the following questions arise for our consideration :

(i) Whether indictment on the two charges, namely, the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC and the offence punishable under Section 338 IPC is mutually destructive and legally impermissible In other words, whether it is permissible to try and convict a person for the offence punishable under Section 304Part II IPC and the offence punishable under Section 338 IPC for a single act of the same transaction

(ii) Whether by not charging the appellant of `drunken condition' and not putting to him the entire incriminating evidence let in by the prosecution, particularly the evidence relating to appellant's drunken condition, at the time of his examination under Section 313 of the Code, the trial and conviction of the appellant got affected

(iii) Whether prosecution evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the offences by the appellant under Section 304 Part II,IPC Section 338 IPC and Section 337 IPC

(iv) Whether sentence awarded to the appellant by the High Court for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC requires any modification

re: question (I)

25. Section 304 IPC provides for punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It reads as under:

"S.304.-Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder-Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death".

26. The above Section is in two parts. Although Section does not specify Part I and Part II but for the sake of convenience, the investigators, the prosecutors, the lawyers, the judges and the authors refer to the first paragraph of the Section as Part I while the second paragraph is referred to as Part II. The constituent elements of Part I and Part II are different and, consequently, the difference in punishment. For punishment under Section 304 Part I, the prosecution must prove: the death of the person in question; that such death was caused by the act of the accused and that the accused intended by such act to cause death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. As regards punishment for Section 304 Part II, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question; that such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his was likely to cause death. In order to find out that an offence is `culpable homicide not amounting to murder'-since Section 304 does not define this expression-Sections 299 and 300 IPC have to be seen.

Section 299 IPC reads as under:

"S.-299.-Culpable homicide.--Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide."

27. To constitute the offence of culpable homicide as defined in Section 299 the death must be caused by doing an act:

(a) with the intention of causing death, or

(b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or

(c) with the knowledge that the doer is likely by such act to cause death.

28. Section 300 deals with murder and also provides for exceptions. The culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done: (1) with the intention of causing death, (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or (3) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or (4) with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. The exceptions provide that the culpable homicide will not be murder if that act is done with the intention or knowledge in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified therein. In other words, the culpable homicide is not murder if the act by which death is caused is done in extenuating circumstances and such act is covered by one of the five exceptions set out in the later part of Section 300.

29. It is not necessary in the present matter to analyse Section 299 and Section 300 in detail. Suffice it to say that the last clause of Section 299 and clause `fourthly' of Section 300 are based on the knowledge of the likely or probable consequences of the act and do not connote any intention at all.

30. Reference to few other provisions of IPC in this regard is also necessary. Section 279 makes rash driving or riding on a public way so as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person an offence and provides for punishment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/-, or with both.

31. Causing death by negligence is an offence under Section 304A. It reads :

"S.304A.-Causing death by negligence.--Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."

32. Section 336 IPC says that whoever does any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 250/-, or with both.

33. Section 337 IPC reads as follows :

"S. 337.-Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others.--Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."

34. Section 338 IPC is as under :

"S. 338.-Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others.

--Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."

35. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg13, Straight J., explained the meaning of criminal rashness and criminal negligence in the following words: criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury but without intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was 13 1881 (3) All 776 the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted.

36. The above meaning of criminal rashness and criminal negligence given by Straight J. has been adopted consistently by this Court.

37. Insofar as Section 304A IPC is concerned, it deals with death caused by doing any rash or negligent act where such death is caused neither intentionally nor with the knowledge that the act of the offender is likely to cause death. The applicability of Section 304A IPC is limited to rash or negligent acts which cause death but fall short of culpable homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. An essential element to attract Section 304A IPC is death caused due to rash or negligent act. The three things which are required to be proved for an offence under Section 304A are : (1) death of human being; (2) the accused caused the death and (3) the death was caused by the doing of a rash or negligent act, though it did not amount to culpable homicide of either description.

38. Like Section 304A, Sections 279, 336, 337 and 338 IPC are attracted for only the negligent or rash act.

39. The scheme of Sections 279, 304A, 336, 337 and 338 of the IPC leaves no manner of doubt that these offences are punished because of the inherent danger of the acts specified therein irrespective of knowledge or intention to produce the result and irrespective of the result. These sections make punishable the acts themselves which are likely to cause death or injury to human life. The question is whether indictment of an accused under Section 304 Part II and Section 338 IPC can co-exist in a case of single rash or negligent act. We think it can. We do not think that two charges are mutually destructive. If the act is done with the knowledge of the dangerous consequences which are likely to follow and if death is caused then not only that the punishment is for the act but also for the resulting homicide and a case may fall within Section 299 or Section 300 depending upon the mental state of the accused viz., as to whether the act was done with one kind of knowledge or the other or the intention. Knowledge is awareness on the part of the person concerned of the consequences of his act of omission or commission indicating his state of mind.

There may be knowledge of likely consequences without any intention. Criminal culpability is determined by referring to what a person with reasonable prudence would have known.

40. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character and the likely effect of the act and resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A person, doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of a risk that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, may be held guilty not only of the act but also of the result. As a matter of law-in view of the provisions of the IPC-the cases which fall within last clause of Section 299 but not within clause `fourthly' of Section 300 may cover the cases of rash or negligent act done with the knowledge of the likelihood of its dangerous consequences and may entail punishment under Section 304 Part II IPC. Section 304A IPC takes out of its ambit the cases of death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act amounting to culpable homicide of either description.

41. A person, responsible for a reckless or rash or negligent act that causes death which he had knowledge as a reasonable man that such act was dangerous enough to lead to some untoward thing and the death was likely to be caused, may be attributed with the knowledge of the consequence and may be fastened with culpability of homicide not amounting to murder and punishable under Section 304A Part II IPC.

42. There is no incongruity, if simultaneous with the offence under Section 304 Part II, a person who has done an act so rashly or negligently endangering human life or the personal safety of the others and causes grievous hurt to any person is tried for the offence under Section 338 IPC.

43. In view of the above, in our opinion there is no impediment in law for an offender being charged for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and also under Sections 337 and 338 IPC. The two charges under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 338 IPC can legally co-exist in a case of single rash or negligent act where a rash or negligent act is done with the knowledge of likelihood of its dangerous consequences.

44. By charging the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 338 IPC-which is legally permissible-no prejudice has been caused to him. The appellant was made fully aware of the charges against him and there is no failure of justice.

We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of Mr. U.U. Lalit that by charging the appellant for the offences under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 338 IPC for a rash or negligent act resulting in injuries to eight persons and at the same time committed with the knowledge resulting in death of seven persons, the appellant has been asked to face legally impermissible course.

45. In Prabhakaran Vs. State of Kerala14, this Court was concerned with the appeal filed by a convict who was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC. In that case, the bus driven by the convict ran over a boy aged 10 years. The prosecution case was that bus was being driven by the appellant therein at the enormous speed and although the passengers had cautioned the driver to stop as they had seen children crossing the road in a queue, the driver ran over the student on his head. It was alleged that the driver had real intention to cause death of persons to whom harm may be caused on the bus hitting them. He was charged with offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The Trial Court found that no 14 2007 (14) SCC 269 intention had been proved in the case but at the same time the accused acted with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death, and, therefore, convicted the accused of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304Part II IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/-with a default sentence of imprisonment for three years. The High Court dismissed the appeal and the matter reached this Court. While observing that Section 304A speaks of causing death by negligence and applies to rash and negligent acts and does not apply to cases where there is an intention to cause death or knowledge that the act will in all probability cause death and that Section 304A only applies to cases in which without any such intention or knowledge death is caused by a rash and negligent act, on the factual scenario of the case, it was held that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304A IPC and not Section 304 Part II IPC. Prabhakaran14 does not say in absolute terms that in no case of an automobile accident that results in death of a person due to rash and negligent act of the driver, the conviction can be maintained for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC even if such act (rash or negligent) was done with the knowledge that by such act of his, death was likely to be caused. Prabhakaran14 turned on its own facts. Each case obviously has to be decided on its own facts. In a case where negligence or rashness is the cause of death and nothing more, Section 304A may be attracted but where the rash or negligent act is preceded with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death, Section 304 Part II IPC may be attracted and if such a rash and negligent act is preceded by real intention on the part of the wrong doer to cause death, offence may be punishable under Section 302 IPC."

10. Considering the material available on record and following the dicta passed in State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap (Supra) and in the case of Alister Anthony Pareira (Supra), this court is of the firm opinion that there are reasonable grounds to presume that the petitioner has committed the offence alleged and for that, he deserve to be tried.

11. Accordingly, there is no force in the instant Criminal Revision Petition and the same is hereby dismissed.

12. The stay petition and all pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.