Wort, J.This is an application in revision against the order of the Munsif extending time to the plaintiff who had obtained a decree for specific performance to deposit money the consideration for the sale. It appears that in the first place the decree allowed one month for such deposit; but for reasons which it is unnecessary to mention, the time was extended by one week.
2. It is now contended on behalf of the defendant that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to extend the time and in so far as he had fixed the time by the decree he was functus officio. On the other hand it has been argued on behalf of the plaintiff that he had jurisdiction to do so u/s 148, Civil P.C., and in that connexion the case of Abu Muhammad Mian v. Mukut Pertap Narain [1916] 2 Pat. 400; is relied upon. That was a case in which there had been a decree for preemption and the learned Judges deciding that case came to the conclusion that that was a matter within Section 148 and that therefore the Judge had jurisdiction to extend the time.
3. Now two cases were relied upon by the learned Judges for that decision, one is Jai Kishun v. Bhola Nath [1892] 14 All. 529, and the other Jaggarnath Pande v. Jokhu Tewari [1896] 18 All. 223. However it was not brought to the attention of the learned Judge that the-decision to which I have referred of the Allahabad High Court was-subsequently considered in the case of Suranjan Singh v. Ram Bahal Lal [1913] 35 All. 582,and if in fact those decisions were not definitely overruled these authorities were very seriously questioned. In any event this must be said that although the learned Munsif has stated that he does, not see the distinction between a decree for preemption and a decree for specific performance, this much is to be noted that there is a special provision under Order 20, Rule 14 which enjoins the Court to fix the time for the payment of the money in a pre-emption decree. Order 20, Rule 14, Sub-clause (a), specifies a day on or before which the purchase money shall be so paid. Now it might well be argued that that is a matter within the expression for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code in Section 148 of the Code. There is no such provision relating to a decree for specific performance. It seems to me quite clear that when Section 148 speaks of an act prescribed or allowed by this Code that is referable to those matters which by the Code are ordered to be done within a certain time and in those matters u/s 148 the Court has discretion to extend the time, It seems to me that the plaintiffs contention in this connoxion is unfounded and the order of the learned Munsif was without jurisdiction.
4. But that does not end the matter. This is an application in revision and is therefore a matter of discretion. Now the facts are that the deed has been executed by the Court on behalf of the defendant. The defendant has paid his money and therefore apart from the payment of the money and handing over to the plaintiff of the deed, the transaction is complete, If seems to me in those circumstances if this Court is to interfere with that order although made without jurisdiction will be doing a grave injustice. In those circumstances the application in revision is dismissed without costs.