Wallis, J.

[1] This is a suit brought by the Plaintiff Mr. A.M. Ross to recover damages from the Secretary of State for India in Council in respect of two orders made by the Collector of Ganjam, by one of which a local agent working under the Assam Labour and Emigration Act 1901, was suspended and the depot maintained by him closed to recruiting, while on the other the local Agent was dismissed; and also for alleged defamation of the plaintiff by the Governor of Madras in Council in a Government order passed on the appeal of the plaintiff and other interested parties against the Collecter s order above referred to. Under Part IV of the aforesaid Act of 1901, as amended in 1908, recruiters known as Garden sirdars are sent by employers in Assam to recruit labourers in Ganjam and other places under a license issued by the authorities in Assam and countersigned by the authorities of the District in which the recruiting is to be carried on. They are under a statutory duty to provide a proper place of accommodation or depot for the recruited coolies and to get each cooly s labour contract executed before an appointed officer. Employers may also appoint local agents to supervise them.

[2] In the exercise of the powers conferred by Section 91 of the Act, as amended, the Government of Madras issued the Notification of 6th October 1909 relaxing or dispensing with the requirements of certain sections of the act in the case of Garden Sirdars working under the control of the Assam Labour Supply association and other bodies on certain specified conditions. One of the conditions required the Association to employ a local agent in each district where recruiting was carried on, for the purpose of representing the Association in all matters connected with the supervision of the Sirdars. Under condition 8 the local agent was to provide suitable accommodation (a depot) for the labourers engaged. Under condition 9 he was responsible for preventing to the best of his ability all acts of misconduct on the part of the Sirdars; and under condition 10 the license of any local agent, who might be found not to have exercised due care in preventing misconduct on the part of the Sirdars, was liable to be cancelled by the District Magistrate.

[3] On the 19th February, 1910 the District Magistrate of Ganjam issued notice to T.S. Rama Sastri, local agent of the Association in the District, calling on him to show cause why his license should not be suspended for habitually allowing illegal recruitment in the Agency tracts where recruitment was prohibited; and on the 21st February he passed the first of the orders complained of suspending the agent s license pending the passing of orders as to its cancellation. A copy was sent to the Sub-Collector and Police-Inspector, Berhampore, was were requested to see that the depot was closed to recruiting until further orders issued. By a subsequent order of the 25th July 1910, made upon the report of the Special Assistant Agent as the result of an enquiry-held by him, the District Magistrate cancelled the local agent s license.

[4] It was admitted before me that, if condition 10 giving the District Magistrate power to cancel the local agent s license for failure to exercise due supervision was valid, the legality of the dismissal could not be questioned in the present case; bat it was contended that the condition was ultra vires as Section 67 specified the cases in which the District Magistrate could dismiss local agents, and was exhaustive. I had no hesitation in overruling this contention, as it seemed to me that the condition was a necessary and a proper one to be made under Section 91 of the Act as amended. So much is left to the local agent under the notification, that it would not in my opinion be safe to make these relaxations without reserving to the District Magistrate power to dismiss a local agent who proves untrustworthy. I hold the order of dismissal was not open to objection.

[5] It is otherwise with the order of the 21st February, closing the depot to recruiting. That depot was available not only to the local agent as the place he was bound to provide under condition 8, but also to garden Sirdars as the place they were bound to provide under Section 62 of the Act when recruiting under the provisions of the Act without the benefit of the concessions. As correctly pointed out in the Government order containing the alleged defamation of the plaintiff, the concessions had not the effect of limiting the right of working under the Act or preventing employers for so doing, if they preferred to conform to the more arduous and exacting requirements of the regular procedure. It is, I think, clear that the District Magistrate s order of the 21st February closing the Berhampore depot to recruiting by garden Sirdars working under the Act was ultra vires.

[6] The legality of the other part of the order suspending the local agent pending the enquiry was also questioned at a late stage of the case on the ground that the power to dismiss under condition 10 did not include a power to suspend. The decision in Barton v. Taylor1 that a Colonial Legislative Assembly has -no power to suspend members as well as to expel, proceeded on the ground that suspension would deprive the constituency of its representation and does not appear to cover the present case. The plaintiff has also referred to an American decision in 3 Lawyer s Reports p. 854 which supports him and to Seshadri Aiyanjar v. Nataraja (1898) I.L.R. 21 M. 17

9. I am inclined to think that a statutory power of dismissal does not include a power of suspension; bat the plaintiff has failed to show that he incurred any additional damages by reason of the suspension and in the view I take of the case it is unnecessary to decide the point.

[7] Assuming the Collector s orders closing the depot to recruiting and suspending the local agent to be ultra vires, the next question is has the plaintiff any cause of action against any one The Local agent and the garden Sirdars were in the service of the Assam employers constituting the Assam Labour Supply Association and it was their business which was interrupted by the closing of the depot. The plaintiff who is the agent of the Association in the Districts of Ganjam, Godavari and Vizagapatam, held agreements and powers of aittorney from several persons and companies working in the Association; and though not filling any statutory capacity under the Act, represented the Association in these Districts, exercised a general supervision over their local agents and garden Sirdars, and corresponded on behalf of the Association with the local authorities in all matters relating to recruiting. For his services he was entitled under his agreements to be paid Rs. 7 a head for each labourer recruited and the plaint alleges that the closing of the depot which put a stop to all work of emigration interfered seriously with the Plaintiff s business, prevented him earning his commission during the period of the closure of the depot and caused heavy loss to him personally.

[8] The question then at once arises whether the plaintiff s claim for damages is not too remote. The general rule is stated in Mayne on Damages. "If A breaks his contract with B or inflicts some harm on B, the result may be most hurtful to C. But C cannot in general sue A" citing as to that the judgment of Lord Penzance in Simpson v. Thomson (1877) 3 A.C. 279 at p. 289; and the same rule is laid down in Dicey s Parties to an action. Rule 83 page 38

2. For the plaintiff reliance has been placed on National Phonogrph Co., Ltd. v. Edison Bell Consolidated Phonograph Co. (1908) 1 Ch. 385 in which it was held that, if by fraud, A induces B to break his contract with C and C sustains damage thereby he may sue A. In the present case it is not alleged that there has been any breach of contract with the plaintiff, and it does not appear to me that the present point arose or was considered in that case. That case therefore is no authority for the plaintiff but it is unnecessary to consider the point further as in my opinion the suit fails on another ground.

[9] Assuming that the action of the Collector was tortious the next question is, is the plaintiff entitled to recover unliquidated damages for such tort from the Secretary of State in Council under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1858 For the plaintiff reliance was placed on Secretary of State for India v. Hari Bhanji (1882) I.L.R. 5 M. 273 and Vijaraghava v. Secretary of State for India (1884) I.L.R. 7 M. 165, and Jehangir v. Secretary of State (1902) I.L.R. 27 B. 189 and on appeal Jehangir v. Secretary of State for India (1902) I.L.R. 27 B. 189, was also referred to. The Advocate General for the defendant relied mainly on the decision in Shivabhajan v. Secretary of State (1904) I.L.R. 28 B. 314, following Rogers v. Rajendra Dutt (1860) 8 M.I.A. 103 and Tobin v. Reg (1864) 33 L.J.C.P. 199 at 204 and also referred to Mc Inerny v. Secretary of State for India (1911) I.L.R. 385 C. 797 at 800, and Secretary of State for India v. Kasturi Reddi (1862) I.L.R. 26 M. 286 at p. 27

9. The important decision of the Privy Council in Moment v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1912) 17 C.W.N. 169 which has only just been reported, was also referred to by the plaintiff at the close of the argument. The fundamental position as stated by their Lordships in that case following the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock in P. & O. Co. v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1861) 5 Bom. H.C.R. App. 1 is that as regards liability to be sued, the Secretary of State is to be in no position different from that of the old East India Co. before the passing of the Government of India Act 1858. The plaintiff has therefore to prove that he would have had a cause of action against the East India Co. if the case had arisen before 1858. In the P. & O. case the plaintiff had been injured by the negligence, in the course of the employment of workmen employed by Government at the Government Dock Yard at Kidderpore. Stress was laid on the fact that the Government in India was obliged to engage in transactions partaking more of the character of private business than of affairs of State, such as this dockyard, the Bengal Marine Bullock Train River Steamers etc. "There is a great and clear distinction" it was said, "between acts done in the exercise of what are usually termed sovereign powers and acts done in the conduct of undertakings which might be carried on without having such powers delegated to them"; and at the close of the judgment at page 16 it was held that the workmen having been employed by Government and the act being of a private nature and not in the exercise of powers usually called sovereign powers or in the performance of an act of State, Government was liable for their negligence in the cource of their employment in the same way as any private employer in a similar case. That was all that was decided, but certain dicta in the judgment were subsequently interpreted by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nobin Chander Dey v. Secretary of State (1875) I.L.R. 1 C. 11 as asserting the immunity of the Company from suit in respect of all acts done in the exercise of sovereign powers whether the suit was based on contract or on tort thus conferring on the company a larger immunity than is enjoyed by the Crown in England. In Hari Bhanji v. The Secretary of State (1879) I.L.R. 4 M. 344, a suit to recover money alleged to have been illegally levied Innes J. refused to follow the Calcutta case but dismissed the suits on the merits, leaving each party to bear his own costs. Even so an appeal was preferred by the successful defendant on the ground that the Court ought to have declined jurisdiction as the act complained of was done, in the exercise of sovereign powers. This contention was overruled in a learned judgment distinguishing between the acts of State over which the court has no jurisdiction as regards which the agent is protected as well as the principal and acts such as these in that case and in this done under colour of Municipal Law--as to which the agent at any rate is always responsible. Hari Bhanji v. Secretary of State in Council (1882) I.L.R. 5 M. 273. The only question before the Appellate Court was one of jurisdiction and they decided nothing as to the grounds on which liability could be brought home to the company with success for acts done by public servants in India in cases within jurisdiction of the Courts, This question was however discussed by Innes J. at the trial. Hari Bhanji v. Secretary of State in Council (1879) I.L.R. 4 M. 344. In the first place the learned Judge drew the inference from the preamble to Bengal Regulation 3 of 1793 (which he set out) that the company had submitted questions such as arose in that case (the alleged illegal levy of salt duty) to the arbitrament of the court. In the 2nd place, he came to the conclusion that a Petition of Rights would lie against the Crown in England in a similar case and decided that the liability of the company for an act of this kind done in the alleged exercise of sovereign powers could not be less. The judgment therefore did not cover the present case, in which no money of the plaintiff has come into the hands of the Government and in which there could be no remedy against the Crown on a Petition of Right. Indeed at pp. 355, 356 referring to the case of Rogers v. Rajendra Dutt (1860) the learned Judge remarked that it might be authority for the position that the East India Co., or the Secretary of State would not be liable to be sued for the recovery of unliquidated damages for a wrong, which is the present case.

[10] It certainly seems a reasonable position that (as held by the learned judge) the liabilities of the East India Co. cannot have been any less than those of the Crown in England on a Petition of Right, which extend not only to detention of the land, chattels or money of the subject, but also as now settled, to breach of contract Thomas v. Reg. 4 St. Tr. N.S. 767. Whether the company enjoyed the same immunity as the Crown with regard to torts is of course; a very different matter. The P. & O. Co. v. The Secretary of State (1861) 5 Bom. H.C.R. App. 1 is authority for the position that it did not do so with regard to transactions which might have been carried on by a private individual. Whether it did so with regard to acts done in the exercise of the sovereign powers bat under colour of municipal law cannot perhaps be considered settled conclusively until their Lordships have had an opportunity of considering the case of Rogers v. Rajendra Dutt (1860) 8 M.I.A. 103 in which "The irresponsibility of the supreme power" for a tortious act committed under the orders of the Government of India by an officer in its service was assumed, and justified on the ground that the officer who does the act is himself liable; and it is unnecessary to recognise an immunity so extensive for the purposes of the present case. Two decisions of Irish Courts as to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland may be cited on one side and numerous English decisions as to Colonial Governors on the other.

[11] While the immunity of the Crown in respect of tortious acts committed by its servants has always been based on the legal maxim, the King can do no wrong, yet the Courts in particular cases where the act had neither been ordered nor ratified by the Crown have been careful to point out that there were less technical grounds on which such immunity could be justified, grounds which appear to be equally applicable to the East India Company. Thus in Canterbury v. Reg. 4 St. Tr. N.S. 767 where an ex-speaker of the House of Commons sought to recover damages for the loss of his furniture in the fire which destroyed the Houses of Parliament and was occasioned by the negligence of the servants of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests who were in charge of the building, Lord Lyndhnrst L.C. pointed out that the commissioners were public officers appointed to perform certain duties entrusted to them by the Legislature and that though they were appointed by the Crown they would not make the Crown responsible for their neglect or misconduct any more than high officers of state such as the Lord Chancellor or Postmaster General were responsible for the neglect or misconduct of subordinate officials appointed by them; and that, if the crown would not be responsible for the neglect or misconduct of the Commissioners themselves, it must be equally irresponsible in the case of their subordinates. And in Tobin v. Reg. (1862) 33 L.J.C.P. 199 at 204 in which it was sought to recover damages from the Crown for the action of the Captain of a ship of war in destroying a vessel supposed to be engaged in the slave trade, the second ground on which the immunity of the Crown was based was that the rule which makes masters or principals responsible for torts committed by their servants or agents in the course of their employment was inapplicable between the Crown and the Captain of a ship of war. In Story on Agency which has quite recently been treated as the highest authority and followed by the House of Lords in settling the vexed question whether the principal is responsible for wrongs committed by the agent in the course of his employment for his own benefit as well as for wrongs committed by him for the benefit of his principal Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co. (1912) A.C. 716, it is broadly laid down that Government do not come within the rule.

[12] Section 319: "it is plain that Government itself is not responsible for the misfeasances or wrongs or negligences or omissions of duty of the subordinate officers or agents engaged in the public service; for it does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of any of the officers or agents whom it employs; since would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments and difficulties and losses which would be subversive of the public interest." This passage is cited with approval in Vijaraghagva v. Secretary of State for India (1884) I.L.R. 7 M. 366. Similarly in a very recent case Mackenzie v. The Corporation of Childwich (1912) A.C. 107 L.T. 570 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee appear to have been of opinion that a local authority could be made responsible for the misconduct of a constable appointed by it, if at all, only on the ground that the1 appointment was not fitly or properly made.

[13] In Dhackjee Dadaji v. The East India Co. (1843) 2 Morley s Digest p. 307 decided by the Supreme Court of Bombay the Court held that an action of trespass for alleged trespass in breaking and entering the plaintiff s house and taking away a book under a warrant from the Govrenor of Bombay in Council would not lie against the East India Company, unless it was shown to have ordered or ratified the act complained of thus negativing the position that the Company could be made responsible like an ordinary principal merely on the ground that the act was done by the agent in the course of employment. The decision in the P & O Co. v. The Secretary of State for India (1861) 5 Bom. H.C.R. App. 1 which has already been examined only makes an exception in the case of undertakings of a private nature carried on by the Company and in no way affects the application of the principle to acts done by the servants of the Company in the exercise of the sovereign powers delegated to it.

[14] The plaintiff however relies on the decision of Kernan, Muthuswamy Aiyar and Hutchins JJ. in Vijiaraghava v. The Secretary of State (1884) I.L.R. 7 M. 466 that the Secretary of State in Council was liable in damages for the illegal action of the Govenor of Madras in removing the plaintiff from the Office of Municipal Councillor under the Towns Improvement Act III of 18

76. That decision does not proceed expressly on the ground that the company would have been liable like an ordinary employer for acts done by its servants in the course of its employment; and indeed this part of the case appears to have received very little consideration, Kernan J. merely refers to the case of Forrestor v. The Secretary of State for India (1872) Ind. App. Supp. 10 in which the defendant was held liable to pay the plaintiff the value of certain arms illegally seized by Government in India with interest at the rate of 12 per cent. The point argued in that case was whether a seizure was an act of state. If not, it was a seizure in respect of which a Petition of Right would lie against the Crown in England, and the liability of the Secretary of State in Council does not seem to have been disputed. That case does not seem to be any authority for holding the defendant liable in damages for the act of the Government of Madras in wrongly dismissing a Municipal Councillor from his office. The other learned judges forming the majority appear from their statements at pp. 478 and 486 to have proceeded on an admission made by the Advocate General who appeared for the defendant that "If the Government would have been answerable otherwise, Section 416 (now 79) of the Code of Civil Procedure would make the Secretary of state liable. Section 416 is as follows : "Suits by or against the Government shall be instituted by or against (as the case maybe) the Secretary of State for India in Council." It has since been decided in Raleigh v. Goschen (1898) 1 Ch. 73 that if a body such as the Governor in Council committed a tort, assuming of course that they were amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court, a suit would not lie against them in their official capacity but only as individuals. Such a suit could not be said to be a suit against Government. Further it could scarcely have been intended in an enactment as to procedure to effect a change in the substansive law and make the Secretary of State in Council liable where he was not liable before. However, if the Legislature had such an intention, it is now settled by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Moment v. The Secretary of State (1912) 17 C.W.N. 169 that an enactment adding to or taking away from the liability of the Secretary of State in Council to be sued as settled by the Government of India Act 1858, is ultra vires of the Indian Legislature, as opposed to the provisions of the Indian Council s Act 1861. It appears to me that the decision in Vijiaraghava v. Secretary of State (1883) I.L.R. 7 M. 166 is no longer of authority and in any case does not preclude me from holding on the authorities already cited that the company could not have been made liable for the tortious acts done by servants in India in the exercise of sovereign powers, which it had not ordered or ratified merely on the ground that they were done in the course of employment.

[15] If the company could not have been held liable for acts such as these on the ground that they were done by its servants in the coarse of their employment, the only other ground of liability I can think of is that the acts were ordered or ratified by it. In the present case the plaintiff relies on an alleged ratification of the orders complained of by the Governor in Council of Madras in G.O. No. 48 of 12th October 19

10. Only part of the order was communicated as to ascertain whether Government ratified the orders or not, as this question in no way turns on whether the ratification was communicated or not. Buron v. Denman (1848) 6 St. Tr. N.S. 525 S.C. 7 6 R.R. 554. It may I think be surmised that Government had been advised that the closing of the depot to recruiting under the Act as distinct from recruiting under the Notification was illegal, and they point out this mistake, though in an earlier part of the order they "consider the present necessities of the case have been met by the District Magistrate s action. On the whole, I think, the order is not expressed in sufficiently clear and unambiguous terms to amount to a ratification; but the point is immaterial, as it seems to me the Government of Madras had no authority from the Company, and have no authority from the Secretary of State now, whether to commit tortious acts themselves or to ratify them when committed by others. The authority of the Government of Madras is derived from the East India Company Act 1793 and the Government of India Act 1833, under which the whole Civil Government of the Presidency was vested and continues vested in the Governor and Councillors. In Dhackjee Dadajee v. The East India Co. (1843) 2 Morley Dig Sir Erskine Perry held that the only ratification which would bind the Company in such a matter was a ratification by the Court of Proprietors itself.

[16] For the foregoing reasons it seems to me that, as this is not a case in which a Petition of Right would lie against the crown and as the company would not have been liable for the acts of its servants merely on the ground that they were done in the course of employment and( as the acts complained of in this case have not been shown to have been ratified by the Secretary of State who has succeeded under Section 3 of the Government of India Act 1850 to the powers of the Directors and the Court of Proprietors this part of the plaintiff s case must fail.

[17] The decision may however be rested on narrower grounds. The orders of the District Magistrate suspending the local agent and closing the depot to recruiting would appear to have been passed by him as incidental to the statutory power, conferred upon him by the Act of 1901 as amended and the Notification made thereunder, to dismiss the local agent; and if this be so, it is well settled that in exercising such authority or in exceeding it he cannot be considered to have been the agent of the authority appointing him so as to render the latter liable. This was the first ground of decision in Tobin v. Reg (1864) 33 L.J.C.P. 199 at 240 already referred to, in which it was held that, independently of the doctrine that the King can do no wrong, the crown could not be made liable for the action of a Naval Captain purporting to act under the Slave Trade Act in seizing and destroying the plaintiff s vessel, as he was not acting in obedience to the command of Her Majesty but in the supposed performance of a duty imposed upon him by the Act of Parliament. In that case Brie C.J. observes:--"Then-as Captain Douglas would not have been an agent of the crown if he had lawfully seized and kept the vessel under the Statute still less ought he to be held such agent in seizing and destroying it illegally." Applying this principle it has been held in Shivabajan v. Secretary of State (1904) I.L.R. 28 B. 379 that the Secretary of State in Council could not be made liable for the negligence of a chief constable in regard to the custody of hay seized by him under statutory authority conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such cases even ratification would make no difference, because there can be no ratification unless the act is done on behalf of the principal in the 1st instance, Buron v. Dentnan (1848) 6 St. Tr. N.S. 525, and notes to Armory v. Delamirie (1721) 1 Stra. 505 1 Sm. L.C. Lord Coke says: By the common law he that recieveth a trespass and agreeth to a trespass after it is done is no trespasser, unless the trespass was done for his use or for his benefit, and then his agreement subsequent amounteth to a commandment, for in that case Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato aequiparatur.

[18] The plaintiff also seeks to recover damages in this suit for an alleged libel in the opening sentence of G.O. No. 948 Public, dated 12th October 1910 which was passed by Government on complaints made by the plaintiff himself and by two of the firms from whom he held powers of attorney namely Messrs. Williamson Major and Company Calcutta, and Messrs Balmer Lawrie and Company British India Tea Company, Calcutta, of the orders of the District Magistrate which are the subject of this suit. The alleged libel is contained in the first sentence of the order: Government see no reason to doubt that there had been illegal recruitment in the agency tracts of the Ganjam District by Sirdars working under the Assam Labour Supply Association and are of opinion that the conduct of Mr. Ross (the plaintiff) in that matter has not been wholly above suspicion." The order directs copies to be sent to the District Magistrate of Ganjam and the District Magistrate of Vizagapatam, and Godavari in whose districts Mr. Ross was working on the same lines, to Mr. Ross himself, and to the two firms already mentioned. This is the only application relied on. The defendant has not thought proper to plead justification but has elected to rely on his other defences.

[19] As to this, I am in the first place of opinion for reasons already stated that no suit lies against the defendant for a libel published by the Madras Government, at all events, unless it has been shown that publication was made under the orders of the Secretary of State, or on his behalf and afterwards ratified by him. A similar conclusion was arrived at by Chandavarkar J. in Jehangir v. Secretary of Stated (1903) 6 Bom. L.R. 131 to whom the case was referred on a difference of opinion between Batty and Jacob JJ. sitting on appeal from the judgment of Tyabji J. which is reported in Jehangir v. Secretary of State (1902) I.L.R. 27 B. 189.

[20] Even if the suit had been brought against the members of the Madras Government at the date of the order and this Court had jurisdiction to entertain such a suit it must still in my opinion have failed on the ground that the publication having been made by such Government in the execution of its duty and without exceeding it is absolutely privileged In Oliver v. Lord William Bentinck (1811) 3 Taun. 455 the plaintiff sued the defendant in the Court of Common Pleas at Westminister for publishing in the Gazette at Madras whilst Governor and the Commander-in-Chief in the Presidency, a notification that the Court of Directors had resolved to dismiss the plaintiff who was a military officer for gross violation of the trust reposed in him as Commander-in-Chief, of the Molucca Islands; and on demurrer all the court were of opinion that it would be a good defence to the suit that the publication was made by the defendant in the execution of his duty and considering that this had not been sufficiently pleaded they gave the defendant leave to amend.

[21] In Grant v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (1877) 2 C.P.D. 452 rove J. held that the defendant was not liable for the publication of a similar notification in the Gazette, apparently the Fort St. George Gazette at all events when the libel was not alleged to have been published maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. This qualification was inserted with reference to the dissenting judgment of Cockburn L.C.J. in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 255 but is not in accordance with the decision of the majority of the Court in that case or with the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal in Chatterton v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (1895) 2 Q.B. 189 explained in the case last mentioned; the defence of absolute privilege in this as in other cases is allowed in the public interest because it would be contrary to such interest to allow public officers to be sued for libel in respect of publications made in the course of their official duty on the mere allegation that the publication was malicious. Otherwise they would be obliged to defend all such actions for the purpose of rebutting the allegation of malice, however unfounded and would be hampered and embarrassed in the due discharge of their duties.

[22] Even if the occasion was not one of absolute privilege, it was certainly one of qualified privilege; and that being so and there being no evidence of malice of any kind on the part of Government in passing the order, a suit against them would fail on this ground also and must also fail against the present defendant. In the result the suit is dismissed with costs.